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Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON) is an Integrated Project 
supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme 
for Research, Priority 7 ‘Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based 
Society’. The five-year project has 21 partners in 13 European countries 
and New Zealand, and is coordinated by ARENA - Centre for 
European Studies at the University of Oslo.  
 
RECON takes heed of the challenges to democracy in Europe. It seeks 
to clarify whether democracy is possible under conditions of pluralism, 
diversity and complex multilevel governance. See more on the project 
at www.reconproject.eu. 
 
The present report is part of RECON’s work package 9 ‘Global 
Transnationalisation and Democratisation Compared’, and contains the 
proceedings of a workshop held at the University of Bremen on 23-24 
November 2007. The inter-disciplinary workshop ‘Transnational 
Standards of Social Protection: Contrasting European and International 
Governance’ was jointly organised by RECON and CRS 597, the 
Collaborative Research Centre on ‘Transformations of the State’ at the 
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1 See more on the CRC 597 at www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de. 
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Christian Joerges and Poul F. Kjaer 
University of Bremen and Goethe-University of Frankfurt am Main 
 
 
The present report contains the proceedings of the inter-disciplinary 
workshop ‘Transnational Standards of Social Protection: Contrasting 
European and International Governance’, which was jointly organised by 
RECON Work Package 9 and the CRS 597 A 1. Within the framework of 
the RECON project, Work Package 9 is devoted to the exploration and 
comparison of social regulation both within the EU, and within global 
structures such as the WTO. Within CRS 597, Project A 1 focuses on the 
tensions between international free trade and concerns for social regulation. 
The research agenda of WP 9 and A 1 have much in common and strong co-




The background for the common agenda of both research initiatives and the 
November workshop, in particular, is the intertwinement of European 
regulatory policies with global governance arrangements. The mutual impact 
of the two layers of governance is steadily increasing, and this development 
poses a dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, an “ideological convergence” 
can be observed, in the sense that stronger global governance can be 
understood as a way through which the EU can project its own raison d’être of 
increased integration to the wider world in order to realise the objective 
perpetual peace which Kant outlined more than two centuries ago, on a 
global, rather than on a European, scale. Traditionally, the EU has been 
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strongly in favour of strengthening both the scope and the impact of global 
governance structures. On the other hand, the design of the European project 
is being increasingly challenged by ever more assertive global structures. This 
is particularly the case in relation to the WTO regime, which is increasingly 
constraining the decisional autonomy of the EU with regard to both the 
appropriateness of its content and its external effects. Against this background, 
the project seeks to pin down the exact nature of the interaction between the 
two levels, and to clarify the differences and similarities in relation to the legal 
and regulatory philosophy which materialises within the two settings. 
 
Regulation should be understood here in both a “narrow” and a “broad” 
sense. The narrow understanding refers to the impact of EU and WTO 
economic regulation on classical labour market and social policies. The 
broader understanding comprises policies which seek to minimise the 
negative externalities of economic reproduction in a more general manner, 
for example, in the form of consumer, environmental and food safety 
policies. 
 
The first section of this report deals with the regulation of services in the EU 
and the WTO. Section Two focuses on labour standards, which are analysed 
from different angles in order to clarify the functions of the WTO and the 
ILO, multinational companies as well as other private actors within this 
specific field. In the final section, the perspectives of our discussion are 
widened. We are addressing here the legitimacy problématique of 
transnational governance, i.e. the theoretical core issue of our project, which 
will remain on our agenda in the years ahead. Since we seek to link 
theoretical deliberations to examplary practical problems, we have included 
an analysis of the regulatory problems of GMOs in that section. Nowhere is 
the need for theoretical orientation more obvious than in these debates. 
Equally  important for our research agenda, the GMO case demonstrates that 
even the EU cannot act fully autonomously but must take the next 




The workshop documented here represents, for the research agendas of both 
the RECON and the Transformations of the State projects, work in progress 
that is bound to lead towards a deeper understanding of the phenomena 
under scrutiny, and, in the long run, to a solid conceptualisation of 
transnational governance, which should reflect the state of the disciplinary art 
in both law and political science. It seems evident to us, after the experience 
Introduction 3
 
with this workshop and our collaboration in the editing of the workshop 
proceedings, that the next step should again become a joint enterprise. The 
profile of this event emerged in this process and is visualised by the photo of 
the young Károly (Karl) Polányi on the cover of our report. We became ever 
more aware of the renaissance of the author of “The Great Transformation”, 
which is accompanied by new intense research activities by sociologists, 
political economists and, occasionally, even by lawyers, who all underline the 
“emebddedness” of markets. Markets, this is the common core of these 
research activities, which are to be analysed as social institutions. This 
reference point lends itself to interdisciplinary efforts. Polanyi’s seminal book 
seems to have captured a crossroads of two seemingly contradictory 
developments. On the one hand, we observe an erosion of the nation state’s 
power, its regulatory capabilities and its role as the guarantor of social justice, 
in particular, through the increased mobility of capital and other 
“disembedding” processes. On the other hand, we also become increasingly 
aware of the interdependencies in the international system and the 
dependence of globalising markets on non-economic conditions. Polanyi 
taught us to pay particular attention to what he termed “fictitious commodity 
goods”, namely, Land (the environment), Labour and (sic!) Money. There are 
co-ordination problems, he asserted, that cannot be solved by markets 
operating on their own. This is why we are witnessing the emergence of a set 
of institutional arrangements which seek to manage these fictitious 
commodities. Polanyi did not analyse what we, today, call globalisation, and 
the selection of our key research fields was not inspired by his work. And yet, 
we believe that it is worthwhile to try to conceptualise the processes that we 
observe as (counter-)moves towards a re-embedding of globalising markets. 
This is the guiding question of the conference on “The Social Embeddedeness of 




Back to the present report! We would like to thank the contributors to this 
volume as well as all the other participants in the workshop. This report is the 
result of intense debates and mutual learning which we will seek to continue. 
We would like to thank Chris Engert for his patience with our use of his 
language and for his editorial assistance. 
 
Christian Joerges     Poul F. Kjaer 



















































Chapter  1 
The Multiple Understandings of Conflict 








The freedom to trade services is often perceived as putting pressure on the 
social protection of workers through three partly-related factors, namely, 
replacement, de-localisation and races to the bottom.1 EC internal market law 
on freedom of establishment and freedom to trade services and the WTO’s 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are faced with the difficult 
task of balancing the trade liberalisation objectives with the policies 
underlying labour law. This chapter shows that the conflict between trade in 
services and labour protection can be understood in multiple ways, depending 
on the function that is ascribed to trade liberalisation and labour law, 
respectively. Because of legitimate differences in understanding the conflict 
between trade and labour law, this contribution submits that trade 
liberalisation law must limit itself to giving some space to each of these 
understandings. In the EC, there has primarily been respect for regulatory 
rights and functions and, to a certain extent, for distributive functions, but less 
for the “autonomy-function” of labour law. In the GATS, the regulatory and 
rights-based function of labour law are respected, but neither the trade 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Markus Krajewski, Susanne Schmidt and the participants of the 
RECON workshop for their useful comments on an earlier version of this contribution. 
1 F. Hendrickx, ‘The Services Directive and Social Dumping: National Labour Law under 
Strain?’, at 5 et seq. Draft paper on file. 
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liberalisation nor the autonomy- and distributive function of labour law are 
sufficiently respected. 
 
2. Conflicts between trade in services and the social 
protection of workers 
2.1.The empirical effects of trade in services on labour 
protection 
According to one scenario, the freedom to trade services leads to replacement 
of high-wage national service providers with service providers from low-
wage countries that post their workforce to the high-wage country. Here, 
competition occurs between national service providers and their workforce 
on the one hand, and foreign service providers and their workforce on the 
other. In terms of trade theory, competition between service providers is 
perceived as being beneficial, while, in terms of social protection, there can 
be high costs if such competition leads to widespread unemployment, to 
national service providers who are employers being squeezed out of the 
market, and to a breakdown of international solidarity between workers. The 
latter concern could be seen to be reflected in the Laval case, in which 
Swedish workers organised a strike against a Latvian service provider who 
had won a tender to build schools in Sweden in order to compel it to sign a 
collective agreement for the protection of the posted workers.2 
 
A further consequence of this scenario could be the de-localisation of national 
service providers to low-wage countries, in order to allow the providers to 
remain competitive, even though they continue to provide services in their 
former home countries. Here, competition occurs between the domestic 
workforce on the one hand and the foreign workforce and service providers 
on the other. This scenario corresponds to the facts of the Viking case.3 A 
Finnish ferry operator sought to re-flag his vessels in Estonia in order to 
benefit from the lower wages there while continuing to operate routes from 
the Baltic states to Finland. The operator was running at a loss because of the 
competition from the Baltic ferry operators and therefore needed to re-
register his vessels to survive. The Finnish union threatened collective action 
                                                 
2 Judgment of the Court Case-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, Opinion of 
Advocate General Mengozzi, Case-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others. 
3 Judgment of the Court Case-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The 
Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Opinion of Advocate 
General Maduro, Case-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti. 
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in order to prevent the Finnish operator from re-registering and sought the 
support of other unionised workers through the London-based International 
Transport Workers Federation. 
 
In response to low-wage competition, national service providers may seek to 
reduce wages or weaken collective bargaining and the right to strike in their 
home countries. Here, the conflict is mainly an internal one between 
employees on the one hand, and workers on the other. The social costs 
associated with the race to the bottom in the home country relates to social 
cohesion and distributive justice in the sense that the lowering of wage levels 
and labour protection increases income gaps and alters the relative powers of 
both employers and workers. Whenever a country artificially lowers its 
labour standards in order to remain competitive or to attract foreign 
investment, it could also be considered to be engaging in unfair trade 
practices, although it is not clear what the appropriate standards for 
determining the existence of social dumping should be. 
 
The scenario described so far could equally pertain to the case of trade in 
goods. What makes the provision of trade in services so unique is that 
domestic employers sometimes do not need to re-locate at all in order to 
lower their labour costs and remain competitive. Sometimes, there is the 
possibility of replacing the local employed workforce with self-employed 
service providers from abroad. Here, the local workforce and self-employed 
service providers are in direct competition. Employers become consumers or 
recipients of services.4 They no longer face the other potential difficulties 
associated with re-location if they wish to reduce labour costs, and this may 
make the replacement of employed workers with self-employed service 
providers particularly attractive. The decision of a firm to re-locate its 
business abroad will generally be conditioned by a variety of factors, amongst 
which the cost of labour is just one. On balance, the lower labour costs 
abroad may not make re-location worthwhile if the legal and political 
environment is less stable, the energy supply is unreliable, the transport costs 
are higher, etc. However, where firms can turn to less expensive, foreign 
service providers in order to purchase services hitherto provided by salaried 
workers, they no longer need to re-locate abroad and may therefore replace 
local labour with foreign service providers more willingly. 
 
Naturally, the extent to which competition from foreign service providers 
exerts pressure on employment and on the social protection of workers differs 
between service sectors. Not all firms will equally be able to take advantage of 
                                                 
4 R. Nielsen, ‘The Services Directive, Rights of Recipients of Services and the Welfare 
State(s)’, draft paper on file. 
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lower labour costs by re-locating. SMEs, for instance, might face more 
hurdles in terms of language barriers, ignorance of applicable business 
regulations, etc., than large corporations. Furthermore, the extent to which 
employed labour can be replaced with self-employed service providers varies 
between sectors. Some sectors may combine the manufacture of goods with 
the provision of services (for example, after-sale services), while other sectors 
may not be sufficiently labour-intensive to make sub-contracting worthwhile. 
 
2.2. Interpreting the conflict between trade in services and 
labour protection 
Conflicts between the objectives of trade liberalisation in services and labour 
law can be understood through different interpretative lenses, which 
ultimately reflect different understandings regarding the very functions of 
trade in services and labour law, respectively. The regulatory, fundamental 
rights-based, distributive and “autonomy-function” of labour law may 
simultaneously be present in national labour laws and national labour 
constitutions may also differ with regard to the functional model of labour 
law they endorse. While many developing countries grapple with how to 
ensure the regulatory function of labour law, countries like Sweden place a 
particular emphasis on the “autonomy-function” of labour law. 
 
The conflict between trade liberalisation and labour law can be understood as 
a conflict between economic freedom and social regulation, as performed by 
labour law. From this point of view, the justification of labour law is 
functionalist - it corrects market failures that arise because the market, left to 
its own devices, will exploit the workforce and eventually erode an adequate 
supply of labour.5 It is, of course, difficult to draw the line between the 
necessary social regulation and economic freedom - what may, to one 
country, appear to be the necessary protection of workers, may appear to be 
unnecessary trade protectionism to another! Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
there are certain elements of labour protection, which are not only politically 
desirable but are also functionally indispensible in order to ensure an adequate 
supply of labour: definitions of maximum work hours, minimum rates of pay, 
minimum holiday entitlements, health and safety at work, payment in case of 
illness or maternity, etc. 
 
Certain aspects of labour law can also be perceived as basic rights, similar to 
other liberal rights, such as the freedom of religion and of speech. Labour law 
rights that typically fall into this category are the right to join trade unions 
                                                 
5 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2nd edition, 2001), at 71et seq. 
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and the right to take collective action. Here, the conflict between trade 
liberalisation and labour law becomes a clash of conflicting rights, i.e., the 
fundamental labour rights and the rights to free movement guaranteed by the 
EC Treaty. The judicial approach to such a conflict of rights requires that we 
first establish which right enjoys priority and then carry out a proportionality 
analysis. 
 
A different function than providing for basic rights is labour law’s distributive 
function. Here, labour law is mainly outcome-oriented, as in the 
functionalist-regulatory model. The protection objectives pursued by labour 
law here reflect notions of distributive justice, i.e., of what should be due to 
workers in exchange for their selling of their labour. What should be due to 
workers can go considerably beyond what is necessary for their subsistence 
and physical well-being. Collective agreements setting a wage-level for a 
particular service sector are a prominent way of affecting the gains of both 
business and workers, respectively. Profit-sharing schemes benefiting workers 
are another means. When the function of labour law is primarily defined in 
this way, the conflict between trade in services and labour law can be 
understood as one between economic freedom and distributive justice. 
However, it is also possible to view trade liberalisation as a means of effecting 
distributive justice between trading countries.6 Trade liberalisation would be 
the means whereby poorer, less developed countries could share in the wealth 
of more developed countries by being more competitive, particularly with 
regard to labour costs. According to this understanding, the conflict between 
the liberalisation of trade services and labour law is really about conflicting 
claims of distributive justice, i.e., about what should be due to the members 
of poorer countries and domestic workers, respectively. 
 
Finally, another function of labour law can be labelled the “autonomy-
function”. Its emphasis is on the respective powers of business and workers, 
and on the process through which decisions concerning the social protection 
of workers are reached, without necessarily being focused on the outcomes. 
The right to join trade unions, to take collective action, to form labour 
representations in firms and negotiate collective agreements, etc., can all be 
seen as expressions of the “autonomy-function” of labour law because they 
increase the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis their employers. 
 
How are EC internal market law and the GATS to react to these different 
interpretations of the conflict between trade in services and labour law? Is 
there one interpretation which would help us to decide how trade 
                                                 
6 For such an argument in the context of the WTO, see E.B. Kapstein, Economic Justice in an 
Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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liberalisation and labour law should be balanced? It is submitted that 
interpreting trade liberalisation law as a means to effect distributive justice is 
not very plausible. After all, EC internal market law and the GATS are 
neither concerned with the internal distribution of wealth in one state, nor 
with relative differences in wealth between citizens of different countries. It is 
more plausible to view competition between high- and low-wage 
jurisdictions as a quid-pro-quo that allows the latter, generally poorer countries, 
to share in the benefits of free trade without having to bear any adjustment 
costs. As a result, it will also be important for trade liberalisation to allow 
competition based upon labour costs in, at least, some instances. 
 
An EC-wide or global definition of the function of labour law is also absent. 
While the GATS does not recognise any labour rights explicitly, the 
Community at least recognised certain labour rights as fundamental rights.7 
However, nothing is said about how those rights should be exercised, and 
with good reason, since structural conditions such as the extent of 
unionisation and size of the transitory workforce differ between EC Member 
States and make the adoption of any one function of labour as a Community-
wide definition unsuitable. It therefore follows that EC internal market law 
must restrict itself to ensuring that the freedom to trade services and the 
various functional models of labour law can co-exist without any one being 
undermined. 
 
3. The interface between trade in services and labour 
law in EC law, the GATS and judicial decisions 
3.1. Balancing economic freedoms and rights against various 
functional definitions of labour law under EC law 
In EC law, the key provisions governing trade in services and the freedom of 
establishment and labour protection are Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty. 
According to Article 43, “restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be 
prohibited”. Article 49 provides that “restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of 
Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than 
that of the person for whom the services are intended”. To the extent that 
the application of labour law can be considered as a restriction, Member 
States need to be able to justify them. The ECJ has recognised overriding 
                                                 
7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal C 303, 14 
December 2007. See, also, Judgment of the Court in Laval un Partneri, cited note 2 above, at 
paras. 90-91. 
Conflict between Trade in Services and Labour Protection 13
?? 
reasons of public interest as justifying indistinctly applicable measures. The 
justificatory grounds of essential interests seem wide enough to accommodate 
diverse views about the function(s) of labour law. Moreover, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU8 recognises certain labour rights as 
fundamental. These include the right to conclude collective agreements, to 
take collective action, rights to protection against unfair dismissal, rights to 
limitations of maximum working hours, rights regarding rest periods and 
holidays and protection from dismissal in cases of maternity as well as rights to 
paid maternity leave and parental leave.9 Member States that already recognise 
these rights as fundamental can therefore now be sure that their view about 
the function of labour law will be protected by Community law. 
 
Another important instrument which governs the liberalisation of trade in 
services and establishment is the Services Directive. It contains references to 
fundamental rights and the right to negotiate collective agreements and to 
take collective action, which can be seen as a reflection of the “autonomy-
function” of labour law. It also contains references to employment and 
working conditions and the relationship between employers and workers, 
which can be interpreted as reflecting the regulatory function of labour law as 
well as the distributive and “autonomy-function” of labour law. As will 
become clear in the following paragraphs, there is some uncertainty as to how 
much the Services Directive respects these different functions of labour law, 
but it can, nevertheless, be concluded that it does not define a priori one 
appropriate function of labour law. 
 
The relationship of the Services Directive to matters of social protection and 
labour law more specifically is complex. The Directive provides - in Article 
1(6) - that it “does not affect labour law, that is any legal or contractual 
provision concerning employment conditions, working conditions, including 
health and safety at work and the relationship between employers and 
workers, which Member States apply in accordance with national law which 
respects Community law”.10 Article 1(7) goes on to provide that “[t]his 
Directive does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in 
the Member States and by Community law. Nor does it affect the right to 
negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take industrial 
action in accordance with national law and practices which respect 
Community law”.11 
                                                 
8 Official Journal C 303 of 14 December 2007. 
9 Articles 28, 30, 31(2), 32(2). 
10 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market, O.J. L 376/36, 27.12.2006, Art. 1(6). 
11 Services Directive, Art. 1(7). 
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It has been pointed out that the Directive’s use of the terms “shall not affect” 
is not tantamount to the wholesale exclusion of labour law from the 
Directive.12 The language differs notably from that used in Article 2, entitled 
“Scope”, which states that the Directive “does not apply” to a range of 
activities. This latter term clearly excludes certain activities from the scope of 
application of the Services Directive. It is also significant that Article 1 is 
entitled “Subject matter”, which could be considered as an operative 
specification of the recitals. 
 
In light of this, the weaker “does not affect” language can be interpreted as 
affirming that the Directive does not regulate labour law matters directly, but 
that they may well fall into the scope of the Directive, in as much as they 
pertain to services supplied by providers established in a Member State13 and 
are relevant to the establishment of general provisions facilitating the exercise 
of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services, while 
maintaining a high quality of services.14 
 
The term “does not affect” is even amenable to an interpretation that 
includes the application of a proportionality test in the sense that Member 
States retain the right to apply their labour laws and continue their industrial 
relations practices as overriding reasons relating to the public interest as long 
as they do not burden the freedom of establishment and service provision in 
an overbroad or unnecessary manner by going beyond what is necessary to 
achieve their objectives. It could be argued that such a proportionality test 
leaves the Member States’ rights to apply labour laws and collective action 
and bargaining practices both intact and unaffected because it merely verifies 
whether the interest in the application of local laws and practices is validly 
present. 
 
It also has to be noted that, according to Articles 1(6) and 1(7), Member 
States must continue to respect Community law in their application of labour 
laws and collective bargaining practices, and that these matters are not directly 
regulated by the Services Directive only to the extent that they conform with 
Community law. Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty are therefore fully 
applicable to labour law and collective bargaining practices which may 
constitute barriers to establishment and to trade in services, and it could be 
argued that proportionality tests are incorporated into the said Articles. 
 
                                                 
12 F. Hendrickx, cited above n. 1, at 12. 
13 Art. 2(1) 
14 Art. 1(1) 
Conflict between Trade in Services and Labour Protection 15
?? 
It next has to be considered whether Article 16(3) modifies the above 
argument in any way. Article 16 is entitled “Freedom to provide services” 
and Article 16(3) reads: 
 
The Member State to which the provider moves shall not be 
prevented from imposing requirements with regard to the provision of 
a service activity, where they are justified for reasons of public policy, 
public security, public health or the protection of the environment and 
in accordance with paragraph 1 [requires non-discrimination, 
justification for reasons of public policy, security, health or the 
protection of the environment and proportionality]. Nor shall that 
Member State be prevented from applying, in accordance with 
Community law, its rules on employment conditions, including those 
laid down in collective agreements. 
 
The concept of “employment conditions” in Article 16(3) is only one part of 
labour law, as specified in Article 1(6). In addition to “employment 
conditions” it mentions “working conditions […] and the relationship 
between employers and workers”. Article 16(3) also omits any reference to 
overriding reasons related to the public interest. Article 4 of the Service 
Directive defines these as: “reasons recognised as such in the case law of the 
Court of Justice, including the following grounds: […] the protection of 
consumers, recipients of services and workers…[and] social policy 
objectives”. 
 
The question thus becomes whether Article 16(3) in effect narrows down the 
subject matter exclusion of Article 1(6) to employment conditions and 
restricts the ability of Member States to regulate to the narrow grounds of 
Article 16 to the exclusion of grounds such as worker protection and social 
policy. Two additional considerations suggest that Article 16 might restrict 
the ability of Member States to introduce overriding requirements relating to 
the public interest: Article 18 makes it clear that the right of Member States 
to go beyond what it laid down in Article 16 applies only in exceptional 
circumstances and only in relation to the safety of services. Furthermore, the 
chapter of the Services Directive relating to establishment mentions 
overriding requirements related to the public interest. 
 
On the other hand, such an interpretation of Article 16(3) would deprive the 
references to working conditions and the relationship between employers and 
workers in Article 1(6) of legal effect, and contradict the text of Article 1(6), 
according to which the Services Directive does not affect these aspects of 
labour law. Furthermore, several pieces of Community legislation, including 
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the Posted Workers Directive take precedence over the Services Directive if 
there is a conflict, provided that the provisions of the Posted Workers 
Directive can be considered as governing specific aspects of access to, or 
exercise of, a service activity in specific sectors or for specific professions.15 
There may be an issue as to whether the Posted Workers Directive has the 
necessary specificity regarding service sectors or professions since it is in 
effect, a horizontal directive. As will be seen below, the Posted Workers 
Directive allows Member States to apply public policy provisions concerning 
the protection of workers where they do not conflict with equal treatment. 
Since this permission is in conflict with the omission of overriding 
requirements relating to the public interest from the Services Directive, it 
could be argued that the provisions of the Services Directive should take 
precedence. 
 
A further issue to consider is whether the Services Directive leaves it to 
Member States to define when their labour laws apply to an economic 
activity. If this were the case, they could still for the most part manage the 
conflict between the liberalisation of trade in services and establishment by 
defining an economic activity as one to which labour law, rather than the 
Services Directive, should be applicable. Clearly, this would give them 
considerable leeway to safeguard their appropriate functional definitions of 
the purpose of labour law. 
 
The Directive states that a service “means any self-employed economic 
activity, normally provided for remuneration, as referred to in Article 50 of 
the Treaty”. Article 50 states that “services shall be considered to be ‘services’ 
within the meaning of this Treaty where they are normally provided for 
remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to 
freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons”. Nielsen argues that 
Member States probably retain the right to determine when their labour laws 
should apply, as the subject matter provisions of the Services Directive state 
that the Directive does not affect labour law.16 However, she also points out 
that there is a Community definition of a worker in the Allonby case, which 
draws a line between self-employment and the status of a worker depending 
on whether independence is merely notional.17 
 
Upon close examination of Article 1(6) it has to be concluded that it does not 
confer the right on Member States to decide autonomously when their 
labour laws apply. The further specification in Article 1(6) provides a finite 
                                                 
15 Services Directive, Art. 3(1). 
16 R. Nielsen, cited n. 4, p. 12. 
17 Ibid. at p. 13. 
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definition of what labour laws comprises since it is preceded by the words 
”that is” and the following enumeration does not include the decision of 
when an economic relationship can be considered as employment. Coupled 
with the analysis above, which suggests that the exclusion of labour law 
matters from the scope of the Services Directive is rather limited, it has to be 
concluded that the Member State definition of what constitutes employment 
is not automatically controlling, and that Member States will therefore need 
to persuade the ECJ to accept their definition into a Community concept of 
what constitutes a worker, with the potential that the Community concept 
may not entirely reflect national definitions. 
 
3.2. Balancing economic freedoms and rights against various 
functional definitions of labour law under the GATS 
The GATS covers four distinct modes of supplying services. These include 
commercial presence, the cross-border provision of services, consumption 
abroad, and the presence of natural persons. The GATS provides a 
framework for the liberalisation of trade in services, but it also involves labour 
mobility through its ‘Mode 4’ of services provision.18 Mode 4 covers the 
supply of a service by a service supplier of one member of GATS, through 
the presence of natural persons of a member in the territory of any other 
member.19 The Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services 
under the Agreement forms an integral part of the GATS and makes it clear 
that the GATS does not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking 
access to the employment market of a member or employment on a 
permanent basis.20 In other words, labour laws - in as much as they pertain to 
permanent employment or to those seeking access to the employment market 
- are excluded from the scope of the GATS. The Annex further states that it 
applies to “measures affecting natural persons who are service suppliers of a 
Member, and natural persons of a Member who are employed by a service 
supplier of a Member, in respect of the supply of a service”.21 This leads to 
the conclusion that the GATS’ Mode 4 covers the provision of services by 
the self-employed as well as the posting of workers in the context of service 
provision. 
 
                                                 
18 T. Broude, ‘The WTO/GATS Mode 4, International Labour Migration Regimes and 
Global Justice’, International Law Forum of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law Faculty 
Research Paper No. 7-07, May 2007, passim. 
19 GATS, Art. I:2(d) 
20 GATS, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, 
para. 2., GATS Article XXIX. 
21 GATS, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, 
para. 1. 
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In the GATS, conflicts between the objectives related to the liberalisation of 
trade in services and labour laws are most likely to arise in the context of the 
cross-border provision of services, the establishment of a commercial 
presence, and the movement of natural persons. A country “importing” a 
service across its borders could, for instance, seek to apply its labour laws 
extra-territorially to the foreign service provider. Another example would be 
a country that allows the movement of natural persons in the context of 
service provision applying its labour laws to the persons temporarily present 
on its territory. 
 
The extent to which labour law, collective bargaining and other, related 
social protection issues come into conflict with the trade liberalisation 
objectives of the GATS depends first and foremost on the commitments that 
members actually make in respect of the cross-border provision of services, 
the establishment of a commercial presence, and the movement of natural 
persons. They retain the right to exclude liberalisation altogether, to establish 
quotas, or to restrict movement to certain types of workers. A member that 
either does not liberalise the service sector or grants market access only to 
those service providers applying its labour laws is therefore able to safeguard 
the regulatory capacity of its labour law and to protect its specific definition 
of its function. In addition to defining rights of market access, members also 
have the right not to grant any national treatment to foreign service providers 
or to limit the extent to which they grant them national treatment. Again, if a 
member does not grant national treatment or explicitly reserves a right to 
discriminate against foreign service providers by requiring them to apply 
domestic labour laws, it can safeguard its regulatory autonomy of the 
appropriate functions of labour law. 
 
However, where members have granted rights of market access and national 
treatment, but have not reserved a right to apply their labour law, the 
application of labour law may well be inconsistent with their commitments. 
The application of labour law will be inconsistent with market access 
commitments if it amounts to a quantitative restriction and is inconsistent 
with the national treatment obligation if it treats similar foreign services or 
service providers less favourably than domestic ones by modifying the 
competitive relationship between the two. Article XVII on national 
treatment provides that “[i]n sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to 
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures 
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own like services and service suppliers”.22 The Article goes on 
                                                 
22 GATS, Art. XVII:1. 
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to state that the national treatment obligation may be met by either according 
formally identical or by formally different treatment, provided that such 
treatment does not modify the conditions of competition in favour of the 
services or service suppliers of the member.23 Since labour costs are an 
important source of competitive advantage, the application of minimum 
wage laws, maximum work hours and minimum holidays may therefore be 
inconsistent with national treatment obligation since they raise the costs for 
foreign service providers. Similarly, requiring foreign service providers to 
negotiate a collective agreement with their workforce could raise their costs 
and be inconsistent with the national treatment obligation. 
 
Broude has queried whether the GATS national treatment provision would 
not, in fact, mandate extending the host member’s labour law, minimum 
wages and collective bargaining practices to the workers moving under Mode 
4 since not doing so could be considered discriminatory vis-à-vis the 
workers.24 
 
It is submitted that the national treatment obligation cannot be interpreted so 
as to require host states to apply their labour laws to workers moving under 
Mode 4. The first issue to consider is whether the workers themselves might 
be considered as service providers. The GATS defines a service supplier as 
“any person that supplies a service”.25 The definition of a service supplier 
could, therefore, potentially encompass workers employed in a home state 
and supplying services in a host state. However, WTO adjudication might 
also consider the definition of Mode 4 in an interpretative context, which 
distinguishes between the service supplier of the home member and the 
presence of natural persons in order to establish that the term “service 
supplier” cannot be extended to the workers who move to the host state in 
order to provide services. 
 
Regardless of whether the term “service supplier” is to be applied to salaried 
workers moving as natural persons, a national treatment violation would 
hinge on a modification of conditions of competition that adversely affects 
the foreign service supplier or service. Since lesser labour protection is more 
likely to confer a competitive advantage than a disadvantage, it can be 
concluded that the GATS does not require members to extend their labour 
law protection to foreign workers moving in the context of service provision. 
                                                 
23 GATS, Art. XVII:2, 3. 
24 T. Broude, ‘The WTO/GATS Mpde 4, International Labour Migration Regimes and 
Global Justice’, International Law Forum of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law Faculty 
Research Paper No. 7-07, May 2007. 
25 GATS, Art. XXVIII (g). 
20                                                                    Herwig 
By the same token, however, a national treatment violation exists, for 
instance, if the member applies different standards of labour protection to its 
own nationals employed as temporary workers than to foreign nationals using 
Mode 4, and this difference in treatment could somehow be shown to 
modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of the foreign 
employer supplying services because it makes translocation of the provision of 
services too unattractive. 
 
Once the application of the labour laws of the host state is provisionally 
found to be inconsistent with the market access and/or the national treatment 
obligation, the issue then becomes one of justification in terms of the general 
exceptions in Article XIV of the GATS and its chapeau. According to Article 
XIV(a) and (b), WTO members have the right to take measures that are 
necessary for the protection of public morals and human health, and to 
maintain public order. The public order exception requires a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. The public 
morals exception has been interpreted as refering to standards of right or 
wrong conduct. Since maximum work hours, annual holidays and maternity 
leave contribute to the health of the workforce, they might be capable of 
justification under Article XIV(b) GATS and the GATS thus recognises some 
of the social regulatory functions of labour law. The public morals and order 
exception could also be used to justify the application of certain, particularly 
fundamental, labour protection rights. While denial of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to strike or unionise would probably constitute a sufficiently 
serious threat to public order, the application of more favourable paid holiday 
legislation or of union wages of the host state might not, particularly if there 
is no real tradition of collective bargaining. It is thus questionable as to 
whether the GATS recognises the distributive and “autonomy-function” of 
labour law, if they are not constitutionally enshrined as a fundamental interest 
of society. 
 
A final issue to consider is whether members retain the autonomy to define 
whether an activity constitutes a service provision or employment, and hence 
falls outside the scope of the GATS. The more freedom of definition that 
WTO members enjoy in this respect, the greater their ability to safeguard 
their various functional understandings of labour law. A member could, for 
instance, argue that a natural person providing services in the capacity of a 
self-employed person has only nominal independence from the recipient of 
the service and that his or her status is that of a person seeking access to the 
employment market and/or of being, in effect, although not formally 
employed on a permanent basis in the host country. 
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Nowhere does the GATS define services. Panels or the Appellate Body 
would therefore be likely to rely on dictionary definitions, which stress the 
fact that services do not produce tangible commodities, in order to interpret 
the term ‘services’. The GATS also does not define when members seek 
access to the labour market or employment on a permanent basis in the host 
member, nor when workers can be considered to be employed in respect of 
the provision of a service. With regard to both definitions, panels and the 
Appellate Body will, again, have to seek guidance from dictionary definitions. 
It is submitted that the GATS definition of natural employed persons 
involved in the provision of services is likely to be a broad one which also 
covers ancillary and technical personnel. This question is not dealt with in the 
definitions and scope of the GATS, although Article XVI on market access 
prohibits non-listed “limitations on the total number of natural persons that 
may be employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may 
employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a 
specific service in the form of numerical quotas or the requirements of an 
economic needs test”.26 The exclusion of members’ labour laws from the 
scope of Article XVI could, therefore, hinge on vague standards of whether 
employees are necessary for and directly related to service provision and on 
the difficult delineation between trading/manufacturing goods and supplying 
services. 
 
In respect of the Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons, a similar issue 
is whether its scope of application is limited rationae materiae or rationae 
personae. A member could argue that Paragraph 1 restricts the scope of 
application to workers who are involved in the supply of the service to the 
exclusion of personnel partly or entirely involved in manufacturing or trade, 
and to where the firm manufactures or trades goods and provides services at 
the same time. A close reading of Paragraph 1 of the Annex on the 
Movement of Natural Persons suggests that it contains no limitation on the 
scope rationae personae since the term “in respect of the supply of a service” is 
separated by a comma from the preceding part, and thus does not refer to 
natural persons employed by a service supplier, but instead to “measures 
affecting natural persons” with the effect of further qualifying these measures 
rationae materiae. 
 
In the final analysis, WTO members that have made no commitments or 
have made appropriately limited commitments are able to pursue the 
functions of labour law as they see fit. The flipside of members’ autonomy 
concerning the inclusion of labour law matters is that the GATS may not be 
granting members that are interested in liberalising the movement of natural 
                                                 
26 GATS, Art. XVI: 2(d). 
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persons or the exploitation of the competitive advantage linked to lower costs 
in the context of cross-border service provision sufficient market access. Few 
members have allowed the cross-border movement of natural persons at all, 
and the few that have done so have restricted it to the category of intra-
corporate transfers at executive level and/or to the short-term entry of self-
employed service providers for the purpose of forming business relationships. 
When labour law carve-outs have been omitted from schedules of 
commitments, it has been shown that the GATS restricts members to labour 
law policies that pursue regulatory functions relating to the health of the 
workforce and to fundamental labour rights. Lastly, it can be concluded that 
the exemption of labour law matters from the scope of the GATS Mode 4 is 
limited. 
 
3.3. Limits on the functions of labour law arising from the 
interpretation of EC secondary legislation 
The ECJ has long recognised that “Community law does not preclude 
Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour 
agreements, entered into by both sides of industry to any person who is 
employed even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which 
country the employer is established”.27 By doing so, it has given considerable 
protection to national labour constitutions and to the different approaches to 
the function(s) of labour law. However, the problem with the Rush 
Portuguesa decision was both its over- and under-inclusiveness. On the one 
hand, member states could apply their legislation or collective agreements to 
posted workers and deprive service provision of much of its competitive 
advantage. It also enabled host member states not to take advantage of 
sufficient or similar protection offered by the home member state under 
functionally different models of labour law. On the other hand, the judgment 
in Rush Portuguesa failed to ensure the regulatory function of labour law since 
Member States could also choose not to apply their legislation to posted 
workers, thereby accepting the provision of services under lower or no 
standards of social protection. 
 
Indeed, the ECJ seems to have increasingly moved away from its broad 
statement in Rush Portuguesa to a closer examination of whether formally 
identical treatment in respect of labour protection requirements is, in effect, 
equal treatment, and towards a more qualified acceptance of worker 
protection as an overriding requirement relating to the public interest by 
                                                 
27 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa v Office National d’Immigration, [1990] ECR I-1321, para 
18.; see, also, Cases-62/81 and 63/81 Seco [1982] ECR-223. 
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examining whether the measure confers a genuine benefit and significantly 
adds to the social protection of workers and whether it is proportionate.28 
 
The standard of a genuine and significant contribution to the social 
protection of the worker constitutes a promising attempt to manage the 
conflicts between the freedom to trade services and the protection of posted 
workers if one uses a regulatory paradigm of labour law. If the Court finds 
that a measure does not add much to the protection of posted workers, it can 
promote the freedom to trade services without being seen as accepting 
differences in social protection between posted and regularly employed 
foreign workers. However, this may work less well when it comes to 
reconciling the differences between trade in services and the autonomy- or 
distributive function of labour law, as these are not focused on correcting 
market failures. They are instead focused on the process of collective 
decision-making about work related matters and relative deserts, i.e. what 
should be due to workers in exchange for their labour, respectively. 
 
The Posted Workee’s Directive attempts to solve the choice of law problems 
in the context of the posting of workers by requiring the host Member State 
to apply certain core employment protection measures to workers posted to 
their territory, where these are specifically laid down in law.29 For the 
building sector, these core protection measures may be contained in 
collective agreements, which have been declared to be universally 
applicable.30 The core protection measures include maximum work periods, 
minimum rest periods, minimum paid holidays, minimum rates of pay, 
including overtime rates, conditions for hiring-out workers, health, safety and 
hygiene at work, protection for pregnant workers, children and young 
people, and equality of treatment between men and women, as well as other 
provisions on non-discrimination.31 
 
The Directive also regulates the case where a Member State does not have a 
system for making collective agreements universally applicable.32 Where a 
Member State applies these other collective agreements in respect of workers 
posted to its territory, it must ensure equality of treatment between the 
undertaking making the posting as well as undertakings in a similar position, 
                                                 
28 B. Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at 171 [with 
further references]. 
29 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, O.J. L-18, 
211.1997, 1, Art. 3(1). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Art. 3(1). 
32 Art. 3(8). 
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notably by requiring the latter to fulfil the same obligations and with the same 
effects.33 
 
Finally, the Directive affirms that it does not preclude Member States from 
applying non-core protection measures if these constitute public policy, nor 
from applying terms and conditions laid down in collective agreements 
outside the building sector, provided that the Member State affords equality 
of treatment in both cases.34 
 
By requiring host Member States to apply defined core labour protection 
measures to the extent that they are contained in the Member State’s labour 
law, the Directive clearly recognises the regulatory function of labour law as 
the enumerated core protection can plausibly be considered as being 
necessary for a functioning labour market. In this sense, then, competition 
between service providers bound by core protection measures and those not 
bound by such measures would also be unacceptable from a trade 
perspective.35 The effect of the Directive is also to exempt core labour 
protection measures from the need for justification as public policy or from 
an overriding requirement relating to the public interest. In addition, it 
contains an important element of subsidiarity and respect for national labour 
constitutions because it leaves the choice regarding what core protection 
measures are necessary to the host Member State. Despite being focused on 
the regulatory function of labour law, the Posted Workers Directive does not 
preclude the possibility that other functions and notably the “autonomy-
function” of labour law exist since it enables the Member States to make 
collective agreements in the building sector universally applicable, and 
conditionally allows them also to apply collective agreements outside the 
building sector and non-core protection measures that constitute public 
policy. 
 
The Posted Workers Directive has recently been the subject of a preliminary 
ruling by the ECJ in the Laval case. The case concerned strike action and a 
blockade by Swedish trade unions against a Latvian construction company in 
order to compel it to sign a collective agreement in Sweden with provisions 
which went beyond the core protection in the Posted Workers Directive and 
to compel it to pay a certain hourly wage.36 Sweden does not have a system 
for declaring collective agreements to be universally applicable, nor does it a 
                                                 
33 Art. 3(8). 
34 Art. 3(10). 
35 The ECJ speaks of unfair competition and the need to ensure minimum protections of 
workers. See Laval un Partneri, paras. 74-76. 
36 Laval un Partneri, paras. 30, 34-38. 
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minimum wage, and remuneration is generally negotiated between employers 
and employees in collective agreements.37 In one question, the referring court 
inquired as to whether the Posted Workers Directive precluded the trade 
union action with a view to persuading Laval to sign a collective agreement 
with more favourable terms and conditions and to enter into negotiations on 
pay.38 
 
The ECJ first noted that Sweden had not used the means provided by the 
Posted Workers Directive for setting a minimum wage, making collective 
agreements universally applicable or deciding to use collective agreements 
which are generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the sector or have 
been concluded by the most representative employers’ and labour 
organisations.39 The ECJ concluded that the trade union action could not be 
justified on the basis of Articles 3(1), (8) of the Posted Workers Directive 
because Sweden had not used the means provided for in these articles and 
because the collective negotiations went beyond minimum rates of pay.40 
Thus, in essence, the court held that Sweden’s labour law system, which 
recognises the autonomous right to negotiate of each trade union, was 
incompatible with the Posted Workers Directive. 
 
The ECJ then turned to Article 3(7) of the Directive, according to which 
Member States are not precluded from applying terms and conditions of 
employment to posted workers which are more favourable than the core 
protections. It found that Article 3(7) only allows the Member State and the 
undertaking that is posting workers to reach a voluntary accord on more 
favourable terms and conditions, but does not allow Member States to 
require conformity with such terms.41 Lastly, the ECJ considered whether the 
trade union action could be justified in the light of the provision in the 
Posted Workers Directive which allows Member States to apply non-core 
protection measures if they constitute public policy. The ECJ reasoned that 
trade unions could not avail themselves of the public policy provision since 
they were not public bodies.42 Thus, what the ECJ did in this part of the 
decision was to restrict the Posted Workers Directive to a functionalist-
regulatory model of labour law, thereby excluding the distributive model of 
labour law, which would, for instance, require higher levels of pay and a 
model based upon the “autonomy-function” of labour law, in which workers 
                                                 
37 Laval un Partneri, paras. 7, 24, 52 
38 Laval un Partneri, para. 53. 
39 Laval un Partneri, paras. 64, 66, 71. 
40 Laval un Partneri, paras. 70-71. 
41 Laval un Partneri, paras. 80-81. 
42 Laval un Partneri, para. 84. 
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and employers decide together on all the terms and conditions governing 
employment. It should also be noted that the Court’s decision represented a 
departure from the more generous approach in Rush Portuguesa and Seco.43 
 
4. Limits to the functions of labour law arising from 
the interpretation of the EC treaty 
The Laval case also concerned an examination of the Swedish trade union 
action in the light of Article 49 of the EC Treaty. The ECJ first decided that 
Article 49 applied to trade union actions because trade unions are engaged in 
the collective regulation of the provision of services and then found that 
strike actions and blockades and the requirement to negotiate with trade 
unions constituted restrictions within the meaning of Article 49.44 As the right 
both to strike and to take collective action are fundamental rights, the ECJ 
then engaged in a balancing exercise with the freedom to provide services in 
order to determine whether the trade union action could be justified as a 
proportionate pursuit of a fundamental right. In respect of the strike action to 
compel Laval to sign the collective agreement on more favourable terms and 
conditions, the ECJ decided that it did not contribute to the protection of 
workers since the Posted Workers Directive already laid down the conditions 
for the protection of workers.45 
 
Here, the ECJ re-affirmed the restrictive reading of the Posted Workers 
Directive as providing only for minimal functionalist-regulatory protection. It 
also, in effect, turned the rights-based function of labour law on its head by 
requiring the exercise of the right to strike to lead to certain outcomes and 
thus conditioning that right. The analysis of the ECJ, it is suggested, has 
subtly shifted from an analysis of fundamental rights to a functionalist-
regulatory one in which labour law is accepted because it leads to certain 
outcomes. 
 
In respect of trade union action aimed at negotiations on pay, the ECJ found 
that they could not be justified as an overriding reason of public interest since 
the Swedish context was too intransparent and made it impossible for a 
service provider to ascertain the obligations with which it had to comply 
regarding minimum pay.46 One may wonder whether a certain degree of 
intransparency and lack of prior notice is not an inherent feature of a national 
labour law system that relies primarily on the “autonomy-function” of labour 
                                                 
43 See n. 27 and the accompanying text. 
44 Laval un Partneri, paras. 89, 99-100. 
45 Laval un Partneri, para. 108. 
46 Laval un Partneri, para. 110. 
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law, and whether the ECJ has not thereby implicitly restricted the 
”autonomy-function” of labour law still further. 
 
The Viking case turned on the conflict between freedom of establishment and 
the right to collective action. It concerned actions by the Finnish Seamen’s 
Union (FSU) and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) to 
prevent the Finnish ferry operator from establishing itself in Estonia by re-
registering a vessel in Estonia in order to use low wage labour there. At the 
behest of the FSU, the ITF had issued a circular that prohibited affiliated 
Estonian unions from negotiating with Viking with a view to concluding a 
collective agreement, or else face sanctions and loss of membership of the 
ITF. What was at issue was, therefore, the collective action of the Finnish 
union and the policy of the ITF. 
 
The referring court referred four main questions to the ECJ, namely, whether 
collective action fell outside the scope of Article 43, whether Article 43 had 
horizontal direct effect, whether the collective action by the FSU and the 
policy of the ITF constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment, 
and whether such restrictions could, nevertheless, be justified as pursuing a 
legitimate aim and be justified by overriding reasons of public interest.47 
 
The ECJ decided that collective action fell within the scope of Article 43 in 
as much as it regulates employment and the provision of services collectively 
by aiming at the conclusion of a collective agreement.48 The ECJ decided that 
the lack of Community competence on these matters, the status of 
fundamental rights or the reasoning in Albany did not modify this 
conclusion.49 Since the actions of the FSU and ITF were aimed at the 
conclusion of a collective agreement and thus at regulating the work of 
Viking’s employees collectively, the ECJ reasoned that Article 43 could apply 
horizontally in the present situation.50 The ECJ also affirmed that the 
collective action by the FSU and the policy of the ITF constituted restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment.51 
 
Concerning the justification of FSU’s collective action and the ITF’s policy, 
the ECJ differentiated between strike action with the purpose of persuading 
the undertaking to maintain jobs or cushion the effects of members of the 
                                                 
47 Viking, para. 27. 
48 Viking, paras. 33, 36-37. 
49 Viking, paras. 38-55. 
50 Viking, paras. 58-61. 
51 Viking, paras. 72-74. 
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workforce being laid off, and strike action and the ITF policy whose purpose 
was to prevent the ferry operator from re-registering by requiring it to sign a 
collective agreement at the place of beneficial ownership. In respect of the 
former, the ECJ affirmed that collective action for the protection of workers 
was a legitimate interest and the protection of workers an overriding reason 
of public interest.52 However, strike action could only be justified if jobs and 
working conditions were actually endangered by the re-registering, given that 
no other, less restrictive, course of action was available to the FSU under 
national law, and the other available means had not been exhausted before 
commencing collective action.53 With regard to the ITF’s anti-flag-of-
convenience policy, the ECJ decided that it could not be objectively justified 
to the extent that the policy results in ship-owners being prevented from 
establishing themselves in another Member State.54 The ECJ also doubted 
whether the purpose of the ITF’s policy was really to protect the terms and 
conditions of employment for seafarers since the ITF was required to initiate 
solidarity action regardless of whether the work or employment conditions 
were adversely affected by the establishment in another Member State.55 
 
What can be concluded from the Viking decision with regard to the functions 
of labour law? The ECJ seems to be prepared to accept the distributive 
function of labour law because it decided that unions could engage in strike 
action in order to preserve their existing employment rights, regardless of 
whether these afforded minimal protection or further protection measures. At 
the same time, the decision reveals a certain suspicion about the “autonomy-
function” of labour law because the ECJ sees strike action as an ultima ratio to 
be resorted to if other means of persuading employers have failed. Finally, the 
decision denies that there can be a Community-wide “autonomy-function” 
of labour law in which trade unions collectively seek to prevent employers 
from relocating to another Member State and wield so much power that they 
can effectively make this impossible. In a sense, then, the ITF became the 
victim of its own success. 
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53 Viking, paras. 81, 84, 86-87. 
54 Viking, para. 88. 
55 Viking, para. 89. 
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5. Conclusion 
The extent to which EC law and the GATS recognise different functions of 
labour law differs. The GATS list approach enables WTO members to 
exempt labour law matters from the scope of the market access and national 
treatment commitments, and thus leaves their various functional models of 
labour law intact. However, members that have not made use of this 
possibility need to be able to justify their application of labour law which 
constitutes barriers to market access or less favourable treatment either in 
terms of making a contribution to health protection, and thus the regulatory 
function, or in terms of public morals and order, and thus the rights-based 
function of labour law. Whether labour laws based upon the distributive or 
“autonomy-function” of labour law can also be justified remains doubtful. In 
contrast, in the EC, the primary legal texts are open towards various models 
of labour law but recent interpretations of these texts and of secondary 
legislation show a more restrictive approach notably towards the autonomy- 
and, to a certain extent, also the distributive function of labour law. 
 
The fact that it is particularly the functionalist-regulatory model of labour law 
that has found acceptance in the EC legal context is not surprising. As 
Polanyi would teach us labour is a commodity whose sufficient production 
would be undermined if markets were left to their own devices. To this 
extent, the Posted Workers Directive could actually be said to strengthen the 
internal market for trade in services, where such services are provided across 
borders with employed labour. However, if labour markets are more 
politically embedded than the functionalist-regulatory model of labour law 
suggests, the Community’s apparent unease with the distributive and 
“autonomy-function” of labour law might lead to further conflicts over the 
liberalisation of services in the long run. 
 
Chapter  2 
Competing in Markets, not Rules: The Conflict 
over the Single Services Market1
 
Susanne K. Schmidt 




The discussion of the Services Directive from 2004 onwards was evidence of 
an unprecedented extent of the politicisation of a single-market issue. 
Whereas single-market policies until then had mainly passed unnoticed, this 
time, protest soared. In the course of this protest, the French and the Dutch 
even rejected the Constitutional Treaty.2 With the Services Directive, 
politicisation hit the single market. No longer can it be said that the left-right 
dimension does not play a role in the European Union.3 
 
With its proposal, the Commission wanted to strengthen the single market 
for services, which does not reflect the importance of services in national 
GDP. While services had already been part of the drive to complete the 
internal market by 1992, only sector-specific directives had been agreed upon 
(such as insurance services), which proved to be a very long and cumbersome 
process. As a horizontal directive, the draft Services Directive targeted all 
                                                 
1 Funding under the “NewGov” Project of the European Union’s 6th Framework Programme 
is gratefully acknowleged (Contract No CIT1-CT-2004-506392). I would like to thank 
Deborah Mabbett, Waltraud Schelkle, Florian Rödl and Burkard Eberlein for comments. 
2 See D. Howarth, “Internal Policies: Re-inforcing the New Lisbon Message of 
Competitiveness and Innovation”. (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies,pp. 89-106, at. 
94; S. Maatsch, “The Struggle to Control Meanings: The French Debate on the European 
Constitution in the Mass Media”. (2007) 8 Perspectives on European Politics and Society, pp. 261-
80. 
3 See P. Genschel, “Markt und Staat in Europa”, (1998) 39 Politische Vierteljahresschrift, pp. 55-
79. 
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services, realising the single market by following the home-country 
responsibility for regulation. While home-country regulation, which implied 
the mutual recognition of the regulation of the other Member States, never 
roused significant fears for the markets in goods, for services, the Commission 
was advised differently. 
 
By integrating segmented national markets, single-market legislation 
significantly enhances efficiency. Companies no longer need to adapt their 
goods or services to the different domestic regulations of the Member States. 
Instead, there are either common, harmonized rules, or there is mutual 
recognition. This lifting of market segmentation allows companies to exploit 
economies of scale while customers enjoy greater product variety. As Majone 
very early pointed out, increased markets are the reason why multi-national 
companies, in particular, seek regulation at European level.4 Single-market 
policies are thus classic examples of measures which increase Pareto-
efficiency. 
 
In this paper, I analyse why the realisation of the internal market for services 
was perceived not as a Pareto-efficient solution, but as a highly distributional 
exercise. My explanation builds on the difference between trade in services 
and trade in goods, the specifics of governance through mutual recognition, 
and the increased heterogeneity among Member States after the Eastern 
enlargement. For mutual recognition to work in this context, it is crucial that 
Member States perceive themselves as co-operating entities, and not as 
competing entities. Integration becomes acceptable only if competition can 
be focused on markets instead of rules, if it is the different competitiveness of 
companies, rather than merely the strictness of national rules, which 
determine market performance. Should the integration of markets via mutual 
recognition result in competition regarding the rules, distributional issues 
come to the forefront. For distributional issues, the European Union has 
insufficient input-legitimation.5 Even if general welfare would be 
strengthened by liberalising the markets for services, if liberalisation has highly 
distributional effects, this is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate, due to the 
lack of a common demos to show sufficient solidarity for significant re-
distribution. 
                                                 
4 See G. Majone, “Regulating Europe: Problems and Prospects”, in: Jahrbuch zur Staats- und 
Verwaltungswissenschaft Band 3, T. Ellwein, (ed.), (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1989), pp. 
159-77, at 166-68; G. Majone, “Regulatory Federalism in the European Community”, (1992) 
10 Government and Policy, pp. 299-316. 
5 See F.W. Scharpf, Legitimationskonzepte jenseits des Nationalstaats, (Cologne: Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2004). 
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In the following, I start by analysing governance through mutual 
recognition,6 which allows ‘unity in diversity’ to be achieved.7 After pointing 
to the specifics of trade in services and the way in which the European Court 
of Justice has analysed the freedom of services, I analyse the original proposal 
of the directive, and the distributional issues which it raised. It is contrasted 
with the final compromise, and an inquiry into how the distributional issues 
in it were lowered. Mutual recognition can only achieve ‘unity in diversity’ 
for trade in services if Member States can assure that others do not exploit 
their regulatory situation. This is achieved by strengthening administrative 
co-operation through the harmonisation of administrative procedures. 
Paradoxically, in services the lack of harmonisation of rules in favour of 
mutual recognition seems to imply that Member States are much more likely 
to follow common administrative procedures in the implementation of the 
directive, as this is the only way to contain its distributive consequences. 
Thus, the case of the Services Directive is an example in which the conflict of 
interest in policy-making is absorbed by shifting it to another venue – that of 
implementation.8 
 
2. The governance of mutual recognition9 
To understand why the Services Directive was able to rouse such fears of re-
distribution, it is necessary to explain how mutual recognition functions, and 
what its pre-conditions to solve governance problems are. The European 
Community had originally relied on the harmonisation of rules in order to 
build the internal market. As harmonisation transfers the competence for rule 
formulation and enforcement to the supranational level, it is a very 
demanding way to integrate markets. Harmonisation can be equalled to 
hierarchy, and to governing, as opposed to governance. Member States 
negotiate common rules, and these are then binding upon all of them, thus 
overcoming the different national regulations which separate the markets of 
Member States. The high decision-making costs associated with it were 
responsible for the sluggish completion of the internal market in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Moreover, once markets are harmonised at European level, the 
                                                 
6 See S.K. Schmidt, “Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance”, (2007) 14 Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 667-681. 
7 See Ch. Joerges, “Conflict of Laws as Constitutional Form: Reflections on the International Trade Law 
and the Panel Report on the EC Biotechnical Products Case”. Paper for the New International Law 
Conference. Oslo, 2007. 
8 See A. Héritier, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 23; N. Zahariadis, “Europeanization as program implementation: Effective and 
democratic?”, (2008) 14 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, forthcoming. 
9 The following draws on S.K. Schmidt, “Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance”, (2007) 
14 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 667-681. 
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Member States are no longer free to change the existing regulation, in order 
to adapt it to new requirements, and, instead, have to wait for the appropriate 
decisions at EU level.10 
 
Mutual recognition is an alternative way of integrating markets. Here, it is 
assumed that Member States regulate markets in different ways, but in ways 
which are functionally equivalent. Instead of engaging in complex decision-
making processes in order to harmonise these rules, Member States mutually 
recognise each others’ rules. Mutual recognition has advantages for building 
markets, as there are no longer complicated pre-conditions. However, some 
of these complications re-appear in the implementation phase. As Member 
States remain politically responsible for the regulation of their markets, they 
only accept mutual recognition if the rules are equivalent. If the rules are not 
equivalent, Member States retain the right to demand adherence to their own 
rules – thus host-country rules would apply rather than home-country rules, 
and the market would remain fragmented. Compared to harmonised rules, 
mutual recognition is therefore more difficult to implement. Although 
companies may believe that their goods and services are regulated in an 
equivalent way and that they therefore qualify for mutual recognition, it may 
always be that local authorities are of a different opinion.11 As the local 
authorities responsible for the control of market regulations have to decide 
whether the rules of the 26 other Member States are equivalent or not, 
mutual recognition entails significant transaction costs. Kalypso Nicolaïdis 
thus argues that mutual recognition relies on a transfer of transaction costs 
from the decision-making to the implementation phase.12 One could also say 
that the solution of conflicts is shifted from the decision-making to the 
implementation stage.13 
 
Similar to harmonisation, mutual recognition can provide governance 
functions. In doing so, it entails benefits and costs, just as harmonisation does. 
While Member States maintain the competence to regulate their markets and 
to adapt regulations to changed circumstances with mutual recognition, they 
transfer this competence to the supranational level through harmonisation. 
However, integrating markets via mutual recognition is more complicated 
                                                 
10 This is likely to prove increasingly problematical after enlargement, given the large acquis 
communautaire and the changed conditions of policy-making. 
11 See J. Pelkmans, “Mutual recognition in goods. On promises and disillusions”, (2007) 14 Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 699-716. 
12 See K. Nicolaïdis, Mutual Recognition Among Nations: The European Community and Trade in 
Services. PhD, (1993), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard., at 352. 
13 See A. Héritier, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 23. 
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compared to following harmonised rules. Typically, therefore, mutual 
recognition is combined with minimum harmonisation, in order to prevent 
Member States from finding reasons to object to mutual recognition because 
of the lack of the equivalence of rules. Moreover, there is the fear that mutual 
recognition puts pressure on regulatory levels, in the sense of a race to the 
bottom. If rules are mutually recognised, companies can pick their home 
country according to the regulatory regime; and those companies operating 
from countries with low levels of regulation enjoy competitive benefits.14 We 
come back to the specific relevance of this point for services. 
 
While mutual recognition was already considered by the Commission in the 
1960s as a way of integrating tax policy,15 it only entered the scene noticeably 
in 1979, when the European Court of Justice gave its ruling in the Cassis 
case.16 Drawing on the previous Dassonville case,17 the ECJ gave a broad 
meaning to the freedom of goods on the basis of Article 28, implying that 
goods legally marketed in one Member State can also be marketed in all other 
Member States. This is the obligation to recognise goods from the other 
Member States mutually, if they conform to the rules of the home country. 
However, by broadening the reach of the market freedoms under the Cassis-
de-Dijon case law, the ECJ simultaneously enhanced the possibilities for 
Member States to make exceptions, beyond those already foreseen in the 
Treaty by Article 30. Member States remain free to regulate their domestic 
markets in sensitive areas, by invoking mandatory requirements goods have to 
adhere to (“rule of reason”).18 
 
As is well-known, the Commission readily took up the idea of mutual 
recognition and launched the single-market initiative around it.19 At the late 
1990s, the European Council in Tampere decided to transfer it to the area of 
justice and home affairs (JHA), with the first application being the European 
arrest warrant. In JHA, there was also a perceived need for co-operation, but 
                                                 
14 See G. Davies, “Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle”, Mitchell Working Paper 
Series 2, 2007: Edinburgh Europa Institute, p. 4. 
15 See P. Genschel, “Why no mutual recognition of VAT? Regulation, taxation and the integration of 
the EU's internal market for goods”, (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 743-761. 
16 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, ECJ, [1979] Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein. 
17 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837. 
18 See V. Hatzopoulos & T.U. Do, “The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the free Provision of 
Services”, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, pp. 923-991, at 956 et seq. 
19 See K.J. Alter & S. Meunier-Aitsahalia, “Judicial Politics in the European Community. European 
Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision”, (1994) 26 Comparative Political 
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an inability to achieve the necessary agreement on common rules. Just as in 
the single market, mutual recognition was taken up as an alternative mode of 
governance.20 
 
It is surprising that political science has largely neglected mutual recognition 
in the broad debate on new modes of governance in the EU. “The most 
important of Europe’s institutional innovations is hardly mentioned any 
longer in the debates on the so-called ‘new modes of governance’.”21 In the 
aftermath of the Lisbon Agenda of 2000 and the Commission’s White Paper 
of Governance in 2001, the discussion of new modes of governance has 
soared in European integration studies. But there has been little on mutual 
recognition until recently,22 despite the fact that most political scientists would 
probably agree that the impact of mutual recognition on European 
integration has been much larger than that of the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC). 
 
To sum up, mutual recognition can act as an alternative to harmonisation if 
Member States differ in their – equivalent – regulations. They can then 
simply accept each others’ rules instead of bothering to agree on common 
ones. But in the case of the Services Directive, the prospect of such an 
acceptance raised significant fears. To understand this conflict further, it is 
necessary to proceed by looking at the specifics of trade in services, 
regulation, and the legal provisions for the freedom of services. 
 
3. The regulation of trade in services in the EU 
In contrast with services, goods can travel borders independent of their 
production. For services, the delivery most often coincides with 
consumption, making it questionable how mutual recognition actually 
applies. Several forms of trade in services can be distinguished: 1) With the 
active freedom of services, the provider of services renders himself in the other 
Member State. 2) With the passive freedom of services, the consumer of 
services locates himself or herself in another Member State. 3) Correspondence 
services are those that can be delivered across borders without requiring either 
the recipient or the provider to move. Examples include financial services, 
                                                 
20 See S. Lavenex, “Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy”, 
(2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 762-779. 
21 See Ch. Joerges & C. Godt, “Free trade: the erosion of national, and the birth of transnational 
governance”, (2005) 13 European Review, pp. 93-117, at 95. 
22 See S. K. Schmidt, “Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance”, (2007) 14 Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 667-681. 
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telecommunications and broadcasting.23 The trade of correspondence services 
resembles the trade of goods most closely. 
 
Services are, in a certain sense, invisible, which is why it is often difficult to 
separate their production from their consumption. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
draw this distinction artificially and to differentiate the service product from 
its delivery,24 because this allows us to consider how the regulation of services 
differs from that of goods. The regulation of services can concern market 
access (for example, certain training requirements), mode of operation (for 
example, certain solvency requirements, speed-limits), the products 
themselves, and their distribution.25 Two important points follow. For 
services, regulation is much more constitutive than for goods. And in contrast 
with goods, the regulation of services relies heavily on what one can compare 
to process standards.26 
 
In trade in goods, product and process standards are subject to different kinds 
of competitive pressures.27 While consumer demand for high-quality products 
may keep product standards up, process standards are much more subject to 
competition, as costly versus cheap production processes determine 
competitiveness, often without having an impact upon product quality (for 
example, environmental standards in steel production). In as far as process 
standards need to be harmonised for trade in services, there is thus much less 
scope to use different process standards as a basis for competitive advantages 
for services than there is for goods. However, if services have to be delivered 
in the country of consumption (namely, the host country) and the latter 
cannot determine which rules apply, there maybe much more scope for 
competitive pressure through different regulations. Given the constitutive 
role of regulation for services, competition in rules - rather than markets - 
                                                 
23 See K. Hailbronner & A. Nachbaur, „Die Dienstleistungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH“, 
(1992) 6 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 105-113, at 108. 
24 See W-H. Roth, “The European Economic Community’s Law on Services: Harmonisation”, (1988) 
25 Common Market Law Review, pp. 35-94, at 44. 
25 See W-H. Roth, “The European Economic Community’s Law on Services: Harmonisation”, (1988) 
25 Common Market Law Review, pp. 35-94, at 16. 
26 See P. Troberg, „Dienstleistungen“, in: H.v.d. Groeben, J. Thiesing & C-D. Ehlermann (eds), 
Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), pp. 1441-1523, at. 1472 et 
seq. 
27 See F. W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
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thus becomes more likely. “[…] there is a closer connection between services 
regulation and labour market regulation than in the case of goods”.28 
 
Having regarded the specifics of the trade and regulation of services, the 
question becomes one of how the EEC Treaty supports mutual recognition 
for services. Traditionally the freedom of services serves a residual function. 
Whenever none of the other freedoms applies, the freedom of services 
becomes relevant. Thus, in contrast to the WTO approach to services, the 
freedom of services covers not the tertiary sector as such, but only trade of 
services across borders. In addition, the remuneration and the temporary 
nature of the delivery of services are important distinctions.29 The residual 
nature makes it necessary to distinguish the freedom of services from the 
freedom of labour and of establishment. If someone occasionally works in 
another country, he or she will probably profit from the freedom of services. 
If an EU-foreigner is part of the national labour market, it will be the 
freedom of labour. If a cabinet-maker offers particularly tailored products 
across borders, he or she profits from the freedom of services; if he or she 
does it on a continuous basis with some sort of establishment, it is the 
freedom of establishment that matters. What is important is the difference in 
regulation: With the freedom of establishment, companies are regulated in 
the country where the services are being provided on a par with nationals. 
But if the freedom of services is being evoked, the regulations of the country 
of establishment (i.e., the home country), and not so much of those of the 
service provision (i.e., the host country) are applicable. However, host 
countries can apply rules that are covered by the general interest, similar to 
the mandatory requirements restricting the freedom of goods – if such rules 
have not already been observed in the home country.30 
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In contrast to the freedom of goods, the ECJ, for a long time, interpreted the 
freedom of services in a fairly restrictive way, not covering continuous, regular 
activities.31 A good example of this is the case law on the posting of workers, 
in which the ECJ allowed France - in the Rush Portuguesa Case32 - to apply its 
minimum wages also to workers temporarily posted from Portugal. Based 
upon this ruling, the Member States agreed on the Posted Workers Directive. 
More recently, however, the ECJ has seemed to pursue a more liberal 
approach with regard to services, emphasising the need to eliminate 
hindrances to trade in services trade. At the same time, the number of Court 
cases concerning the freedom of services increased from 40 cases between 
1995 and 1999, to 140 cases between 2000 and 2005.33 Thus, in 2003, the 
ECJ did not stress the temporary nature of services in the Schnitzer case,34 
which loosened the relationship with the freedom of establishment. In a later 
case, the ECJ went so far as to state that “all services that are not offered on a 
stable and continuous basis from an established professional base in the 
Member State of destination constitute provision of services within the 
meaning of Article 49 EC”,35 thus bringing the interpretation of the freedom 
of services more into line with the WTO concept of trade in services. 
 
The broadening of the case law on services which the ECJ has been 
developing since the early 2000s increasingly implies that Member States are 
forced to recognise the rules of the home country of service providers 
mutually. As we will see, the proposal for a Services Directive took up this 
incipient change of the case law, seeking to codify it in a radical way.36 
  
                                                 
31 See A. Randelzhofer & E. Forsthoff, “Art. 43 EGV: Das Niederlassungsrecht”, in: E. Grabitz & 
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35 See V. Hatzopoulos & T.U. Do: “The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the free Provision of 
Services”, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, pp. 923-991, original emphasis, at 929. 
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4. The Bolkestein Directive 
Launched in early 2004, the draft directive aimed to achieve the single 
market for services in all those areas where specific legislative measures had 
not yet been taken (as happened for financial services, for instance). Due to 
the importance of services, the Commission targeted about 50% of all the 
economic activities of the Member States with this single directive.37 The 
directive aimed to accomplish both the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom of services, exempting only lotteries and all genuinely public services 
with no profit interest (for example, education, cultural activities, etc.). Health 
and social services were included. In order to achieve its ambitious goal, the 
draft directive relied on the principle of home-country control. Member 
States were required to recognise mutually services regulated in other 
Member States as equivalent to their domestically regulated services. 
Excessive regulatory requirements were to be abolished. Given the highly 
regulated nature of most services, the de-regulatory potential of the directive 
was considerable, as was aptly described by the then Commissioner 
Bolkestein: 
 
We cannot expect European businesses to set the global 
competitiveness standard or to give their customers the quality and 
choice they deserve while they still have their hands tied behind their 
backs by national red tape, eleven years after the 1993 deadline for 
creating a real Internal Market. Some of the national restrictions are 
archaic, overly burdensome and break EU law. Those have simply got 
to go. A much longer list of differing national rules needs sweeping 
regulatory reform.38 
 
Given that sector-specific attempts at building the single market for services 
had already proven to be very cumbersome, the directive was bound to be 
controversial. To facilitate both the freedom of establishment and of services, 
Member States were called upon to establish a single contact point in their 
administrations (Article 6) for service providers. For the freedom of services, the 
draft prescribed the rules of the home country. Service providers would be able 
to offer their services in the host country, by simply following their home 
rules regarding access to services markets and the practice of service delivery. 
The host country was only to be able to enforce rules justified by the general 
                                                 
37 See the report of the European industrial relations observatory on-line under: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/07/feature/eu0407206f.html  
[accessed September 24th, 2008]. 
38 Rapid press release IP/04/37, 13.1.2004: Services: Commission proposes Directive to cut 
red tape that stifles Europe’s competitiveness. 
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interest. Thereby, the increased legal certainty for services providers to 
operate simply under home-country rules resulted in significant legal 
uncertainty for the host countries. For them, mutual recognition would mean 
that they would no longer be aware under which rules services would be 
temporarily provided in their country. Related to this were fears of 
downward pressures on domestic regulations as well as insecurity for end-
consumers who were uncertain of which rules service providers would have 
to abide by, and which rights they would themselves have as consumers.39 
However, the directive obliged national authorities to co-operate with each 
other. Thus, the possibilities for host-country authorities to obtain 
information from home-country authorities regarding the legality of 
companies posting workers would be greatly improved. 
 
Given its broad scope, it was hardly possible to assess all the implications of 
the directive. In addition, further uncertainty was added by other provisions 
of the draft. Thus, the Services Directive explicitly was said to complement 
existing services law. However, it was not clear what implications would arise 
from the interaction of the new basis with the existing legal basis, such as the 
specialised directives for services, for utilities and services of general economic 
interest. In particular, this overlap concerned the Posted-Workers Directive40 of 
1996, for which the services draft foresaw the easing of some restrictions, 
such as the need to carry identity papers for local controls in the host country, 
and the obligation to appoint a national representative, making the controls of 
the host country more difficult. 
 
Looking at the draft Services Directive, it is surprising that the Commission 
could agree to propose it,41 thereby placing the “permissive consensus” 
supporting European integration under such strain.42 The internal market DG 
had engaged in intensive consultations with the Member States before 
publishing the proposal, without getting to know the extent of the 
opposition within the Member States.43 Moreover, it could point to the 
evolving case law of the ECJ on the freedom of services for support. It was 
argued that the directive simply codified much of what was already there, 
thus making the existing acquis communautaire more accessible for companies, 
                                                 
39 See K. Nicolaïdis & S.K. Schmidt, “Mutual Recognition on ‘Trial’: The Long Road to Services 
Liberalization”, (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 717-734. 
40 Posted-Workers Directive (96/71/EC) of 1996. 
41 I thank Ivo Maes for raising this question. 
42 See A. Schäfer, “Nach dem permissiven Konsens. Das Demokratiedefizit der Europäischen Union”, 
(2006) 34 Leviathan, pp. 350-376. 
43 See K. Nicolaïdis & S.K. Schmidt, “Mutual Recognition on ‘Trial’: The Long Road to Services 
Liberalisation”, (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 717-734, at 722. 
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thereby enhancing legal certainty. While the Commission tried to advertise 
the services proposal as a measure which simply enhanced efficiency in a 
Pareto-optimising sense, the reactions to the draft emphasised its distributive 
consequences. It is to these consequences that I will now turn. 
 
5. Re-distributive concerns: the contention about 
the Draft Directive 
Given that the single-market initiative of the late 1980s had already targeted 
services next to goods, the Services Directive was long overdue. With the 
growing relevance of services, the failure to establish the single market 
implied significant losses of efficiency.44 So why did distributive worries 
largely manage to overshadow the concerns for efficiency? An important 
factor here was the particular timing of the draft directive. Within a few 
months of the proposal, the Eastern enlargement took place, which 
significantly increased the heterogeneity among the European Union’s 
members. This fundamentally altered the basis upon which the foreseen 
regime of a home-country rule had to build. Governance based upon mutual 
recognition needs to build upon the equivalence of rules and a functioning 
administrative co-operation. While this was already bound to cause problems 
in the EU-15, in the EU-25 (27 to be) it could not be any easier. 
 
In the following, I take the German case in order to illustrate the distributive 
issues stemming from the single services market. On this basis, I analyse how 
Germany attempted to reduce the distributive consequences of the freedom 
of services by on its own, while negotiating the Services Directive. 
 
6. Exemplifying re-distributive consequences: the 
German case 
Given its central position in the European Union and the possible 
competitive pressure resulting from the wages gap of the new Member States, 
Germany joined most other Member States (with the exception of the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden) in using the transitory arrangement (2+3+2) in order to 
restrict the free movement of labour for the new East European Member 
States (not including Cyprus and Malta). In addition, Germany negotiated a 
                                                 
44 Several economic studies make the point, see the webpage of the Commission under: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-dir/studies_en.htm (accessed 14.9.07). 
However, see C. Hay, “Keynote Article: What Doesn't Kill You Can Only Make You 
Stronger: The Doha Development Round, the Services Directive and the EU's Conception of 
Competitiveness”, (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 25-43, who argues that 
the analogy of services markets with cheap consumer goods is faulty. 
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transitory regime for the freedom of services, exempting construction 
services, cleaning, and interior decoration in parallel to the freedom of labour. 
The German public was therefore surprised when, some months after the 
Eastern enlargement, it appeared that East Europeans were, nevertheless, 
exerting significant pressure on the national job market – simply by 
exploiting the freedom of services. Arguably, the exemptions that Germany 
had negotiated were precisely in those areas where East Europeans could 
profit least from the wage differential. When using free movement of labour, 
the same conditions apply to EU foreigners as to nationals. As construction is 
the main economic sector covered by the German Posted-Workers Law, 
similarly, a minimum wage has to be respected. In all other sectors, workers 
can come in temporarily under the freedom of services – which is interpreted 
as up to one year with the possibility of an extension for further twelve 
months – and replace German workers for the wages of their home country. 
As Germany does not have a minimum wage with the exception of the 
construction industry and sea transport, it cannot demand it for posted-
workers.45 
 
Most noted in the press was the case of the slaughterhouses, where Germans 
were laid off on a large scale. In their stead, the slaughterhouses 
commissioned East European service providers with the slaughtering, which 
brought in East European personnel working for little money under 
deplorable working conditions. In some cases, wages were only 2-3 euro per 
hour with a daily working-time of up to 16 euro per hour. Already in early 
2005, the unions spoke of 26,000 jobs lost; one third of all employees in the 
sector had been replaced by East Europeans. On the basis of this experience, 
it was feared that the Services Directive would bring similar pressure to other 
sectors.46 
 
The situation was complicated as East Europeans could come into Germany 
under different legal provisions, either relying on the freedom of 
establishment or of services, added to which there were also illegal activities.47 
Under the freedom of establishment, East Europeans face no restrictions, but 
                                                 
45 See T.G. Christen, “Der Zugang zum deutschen Arbeitsmarkt nach der EU-Erweiterung”, (2004) 3 
Bundesarbeitsblatt, pp. 4-16; see, also, F. Temming, “EU-Osterweiterung: Wie beschränkt ist die 
Dienstleistungsfreiheit?“, (2005) 3 Recht der Arbeit, pp. 186-192. For construction services in 
West Germany, the minimum wage is currently 10.40 EUR to 12.50 EUR (see 
Handwerkskammer Dresden http://www.hwk-
dresden.de/Serviceangebot/Beratung/Recht/RatgeberRecht/tabid/276/Default.aspx [accessed 
24 September 2008]. 
46 FTD 9.2.2005, p.27. Der Spiegel 7/2005, “Der Osten kommt“, p. 32-35; Hamburger 
Abendblatt 26.2.2005, p. 23. 
47 I omit the free movement of labour being less relevant for reasons of simplicity. 
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they do have to comply with German laws. Due to the coincidence that 
Germany had liberalised its crafts law right before the Eastern enlargement in 
early 2004, the loosened rules were exploited by many East Europeans. No 
specific wage and social security obligations exist for establishments, thus 
inviting social security fraud, for instance, through mock self-employment.48 
 
Under the freedom of services, East Europeans can be posted from an Eastern 
European company for temporary service deliveries in Germany, except in 
the exempted sectors (construction, cleaning, and interior decoration).49 The 
Posted-Workers Directive prescribes German labour conditions for all sectors. 
However, with no general minimum wage, there are no restrictions with 
regard to what posted-workers have to be paid. The posting company has to 
discharge social security expenses in the home country. In addition, posting 
has to be a temporary activity and the company has to be active in its home 
country – mere mailbox companies established exclusively for posting 
workers are illegal, as are posted workers who are fully integrated into the 
German company’s work process.50 A host of different possibilities result for 
illegal activities: the temporariness, the exclusion of certain sectors, the 
working conditions of the host country, and the need to pay social security 
expenses in the home country may all be violated as well as the restrictions of 
the Posted-Workers Directive. Moreover, many companies are expressly 
established for posting workers, with no regular economic activity in their 
home country. But violations are difficult for the host country to detect. 
Authorities in the host country have to rely on the controls of the home 
country, and have to trust these accordingly. Moreover, it is not clear when a 
company legally posts workers abroad: it is probably insufficient for a 
company to employ one person for recruitment and control purposes in, say, 
Poland, and posts 99 workers into Germany. But how many persons have to 
be employed in Poland? Which part of the annual turnover has to be 
achieved in the home country in order for it to be seen as a company that is 
active in its home country?51 With high unemployment rates in many new 
Member States, the older Member States distrust whether the new Member 
States are playing by the rules. 
 
                                                 
48 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 12.4.2005, p. 1; General-Anzeiger 14.5.2005, p. 3. 
49 See F. Temming, “EU-Osterweiterung: Wie beschränkt ist die Dienstleistungsfreiheit?“, (2005) 3 
Recht der Arbeit, pp. 186-192, at 188; see, also, T.G. Christen, “Der Zugang zum deutschen 
Arbeitsmarkt nach der EU-Erweiterung”, (2004) 3 Bundesarbeitsblatt, pp. 4-16. 
50 Fleischwirtschaft 12.5.2005, p. 10. 
51 FR 23.7.2005, p. 12. 
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The German situation was worsened by the mixture of not having a 
minimum wage, of being required to respect the services freedom, and of 
having little chance of reacting towards illegal activities. Only few other 
Member States (Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden) share the problem of 
not having a minimum wage. Nevertheless, the lesson told by the German 
case is a more general one. This is due to the problems created when the 
principle of home-country control is applied to services, of which the 
overriding incentives to use the opportunities for illegal activities are only one 
part. With the significant wage differentials in the EU after the Eastern 
enlargement, a greater emphasis on home-country regulations for services has 
a significant de-regulatory potential – which, after all, was partly desired, as is 
evident in the citation from Commission Bolkestein, noted above. 
 
Moreover, it seems likely that the conflict about home-country control in 
services goes beyond a mere conflict about the extent of the liberalisation of 
services – as grave as the distributive issues may be. Instead, the fact that 
services are often traded with their providers present means that home-
country control raises important issues of equality.52 Davies puts the problems 
succinctly: 
 
The presumption is that service providers are exempt, above the law of 
the territory where they operate, and the rebuttal of that presumption 
is hard. The situation where competing service providers on a territory 
are subject to different legal regimes – that they essentially bring their 
own legal regime with them – becomes the usual one, with all the 
associated challenges to equality and competition norms […]. 
 
Davies therefore argues that an interpretation of the services freedom as 
pertaining to home-country control violates the prohibition of nationality 
discrimination of Article 12 of the Treaty. The nationals of the host state are 
being discriminated against. Given the implication of home-country rule in 
trade in services, host-country control would often lead to less inequality.53 
 
An individual who is present in the jurisdiction but not subject to its 
regulation, and operating under a more beneficial regime, is a direct 
challenge to the content of citizenship – national or European – and its 
associated guarantees of equality and privilege. His domestic 
competitor sees his most privileged position as a national citizen 
                                                 
52 See G. Davies, “Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle”, (2007) 2 Mitchell 
Working Paper Series: Edinburgh Europa Institute, p. 8. 
53 Ibid., at 8. 
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undermined, while the two competitors, working side by side, operate 
under different legal regimes with different rights, despite a shared EU 
citizenship.54 
 
To sum up, services are particularly rule-dependent. Moreover, they 
normally cannot be traded without their providers. To allow people in the 
same situation to be subject to different rules raises questions of equality 
which do not appear if goods are subject to different regulations. As service 
traders are controlled, moreover, by a different jurisdiction than the one 
where they operate, incentives for illegal activities are of great importance. 
The risk is that the liberalisation of services does not lead to (fair) competition 
in markets, but to (unfair) competition in rules – as difficult as it is to separate 
the two, given the rule-dependence of services.55 
 
7. Reacting to the new situation: lessening re-
distributive effects 
Given the problems resulting from trade in services, Germany was forced to 
react politically. Parallel with the multi-lateral negotiations, it could, and did, 
react both unilaterally and bi-laterally. One notable result of the freedom of 
services has been the intensified discussion on minimum wages in Germany, 
which started under the red-green coalition when it agreed, in May 2005, 
upon the aim to extend the German Posted-Workers law to all sectors of the 
economy.56 This discussion has been continuing ever since. Since the state 
traditionally leaves wage agreement to the unions and employers’ associations, 
a state-set minimum wage would be a significant institutional rupture. At the 
same time, it would be the easiest way to tackle the re-distributive issues 
arising from the freedom of services. The discussion on minimum wages, 
which is ongoing, is therefore a highly interesting example of an 
Europeanization effect, exemplifying the shortcomings of Europeanisation 
studies that normally focus only upon the implementation of directives.57 
 
                                                 
54 Ibid., at 7. 
55 The fact that there are grey areas in distinguishing the two does not imply that rule 
manipulation or violation in order to gain competitive advantage are not being noticed as such. 
56 ‘Für Fairness am Arbeitsmarkt – Kabinett beschließt Änderung des Arbeitnehmer-
Entsendegesetzes’,  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, 11-05-2005. 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=63816,render=rend
erPrint.html 
57 See S.K. Schmidt, M. Blauberger & W. van den Nouland, “Jenseits von Implementierung und 
Compliance – Die Europäisierung der Mitgliedstaaten”, in: I. Toemmel (ed.): “Die Europäische Union: 
Governance und Policy-Making”, (2008) Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 40, pp. 275-
296. 
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In the following, I will not engage any further in this kind of purely domestic 
institutional adaptation to reduce the distributional consequences of European 
regulation. Instead, I discuss two other kinds of domestic reaction: the 
German attempt to fight illegal activities, and the bilateral talks with its 
neighbours about the freedom of services.58 Both reactions have been part of 
the mandate of the ‘Task Force zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs der 
Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit’,59 which Germany created in March 
2005 to combat the adverse effects of the freedom of services and 
establishment after the Eastern enlargement.60 
 
To tackle illegal activities Germany requires a postal address for the posting 
company as well as a translation of all the relevant documents concerning the 
working contract, working times and pay into German.61 The facilitations on 
the Posted-Workers Directive of the draft Services Directive clearly ran 
counter to these control efforts. In its attempt to ease the posting of workers, 
the Commission started an infringement procedure in late 2004 against 
Germany for restricting the freedom of services disproportionately. In its 
recent judgment of July 2007, the ECJ, however, assessed the German 
interest in workable controls as not interfering with the freedom of services.62 
It remains to be seen whether this will lead the European Commission to 
back down from its criticism on how Germany, and other Member States, 
have implemented the Posted-Workers Directive. Only in June 2007 did the 
Commission publish a communication on the directive, criticising Member 
States for overly controlling the use of the freedom of services.63 
  
                                                 
58 In the following, I partly draw on unpublished work by Wendelmoet van den Nouland in 
the context of the NewGov project “The Domestic Impact of European Law”. 
59 Task Force to fight the abuse of the freedom of services and of establishment. 
60 See BMF/BMAS Bericht zu den Aktivitäten der Task Force zur Bekämpfung des 
Missbrauchs der Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit, Oktober 2006, under:  
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_54338/DE/BMF__Startseite/Service/Download
s/Abt__I/Monatsbericht/Downloads/0609121a1001,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile
.pdf#search=%22task%20force%22 [accessed 24. September 2008]. 
61 TAZ, 14.06.2007. 
62 Case C-490/04, [2007] Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany. 
63 Communication from the Commission: Posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services – maximising its benefits and potential while guaranteeing the protection of workers. Under: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2007/jun/communication_en.pdf [24.09.2008] 
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Since April 2006, Germany has compelled the other Member States to send a 
copy of all E 101-forms of workers posted to Germany to the Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung in Würzburg.64 Previously, Germany suffered a serious set-
back in its activities to combat fraud when the ECJ ruled in early 2006 that 
Member States have to accept existing E 101 forms, even when they are 
obviously fake.65 In cases of suspicion, the Member States have to contact the 
issuing authority of the Member State concerned or have to start an 
infringement procedure66 against the issuing Member State. National courts 
are not allowed to decide by themselves whether the forms have been forged. 
Consequently, Germany could not do anything in a case in which Germans 
had employed Portuguese workers on a permanent basis, pretending that they 
were being posted from Portugal, thus evading social security in Germany.67 
 
As Member States have to accept each others’ administrative acts according to 
the ECJ, Germany conducted bilateral talks with other Member States, both 
old (for example Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria) and new. Talks are 
being held regularly with Poland and Hungary once every three months.68 
With these meetings, Germany wants to reach a ‘common understanding’ of 
the freedom of services, in order to establish the criteria for defining the status 
of ‘posted workers’ and for issuing E 101 certificates, including the pre-
condition of the economic activity in the country of origin (in order to 
combat mailbox companies), and the distinction between real and mock self-
employment.69 Moreover, the bilateral talks allow specific problems, such as 
the situation in German slaughterhouses, to be investigated.70 An underlying 
                                                 
64 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/5098, 25.4.2007; Deutscher Bundestag, 27 May 2005, 
“Dienstleistungsfreiheit nach der EU-Osterweiterung“, p. 18. 
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/055/1505546.pdf (accessed 24.09.2008). 
65 Case C-2/05 Rijksdienst voor Sociale Zekerheid v Herbosch Kiere NV [2006]. 
66 Article 227 EC Treaty. 
67 Bundesgerichtshof, Pressestelle, N. 143/2006; “Keine Strafbarkeit wegen Nichtabführung 
von Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen bei Vorlage einer durch einen Mitgliedstaat ausgestellten ‘E 
101-Bescheinigung’”. Urteil vom 24.10.2006, 1 StR 44/06. 
68 Information on these bilateral contacts can be found in: BMF/BMAS Bericht zu den 
Aktivitäten der Task Force zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs der Dienstleistungs- und 
Niederlassungsfreiheit, Oktober 2006, under: 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_54338/DE/BMF__Startseite/Service/Download
s/Abt__I/Monatsbericht/Downloads/0609121a1001,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile
.pdf#search=%22task%20force%22  [24.9.2008], pp.4-6. 
69 Interview 11: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales; Interview 12: Bundesministeriums 
für Wirtschaft und Technologie; Die Welt, 12 April 2005, “Lohndumping: Regierung 
verhandelt mit Polen”; Financial Times Deutschland, 26 April 2005, “Rüge aus Polen; 
Dienstleistungen”. 
70 Interview 12: Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie. 
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goal of the talks is the strengthening of mutual trust.71 A more formal goal is 
the signing of administrative co-operation agreements between Germany and 
the new Member States (which already exist between Germany and France, 
between France and Belgium, and between Britain and the Netherlands) in 
order to improve cross-border controls and co-operation between the 
respective authorities.72 
 
8. The fate of the Bolkestein Directive 
The German experience clearly illustrates the distributive consequences when 
the principle of home-country control is applied to the provision of services. 
The contradictory discussions surrounding the proposal of a Services 
Directive took off from here; arguments about Pareto-efficiency met those of 
distributional effects. This discussion shall not be resumed here.73 Instead, I 
wish address how the final compromise managed to lessen the distributive 
effects of the freedom of services. 
 
The compromise which was reached in the European Parliament between 
the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats abolished the contentious 
home-country principle, thus only leaving the obligation to enable the 
freedom of services.74 Officially, the directive does not speak of mutual 
recognition,75 but of enabling the freedom of services. However, a list is 
included of the measures Member States may not require, which include 
special duties to register in the host country or to acquire ex-ante certification 
as well as prescriptions regarding the materials and tools to be used. So, in all 
these cases, home-country rules apply, even though the directive refrained 
from saying so openly. Importantly, the list of justifications for host-country 
                                                 
71 Ministry of Finance/Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, October 2006, “Bericht zu den 
Aktivitäten der Task Force zur Bekämpfung des Missbrauchs der Dienstleistungs- und 
Niederlassungsfreiheit”, p. 4.  
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_54338/DE/BMF__Startseite/Service/Download
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72 See Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2005: 161; Interview 7: ZOLL - Finanzkontrolle 
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74 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market, under: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006L0123:EN:NOT. 
75 See K. Nicolaïdis & S.K. Schmidt, “Mutual Recognition on ‘Trial’: The Long Road to Services 
Liberalisation”, (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 717-734. 
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requirements in Art. 16 III is much more narrow than the ones the ECJ has 
accepted in its case law, implying a “deregulatory shift”.76 
 
The final directive is more restricted in scope than the draft, exempting 
health services, utilities, public transport, social, and security services, 
temporary workers, gambling and lotteries, waste, audiovisual services, 
electronic communication, financial and legal services. In addition, the 
facilitations foreseen for the Posted-Workers Directive were deleted, much to 
the chagrin of the East European Member States. Here, the Commission 
promised a separate follow-up on the workings of the posted-workers 
directive. It remains to be seen whether the recent ECJ judgment concerning 
the German control inhibits the Commission’s attempts to remove controls of 
posted workers by the Member States. 
 
Other provisions survived more or less untouched. Thus, Member States 
have to establish points of single contact for service providers in their 
administration. They also have to review their regulations and abolish 
disproportionate burdens. Moreover, they have to ensure that service 
providers can fulfil all formalities electronically. Importantly, the directive 
includes a far-reaching provision on administrative co-operation,77 detailing 
the responsibilities of the administrations in the home and the host country. 
In contrast to the original version, the host-country authorities will now be 
responsible for controlling those rules which they themselves impose. But 
generally, the home-country authorities are the ones legally responsible for 
oversight. Both authorities co-operate closely, since the home-country 
authorities cannot become active in the host country, but have to request the 
host authorities to take action. Notably, the directive establishes a duty to co-
operate among the administrations of the Member States. This had not 
existed before.78 Thus, Article 28 (8) provides that the Commission will start 
an infringement procedure if the Member States fail to comply with their 
duties: 
 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission information on 
cases where other Member States do not fulfil their obligations of 
mutual assistance. Where necessary, the Commission shall take 
                                                 
76 See B. de Witte: “Setting the scene: How did services get to Bolkestein and why?”, (2007) 3 
Mitchell Working Paper Series,: Edinburgh Europa Institute, p. 12; see, also, G. Davies: “Services, 
Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle”, (2007) 2 Mitchell Working Paper Series: 
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77 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
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appropriate steps, including proceedings provided for in Article 226 of 
the Treaty, in order to ensure that the Member States concerned 
comply with their obligations of mutual assistance. The Commission 
shall periodically inform Member States about the functioning of the 
mutual assistance provisions. 
 
In order to facilitate co-operation across the language barriers, the 
Commission is promoting an information system that provides for the 
automatic translation of specific standardised paragraphs. 
 
Thus, the Services Directive lays the foundations for transnationally operating 
administrations. Instead of simply following the instructions given in their 
national hierarchy of command, with the Minister on top being ultimately 
responsible politically,79 administrations now also have to comply with 
horizontal demands which originate in the administrations of other Member 
States. 
 
In the negotiations on the directive, the administrative changes required by 
the directive received relatively little attention. The political conflict about 
the extent of the liberalisation overshadowed everything else. However, they 
do impose major institutional changes. Already the requirement to provide 
for points of single contact implies a “paradigmatic” change for 
administrations, as they now have to be thought of from the point of the 
citizen accessing the administration, rather than from the point of state 
organisation and along the lines of inner-administrative accountability and 
responsibility.80 The obligation of administrative assistance among Member 
States intensifies these changes, and prompts questions regarding which 
administration acts under what kind of law. Thus, if the host-country 
administration takes action, upon the request of the home-country 
administration, it would have to do so upon the legal basis of the home 
country. But how would legal protection against these acts be organised, and 
to which court the administration would be subject and under what kind of 
law? Would the home-country court, say in Estonia, order the 
administration, say in the UK, to postpone or alter its acts? How would 
different data protection laws be handled? It is likely, that the duty to co-
operate will lead to further harmonisation of administrative laws of Member 
                                                 
79 See M. Döhler, “Institutional Choice and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Germany”, (2001) 25 West 
European Politics, pp. 101-124. 
80 See U. Schliesky, “Von der Realisierung des Binnenmarktes über die Verwaltungsreform zu einem 
gemeineuropäischen Verwaltungsrecht? Die Auswirkungen der geplanten EU-Dienstleistungsrichtlinie auf 
das deutsche Verwaltungsrecht”, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 2005, July, pp. 887-895, at 891. 
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States. Thus, the directive presents a significant break from the past principle 
that Member States are free to implement European directives with the 
European Union not interfering with administrative organisation of the 
Member States.81 
 
To sum up, distributive concerns were contained by reducing the scope of 
the directive and by abolishing the home-country principle, at least officially. 
At the same time, the strengthened co-operation appears crucial for Member 
States to accept the further integration of service markets by a combination of 
applying home-country and host-country rules, which now results. Given the 
way the ECJ is interpreting the need for administrative collaboration and 
reliance, totally rejecting the right of one Member State to control the 
administrative acts of another, it is only through further administrative co-
operation that the distributive effects of fraud in the trade of services can be 
contained. The centrality of administrative co-operation also becomes 
apparent in the bilateral attempts of the German government. 
 
9. Conclusions 
Mutual recognition is an alternative to integrating markets via harmonisation. 
For it to function, Member States have to trust that different rules will not be 
taken as a basis of competition; that difference will not be exploited to gain 
“unfair” advantages, relating not to different competitive strength but simply 
to rules and their enforcement. I have argued that mutual recognition is 
acceptable if competition is about markets not rules. Given the rule-
dependent nature of services, there is controversy among the Member States 
as to whether it is rule manipulation, and not efficiency and specialisation, 
that strengthens their competitiveness. Distributive effects arise, on the one 
hand, due to the labour-intensive nature of most services. With the 
liberalisation of services coinciding with the Eastern enlargement, the lower 
wages of these countries immediately exert pressure – most of all in those 
countries which rely on collective wage agreements, instead of minimum 
wages, as the host states cannot make these binding. In addition, there are, on 
the other hand, the many control problems that the principle of home-
country rule implies, when it is put to use with services. Several points are at 
issue here, and they are best illustrated by taking the case of goods as a starting 
point. Goods are being produced in the home country, under its rules, being 
controlled by local authorities and then traded. For services, with the 
exception of correspondence services, the situation is entirely different. 
Under the principle of home-country rule, service providers, regulated under 
                                                 
81 Ibid., at 893 et seq. 
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27 different regimes, work side-by-side. This raises issues of basic equality, 
particularly if nationals feel discriminated against by their own domestic rules. 
Host-state authorities, moreover, have to trust in the adequacy of the rules 
and the administrative controls of 26 different home countries. They cannot 
exert on-site controls, but have to ask the home-country authorities for such 
controls. It seems evident that integrating services markets via mutual 
recognition requires much more trust and institutional support structures than 
is the case for goods markets. For the latter, Member States have to trust each 
other to control the home market sufficiently to protect their own population 
as well as customers from abroad. For services, Member States have to trust 
each other to control their service providers sufficiently exclusively for the 
sake of customers abroad. In contrast to goods, it is possible, in the control of 
services, to distinguish whether the beneficiaries of controls are domestic 
customers or those of another Member State. In view of high unemployment 
figures in new Member States, the old Member States are sceptical as to 
whether the administrations of new Member States will take decisions that 
favour the old Member States at the expense of their own populations. By 
setting incentives in this way, mutual recognition in services favours illegal 
activities. 
 
In order to ameliorate such concerns as not playing by the rules, and thereby 
raising distributive issues, administrative co-operation is being strengthened. 
As we have seen, this is what Germany has, on its own, initiated by means of 
bilateral talks, but this is also the way that the Services Directive proceeds. 
Interestingly, mutual recognition thus leads to a harmonisation of state 
organisation. Traditionally, it is up to the Member States to decide how they 
implement the law of the European Union. While mutual recognition allows 
‘unity in diversity’ when it comes to regulation, paradoxically, in 
implementation, it leads to a new and significant form of harmonisation in 
the case of services. By instituting a new line of duties, administrations are 
released from their exclusive national obligations, and start to be similarly 
dedicated to the needs of other Member States in the context of the 
Community cause. In terms of institution-building, this is a very significant 
development. Possibly, it lays the foundation for a network of nationally-
based administrations pursuing European aims, rather than segmented 
national authorities pursuing domestic goals. 
 
The services single market is an interesting example of changes of institutional 
venues in view of conflicts of interest. First, the mutual recognition of rules is 
pursued instead of harmonisation, shifting the conflict of interest from the 
decision-making to the implementation stage. However, in the case of 
services, where regulation matters so much for competitive performance, the 
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incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage are high and conflicting interests 
cannot be mediated via mutual recognition. The harmonisation of 
administrative procedures to contain the distributive issues is the next step in 
this development. In the course of implementing the Services Directive, it 
remains to be seen whether distributional conflicts can be mediated 
successfully at this level. 
 
Chapter  3 








The GATS and the EC internal market on services, in particular the Services 
Directive, have been at the centre of a vigorous public debate about the 
effects of the liberalisation of services on domestic political, economic and 
social systems in recent years. This debate was part of the general discourse 
about the establishment and maintenance of social and economic justice 
under the conditions of globalisation. One of the aspects of this debate 
concerns the conflict-laden relationship between labour protection or social 
policy in general and competitiveness in the markets for services, which raises 
legal, political, economic and social concerns. The stimulating chapters by 
Alexia Herwig and Susanne Schmidt address two aspects of this multi-
dimensional relationship and approach them from different disciplinary 
backgrounds. 
 
2. The impact of GATS and EC law 
From the legal perspective, Alexia Herwig is interested in how the law reacts 
to the potential conflicts between the labour law regime and the services 
liberalisation regime. She approaches this question on a comparative basis, 
discussing the Services Directive and the GATS. She develops her arguments 
in two steps: first, she discusses whether the legal regimes can apply 
simultaneously, or, more precisely, whether the Services Directive or the 
GATS contain a carve-out for labour laws. She concludes - correctly, to my 
mind - that neither Article 1.6 of the Services Directive nor the GATS 
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Annex on Movement of Natural Persons preclude the applicability of the two 
liberalisation of services regimes to labour law. 
 
Having determined that an overlap between trade liberalisation and labour 
protection is possible, Herwig then analyses a potential area of conflict, i.e., 
the application of domestic labour laws and collective wage agreements to 
posted-workers from abroad. She points to the approach taken by the Posted-
Workers Directive in the EC context, which aims at a balance between the 
competitiveness of service providers and the protection of the (domestic and 
foreign) labour force. As Herwig rightly points out, the Posted-Workers 
Directive can be seen as an attempt to manage the underlying conflicts by 
means of the free movement of services and labour protection. However, the 
Posted-Workers Directive can also limit additional instruments used by the 
Member States in order to protect the labour force, as the Rüffert case aptly 
demonstrated.1 This case concerned the public procurement law of the 
German Land Niedersachsen which required a declaration from the bidders 
in a public tender to pay at least the remuneration prescribed by the 
collective agreement in force at the place where these services were to be 
performed. The ECJ held that this requirement is incompatible with the 
Posted-Workers Directive and Article 49 EC.2 
 
Lastly, Herwig turns to the GATS and assesses the potential impact of the 
national treatment obligation (Article XVII GATS) on domestic labour law. 
She identifies the modification of the competitive relationship as the 
determining factor of the application of Article XVII GATS, which contains 
the national treatment obligation. She concludes that the GATS national 
treatment obligation does not require the extension of labour standards to the 
foreign service supplier. This conclusion can be supported in full. However, 
the question answered by this conclusion is not the only relevant question in 
this context. Asking whether the GATS national treatment obligation 
prohibits WTO members from applying their own domestic system may be 
equally – if not more – important. Herwig briefly mentions this question but 
does not pursue it further. 
  
                                                 
1 Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen, Judgment of 3 April 2008, nyr. 
2 Rüffert, above note 2, para. 49. 




3. Revisiting Laval, Viking and Rüffert in light of the 
GATS 
In order to ascertain the potential impact of the GATS national treatment 
obligation on social policy and labour protection, it may be helpful to assess 
the three recent ECJ cases, which concerned the conflict between labour 
protection and the markets for services in the EC context, from the GATS 
perspective. How would the Viking,3 Laval,4 and Rüffert cases have been 
decided on the basis of the GATS national treatment obligation, assuming, in 
each case, that the countries concerned made full national treatment 
commitments? 
 
The answer to this question is relatively straight-forward in the Viking and 
the Rüffert cases: Viking is – as Herwig reminds us – a typical re-location 
scenario which concerns the re-establishment of a service provider in a 
country other than its (former) home country. From a GATS perspective, 
this involves trade in services through Mode 3 (commercial presence). 
However, the measure in question (preventing a company from re-locating) 
is a measure attributed to the home and not the host country,5 and affects the 
exportation of services, but not their importation. Yet, Mode 3 (unlike 
Modes 1 and 2) concerns the importation of services. Hence, only the 
measures of the host state are covered. Thus, the GATS national treatment 
obligation does not prohibit governments from preventing the re-location of 
a company. 
 
Rüffert concerned a condition placed on a call for tenders. According to 
Article XIII:1 GATS the national treatment obligation (as well as the most 
favoured nation and the market access obligations) does not apply to 
requirements governing government procurement. The GATS mandates 
negotiations on government procurement, but, so far, these have not 
produced any results. Thus, a Rüffert-type regulation would not be affected 
by Article XVII GATS. 
 
As Herwig points out, Laval is a typical replacement scenario: A service 
provider employing high-wage workers loses a competitive bid to a service 
                                                 
3 C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation a. o. v Viking Line a.o., Judgment of 11 
December 2007, nyr. 
4 C-341/05, Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet a. o., Judgment of 18 
December 2007, nyr. 
5 In fact, the measure in question was a measure by trade unions. Whether these are covered by 
GATS will be discussed in the context of the Laval case. 
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provider employing low-wage workers. This amounts to a de facto 
replacement of high-wage workers with low-wage workers. Addressing this 
case from a GATS perspective, one would first have to ask whether the 
activities of the labour unions (calling for a strike and blocking the 
construction site of Laval) would fall under the scope of the GATS as a 
measure by a WTO member affecting trade in services according to Article 
I:1 GATS. It can be argued that the collective action of the labour union 
affects trade in services, because Laval is supplying a service under Mode 4 of 
the GATS by posting workers to a construction site abroad, and was 
therefore engaging in “trade in services” according to Article I:2 GATS. 
However, it is questionable whether the collective action is a “measure by a 
Member”. The term “measure” is defined in Article XXVIII(a) GATS as 
suggesting that only governmental activities are covered by the GATS. 
However, GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice has extended the 
notion of a measure to include private actions encouraged or supported by a 
government, and not merely tolerated by it.6 Whether collective action 
would be covered by this, depends on the circumstances of the case. In any 
event, the institutional scope of the GATS seems much narrower than the 
scope of Article 49 EC which extends to rules “which are not public in 
nature but which are designed to regulate, collectively, the provision of 
services” and to “associations or organisations not governed by public law” 
including collective actions of trade unions.7 
 
If the collective action was covered by the GATS, one would have to 
determine whether the measure violates a specific commitment. There is no 
market access violation involved because measures against a service supplier 
who has already been granted market access are not mentioned in the list of 
prohibited measures in Article XVI:2 GATS. It is, however, possible that the 
collective action would violate the national treatment obligation in Article 
XVII GATS. While the requirement to join a collective labour agreement 
can be construed as a formally non-discriminatory requirement, it could, 
nevertheless, be discriminatory on a de facto basis. According to Article 
XVII:3 GATS, a measure is considered discriminatory if it modifies the 
conditions of competition in favour of the domestic service supplier. Hence, 
the central question is: What determines the competitive basis of the 
domestic and the foreign service supplier? On the one hand, it could be 
                                                 
6 W. Zdouc, “WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS”, in: F. Ortino & E-
U. Petersmann (eds), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003, (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2004), pp. 387-389. 
7 Laval, above note 5, para. 98. This conclusion deserves a very critical analysis, which is, 
however, beyond the scope of this comment. 




argued that the lower wages that Laval was paying determined the basis of its 
competitiveness. Viewed from this perspective, a requirement to join the 
Swedish collective wage agreement would modify the competitive basis to 
the detriment of Laval, because it would be required to pay wages 
above/superior to the level of its regular wages. On the other hand, it could 
be argued that competitiveness is determined by other factors such as the 
technology used by the service supplier. In this perspective, the requirement 
to join the collective agreements would establish a level playing-field between 
the domestic and foreign service supplier. A related question is at the heart of 
Susanne Schmidt’s paper. It is hence useful to turn to her arguments now. 
 
4. Solving the conflict through mutual recognition? 
Susanne Schmidt approaches the conflict between labour protection or social 
policy and the internal market from a political economy perspective. She is 
interested in the underlying reasons for the opposition to the single market 
for services in general, and the Services Directive in particular. She claims 
that the liberalisation of services was perceived by many as implying high 
distributive costs, because of the complexities of “governance through mutual 
recognition” in the context of services. While mutual recognition or the 
country of origin principle has long been accepted in the context of goods, it 
proved to be more contentious and complicated in the context of services. In 
fact, the critics of the Services Directive were particularly opposed to the 
inclusion of this principle in the directive. Why, one may ask, is there such a 
categorical difference between the free movement of goods and the free 
movement of services? Schmidt argues that there are, at least, two reasons: 
first, services are much more “rule-dependent” than goods. The application 
of different legal regimes therefore makes a greater difference than in the 
regulation of goods. Rules often shape and influence both the nature and the 
supply of a service as such. Second, the first draft of the Services Directive 
was published shortly before the Eastern enlargement took place, which 
increased the fears about liberalisation of services and produced a conflict 
between the new and the old Member States. In fact, all three controversial 
cases regarding labour protection and the free movement of services, the 
Viking, the Laval, and the Rüffert case, involved a competitive relationship 
between services suppliers from both “old” and “new” Member States.8 
 
However, there is more than just the rules-based nature of services and the 
increased competition from Eastern Europe. Mutual recognition in services 
                                                 
8 Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, Von der Entformalisierung europäischer Politik und dem 
Formalismus europäischer Rechtsprechung im Unfang mit dem “sozialen Defizit” des 
Integrationsprojekts, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 2/2008, p. 12. 
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leads de facto to the application of multiple regulatory regimes in a Member 
State. Taken to its extreme, if service providers from every Member State had 
to operate on one national market, 27 different legal regimes would be 
applicable to the various operations. Complicating matters further, the 
authorities of the host state are usually not very well informed about the legal 
requirements of the home states. The crucial argument of the paper is that, in 
the end, the popular acceptance of mutual recognition in services will greatly 
depend upon whether there is a “real competition” between different market 
players, or whether the competition actually takes place between different 
regulatory regimes. Susanne Schmidt puts it concisely in the following words: 
mutual recognition is acceptable if competition is about markets, not rules. 
This is an attractive and powerful finding. The key question is, however, 
how to distinguish competition between markets from competition between 
rules. This question is, in essence, the same question as the one raised above 
in the context of the GATS national treatment obligation: If two companies 
are competitors on a given market, which conditions constitute the 
competitive basis of their businesses? Which governmental measures would 
distort the competitive basis and which measures would establish this basis by 
creating a level playing-field? 
 
5. The conditions of competition: Economics, 
politics or both? 
Taking Susanne Schmidt’s distinction between markets and rules as a starting 
point, one would have to distinguish the economic and regulatory conditions 
of a competitive relationship. Economic conditions relate to the production 
costs. They could involve the technology used by the service supplier (for 
example, special software), its machinery and equipment, management 
measures and the qualification of its work-force. If a foreign service supplier 
is able to provide a service at lower costs than a domestic supplier due to 
better technology or a better qualified work-force, this would clearly be a 
competition in markets. Regulatory conditions refer to the legal regime 
applicable to the service and the service supplier. If a foreign service supplier 
is able to provide a service at lower costs because the registration 
requirements in the home country are less burdensome than those 
requirements in the host country, this could be labelled as competition in 
rules. Susanne Schmidt would argue that mutual recognition in this situation 
gives the foreign service supplier an “unfair advantage”, because neither the 
domestic nor the foreign service supplier can influence the regulatory 
conditions. In the context of GATS, non-discriminatory burdensome 
domestic regulations, which have an effect upon the competitive basis, should 




not be addressed by Article XVII GATS, but by the disciplines on domestic 
regulation according to Article VI:4 GATS. 
 
Labour costs are difficult to characterise in this scheme. On the one hand, 
they are clearly part of the production costs and depend, to a large extent, on 
the productivity of the labour force. In fact, if this is the only factor which 
influences labour costs, it seems convincing to assume that labour costs should 
be considered as part of the economic conditions. A national measure 
requiring the foreign service supplier to pay the same average wage as 
domestic service suppliers would, therefore, modify the conditions of 
competition to the detriment of the foreign service supplier within the 
meaning of Article XVII:3 GATS. On the other hand, labour costs often also 
depend on the legal framework, in particular, if a country has a law on 
minimum wages. Such a law could be regarded as part of the regulatory 
conditions because the requirement is imposed on the service suppliers 
without any possibility for them to change this condition. The same 
argument could be made about the conditions of public procurement such as 
the mandatory declaration to pay its employees a minimum wage by the 
bidder, which was at stake in the Rüffert case. 
 
The situation becomes even more complex if – as in the Laval and Viking 
cases – the measures in question are not the measures of governments but are, 
instead, imposed by collective agreements. These are clearly not regulatory 
measures, but they are often functionally equivalent to labour law and social 
regulation, in particular, concerning working hours, holidays and social 
benefits. This is why the ECJ extended the scope of the free movement of 
workers and the free movement of services to such collective agreements. 
However, collective agreements can also be considered as part of the 
economic conditions because they often contain the general structure and the 
level of the wages to be paid, and therefore supplement the individual 
contracts signed between the employer and the employee. In the end, it can 
be said that collective agreements do contain elements of economic and of 
regulatory conditions. 
 
What does the double-nature of collective agreements imply about the 
applicability of the GATS or the EC free movement of services? Here, a 
distinction between EC and GATS law seems necessary. Under EC law, 
collective action is recognised as “a fundamental right which forms an integral 
part of the general principles of Community law”.9 Furthermore, labour 
                                                 
9 Viking, above note 4, para. 44; Laval, above note 5, para. 91. 
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protection and social policy is an important aspect of the EC legal order, 
since the EC has “not only an economic but also a social purpose”.10 As a 
consequence, EC law should be deferential to collective agreements and leave 
them intact as much as possible. The national courts and the ECJ should 
therefore place great emphasis on the value of such agreements as important 
instruments of protecting labour when assessing whether the restrictions that 
they may impose on a fundamental freedom are necessary. 
 
Unlike EC law, the WTO legal order does not recognise fundamental rights 
and has no social purpose. It aims at economic integration, but not at social 
integration. It would therefore seem possible to argue that WTO law should 
not be interpreted and applied in deference to collective labour agreements. 
Yet, the WTO agreements are international agreements which oblige, first 
and foremost, the states (and other subjects of public international law) and 
their agencies. WTO law has generally no direct effect.11 Individuals cannot 
rely on WTO law or derive any individual rights from it. As a consequence, 
WTO law should also not be interpreted in order to create direct obligations 
imposed on individuals or non-state actors. Labour unions are not normally 
associated with the state. Hence, collective agreements should generally be 
considered as being outside the scope of WTO law despite the fact that they 
may contain rules which are functionally equivalent to national labour laws. 
 
To summarise, competitiveness should be determined by economic factors 
which reflect production costs which can be influenced by the service 
supplier, in other words, which are a result of an entrepreneurial decision. 
Other factors, including laws, regulations and collective wage agreements 
should be regarded as the regulatory framework of the service supply. Service 
suppliers should compete with each other for better entrepreneurship, but 
should not exploit differences in regulatory frameworks which reflect the 
policy choices of a particular society and which are part of that respective 
social model. 
 
                                                 
10 Viking, above note 4, para. 79; Laval, above note 5, para. 105. 
11 ECJ, Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council [1999] E.C.R. I-8395; US – Section 301-310 of the 






























































1. Labour standards in the Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organisation 
Although the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation (ITO) 
could not been realized, Article 7 on fair labour standards can be seen as an 
ambitious attempt to integrate social aspects into a Trade Agreement. The 
members should recognise that measures relating to employment must take 
the rights of workers under inter-governmental declarations, conventions and 
agreements fully into account. The achievement and maintenance of fair 
labour standards were seen as a common interest of countries, irrespective of 
their different degree of industrialisation. In a very open manner, it was 
recognised that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for 
export, may create difficulties in international trade. This understanding of 
the relations between trade and labour standards corresponded with the 
Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation, 24 March 
19481 acknowledged the prominent standing of the ILO and its labour 
standards. 
                                                 
1 Source: United Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held at 
Havana, Cuba, from 21 November 1947, to 24 March 1948: Final Act and Related 
Documents, Lake Success, New York: Interim Commission for the International Trade 
Organisation April 1948, p. 7. 
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Article 7: Fair Labour Standards 
 
1. The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take 
fully into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental declarations, 
conventions and agreements. They recognize that all countries have a common 
interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair labour standards related to 
productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and working conditions as 
productivity permit. The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, 
particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, 
and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate 
and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory. 
2. Members which are also members of the International Labour Organisation 
shall co-operate with that organization in giving effect to this undertaking. 
3. In all matters relating to labour standards that may be referred to the 
Organisation in accordance with the provisions of Articles 94 or 95, it shall 
consult and co-operate with the International Labour Organisation. 
 
2. Labour standards – not welcome as issue on the 
agenda of the WTO 
Labour standards are not subject to any WTO rules or disciplines at present. 
Some WTO member governments in Europe and North America have 
argued that the issue must be taken up by the WTO if public confidence in 
the WTO and the global trading system is to be strengthened. Without any 
success, they have argued that a narrower set of internationally recognised 
“core” labour standards – such as freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, prohibition of forced labour and of the worst forms of child 
labour, elimination of discrimination in the workplace (including gender 
discrimination) – should be put on the WTO’s agenda of future work. There 
is no other “trade and”-issue which inspires more intense debate among 
WTO members than the issue of trade and core labour standards. 
 
At the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, members defined the WTO’s 
role on this issue, identifying the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as 
the competent International Organisation to negotiate International Labour 
Standards in the form of Conventions and Recommendations, and to 
supervise their implementation. There is no work on this subject in the 
WTO’s Councils and Committees. In the past, some member governments 
did suggest that a WTO working party be established to examine the link 
between trade and core labour standards, in other words, the social issues that 
are affected by more and more globalised markets for goods and services. 
Such a working group could link the WTO to the relevant activities of other 
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International Organisations and associations of workers and employers in this 
field. But there are deeply-rooted differences between some developed and 
the most developing countries on this topic. Member governments from the 
developing world believe attempts to introduce this issue into the WTO 
represent a thinly-veiled form of protectionism which is designed to 
undermine the comparative advantage of lower wages in many developing 
countries. They argue that workplace conditions will improve through 
economic growth and development, which would be hindered should 
industrialised countries apply trade sanctions to their exports for reasons 
relating to labour standards. The application of such sanctions, so the 
arguments go, would perpetuate poverty and delay developmental efforts 
including those aimed at improving conditions in the workplace. 
 
Because the core labour standards are, at the same time, basic social human 
rights, this controversy is very closely connected with the debate on the 
respect of human rights in the world trading system. 
 
The highly controversial issue of trade and labour standards has been with the 
WTO since its foundation. In April 1994, when trade ministers gathered in 
Marrakesh to sign the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, nearly all the 
ministers expressed their very controversial views on this issue. The Preamble 
of the WTO Agreement states that “relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living (and) ensuring full employment”. 
 
At the First WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996, 
the issue was taken up again and addressed in Paragraph 4 of the Ministerial 
Declaration, 13 December 1996:2 
 
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these 
standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. 
We believe that economic growth and development fostered by 
increased trade and further trade liberalization contributed to the 
promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour standards for 
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of 
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way 
be put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO 
Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration. 
                                                 
2 WT/MIN 96/DEC/W. 
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This Declaration was supplemented with some very pointed comments made 
by the Chairman of the Conference as follows:3 
 
In the first place, with regard to paragraph 4 – core labour standards – 
we have agreed on a text which sets out a balanced framework of how 
this matter should be dealt with. The text embodies the following 
important elements: First, it recognizes that the ILO is the competent 
body to set and deal with labour standards. Second, it rejects the use of 
labour standards for protectionist purposes. This is a very important 
safeguard for the multilateral trading system, and in particular for 
developing countries. Third, it agrees that the comparative advantages 
of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no 
way be put into question. Fourth, it does not inscribe the relationship 
between trade and core labour standards on the WTO agenda. Fifth, 
there is no authorization in the text for any new work on this issue. 
Six, we note that the WTO and the ILO Secretariats will continue 
their existing collaboration, as with many other intergovernmental 
organizations. The collaboration respects fully the respect and separate 
mandates of the two organizations. Some delegations had expressed the 
concerns that this text may leave the WTO to acquire a competence to 
undertake further work in the relationship between trade and core 
labour standards. I want to assure these delegations that this text will 
not permit such development. 
 
In June 1994, the Governing Body of the ILO decided to set up a Working 
Party to discuss all relevant aspects of the social dimensions of the 
liberalisation of international trade, which would be open to all members of 
the Governing Body. In June 1999, the Governing Body decided to 
reconstitute this Working Party with a new mandate and to give it the new 
title “Working Party on the Social Dimension of Globalization”. 
 
At the Third Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in December 1999, the issue of 
core labour standards was perhaps the most divisive issue on the agenda. Both 
the United States und the EC put forward proposals for addressing the issue 
of labour standards inside the WTO. Although trade sanctions as reactions to 
violations of labour standards are not envisaged, the proposals were fiercely 
opposed by the governments of developing countries. Debates in a working 
group showed strong disagreement among the members; consensus on any 
role for the WTO on the question of labour standards could not be attained. 
                                                 
3 Concluding remarks by H.E. Mr Yeo Cheow Tong, Chairman of the Ministerial 
Conference, Minister for Trade and Industry of Singapore. 
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Since the Seattle Ministerial Conference, governments from around the 
world have turned their attention to the ILO as the forum for addressing 
questions on the relationship between trade, globalisation and labour 
standards. During the June 2001 meeting of the ILO Governing Body, the 
Working Party on the Social Dimension of Globalization reached several 
agreements on how it might proceed with its work. It was agreed that trade 
liberalisation and employment and investment, with a special emphasis on 
poverty reduction, should be issues that are taken up by the Working Party. 
There was also a general agreement that a permanent forum for exchange of 
views should be established. Members also generally agreed that the ILO 
contribution to the international policy framework on the question of 
globalisation needed to be enhanced and that a report on the social dimension 
of globalisation should be written. One idea was that a global commission of 
eminent personalities could be formed to examine the social aspects of 
globalisation and to write a report on the social dimension of globalisation in 
order to launch - in a very prominent way - ideas for a coherent political 
framework as an answer to the challenges of the globalisation. Meanwhile, 
Paragraph 8 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration in November 20014 had re-
affirmed the declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference with 
regard to internationally recognised core labour standards: 
 
We re-affirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference regarding internationally recognized core labour standards. 
We take note of work under way in the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization. 
 
In February 2001, Arthur Dunkel, Peter Sutherland and Renato Ruggiero 
had published a joint statement on the future on the multilateral trading 
system.5 They underlined that labour standards should not be put on the 
agenda of the WTO: 
 
Labour rights and environment are often linked as issues to be dealt 
with by the WTO. They should not be linked. The GATT and, 
especially, the WTO have been able to consider, if not always resolve, 
questions related to the intersection between environmental and trade 
policies; no doubt that will continue. It is not the case for labour rights. 
 
                                                 
4 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 
5 Arthur Dunkel, Peter Sutherland, Renato Ruggiero, Joint statement on the multilateral trading system, 1 
February 2001, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/jointstatdavos_jan01_1e.htm. 
70                                                                    Falke 
We accept that many of those who call for recognition of a link 
between international labour standards and trade do so out of genuine 
concern for the welfare of foreign workers. It is clear, however, that 
there is no basis for agreement on such a link being examined and 
acted upon within any delegate body of the WTO. That is the case for 
certain other areas where social development or human rights 
objectives are said to intersect with trade policy. 
 
The real problem is much wider. We accept that there is some genuine 
public disquiet, sometimes a sense of insecurity, about the nature and 
the speed of globalisation. There is some truth in the view that there is 
a lack of balance in the management by the international community 
of the social and developmental elements of global change. 
 
Indeed, there are many issues for which a complete and valid 
understanding requires the co-ordinated and focused attention of a 
number of international agencies. We therefore propose that a new 
commission be established, which brings together the heads of all 
relevant trade, financial and development institutions, to assist 
governments in understanding and managing the balance between the 
social and developmental aspects of global economic change. 
 
The collaboration between the WTO and ILO secretariats, both located in 
Geneva, seems to be of a very formalistic nature. It includes the participation 
of the WTO in the meetings of ILO bodies, the exchange of documentation 
and informal co-operation between the two secretariats. In March 2007, the 
Secretariats of the WTO and of the ILO presented the study “Trade and 
Employment Challenges for Policy Research” as the first result of 
collaborative research. With the relationship between trade and employment, 
it addresses an issue that is of important concern to both organisations. The 
foreword to this study demonstrates as clearly as possible, that the WTO and 
the ILO are – ten years after the Singapore Declaration – at the very 
beginning of their co-operation: 
 
The multilateral trading system has the potential to contribute to 
increasing global welfare and to promote better employment 
outcomes. The challenge all our Members face is to find ways of 
realizing this potential as fully as possible. A first step in that direction is 
to improve our understanding of how trade and labour markets interact 
and affect the lives of millions around the world. 
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We consider this joint study undertaken by the ILO and the Secretariat 
of the WTO a useful and timely initiative that will promote greater 
understanding and assist governments in making decisions in an 
increasingly complex and fast-changing environment. In joining the 
expertise of the two Secretariats, this technical study aims to provide a 
broad and impartial view of what can be said – and with what degree 
of confidence – about the relationship between trade and employment, 
and the way in which trade policies and labour market policies affect 
this relationship. The study also identifies questions that are not always 
well understood in the literature, and on which more research would 
be useful. 
 
We are therefore pleased to present this study as an encouraging 
illustration of how useful collaboration can be developed between the 
two Secretariats on issues of common interest. 
 
The study is finished with a statement between hope and lack of knowledge 
and far from a perspective for common actions: 
 
The main conclusion that emerges from this study is that trade policies 
and labour and social policies do interact and that greater policy 
coherence in the two domains can have significantly positive impacts 
on the growth effects of trade reforms and thus ultimately on their 
potential to improve the quality of jobs around the world. From this 
perspective, research directed at supporting the formulation of more 
effective and coherent policies would clearly have a high pay-off to the 
international community. 
 
3. World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization – WCSDG 
Globalisation is one of the most divisive issues of our time. Some view 
globalisation as a positive force that spreads wealth; others blame it for the 
world’s numerous problems. What is absent from much of this discussion, 
however, is the impact of globalisation on ordinary people throughout the 
world. 
 
This question was at the heart of the work of the independent World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG) which was 
created by decision of the ILO Governing Body in November 2001. The 
Commission was to prepare a major authoritative report on the social 
dimension of globalisation, including the interaction between the global 
72                                                                    Falke 
economy and the world of work.6 The ILO’s Director-General was invited to 
consult widely in order to appoint Commissioners with recognised eminence 
and authority, with due regard to gender, regional balance, tripartite 
perspectives, and reflecting the principal views and policy concerns in 
globalisation debates. Under the co-chairs of Tarja Halonen, the President of 
the Republic of Finland, and of Benjamin Mkaspa, the President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, nineteen other members were appointed from 
across the world’s regions, with diverse backgrounds and expertise. Five ex-
officio members, including the Director-General and the Officers of the 
Governing Body, provided linkage between the Commission and the ILO. 
The Commission has functioned as an independent body and takes full and 
independent responsibility for its Report and its methods of work. 
 
The Commission’s report, “A Fair Globalization – Creating Opportunities 
for All”, was published in February 2004.7 It was commented world-wide by 
heads of state and government, ministers, international organisations, 
parliamentarians, representatives of business and trade unions, national 
Economic and Social Councils, civil society organisations and the press, 
mainly in a favourable way.8 However, one cannot find any reaction on the 
part of the WTO, be it its Secretary-General, the General Council or its 
other bodies. 
 
The report’s main conclusion is that globalisation has enormous potential for 
goods, but urgently needs to become fairer, with its benefits extending to 
many more people and countries. This means changing the path of 
globalisation. In the words of the report: 
 
There are deep-seated and persistent imbalances in the current 
workings of the global economy, which are ethically unacceptable und 
politically unsustainable. […] Seen through the eyes of the vast 
majority of men and women, globalization has not met their simple 
and legitimate aspirations for decent jobs and a better future for their 
children. 
 
                                                 
6 See ILO Governing Body documents. “Enhancing the action of the Working Party on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization: Next Steps” (GB.282/WP/SDG/1), Geneva, November 
2001; and “Report of the Working Party on the Social Dimension of Globalization” 
(GB.282/12), Geneva, November 2001. 
7 The Report and some follow-up materials are available at: http://www.ilo.org/wsdg. 
8.A collection of references is available at:  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/fairglobalization/report/references.htm. 
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The report recommends changes in attitudes and policies to create a strong 
social dimension for globalisation. This should be based upon universal 
values, including respect for human rights and individual dignity, democracy 
and opportunity for all. While there are no miracle cures, the report puts 
forward a series of recommendations and proposals to help make globalisation 
a positive force for all people and countries. 
 
The report outlines a series of co-ordinated actions at national, regional and 
international levels involving international bodies, governments, workers, 
employers and civil society. In addition to fairer rules on trade, finance and 
migration, the report calls for policies to promote decent employment, 
sustainable economic development, social security, education and health care. 
Decent work, which meets people’s aspirations and respects their rights and 
dignity, should become a global goal. 
 
Globalisation needs a strong social dimension if it is to uphold basic human 
values and improve the well-being of people. The essential elements of this 
social dimension include: 
 
– basing globalisation upon universally-shared values, with economic 
development founded on the respect for human rights; 
– an international commitment to eradicate poverty and meet the 
basic material and other needs of all people; 
– a path of development that provides opportunities for all, expands 
sustainable livelihoods and employment, promotes gender equality 
and reduces disparities between countries and people; 
– making the system for governing globalisation more democratic and 
accountable. 
 
As the world becomes more interconnected through globalisation, there is 
increased need for effective international policies, rules and institutions. The 
report strongly recommends for the creation of a better international system 
to overcome the present fragmented and incoherent system which consists of 
a patchwork of overlapping networks and agencies in the economic, social 
and environmental fields. It outlines reforms to make multilateral 
organisations more democratic, accountable, transparent and coherent. It calls 
on international organisations to help find a better balance between social 
goals and economic policies, and to shift the focus from the markets to the 
people. International bodies should systematically examine the implications 
that their policies have for decent work, gender equality, education, health 
and social development. Such agencies should also work together to address 
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the social dimension of globalisation through “Policy Coherence Initiatives”, 
which aim to find new solutions to global problems, taking different 
perspectives into account. The report recommends the setting up of a 
Globalisation Policy Forum among interested international bodies. This 
would provide an opportunity for the United Nations and its specialised 
agencies to work with others to foster a more balanced and fair globalisation. 
 
4. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work 
As the report of the WCSDG says, it is essential that respect for core labour 
standards form part of a broad international agenda for development. The 
international community recognises the value of international labour 
standards in improving employment and labour conditions worldwide. Such 
standards are contained in the conventions and recommendations of the ILO, 
which are adopted in the tripartite framework by employers, workers and 
governments from the ILO’s 177 member countries. International labour 
standards are seen as a central plank of “decent work”. Over many years, a 
consensus has emerged on a series of “core” labour standards as a minimum 
set of rules for labour in the global economy. One important stage in this 




We commit ourselves to promoting the goal of full employment as a 
basic priority of our economic and social policies, and to enabling all 
men and women to attain secure and sustainable livelihoods through 
freely chosen productive employment and work. 
To this end, at the national level we will: 
[…] 
(i) Pursue the goal of ensuring quality jobs, and safeguard the basic 
rights and interests of workers and to this end, freely promote respect 
for relevant International Labour Organization conventions, including 
those on the prohibition of forced and child labour, the freedom of 
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the 
principle of non-discrimination. 
 
                                                 
9 Reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly Special Session (Copenhagen+5): World Summit 
for Social Development and Beyond: Achieving Social Development for All in a Globalized 
World (United Nations, Further initiatives for social development, A/RESD/S-24/2, New 
York 2000: United Nations, pp. 21.23. 
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The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work aims to 
ensure that social progress goes hand in hand with economic progress and 
development. The Declaration is a promotional instrument and a re-
affirmation by the ILO’s government, employer and worker constituents of 
the central belief set out in the organisation’s Constitution. 
 
Adopted in 1998, the Declaration commits member states to respect and 
promote principles and rights in four categories, independently of whether or 
not they have ratified the relevant Conventions. These categories are: 
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of 
child labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation. The Declaration underlines that these rights are universal, 
and apply to all people in all states – regardless of the level of economic 
development. 
 
This commitment is supported by a follow-up procedure. Member states that 
have not ratified one or more of the core Conventions are asked each year to 
report on the status of the relevant rights and principles within their borders, 
noting impediments to ratification, and areas where assistance may be 
required. These reports are reviewed by the Committee of Independent 
Expert Advisers. Their observations are, in turn, considered by the ILO’s 
Governing Body. 
 
The Declaration and its Follow-up provide three ways to help countries, 
employers and workers achieve the full realisation of the objective of the 
Declaration: 
 
– An Annual Review composed of reports from countries that have not yet 
ratified one or more of the relevant ILO Conventions. This reporting 
process provides governments with an opportunity to state what measures 
they have taken towards achieving respect for the Declaration. It also gives 
organisations of employers and workers a chance to voice their views on 
the progress made and the actions taken relating to enduring inactivity. 
 
– The yearly Global Report provides a dynamic global picture of the current 
situation of the principles and rights expressed in the Declaration. It is an 
objective view of the global and regional trends on the issues relevant to 
the Declaration and serves to highlight those areas that require greater 
attention. It serves as a basis for determining priorities for technical co-
operation. 
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– Technical co-operation projects are designed to address identifiable needs in 
relation to the Declaration, and to strengthen local capacities thereby 
translating principles into practice. 
 
The Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work are gaining wider 
recognition among organisations, communities and enterprises. They provide 
benchmarks for responsible business conduct, and are incorporated into the 
ILO’s own Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy. The OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises emphasise them and the UN Global Compact promotes them as 
universal values to be achieved in business dealings around the world. A 
growing number of private sector codes of conduct and similar initiatives also 
refer to the fundamental principles and rights at work. 
 
The Declaration explicitly states that these core labour standards should not 
be used for protectionist trade purposes, and that nothing in the Declaration 
and in the Follow-up process is to be invoked or otherwise used for such 
purposes; the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be 
called into question. 
 
Table one gives an overview of the Fundamental ILO Conventions and the 
Number of Ratifications in June 1998, the date of the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and in November 2007. 
Additionally, the main content of the several Conventions is summarised. 
 
 
Table 1: Fundamental ILO Conventions and Number of Ratifications 
No. Title and Aim of Convention Ratifications 
6/98 11/07 
29 Forced Labour Convention (1930) 
– Ratifying States are under the obligation to suppress all 
forms of forced or compulsory labour. 
– Illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour must be 
punishable as a criminal offence. 
145 172 
87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention (1948) 
– Workers and employers, without discrimination 
whatsoever, have the right to establish and join 
organisations of their own choosing with a view to 
furthering and defending their respective interests. 
– These organisations must enjoy full freedom to draw up 
their rules, designate their representatives and formulate 
their programmes. 
121 148 
Social Responsibility in International Trade? 77
 
No. Title and Aim of Convention Ratifications 
6/98 11/07 
98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining  
Convention (1949) 
– Workers must enjoy adequate protection against acts of 
anti-union discrimination. 
– Workers’ and employers’ organisations must enjoy 
protection against acts of interference by each other. 
– Voluntary collective bargaining to regulate terms and 
conditions of employment must be promoted. 
137 158 
100 Equal Remuneration Convention (1957) 
– Ratifying States undertake to promote and, where 
possible, to ensure application to all workers of the 
principle of equal remuneration for men and women for 
work of equal value. 
136 164 
105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957) 
Ratifying States undertake to suppress the recourse to any 
form of forced or compulsory labour: 
– as means of political repression; 
– as a method of mobilization of labour for economic 
development; 
– as a means of labour discipline; 
– as a punishment for having participated in strikes; 
– as a means of racial, social, national or religious 
discrimination. 
130 170 
111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
(1958) 
Calls for a national policy to eliminate discrimination in access 
to employment, training and working conditions, on grounds 
of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin, and to promote equal opportunity 
and treatment. 
129 166 
138 Minimum Age Convention (1973) 
– A general minimum age for admission to employment or 
work must be set, not lower than the age of completion 
of compulsory education and not less than 15 years. 
– Minimum age must not be less than 18 years in 
employment or work likely to jeopardize the health, 
safety or morals of young persons. 
– Light work may be permitted to young persons of 13 to 
15 years of age, provided it does not prejudice their 
education. 
64 150 
182 Worst Form of Child Labour Convention (1999) 
Ratifying States must take immediate and effective measures 
to prohibit and eliminate the worst forms of child labour, 
namely, slavery and forced labour, prostitution and 
pornography, illicit activities, and work likely to harm health, 
safety or morals. 
0 165 
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5. Possibilities for implementing social standards 
Flexible forms of transnational production and processes of economic 
globalisation are increasingly challenging the traditional capacity of domestic 
labour law to promote justice in the world of work. Three international and 
transnational modes of regulation are forming beyond the state: First, the 
International Labour Organisation is promoting a set of labour rights with 
which all states ought to comply as a matter of international law. Secondly, 
numerous institutions and actors are linking international labour rights with 
trade liberalisation initiatives. Thirdly, corporations are increasingly relying 
on codes of conduct to govern their employment relations. 
 
These developments are establishing relatively firm footholds in international 
law, and operate in tandem to provide international legal authority for 
innovative domestic regulation of transnational corporate activity. Together 
with more general principles of international human rights law, they 
authorise a state to require all corporations operating within its jurisdiction 
and all corporations operating outside its jurisdiction seeking domestic market 
access to comply with a domestically enforceable code of conduct that 
enshrines international labour rights. This new labour law authorises a hybrid 
form of domestic labour market regulation, one that combines public and 
private power, and invests international commitments with domestic legal 
force. It supplements traditional forms of domestic labour law to enable a 
state to regulate not only production within its jurisdiction, but also flexible 
forms of transnational production both at home and abroad.10 
 
Table two gives an overview of these implementing social standards. It 
differentiates between governments and privates as actors. Regulations and 
actions for implementing social standards with the participation of 
governments can be found at multilateral or bilateral level as well as in the 
UN human rights area, in the trade policy area and in the development 
policy. Reports and sanctions are mainly used as common instruments. 
Private actors use international, branch-related or firm-related levels as a 
playing field; codes of conduct and quality seals, as well as other forms of 
social labelling play a prominent role. 
  
                                                 
10 For more details, see Patrick Macklem, ‘Labour Law Beyond Borders’, (2002) 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law, pp. 595-645. 
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Table 2: Possibilities for implementing social standards 





human rights area 
ILO Reports, 








GSP Sanctions (positive, 
negative) 
Development policy: 
World Bank et al. Preparation of standards, 
Advising governments 
 2. Bilateral  Sanctions, 







 Codes of conduct 
  OECD Codes of Conduct 
  EC EC monitoring agency for 
behaviour of EC TNCs 
 2.Bilateral Ethical 
Trading Initiative 
 Monitoring quality of 
codes 
  DC measures Advertising governments 
etc. 
Private-Private 1.International NGOs / firms Quality seals: 
Social accountability 
8000, 
Rugmark, Flower Label 
Programmes 
 2. Branches e.g. Toy industry Codes of conduct 
 3. Firm-related Only firm-
international  
In-house of conduct 
  Firms / NGOs Ethics /business principles 
  Only NGOs  
Source: GTZ, Social Standards in Technical Cooperation, Eschborn 2004, p. 32. 
Acronyms: CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and cultural Rights 
CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child 
DC Development Cooperation 
GSP General System of Preferences 
NFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
TNC Transnational corporation 
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6. Corporate Social Responsibility – CSR 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept whereby organisations 
consider the interests of society by taking responsibility for the impact of their 
activities on customers, employees, shareholders, communities and the 
environment in all aspects of their operations. This obligation is seen to 
extend beyond the statutory obligation to comply with legislation, and sees 
organisations voluntarily taking further steps to improve the quality of life for 
both their employees and their families as well as for the local community and 
society at large. The term “corporate social responsibility” came into 
common use in the early 1970s. Many large companies now issue a corporate 
social responsibility report along with their annual report. 
 
There is no universally-accepted definition of CSR. Selected definitions by 
CSR organizations and actors include: 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by 
business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families 
as well as the local community and society at large.11 
 
Corporate social responsibility is undertaking the role of ‘corporate 
citizenship’ and ensuring the business values and behaviour is aligned 
to balance between improving and developing the wealth of the 
business, with the intention to improve society, people and the 
planet.12 
 
Corporate social responsibility is the commitment of business to 
contribute to sustainable economic development by working with 
employees, their families, the local community and society at large to 
improve their lives in ways that are good for business and for 
development.13 
 
A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.14 
 
                                                 
11 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Making good business sense, 2000. 
12 A brief history of social reporting, Business Respect 2003. 
13 International Finance Corporation, http://www.ifc.org (accessed 24 September 2008) 
14 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/csr/index_en.htm (accesssed 24 September 2008) 
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It is apparent that, in today’s business practice, CSR is entwined in many 
multinational organisations strategic planning processes. The reasons or drive 
behind social responsibility towards human and environmental responsibility 
is still questionable, and whether they are based upon genuine interests or 
have underlining ulterior motives still remains a valid question. Critics argue 
that CSR cherry-picks the good activities that a company is involved in and 
ignores the others, thus “greenwashing” their image as a socially or 
environmentally responsible company. There are other people who argue 
that it inhibits free markets. Some critics believe that CSR programmes are 
often undertaken in an effort to distract the public from the ethical questions 
posed by their core operations. 
 
The concept of CSR is closely connected with the idea of ethical 
consumerism. In many cases, international organisations and governments 
themselves have set the agenda for social responsibility. In many instances, 
separate organisational bodies are established to administer the workings of 
fair-trading at both a local and a global front. 
 
Table three gives an overview of benefits and costs of CSR for different 
stakeholder groups inside and outside the corporations. Table four shows the 
most well-known initiatives and their main issues. It differentiates between 
governmental and intergovernmental initiatives, company-led initiatives, 
NGO-led initiatives and governance initiatives. The last group is only in a 
very vague manner connected with the CSR concepts and has mainly 
managerial aims. 
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Table 3: Corporate Social Responsibility – Benefits and Costs for Different 
Stakeholder Groups 
Stakeholder group Benefits Costs 
Directors More independent non-executive 
directors 
More meetings and 
briefings 
Shareholders Increased investment from ethically 




Managers Better human rights policies lead to 
increased motivation 
Increased training in 
ethics 
 More awareness of ethical issues lead to 
more confidence about employees 
Focus group sessions 
and reporting 
Employees Better human rights policies lead to 
increased motivation 
Inclusion of ethics 
training 
 Good ethical conduct by superiors lead 
to increased productivity 
More intra-company 
communications 
 Less labour relations disputes, less strikes More efforts on 
labour relations 
 Better working conditions  
 Easier recruitment of high flyers and 
young people 
Will need to 
implement human 
rights policies 
 Reduced costs of recruitment  
Customers Move to ethical consumption captured  
by company 
Less disputes 
Advertising can cite CSR 
Enhanced reputation 
Brand quality recognition 
Costs of goods may 
increase in the 
short term 
Subcontractors/ Better quality inputs Cost of inputs may 
increase in the 
short term 
Suppliers Less harmful effect on public image  
Community More willingness to accept  
New investments  




Government More confidence in company  
 Fewer legal battles, no new potentially 
harmful legislation 
Costs of adhering 
to new regulations 
will increase 
 More favourable trading regime  
 More willingness to accept expansion or 
downsizing 
 
Environment Less legal battles  




Source: Michael Hopkins, Corporate social responsibility: an issues paper, Policy 
Integration Department Working Paper prepared for the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, No. 27, May 
2004, p. 30. 
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Table 4: Corporate Social Responsibility – Most well-known initiatives and their 
specific issues 
Initiatives Date Main Issues 
Governmental and Intergovernmental Initiatives: 
ILO Tripartite Declaration on 
TNCs 
Geneva, 1977, rev. 
3/2000 
Employment 
OECD Guidelines for MNEs Paris, 1976, rev. 6/2000 Employment, environment, 
combating bribery, 
consumer interests, 
science and technology, 
competition, taxation 
UN Global Compact New York, 7/2000 Human rights, labour and 
environment 
UNEP Financial Statement Paris, 1992, rev. 5/1997 Environment 
EC Principles Brussels, 2001, rev. 
2002 
Multi-stakeholder 
Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights, US & UK 
Govt. 
Washington DC and 
London, 12/2000 
Security and human rights 
for extractive and energy 
industries 
US Model Business Practices 
corruption, community, law 
Washington DC, 1996 Health and safety, labour, 
environment 
Ethical Trading Initiative, UK, 
Govt. NGOs 
London, 9/1998 Labour practices essentially 
on trade links and NGOs 
Company-led Initiatives: 
Caux Principles Minnesota, 1994 Multi-stakeholder 
Fair Labor Association (FLA), US California, 11/1998 Labour practices 
Global Sullivan Principles USA, 11/1999 Mainly external 
stakeholders 
ICC Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development 
Brussels, 1991 Environment, health and 
safety 
World Economic Forum Davos/Geneva, 2002 Corporate governance 
NGO-led initiatives: 
AccountAbility 1000 London, 1999, rev. 
2002 




Amnesty International Human 
Rights 
London, 9/1998 Human rights and 
security 
CERES Principles USA, 1989 Environmental ethical 
standards 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Boston 1997, rev. 2002 Multi-stakeholder, triple 
bottom line indicators 
ICFTU Code of Labour Practice Brussels/Geneva, 1997 Labour and trade union 
issues 
SA 8000 London, 1998, rev. 
2002 
Says CSR, but is mainly 
labour 
Social Venture Network 
Standards on CSR 
Brussels, 1999 CSR multi-stakeholder, 
corporate Governance 
mentioned, social audits 
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Initiatives Date Main Issues 
Sigma Sustainable Principles London, 1999 Multi-stakeholder, bias 
towards environment, no 
management 
shareholders 
Q-Res Codes of Ethics Italy, 1999 Multi-stakeholder 
Governance Initiatives: 
General Motors Board Guidelines Detroit Management 
OECD Principles / Millstein 
Report International 
Paris Management 
Bosch Report, Australia Australia Management 
Merged Code Recommendations Brussels Management 
Turnbull Report, UK London Management 
King Report, South Africa Johannesburg, 2002 Management and ethics 
King Report, Commonwealth London, 2001 Management and ethics 
World Bank Corporate Washington DC, 2000 Management and finance, 
Governance Forum 
Source: Michael Hopkins, Corporate social responsibility: an issues paper, Policy 
Integration Department Working Paper prepared for the World Commission on 
the Social Dimension of Globalisation, No. 27, May 2004, p. 30. 
 
7. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The first versions of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) can be 
seen as predecessors for the recent debate on the linkages between trade and 
core labour standards. 
 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations 
addressed by governments to MNEs operating in or from adhering countries 
(the 30 OECD member countries plus ten non-member countries15). They 
provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct, 
in a variety of areas including employment and industrial relations, humans 
rights, the environment, information disclosure, competition, taxation, and 
science and technology. The OECD Guidelines are the only multilaterally 
endorsed and comprehensive code that governments are committed to 
promote. The Guidelines’ recommendations express the shared values of the 
governments of countries that are the source of most of the world’s direct 
investment flows and home to most MNEs. They aim to promote the 
positive contributions that MNEs can make to economic, environmental and 
social progress. They are an annex to the OECD Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, and were adopted by the OECD 
in 1976, and were revised in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1991 and 2000. 
                                                 
15 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Israel, Lavia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. 
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, revised version 2000 
Selected outline 
Preface: 
1.  The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) are 
recommendations addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises. They provide voluntary principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws. 
They aim to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in 
harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of 
mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in which 
they operate, to help improve the foreign investment climate and 
to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by 
MNEs. 
I. Concepts and Principles: 
1.  The Guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed by 
governments to multinational enterprises. They provide 
principles and standards of good practice consistent with 
applicable laws. Observance of Guidelines by enterprises is 
voluntary and not legally enforceable. 
6.  Governments adhering to the Guidelines should not use them for 
protectionist purposes nor use them in a way that calls into 
question the comparative advantage of any country where 
multinational enterprises invest. 
7.  Governments have the right to prescribe the conditions under 
which MNEs operate within their jurisdictions, subject to 
international law. 
10.  Governments adhering to the Guidelines will promote them and 
encourage their use. They will establish National Contact Points 
that promote the Guidelines and act as a forum for discussion of 
all matters relating to the Guidelines. The adhering Governments 
will also participate in appropriate review and consultation 
procedures to address issues concerning interpretation of the 
Guidelines in a changing world. 
IV. Employment and Industrial Relations: 
Enterprises should, within the framework of applicable law, regulations and 
prevailing labour relations and employment practices: 
1. a) Respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade 
unions and other bona fide representatives of employees, and 
engage in constructive negotiations with such representatives 
with a view to reaching agreements on employment 
conditions. 
b) Contribute to the effective abolition of child labour. 
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c) Contribute to the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour. 
d) Not discriminate against their employees with respect to 
employment or occupation on such grounds as race, sex, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, 
unless selectivity concerning employee characteristics furthers 
established governmental policies which specifically promote 
greater equality of employment opportunity or relates to the 
inherent requirements of a job. 
2. a) Provide facilities to employee representatives as may be 
necessary to assist in the development or effective collective 
agreements. 
b) Provide information to employee representatives which is 
needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of 
employment. 
c) Promote consultation and co-operation between employees 
and employers and their representatives on matters of mutual 
concern. 
3. Provide information to employees and their representatives which 
enables them to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of 
the entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole. 
4. a) Observe standards of employment and industrial relations not 
less favourable than those observed by comparable employers in 
the host country. 
b) Take adequate steps to ensure occupational health and safety in 
their operations. 
5. In their operations, to the greatest extent practicable, employ local 
personnel and provide training with a view to improving skill 
levels, in co-operation with employee representatives and, where 
appropriate, relevant governmental authorities. 
 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted in 1977, is addressed to both the 
governments of home and host countries, and to the MNEs themselves. 
MNEs are, above all, required to respect the national policy objectives of 
countries in which they operate with regard to employment promotion, job 
security, non-discrimination, training, wages, and safety at work. They must 
also comply with national laws to the highest possible standard, and not to 
treat their employees less favourably than comparable national enterprises 
would treat them. MNEs, governments, and employers’ and workers’ 
organisations should help to implement the ILO Declaration on the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The text of the MNE 
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Declaration is regularly updated to include references to new instruments, 
adopted by the International Labour Conference and the Governing Body, 
which are of relevance to the issues it covers. In March 2000, the text was 
revised to incorporate the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
During the last update, which was adopted in March 2006, the list of ILO 
Conventions that member states are invited to ratify was extended to all the 
fundamental Conventions. 
 
ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 




5.  These principles are intended to guide the governments, the 
employers’ and workers’ organizations and the multinational 
enterprises in taking such measures and actions and adopting such 
social policies, including those based on the principles laid down 
in the Constitution and the relevant Conventions and 
Recommendations of the ILO, as would further social progress. 
7.  This Declaration sets out principles which governments, 
employers’ and workers’ organizations and multinational 
enterprises are recommended to observe on a voluntary basis; its 
provisions shall not limit or otherwise affect obligations arising 
out of ratification of any ILO Convention. 
Means: 
3.  This aim will be furthered by appropriate laws and policies, 
measures and actions adopted by the governments and by 
cooperation among the governments and the employers’ and 
workers’ organizations of all countries. 
Addressees: 
4.  The principles that out in this Declaration are commended to the 
governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations of home 
and host countries and to the multinational enterprises 
themselves. 
General polices: 
8.  All the parties concerned by this Declaration should respect the 
sovereign rights of States, obey the national laws and regulations, 
give due consideration to local practices and respect relevant 
international standards. They should respect the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding 
International Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations as well as the Constitution of the ILO and its 
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principles. They should contribute to the realization of the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
its Follow-up, adopted in 1998. 
10.  Multinational enterprises should take fully into account 
established general policy objectives of the countries in which 
they operate. Their activities should be in harmony with the 
development priorities and social aims and structure of the 
country in which they operate. 
11.  Multinational and national enterprises should be subject to the 
same expectations in respect of their conduct in general and their 
social practises in particular. 
Employment: 
Employment promotion 
16.  Multinational enterprises, particularly when operating in 
developing countries should endeavour to increase employment 
opportunities and standards. 
18.  Multinational enterprises should give priority to the 
employment, occupational development, promotion and 
advancement of nationals of the host country at all levels. 
Equality of opportunity and treatment 
22.  Multinational enterprises should be guided by this general 
principle throughout their operations without prejudice to the 
measures envisaged in par. 19 or to government policies designed 
to correct historical patterns of discrimination and thereby to 
extend equality of opportunity and treatment in employment. 
Conditions of work and life: 
Wages, benefits and conditions of work 
33.  Wages, benefits and conditions of work offered by multinational 
enterprises should be not less favourable to the workers than 
those offered by comparable employers in the country 
concerned. 
Minimum age 
36.  Multinational enterprises, as well as national enterprises, should 
respect the minimum age for admission to employment or work 
in order to secure the effective abolition of child labour and 
should take immediate and effective measures within their own 
competence to secure the prohibition and elimination of the 
worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. 
Safety and health 
38.  Multinational enterprises should maintain the highest standards of 
safety and health, in conformity with national requirements, 
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bearing in mind their relevant experience within the enterprise as 
a whole, including any knowledge of special hazards. 
Industrial Relations: 
41.  Multinational enterprises should observe standards of industrial 
relations not less favourable than those observed by comparable 
employers in the country concerned. 
Freedom of association and the right to organize 
42.  Workers employed by multinational enterprises as well as those 
employed by national enterprises should have the right to 
establish and to join organizations of their own choosing without 
previous authorisation. They should also enjoy adequate 
protection against acts of antiunion discrimination in respect of 
their employment. 
Collective bargaining 
49.  Workers employed by multinational enterprises should have the 
right, in accordance with national law and practice, to have 
representative organizations of their own choosing recognized for 
the purpose of collective bargaining. 
53.  Multinational enterprises should not threaten to utilize a capacity 
to transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from the 
country concerned in order to influence unfairly those 
negotiations or to hinder the exercise of the right to organize; 
nor should they transfer workers from affiliates in foreign 
countries with a view to undermining bona fide negotiations 
with the workers’ representatives or the workers’ exercise of 
their right to organize. 
55.  Multinational enterprises should provide workers’ representatives 
with information required for meaningful negotiations with the 
entity involved and, where this accords with local law and 
practices, should also provide information to enable them to 
obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity or of 
the enterprise as whole. 
 
Table 5 gives an overview of the many multilateral sources of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Table 6 entails a comparison of the 
OECD Guidelines for MNEs with the ten principles of the UN Global 
Compact. 
  
90                                                                    Falke 
Table 5: Multilateral Sources of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
OECD Guidelines Established International Framework mentioned in the OECD 
Guidelines 
Preface 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1995 Copenhagen Declaration for Social Development, 
1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, 
1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
1999 OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context 
of Electronic Commerce, 
1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MNEs and Tax 
Administration 
I. Concept and 
Principles 
 
II. General Policies 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
III. Disclosure 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
IV. Employment and 1977 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning MNEs 
and Social Policy, Industrial Relations 
1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work;  
ILO Conventions:  
No. 29 of 1930 concerning Forced and Compulsory Labour,  
No. 105 of 1957 on the Abolition of Forced Labour, No. 111 of 
1958 concerning Discrimination with respect to Employment and 
Occupation,  
No. 182 of 1999 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour,  
No. 138 of 1973 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment; ILO Recommendations: No. 94 of 1952 concerning 
Consultation and Cooperation between Employers and Workers 
at level of Undertaking,  
No. 146 of 1973 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment 
V. Environment 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and 
Agenda 21, 
1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 




1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, 
1997 OECD Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in 
International Business Transactions, 
1996 OECD Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials 
VII. Consumer 
Interests 
1999 Revised UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 
1999 OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context 
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of Electronic Commerce, 
1980 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Trans-border Flows of Personal Data 
VIII. Science & 
Technology 
No OECD or external references 
IX. Competition 1998 Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning 
Effective Sanctions Against Hard Core Cartels, C (98)35/Final, 
1995 Recommendation of the Council, concerning Co-operation 
Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices 
Affecting International Trade, C(95)130/Final, Making International 
Markets More Efficient Through Positive Comity in Competition Law 
Enforcement. Report of the OECD Committee on Competition 
Law and Policy 
X. Taxation 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MNEs & Tax 
Administrations, Recommendation of the OECD Council on the 
Determination of Transfer Pricing between Associated 
Enterprises 
Source: Kathryn Gordon / Clelia Mitidieri, Multilateral Influences on the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment No. 2005/2, Paris, Sept. 2005, p. 7. 
 
 
Table 6: Comparison of the Coverage of the UN Global Compact Principles and 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
Global Compact Principles OECD Guidelines’ Chapter 
Human Rights:  
Principle 1: Business should support and respect the 
the protection of internationally proclaimed human 
rights. 
Chapter II – General Principles  
Chapter VII – Consumer 
Interests 
Principle 2: Make sure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses. 
Chapter II – General Policies 
Labour:  
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining 
Chapter IV – Employment and 
Industrial Relations 
Principle 4: Elimination of all forms of forced and 
compulsory labour 
Chapter IV – Employment and 
Industrial Relations 
Principle 5: Effective abolition of Child Labour Chapter IV – Employment and 
Industrial Relations 
Principle 6: Elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation 
Chapter IV – Employment and 
Industrial Relations 
Environment:  
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary 
approach to environmental challenges. 
Chapter V – Environment and 
Industrial Relations 
Principle 8: Undertake initiatives to promote greater 
environmental responsibility. 
Chapter V – Environment 
Principle 9: Encourage the development and diffusion 
of environmentally friendly technologies. 
Chapter V – Environment 
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Global Compact Principles OECD Guidelines’ Chapter 
Anti-corruption:  
Principle 10: Business should work against all forms of 
corruption, including extortion and bribery. 
Chapter VI – Combating Bribery 
Other issues:  
 Chapter III – Disclosure 
Chapter VII – Consumer 
Interests 
Chapter VIII – Science and 
Technology 
Chapter IX – Competition 
Chapter X – Taxation 
Source: OECD Secretariat / UN Global Compact Office, The UN Global Compact 
and the OECD Guidelines for Multination Enterprises: Complementarities and 
Distinctive Contributions, Paris, 26 April 2005, p. 5. 
 
8. United Nations Global Compact 
The United Nations Global Compact is an initiative to encourage businesses 
worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially-responsible policies, and to report 
on them. Under the Compact, companies are brought together with UN 
agencies, labour groups and civil society representatives. 
 
The UN Global Compact was first announced by UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan in an address to the World Economic Forum on 31 January 
1999, and was officially launched at UN Headquarters in New York on 26 
July 2000. As of 2006, it included more than 3,300 companies from all 
regions of the world, as well as around 1,000 labour and civil society 
organisations, also from all regions of the world. The Global Compact Office 
is supported by six UN agencies: the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), and the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
 
The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument, but is, instead, a forum 
for discussion and a network for communication, which includes 
governments, companies and trade unions, whose actions it seeks to 
influence, and civil society organisations, which represent its stakeholders. 
The Compact’s goals are intentionally flexible and vague; it distinguishes the 
following channels through which it provides facilitation and encourages 
dialogue: policy dialogues, learning, local networks and projects. The ten 
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leading principles in the fields human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption are included in Table 6. 
Global Compact Critics is an informal network of organisations and people 
with concerns about the Global Compact. Many NGOs, such as Greenpeace 
ActionAid, CorpWatch and the Berne Declaration, believe that, without any 
effective monitoring and enforcement provisions, the Global Compact fails to 
hold corporations accountable. Moreover, these organisations argue that 
companies can misuse the Global Compact as a public instrument for “blue-
washing”, as both an excuse and an argument to oppose any binding 
international regulation on corporate accountability, and as an entry door to 
increase corporate influence on the policy discourse and the development 
strategies of the United Nations. 
 
9. Conditionality of General Systems of Preferences 
as linkage between trade and labour 
The purpose of the General Systems of Preferences (GSP), which was 
initiated by the United States and other industrial countries in the 1970s, is to 
promote economic growth in developing countries by stimulating their 
exports. The EC introduces the GSP and its successor programme GSP+ for 
developing countries to be granted preferential status when exporting into the 
EC and, among others, applying fundamental human rights, core labour 
standards and some Multilateral Environment Agreements. This instrument is, 
therefore, an incentive-based system which should contribute to the 
implementation of fundamental labour standards in developing countries. The 
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance may be granted to a country which has ratified and effectively 
implemented the relevant conventions. The European Commission is to keep 
the status of ratification and effective implementation of the conventions 
under review. The examination must take the findings of the relevant 
international organisations and agencies into account. The preferential 
arrangements may be temporarily withdrawn with regard to serious and 
systematic violations of principles laid down in the relevant conventions. 
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Conditions referred to in Art. 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 
of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, OJ L 169, 
30.6.2005, 1-43 
Annex III, Part A: Core human and labour rights, UN/ILO 
Conventions 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
3. International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) 
5. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 
8. ILO Convention No. 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment 
9. ILO Convention No. 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
10. ILO Convention No. 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 
11. ILO Convention No. 29 Forced or Compulsory Labour 
12. ILO Convention No. 100 concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and 
Women Workers for Work of Equal Value 
13. ILO Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation 
14. ILO Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise 
15. ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the Application of the Principles to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively 
16. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid 
Annex III, Part B: Conventions related to the environment and 
governance principles 
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
19 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
20. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
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21. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
22. Cartagena Protocol on Biological Diversity 
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
24. United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) 
25. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) 
26. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988) 
27. United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mexico) 
 
10. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism as a means 
to consider labour standards inside the WTO 
A possible compromise approach, which, on the one hand, would employ 
the WTO in considering core labour standards, but which, on the other, 
would allow time to establish the best way in which they could be enforced, 
involves using the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).16 The 
TPRM was established in 1988 as the very first result of the starting Uruguay 
Round. Subsequently established as a key component of the WTO, the 
objective of the TPRM is to review the trade policies and practices of the 
members and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system. 
 
The reviews are carried out by the WTO Secretariat, whose report is 
subsequently sent to the WTO General Council. In this way, the TPRM is 
essentially a kind of peer-group assessment. Although all WTO members are 
subject to review under TPRM, the regularity is determined by their share of 
world trade. The top four members are subject to review every two years, the 
next 16 are reviewed every four years, while the reminder are reviewed every 
six years. However, the TPRM does not hand out “punishments”, nor can it 
be used for the enforcement of specific obligations or to settle disputes. 
 
The TPRM provides a constructive and non-confrontational way through 
which institutional links can be established between social issues and trade.17 It 
is also an approach favoured by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) which contends that labour standards must be 
regarded as among the trade-related policies and practices that are central to 
the TPRM process. As a way of demonstrating the efficacy of the process, the 
                                                 
16 For more details, see Sean Turnell, ‘Core Labour Standards and the WTO’, (2002) 13 
Economics and Labour Relations Review. 
17 Mehmet et al., 1990, p. 202. 
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ICFTU has begun producing its own labour standards reports for the 
countries subject to the periodic Trade Policy Review.18 
 
Mehmet et al. (1999, p. 203) are impressed by the educative possibilities of 
the use of the TPRM process, noting that “it may be the best way to develop 
our conceptual and empirical understanding of the linkage that is required to 
develop further policy in this area, and, in particular, to determine the extent 
that labour standards can be subsidising trade or investment, whether in a 
traditional or non-traditional conceptualisation of subsidy’. The TPRM also 
provides the means, they argue, by which “aggressive unilateralism” could be 
avoided, while, at the same time, exposing the emerging labour tensions in 
international economic relations before they are allowed to escalate into trade 
disputes. 
 
                                                 
18 These reports can be found at the website of the ICFTU, http://www.icftu.org. 
Chapter  5 
Reframing RECON: Perspectives on 
Transnationalisation and Post-national 
Democracy from Labour Law
 
Claire Methven O’Brien 




RECON takes as its challenge the task of discovering whether supranational 
governance can achieve a democratic character. It assumes that an essential 
core of the concept of democracy can be disembedded from the notion and 
institutions of the constitutional nation state and re-planted within 
transnational governance systems, in the EU and beyond, even while these 
fail to provide for representation and accountability along traditional lines.1 It 
further asserts that social ordering deriving from transnational governance that 
is democratic will be legitimate.2 
 
RECON’s “yardstick” for these two properties is deliberative: democratic 
legitimacy, it says, “requires public justification of the results to those who are 
affected by them”. Deliberation is further claimed to embody the democratic 
principles of congruence (“those affected by laws should also be authorised to 
make them”) and accountability (which relates to reason-giving practice 
                                                 
1 E.O. Eriksen & J.E. Fossum, “Europe in Transformation. How to Reconstitute 
Democracy?”, RECON Online Working Paper 2007/1, (Oslo: ARENA, 2007), at 4. 
2 See, further, E.O. Eriksen & J.E. Fossum, “Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of 
Legitimation Assessed,” (2004) 25 International Political Science Review, p. 435. 
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“wherein the decision-makers can be held responsible to the citizenry, and 
that, in the last resort, it is possible to dismiss [...] incompetent rulers”.)3 
 
Within this framework, Work Package 9 seeks to explore the dynamics of 
interaction between transnational economic integration, proceeding through 
law, as in the EU and WTO, and constitutional norms and standards, of both 
national and international origin, subsumed by such systems. Its project is to 
assess, “…whether the…‘package’ once associated with state citizenship, 
including all of the classical attributes of legal, political and socio-economic 
citizenship can be reconstructed and reconfigured across different 
‘constitutional’ sites, or whether the language and practices of 
constitutionalism beyond the state instead ‘hollow out’ the capacity for state 
constitutional citizenship without adequate replacement or substitution at the 
post-national level. 
 
To this inquiry, this paper contributes a study of recent reflections on the 
consequences of global economic integration within the field of labour law. 
Its purpose is to provide the basis for a synchronic comparison, in outline, 
across legal sub-disciplines. In their framings, methodologies, precepts, and 
functional identities, social science disciplines and sub-disciplines evince and 
prosecute a range of cognitive and normative concerns.4 Viewing the 
transformations and potentials of globalisation and supranational governance 
through the lens of labour law ought, then, to help to illuminate the 
preferences and selections of constitutional theory and general public law, the 
mainstays of RECON’s theoretical framework, and so offer means to refine 
and enrich it. 
 
The first main finding taken to emerge from this exercise is that the working 
definitions of democratic legitimacy, congruence and accountability stated at 
the start tend to re-produce a limited democratic horizon that is classically 
liberal in orientation. Axiomatically and functionally, labour law is concerned 
with the sphere of market relations. Normatively, it is engaged by challenges 
                                                 
3 Eriksen & Fossum, n. 1, at 4, and further (at 8): “The public sphere located in civil society 
holds a unique position, because this is where everyone has the opportunity to participate in 
the discussion about how common affairs should be attended to. It signifies that equal citizens 
assemble into a public, which is constituted by a set of civil and political rights and liberties, and set 
their own agenda through communication” (emphasis added). 
4 R. Mayntz, “Embedded Theorizing. Perspectives on Globalization and Global Governance”, 
MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/14 (Cologne, MPIfG, 2005); M. Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, “A 
Decentred Theory of Governance: Rational Choice, Institutionalism, and Interpretation”, 
Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper 2001-10, (Berkeley CA: IGS, 
2001). 
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to individual autonomy which arise in the course of work - its understanding 
of which essentially embraces distributive issues – and which may be 
crystallised in “private” legal relations, principally contract. During the 
twentieth century, labour law – through state constitutions, national and 
sectoral collective agreements, statute and court decisions5 - articulated 
individual and collective rights in response to such challenges. At various 
moments, it sought to extend the scope of application of concepts of civil 
rights, citizenship and democracy into the realm of industrial production, as a 
framework for the conduct of economic life (since, originally, they set 
parameters channelling the conduct of politics).6 Feminist labour analyses, for 
their part, have conclusively shown interdependencies, and the gendered 
nature of the boundary between market/non-market rights, rewards, and 
statuses within the constitutional frameworks of existing democratic states.7 
 
By contrast the “deliberative yardstick” as defined implicitly reaffirms a liberal 
constitutional paradigm8 that restricts the scope of democratic self-
governance, citizenship and associated rights to one side of the conventional 
constitutional public-private divide. Analysis with this starting point, it is 
suggested, already “…hollows out the capacity” for state constitutional 
citizenship” including “all of the classical attributes of legal, political and 
socio-economic citizenship”, before it begins. RECON should, I argue, 
instead explicitly acknowledge and engage with communication, rule-making 
and coercive power9 within the economy as well as in the “public” sphere 
and civil society, and should include in the scope of study the altered 
dynamics affecting them that stem from transnationalisation’s de-borderings 
and re-borderings.10 If it elects to take the other course, at the very minimum, 
it must openly register and defend this choice as such. 
                                                 
5 F. Rödl, “Towards a Reflexive Labour Constitution. On the Form of Regulating Labour 
Relations in Europe”, Cidel concluding conference Paper No. 14 (Florence, 
ARENA/CIDEL/EUI, 2005). 
6 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (London: Pluto, 1992 (1950)), H. Arthurs, 
“Developing industrial citizenship: a challenge for Canada’s second century”, (1967) XLV La 
revue de Barreau canadien, p. 786; C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), P. Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice, (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1978). 
7 Classically, F. Olsen, “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”, 
(1983) 96 Harvard Law Review, p. 1497. 
8 J. Habermas, “Paradigms of Law”, in: M. Rosenfeld & A. Arato (eds), Habermas on Law and 
Democracy, (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1996). 
9 As discussed further, in interview, by Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge: A. Fung, 
“Deliberation’s Darker Side: A Discussion with Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge”, 
(2004) 93 National Civic Review, p. 47. 
10 S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages, (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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The second conclusion has a methodological basis. Labour law - more 
frequently than constitutional legal theory - historicises its concepts and 
institutions.11 It thus highlights the co-evolution of democratic constitutions 
with industrialisation and the development of national welfare regimes. Social 
integration, it underlines, has material as well as political and cultural bases: 
national constitutions represent settlements with distributive as well as 
political dimensions, and modern democratic legitimacy has depended on the 
delivery of acceptable standards of living as much as on public justification, 
formal rights of political participation or the power to dismiss rulers.12 “[T]he 
solidaristic basis of the nation state, as well as of the welfare state”, it has been 
said, encompasses more than “the symbolic ‘we’”.13 On this basis, RECON’s 
“results” requiring public justification, understood fully, must extend to 
material social outcomes for whose achievement constitutions provide the 
framework, and which derive not just from the public but also the private 
arrangements they permit, including in the world of work. Moreover, 
principled calibration of such results – prerequisite to justification through 
rational discourse, as deliberative cosmopolitanism would demand – will 
require collection and evaluation of information regarding substantive 
(including relative) levels of individual and collective welfare, in terms of 
both their public and private components. There are, in other words, 
technical-institutional implications, flowing from a normative preference for 
deliberative cosmopolitanism, which touch on distribution and “private” 
social ordering, in addition to those relating, for example, to supporting the 
coalescence of post-national communicative space and party-political 
representation.14 
 
These observations, it is suggested, run flush with, and lend support to, a thick 
theory of deliberation, that is, one which sees a wide range of factors, social as 
well as personal, as affecting the extent and quality of individual participation 
                                                 
11 Ch. Joerges, B. Stråth & P. Wagner (eds), The Economy as Polity: The Political Constitution of 
Contemporary Capitalism, (London: UCL Press, 2005) marks an exception. 
12 See F. Block, “Towards a New Understanding of Economic Modernity”, Ch. 1 in: The 
Economy as a Polity: The Political Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism, (London: UCL Press, 
2005), Ch. Joerges, B. Stråth & P. Wagner (eds), for discussion of perceptions of historical 
complementarities between market expansion and popular “protective counter-movements”, 
despite superficially contradictory objectives, in the works of Karl Polanyi, Karl Marx and E.P. 
Thomson (at 13-14). 
13 See Fossum & Eriksen (supra n. 1, at 20): “A legally integrated state-based order is often seen 
as premised on the existence of a sense of common destiny, an imagined common fate…This 
constitutes the solidaristic basis of the nation state, as well as of the welfare state…” 
14 See M. Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Global Justice”, 
(2003) 9 Feminist Economics, p. 33. 
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in rational discussion preceding the making and approval of legal norms,15 and 
the extent to which these norms express the needs, preferences and values of 
different social groups.16 Failure explicitly to specify substantive social, welfare 
and labour objectives (which may be structured through reference to socio-
economic rights) as both a goal and pre-condition of reconstructed cosmopolitan 
democracy by contrast seems unlikely, in the context of negative market 
integration underpinned by law, to restrain trends favouring market values 
over social values.17 
 
This leads back to RECON’s starting point, the crisis of European 
constitutionalism. In an early response, one authoritative voice stated the aim 
must now be “…to ‘conserve the great democratic achievements of the 
European nation-state, beyond its own limits”, including “…not only formal 
guarantees of civil rights, but levels of social welfare, education and leisure 
that are the precondition of both an effective private autonomy and of democratic 
citizenship”.18 In other words, the resource-distributive dimension of 
democratic self-governance, key to both social productivity and social 
reproduction, and highlighted here through the lens of labour law, must be 
embraced by the “language and practices of constitutionalism beyond the 
state” if they are to secure, for the EU, or any other supranational governance 
system, the legitimacy desired. 
 
I proceed as follows. Section 2 breaks down recent labour law readings of 
global economic integration according to the perceived impact of the latter’s 
major trends on its foundational sub-disciplinary concepts and categories: 
industrial production, labour, work, the worker, the employment relationship 
and collective worker representation. The discussion substantiates the points 
outlined above. Labour law, in reflecting on global economic integration, is 
chiefly concerned with the impact in the private sphere, whether directly via 
transnationalisation of private law, or indirectly, via market dynamics 
affecting private law’s conduct or states’ capacity to regulate in the labour 
field. In gauging changes to its institutions and norms, labour law envisions 
them in social-historical context, products of the interwoven emergence of 
markets and democracies. 
                                                 
15 See, for example, D. Crocker, “Deliberative Participation. The Capabilities Approach and 
Deliberative Democracy” (mimeo, 2004). 
16 See I.M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); see, also, 
J. Nagel, Participation, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1987). 
17 See Nussbaum, supra n. 14. 
18 See J. Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, (2001) 11 New Left Review, p. 5, at 6 
(emphasis added). 
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The following section presents four reconstructions proposed by labour 
lawyers in response to a perceived “crisis” of the sub-discipline provoked by 
transnational economic integration. Assessing national legislatures and trade 
unions as now beset by systematic limitations, each seeks to reanimate labour 
law’s distributive democratic agenda by a novel route. Respectively, they 
concentrate on the contract of employment;19 site-level worker 
representation;20 the corporation;21 and supranational social citizenship, re-
defined as an expanded set of procedural rights alongside substantive social 
and welfare entitlements.22 Mis-assumptions, I, however, suggest, invalidate 
the first three reconstructions. Not so the fourth, which is recommended as a 
necessary complement to supranational governance, capable of countering the 
tendencies of its modalities (such as subsidiarity and self-regulation) in 
practice to autonomise market power. Consequently, it is urged, this, or a 
similar vision of social citizenship, must form an integral element of 
RECON’s model of post-national deliberative supranationalism. In 
conclusion, the case for reframing RECON is recapitulated. 
 
2. Globalisation, transnational economic integration 
and labour 
As a sub-discipline, labour law sees itself as profoundly altered by 
globalisation, which has acted on its baseline concept, industrial labour, via 
changes to the various elements that previously constituted it: industrial 
production, work, the standard employment relationship, and the contract of 
employment. These are also indicated to have transformed, and partially 
dissolved, the former foundations of labour solidarity, as well as its national 
and international institutional embodiments. Voiced first in the 1970s,23 but 
                                                 
19 See H. Collins, “Is There a Third Way in Labour Law?”, in: J. Conaghan, R.M. Fischl & K. 
Klare (eds), Labour Law in an Era of Globalization. Transformative Practices and Possibilities, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
20 See C. Estlund, “Rebuilding the law of the workplace in an era of self-regulation”, (2005) 
105 Columbia Law Review, at 319. 
21 See S. Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment”, and P. Ireland, “From 
Amelioration to Transformation: Capitalism, the Market and Corporate Reform”, both in: 
Conaghan et al. (eds), supra n. 19. 
22 See A. Supiot, “The transformation of work and the future of labour law in Europe: A 
multidisciplinary perspective”, (1999) 138 International Labour Review, p. 31, and ibid., Au-dela 
de de l’emploi: Transformations du travail et l’avenir du droit du travail en Europe. Rapport pour la 
Commission Européenne, (Paris: Flammarion, 1999). 
23 In 1972, Kahn-Freund observed “the entire basis of our thinking on collective labour 
relations and collective labour law is destroyed”, (O. Kahn-Freund, “A Lawyer’s Reflections 
on Multinational Corporations”, (1972) Journal of Industrial Relations (Aus.), at 351. 
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prominently from the mid-1990s, allusions to the crisis,24 or “disintegration” 
of labour law, and a need for its re-invention,25 are commonplace.26 In this 
section, the bases of these evaluations are examined in greater detail. 
 
2.1. Global economic and political transformations 
Concerning globalisation trends, labour law shares basic viewpoints with 
political science, economics, international relations, and other legal sub-
disciplines, refining and adapting these to its own context and concerns. That 
the world economy has, over the last thirty years, undergone qualitative 
alteration is thus widely accepted. Technological innovation has extended the 
horizons of information systems, accelerated communications, de-materialised 
goods and services and stimulated the development of cross-border corporate 
and social networks.27 Facilitated by liberalisations affecting global currency 
transactions, trade, foreign direct investment, inter-national capital flows, and 
privatisation, these trends continue to deepen and thicken transnational 
economic and political relations, constituting transnational markets. In turn, 
this has permitted the rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs): directly, for 
example, by permitting MNE entry into formerly public sectors, and 
indirectly, by allowing the concentration of market power on a global scale. 
Completing the circle, through their legal and commercial praxis, and in the 
influence which they wield over policy at national and international levels, 
MNEs themselves are agents and promoters of transnational market 
integration. 
 
Labour lawyers also identify a qualitative political shift as having occurred. 
Neo-liberal hegemony followed swiftly on the demise of socialist states, 
substituting for Keynesian reliance on state ownership, planning and 
intervention as strategies to achieve political goals, including with respect to 
regulation of labour markets,28 renewed confidence in the legitimacy, as well 
                                                 
24 See M. D’Antona, “Diritto del Lavoro di Fine Secolo: Una Crisi di Identita?”, (1998) 48 
Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, at 31; see, also, H. Collins, “The 
Productive Disintegration of Labour Law,” (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal, at 295. 
25 See K. Klare, “The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law”, in: 
Conaghan, Fischl & Klare (eds), supra n. 19; see, also, A Supiot, supra n. 22. 
26 For example, “[…] [the] social and political world classically imagined by labour law is 
disappearing, gradually in some places, quite abruptly in others”, so that, “labour law must be 
invented”: see, also, Klare, supra n. 25, at 4. 
27 See Klare, ibid., at 5; see, generally, M. Castells, The Information Age: The Rise of the Network 
Society, Vol. I (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2000). 
28 See, for example, C. Kollonay Lehoczky, “Ways and Effects of Deconstructing Protection in 
the Post-socialist New Member States - Based on Hungarian Experience”, in: G. Davidov & 
B. Langille (eds), Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law. Goals and Means in the Regulation of 
Work, (Oxford: Hart, 2006). D’Antona (supra n. 24, at 34-5, & 38) highlights, in this context, 
the marginalisation of worker interests and labour law within national constitutions. 
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as efficiency, of competitive markets as a distributive mechanism.29 Critical 
labour lawyers sometimes supplement this general account by pinpointing the 
operation of interest-driven political dynamics of specific historical 
moments.30 State sovereignty over labour regulation, it is said in this context, 
was subjected to policy steering by international organisations, under which 
“social controls” on foreign investment and state support for domestic 
production were eliminated,31 restraining “Third World” development and 
re-instating dependence on industrialised nations.32 
 
2.2. Transformations affecting production, employment and 
“the worker” 
Labour law envisages various connections between macro-level economic 
and political transformations and the alteration of the character of industrial 
production, work, the employment relationship, and the legal and social 
identities of the “worker”. Starting with production, in Europe and 
elsewhere in the developed world, diminishing labour demand, due to 
mechanisation, has been followed (often via long transitional periods of high 
unemployment) by the growth of employment of different kinds, for 
instance, in light manufacturing and services. Increasing ease of transportation 
of production factors and dematerialisation marginalised the need for 
continuous plant operation by a local workforce. Facilitated by the 
liberalisations mentioned above, this has meant that vertically integrated 
production systems contained by national boundaries have yielded to global 
supply chains - production networks held together by non-ownership legal 
                                                 
29 See, for example, H. Arthurs, “Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global 
Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation”, in: 
Conaghan et al. (eds.), supra n. 19. See, also, Habermas, supra n. 18, at 11-12. 
30 For example, highlighting the 1980s “global debt crisis” of the 1980s as the platform for 
definitive insertion into the institutional frameworks of developing countries of neo-liberal 
trade and economic policies, via IFI-imposed structural adjustment packages, including labour 
market flexibility agenda; secondly, via trade-related treaties concluded with developed 
countries. Rittich highlights labour rights and labour market flexibility as “distinct normative 
visions with respect to the structure and operation of labo[u]r markets and the location of 
authority and control in the workplace […]” : K. Rittich, “Labor Law Beyond Borders: ADR 
and the Internationalization of Labor Dispute Settlement”, in: Labor Law Beyond Borders: ADR 
and the Internationalization of Labor Dispute Settlement, (The Hague, Kluwer International, 2003) 
at 161. 
31 See, for example P. Alston, “Labor Rights Provisions in US Trade Law: ‘Aggressive 
Unilateralism’?”, (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly, at 1, for early critique of the NAFTA 
regime’s impact on national labour rights. 
32 See, for example, D. Montgomery, “Labor Rights and Human Rights. A Historical 
Perspective”, in: L. Compa & S. Diamond, Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) at 15; see, also, Rittich, supra n. 30. 
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relations, principally contract, but also, for example, licensing and franchising 
agreements. 
 
Concerning employment, one effect of such changes has been to normalise 
short-term relationships between employers and employees, removing the 
need and incentive to undertake long-range investment in training and 
wellbeing of workforces, and in relationships with their representatives. Sub-
contracting fragments responsibility, and decreases transparency for 
employers, employees and third parties. It also creates novel spaces for 
informal working in transnational production which, in contrast with national 
production in many developing countries, was previously largely formalised. 
 
With respect to work, one effect is intensification,33 for instance, proceeding 
via revision of job descriptions and categories in the context of weakening 
union representation. Another dimension, flagged by labour lawyers as 
transformative, but infrequently recognised in general social scientific 
accounts of globalisation, is “feminisation” - the “gendered transformation of 
work”.34 Feminisation has been made possible, in part, by relative de-
materialisation, diminishing the need for heavy manual labour, but also by 
enhanced personal mobility and communications, and the social and cultural 
impacts of political movements for women’s equality that have followed 
autonomous trajectories. 
 
Feminisation does not correspond merely to the rise of women in the global 
workforce numerically. Rather, it stands for what has accompanied this, that 
is, the pronounced growth of “contingent, non-standard or atypical work”, 
“part-time, casual, temporary, own account or self-employed, home work, 
and contract work”, sometimes given the label “precarious” work,35 and the 
normalisation of these forms of work, and the terms of their performance, with 
respect to the workforce as a whole.36 Increasingly, these substitute the 
                                                 
33 See, generally, R. Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the 
New Capitalism, (New York: Norton, 1998). 
34 See K. Rittich, “Feminization and Contingency: Regulating the Stakes of Work for 
Women”, in: Conaghan et al. (eds), supra n. 19. 
35 See J. Fudge & R. Owens, Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy: The Challenge to 
Legal Norms, (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 
36 See G. Standing, “Global Feminization Through Flexible Labour”, (1989) 17 World 
Development, p. 1077, and G. Standing, “Global Feminization through Flexible Labour: A 
Theme Revisited”, (1999) 27 World Development, p. 583. According to recent studies, migrant 
workers number 80-100 million: about half of these workers are women, amongst whom 
domestic work is the most common occupation (ILO, About MIGRANT 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/about/index.htm, 
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“standard employment” norm, around which labour and welfare law, and the 
ends and modalities of collective action, were historically constituted: the 
(typically white) male head of household, engaged continuously from post-
education to standard retirement age, on the basis of a permanent, full-time 
contract, performing site-based work, according to a regular schedule, and 
earning, and socially understood as entitled to, a “breadwinner” or “family” 
wage.37 
 
A further consequence of feminisation, then, is the foregrounding of the 
instability, rising with global market integration as defined above, of the 
boundaries “public”/“private”, “market”/“home–family-social”. These have 
been identified by feminist labour theorists as the principal sites on which the 
tensions between the functions of individuals with regard to society’s 
productive and reproductive capacities are played out.38 Always contingent and 
infused by ideology, the distinction between market- and non-market work 
is blurred as a combination of the two becomes the norm for individual 
workers, also exposing the “interconstitution” of structures of production and 
reproduction.39 Its corrosion proceeds across multiple dimensions: 
geographical, in the vanishing separation between work/non-work space (for 
example, as in homeworking); temporal, in the fusion of work/non-work 
time (for example, self-employment); financial, in the meshing of workers’ 
production and living costs (for example, child care expenditure). As a side-
effect, this to an extent problematises the corporation which increasingly 
serves a vehicle for own-account working. In aggregate, these developments 
mean that women workers collectively are subsidising both the costs and risks 
of production, while, as individuals, they suffer cuts in real income and the 
dilution of the benefits of paid work. 
 
Thus revealed is labour law’s founding ideal of the male unencumbered 
worker. Also uncovered is the constitution/production of the legal and policy 
categories of labour, work and employment by wider frameworks of legal 
regulation, their still-gendered distributions of legal rights, property and 
goods, both public and “private”, as well as by the national, international and 
                                                                                                                   
Preventing Discrimination, Exploitation and Abuse of Women Migrant Workers: An Information 
Guide-Booklet 1: Why the Focus on Women International Migrant Workers 5 (2003)). 
37 See Rittich in: Conaghan et al. (eds), supra n. 19, at 117. 
38 See Fudge & Owens, supra n. 35. 
39 See Rittich, supra n. 34, at 128. Appreciation of the interdependence of market and non-
market activities, risks and rewards is mirrored by international human rights law discourses’ 
notions of “interdependence and indivisibility” of human rights across the categories of civil 
and political, social and economic human rights (see, for example, 1995 Beijing Declaration of 
the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women). 
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supranational constitutions that frame them. Family law, taxation, social 
welfare law, health care policy - all impact on the ability to perform paid and 
unpaid work, and to access the attached payments. Feminisation presents 
fresh opportunities, then, to consider the ways “employment” on the one 
hand, and work, on the other, are “formed by and articulated with other 
[social] institutions such as the family or household”. It should also force 
recognition, at last, of the lack of any necessary definitional relationship 
between them and their non-coextensivity in practice.40 
 
2.3. Collective labour institutions – trade unions 
Despite diversity in national arrangements, historically and persisting to the 
present time,41 trade unions’ trajectories over the last two decades display 
certain similarities across jurisdictions. Union density and union membership 
have declined “precipitously” across developed and developing economies 
where they were formerly strong.42 How does labour law explain these 
changes? A typical answer links the demise of Keynesian labour policies of 
“counter-cyclical job creation, collective bargaining, protective labour 
legislation, and equality-enhancing strategies”43 to the dismantling of the 
“four pillars” on which they formerly rested - nation state, large factories, 
full-time employment, and generalised union representation.44 
 
Some authors points to supplementary factors. A significant strand in the 
literature (and one whose discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper) 
asserts the role of regulatory competition in creating downward pressure on 
national regimes of labour regulation.45 Secondly, feminist labour analysis 
                                                 
40 Rittich, ibid., at 123. 
41 For example, in socialist states, trade unions were often integrated into totalitarian systems of 
rule; as a result, they were generally unable to exert strong influence over post-Communist 
labour constitutions. In some post-colonial states, by contrast, trade unions functioned as 
organs of civil resistance to military rule; elsewhere, as quasi-official “workers” organisations”, 
their collusion won industry-specific protectionist intervention within directed economies. In 
some states, such as China, free trade unions do not yet exist. 
42 See, for example, R.M. Fischl, “Organizing Low-Wage Workers in the US: Some Lessons 
from the Miami Janitors Campaign”, mimeo ; and P. Benjamin, “Beyond the Boundaries: 
Prospects for Expanding Labour Market Regulation”, in: Davidov & Langille, (eds), Boundaries 
and Frontiers of Labour Law. Goals and Means in the Regulation of Work, (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 
with regard to South Africa. 
43 See H. Arthurs, in: Conaghan et al., (eds) supra n. 19, at 471. 
44 See D’Antona, supra n. 24. 
45 See, now classically, W. Streeck, “Industrial citizenship under regime competition: the case 
of the European works councils”, (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy, p. 643; and, also, C. 
Barnard, “Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European 
Union from Delaware”, (2000) 25 European Law Review, p. 57, and S. Deakin, “Legal 
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points to trade unions’ hesitance in responding to changing work patterns and 
recognising non-standard workers, as a result of which women and racial 
minorities were historically denied equal employment rights.46 Against this 
background, the normalisation of atypical work can be seen to have had a 
dual relationship with union decline. In the first instance, precarious work 
emerges partly as a result of non-standard workers “definitional exclusion” by 
collective organisations.47 Unprotected as they entered the labour market, 
non-standard workers subsequently functioned, through no fault of their 
own, to encourage the spread and embedding of atypical, less advantageous 
terms and conditions of work. 
 
Secondly, the incompatibility of full-time, long-term continuous 
commitment with the demands of women’s unpaid work undoubtedly 
encouraged the growth of atypical employment to meet women’s needs, 
albeit unsatisfactorily. Individualised and de-sited, and hence, “invisible”, 
precarious work poses obstacles to the coalescence of solidarity and worker 
organisation. In combination with their political and social marginalisation – 
partly prior, but also an effect of low employment status and lack of 
employment-related benefits (for example, income, healthcare, pension) in 
the past restricted to unionised sectors – this has had the outcome that a 
substantial segment of the total working population are now relatively 
disempowered by the standards of earlier decades.48 Whereas national and 
international politics and law-making at one time often sought explicitly to 
articulate employees’ (and trade unions’) interests, now this scarcely 
happens.49 
 
Subsequently, unions have sought to embrace atypical workers (such as the 
notionally “self-employed”) even where this threatens standard employment 
                                                                                                                   
Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?”, (2006) 12 European Law 
Journal, p. 440. 
46 See Fischl, supra n. 42, at 3. Practices such as giving priority to full-time workers for 
promotion and job security tend disadvantage of female workers. 
47 See Rittich, supra n. 30, at 118. 
48 See M. Ontiveros, “A New Course for Labour Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a 
Response to Globalization”, in: Conaghan et al. (eds), supra n. 19, observes, in addition to sex 
discrimination, female workers’ ongoing subordination via family roles and expectations 
strongly influenced by patriarchal social structures. On the other hand, Fischl (supra n. 42) 
describes migrant workers as geographically and temporally dispersed, racially and culturally 
heterogeneous, economically disempowered and precarious, due to irregular immigration 
status. 
49 See S. Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment”, in: Conaghan et al., 
(eds) (at 194) frames this as a shift in the role of trade unions, from that of co-regulator, to 
monitor and enforcer, ex post facto, of labour-related legal norms. 
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terms and conflicts with the interests of existing members.50 Some unions, for 
instance, now select organising goals and strategies ad hoc according to target 
groups and the nature of the work performed.51 Identity-based organising52 
takes a multi-dimensional view of workers: in addition to the economic 
interests that were historically the explicit basis of solidarity, it recognises the 
inter-linked individual, social and cultural identities of workers, and the 
obstacles, as well as possible routes, to empowerment, now increasingly 
broadly understood, that may be attached to them. The specificities of the 
formal legal status of workers, within complex corporate and contractual 
relationships, and more widely (for instance, with regard to immigration) may 
also be taken into account. Moreover, this wider canvas for the articulation of 
claims is linked in some unions’ activity to the substitution of labour 
procedures prescribed by national law by recourse to non-legal forms of 
“enforcement” involving new actors (NGOs, media, etc.), based on 
employers” voluntary commitments, and which avoid reliance on state 
coercion which, in any case, is less reliable than before.53 In some instances 
(though this is not yet a general trend), organising is expressly based upon 
“dignity and justice”,54 and directed to objectives framed in terms of 
citizenship, political participation and empowerment.55 Such “grass roots” 
                                                 
50 For example, the US Service Employees International Union was established in the 1990s as 
a break-away from AFL-CIO, over the latter’s “perceived failure to devote sufficient resources 
and ingenuity to organizing new workers”: Fischl, supra n. 42 at 1. 
51 See Ontiveros, supra n. 48. Fischl, supra n. 42, illustrates with reference to site security jobs, 
which cannot be outsourced, and are already sub-contracted. 
52 Ontiveros, supra n. 48 defines identity-based organising as “a way of organizing the whole 
identity of a human being, not just his or her workplace identity”, with reference to personal 
identity factors including “race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, citizenship status, 
community, sexual orientation, and religion”, as well as class identity factors, these being “job, 
social class, career, income and wealth” (at 417). 
53 Fischl, supra n. 42, even refers to a “law avoidance strategy” by unions in the US, for 
example, substituting organised ballots with direct action, including “corporate campaigns” 
seeking to provoke public or contractor pressure on targeted companies who may not be the 
legal employer, but who may be more visible, locally or nationally, and sensitive to publicity 
(at 5). See Ontiveros, supra n. 48, at 418, relates avoidance of “traditional administrative 
process used by unions in the USA”, on grounds of ineffectiveness. Non-legal action is 
highlighted as especially important where workers, despite large numbers and longevity of 
employment, are irregular. For countless further examples of extra-legal organisation, see 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home). 
54 Reflecting “specific affronts to human dignity encountered by immigrant workers, as 
immigrants and workers”: See Ontiveros, supra n. 48, at 418, with reference to the Los 
Angeles Justice for Janitors campaign undertaken by the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU). 
55 Ontiveros, supra n. 48, illustrates with reference to Teamsters Local 890’s Citizenship Project 
in California, addressed to the Latino community (at 421), http://www.newcitizen.org. This 
contrasts with past constructions of “countervailing workers’ power” which focussed on 
negotiation within the frame of the long-term contract of employment (Klare & D’Antona (at 
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developments have been paralleled by pressure on unions to extend full 
effective access to sectors of the workforce that were previously excluded, 
stemming from activism drawing authority from international human rights 
standards.56 
 
What implications for labour law do labour lawyers draw from such 
developments? Evidence of unions’ progressive adaptation to evolving 
contexts and worker profiles through systemic internal changes can certainly 
be viewed as encouraging.57 Some theorists, however, see in organised 
labour’s relative decline the de-centring of the category of labour and the 
demise of the “binary capital-labour frame”.58 “Pluralistic” labour relations – a 
reference to the newly diverse social bases and modalities of worker 
organisation – are, on the one hand, in line with the unmasking of “worker” 
as a contingent and partial, as opposed to the totalising identity economic 
determinism construed it to be; on the other hand, the criss-crossing of 
received “public-private” legal and policy boundaries by novel worker 
concerns, illustrated above, is suggested to indicate “de-stabilisation” of the 
social meaning of work. 
 
2.4. The contract of employment 
Contrasting law and economics’ depiction of the employer-employee relation 
as a bargain struck between “private” and freely-contracting individuals in 
abstraction from both social conditions and individual characteristics, labour 
lawyers frequently adopt an historicised account of the origins of the contract 
of employment. This approach highlights the co-originality of employee 
status with industrialisation, over the course of which it gradually superseded 
other legal arrangements for performance and payment of work, such as 
master-servant and the contract for hire, and constituted the category (if not 
the class) of wage-dependent labour. The arrival, in parallel, of workplace and 
social welfare legislation constituted the enterprise, as employer, locus of fiscal 
revenue collection, bearer of health and safety duties, and, also, with the 
introduction of compensation schemes (for example, for interruption of 
                                                                                                                   
42), both in: Conaghan et al., (eds), supra n. 19) to such an extent that “goals of job 
enrichment and self-realization” during work performance were often overlooked: Ireland, 
supra n. 21, at 198. 
56 For example, the campaign for an ILO Convention relating to the rights of domestic workers, see, 
further, http://communicatinglabourrights.wordpress.com/2008/03/22/domestic-workers-step-
towards-an-ilo-international-convention/. 
57 Ontiveros, supra n. 48, at 420-421cites AFL-CIO’s 2000 reversal of its “traditional nativist 
approach to immigration”. 
58 Klare, supra n. 25, at 13, suggests the assumption of the employment relationship as the 
“essential substrate of social organization” is no longer valid. 
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earnings through sickness or injury) as a vehicle for redistribution of the risks 
of industrial production.59 In like fashion, it has been suggested, collective 
representation, the articulation of job categories, statutory employment 
protection rights, and the emergence of larger firms, were subsequently 
mutually conditioning.60 
 
On other (though reconcilable and partly overlapping) readings offered by 
institutionalism (economic and/or sociological), the contract of employment, 
in its traditional form, is explained on the basis that it rewarded employees 
with security in return for subordination - to state authority, legislation and 
bureaucracies (industrialisation coinciding with the consolidation of national 
government and identities in many countries) and employers. To the latter 
flowed benefits, first, in the form of decreased information, search and 
transaction costs, and second, flexibility, in the form of the “managerial 
prerogative”, the exercise of which gave content to an otherwise largely 
indeterminate agreement. In return, employees were rewarded with resources 
which facilitated family subsistence and social inclusion to a basic level.61 
Importantly, the state was implicated in this arrangement in a number of 
ways: exploiting it to collectivise risks via social insurance,62 it also made the 
assumption of long-range employment relations between parties of stable 
identity the platform for a range of social policy interventions. 
 
As with the sovereign nation state and democracy,63 the gradual embedding of 
the employment relation in this institutional framework led to their habitual 
identification. Now, however, welfare and other social systems, and 
employment, are increasingly prised apart. Short-termism, and geographical 
                                                 
59 According to Deakin, with reference to regulation, private and social insurance, “…the 
enterprise became the main conduit for the wider process of risk-sharing at which the laws 
were aimed”: supra n. 49, at 184. 
60 See S. Deakin, ibid., at 182-4, citing R. Coase “The Nature of the Firm” (1951) 4 Economica 
(NS), at 386; Simon, “A Formal Theory of the Employment Relation”, (1985) 19 
Econometrica, at 293, and Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (New York: Free 
Press, 1985), Ch. 9. 
61 Klare, supra n. 25, at 12-13, suggests that according to the ideal of typical employment, 
workers “leave strategic decision-making and risk to the employer in return for a modicum of 
security, fair-play and (theoretically) a family wage”; employees, during employment, “are and 
should be command-followers”. Supiot refers to the trading of “economic dependence” for 
“social protection”: A. Supiot, Au-dela de de l”emploi: Transformations du travail et l”avenir du 
droit du travail en Europe. Rapport pour la Commission Européenne, (Paris: Flammarion, 1999), at 
10. 
62 See Deakin, supra n. 49 at 178. 
63 See Eriksen & Fossum, supra n. 1. See, also, Zürn, “The State in the Post-National 
Constellation - Societal Denationalisation and Multi-Level Governance”, Arena Working 
Papers WP 99/35 (Oslo: ARENA, 1999), and Sassen, supra n. 10. 
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dispersal of those engaged by single enterprises, even within individual 
production lines, and via cross-border service provision, are significant 
alterations to the context of the employment contract. National borders no 
longer contain contracting parties or tasks performed, nor do they define 
applicable regulatory regimes (consider special fiscal arrangements applicable 
to Export Processing Zones and the increasing role of regional authorities). 
The “employer” is no longer a local, dependable locus of material or financial 
resources or administrative infrastructure, nor is its legal identity and 
longevity assured. 
 
Moreover, as production becomes a “flatter” affair,64 workers are called upon 
to be more entrepreneurial, to collaborate with firms, instead of awaiting 
their instruction, for example, and to predict future production trends and 
respond to these proactively. Flexible labour market policies in practice often 
entail that it is individuals, and not employers, who assume the costs and risks 
of acquiring new skills and qualifications. Negotiation is complicated by the 
diminishing portion of workers who are, in technical legal terms, 
“employees”; others’ interests, as discussed above, are still only barely 
represented by trade unions.65 In the ultimate result, for many workers, 
employment’s original promise and reward of long-term security and 
supported career progression has been withdrawn.66 
 
Accordingly, it has been concluded, the employment contract is now “less 
suitable as a vehicle for sharing and redistributing risks among the working 
population” than before.67 Nonetheless, this serves only to underline that the 
employment relationship has been, and remains, an emergent socio-legal 
institution: a “complex bundle of conventions and norms of varying degrees 
of formality […]”; cumulative, path-dependent, and contingent; and, 
critically, the product of a multitude of interactions of “[…] economic 
organisation, dispute resolution, and political mobilisation.”68 It “encodes” 
political solutions to social co-ordination problems, as filtered by court and 
legislative processes.69 It captures a compromise between market-making and 
                                                 
64 See T. Friedman, The World is Flat, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); C. Sabel, 
“Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development”, in: N. Smelser & R. 
Swedberg, The Handbook of Economic Sociology, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994). 
65 For example, with the growth of notional self-employment. 
66 See Deakin, supra n. 49, at 178. 
67 See Deakin, supra n. 49, at 179. 
68 See Deakin, supra n. 49, 185-6. 
69 Deakin, supra n. 49 at 181, in this context, he refers to the classical employment contract as a 
“relational contract”, in which market exchange is enmeshed by “political and social processes 
of the relation, internal and external” (citing MacNeil, “The Many Futures of Contracts”, 
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market-correcting impulses for a given political space and time. But it can 
only be accurately read and understood in conjunction with the national 
constitutional and welfare arrangements that it presupposes and, vice versa, 
which presuppose it. Within constitutional nation states, all have been part of 
the same complex device for sharing the risks of social production and 
reproduction. The legitimacy of private relations hinges upon the overall 
distributive outcomes achieved by the wider constitutional systems of which 
they are part, and democratic legitimacy depends on the protection provided 
for both public and private autonomy, against both public and private 
coercion. 
 
3. Labour rights under globalisation: Four 
reconstructions 
Recognition of the employment relationship’s status as an emergent socio-
legal institution justifies the following four attempts by labour lawyers to 
reconstruct the discipline - that is, having identified a central normative 
objective, to re-interpret its scope and concrete applications, with the aim of 
securing its achievement in changed external conditions.70 
 
3.1. Responding to global competition: The “symbiotic” 
employment contract 
At least in “OECD world”,71 it was noted, the social legitimacy of the 
employment contract formerly rested on the exchange of individual 
subordination to managerial prerogative for material security and, secondly, 
on its minimum but progressive terms, set legislatively, rewarding loyalty to 
national authorities and acceptance of the market mechanism, and providing a 
bond between individuals and the state, thus supporting the coalescence of 
national identity and citizenship. When fewer workers enjoy security of 
employment, or rewards and resources as favourable as those that self-
employment paradigmatically presupposes; when social security provision is 
restricted, even for nationals; and when migrant workers, enjoying few, if 
any, of the benefits of citizenship, now represent a large proportion of the 
global workforce, what can the legitimising basis of the employment contract 
be? This section considers a reconstruction of the employment contract, 
intended to answer this dilemma.72 
                                                                                                                   
(1974) 47 Southern California Law Review, p. 691). 
70 See Mayntz’s observation of the “hermeneutic and interpretive” approach of legal studies, in 
general, with regard to globalisation (Mayntz, supra n. 4). 
71 Michael Zürn’s expression: supra n. 63. 
72 See H. Collins, “Is There a Third Way in Labour Law?” in: Conaghan et al., (eds), supra n. 
19. Its immediate pretext is Third Way politics and its “reconfiguration” of employment 
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In general, OECD states’ policies increasingly substitute concern for equality 
of outcome with the goal of “real equality of opportunity”, that is, formal 
equality supplemented by the “necessary resources in terms of education, 
training, skills and other financial support, so that they [workers] can 
participate fully in the opportunities afforded by a flourishing market 
economy”.73 Similarly, they have adopted a revised (and by now orthodox) 
understanding of the regulatory role of the state, as rudder, not rower: 
governments can modulate the operation of market forces, but they take their 
place only on proof of failure. Thus, there is a tendency to eschew 
redistribution in the workplace as a legislative goal, hence also concern with 
labour rights, to the extent these are considered redistributive, and any special 
commitment to trade unions (non-union entities, such as quality circles, 
works councils, recognised as equivalents). Thirdly, given the prima facie 
legitimacy of markets, individual labour rights’ justification is increasingly 
recast as functional, in promoting efficiency.74 Against the background of 
economic integration, this defines a new global function for labour law: to 
improve competitiveness of business operations located within the 
jurisdiction (no point being taken on firms’ nationality) and to avoid social 
exclusion, by guaranteeing equal access to labour markets, enhancing 
employability, and reconciling family and other social responsibilities with 
labour market participation. Together, these strands displace social 
democracy’s traditional conceptual framework, under which trade unions and 
collective bargaining, statutory intervention, and individual rights75 were 
essential to achieving social equality.76 
 
Concerning specific employment policies, in line with this general view, 
“Partnership at Work”, a UK legislative initiative, is taken to be exemplary. 
                                                                                                                   
standards (see, for example, A. Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, 
(Cambridge MA: Polity, 1998). Since these are interpreted as a response to the re-
contextualisation of national economies and politics within global economic integration it is, 
however, suggested as an account of potentially broader, perhaps even general, application. 
Interestingly while Collins (ibid., at 450) suggests these trends contradict “aspects of accepted 
international norms as embodied in the Conventions of the ILO”, there would now appear to 
be a degree of convergence between ILO and Third Way agenda: see, for example, ILO/Auer, 
“In search of optimal labour market institutions,” Economic and Labour Market Paper 
2007/3, (Geneva, ILO, 2003) concluding active labour market policies as “optimal labour 
market institutions” for the contemporary economic setting for developed countries. 
73 See Collins, “Is There a Third Way in Labour Law?” in: Conaghan et al., (eds), supra n. 19, 
at 452-453. 
74 Ibid., at 451. 
75 The suggestion is that flexibility discourages the “adoption of mandatory and inalienable 
rights”, which might be inefficient, or obstruct steps to employer-worker co-operation. 
76 See Collins, supra n. 73, at 455. 
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For trade union rights, this substituted information exchange, and a 
commitment to use information “[…] co-operatively to improve the 
efficiency of the relations of production”. Diverging further from historical 
labour norms, while communication facilitated by information exchange may 
concern “details and objectives of production”, and perhaps business strategy, 
it will not concern “the price of labour except […] as […] part of 
productivity-enhancing agreements”.77 Non-union entities, mentioned above, 
are recognised for this purpose. Once more, competition provides both 
practical rationale and normative justification: “countries that pay high [sic] 
wages” must compete in terms of “quality, design, responsiveness to changes 
in the market, and technological superiority”, as must companies individually, 
this reflected in the spread of total quality management, just-in-time, and 
human resources management, and a new emphasis in management (rhetoric) 
on “partnership inside the firm”. Accordingly, the content of “partnerships” 
varies in line with the competitive needs of firms, whose dynamism precludes 
statutory specification of any single partnership model.78 As for the state, it 
meets labour market access and flexibility objectives through supply-side 
measures, for example, certifying work-related education, subsidies for low 
wages via tax credits, and “family-friendly” labour market policies, such as 
equal treatment for part-time work and promoting access to childcare. 
 
This package is identified as the basis for a reconstruction of employment’s 
legal form, with the “symbiotic” employment contract assuming the role of 
new regulative ideal.79 Under this concept, in place of the traditional 
asymmetric exchange relationship noted at the outset, employers are to 
provide work and skills in return for co-operation and innovation and – the 
critical difference - vice-versa, the employee. Contrasting with the verticality 
of the old employment contract (a result of the constitutive role of managerial 
prerogative), this is a horizontal vision of employment, with potential to 
make work “more fulfilling and democratic” and to balance work with other 
parts of life. But traditionally, labour law proceeded from the presumption of 
the inevitability of a conflict of interest between employer and employee. In 
partnership, by contrast, mutual trust appears to be foundational. How is this 
circle to be squared? 
                                                 
77 Ibid., at 457. 
78 See W. Scheuerman, “Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical 
Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy”, (2004) 17 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, p. 101. 
79 Collins attributes to Schanze the “symbiotic contract” concept, said to contain the “seeds of 
a radically new approach to labour law”: E. Schanze, “Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-
Term Agency Structures between Contract and Corporation”, in: Ch. Joerges (ed), Franchising 
and the Law, (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1991). 
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The response is that trust is, indeed, foundational – and traditional coercive 
legal intervention has never been able to compel it. Two alternatives are, on 
this basis, advocated. First, procedural, reflexive, responsive regulatory 
approaches, whose capacity to compensate unequal bargaining power 
between labour and capital is asserted;80 second, voluntary company action on 
basic and minimal workers’ entitlements, which are claimed to yield “credible 
promises”.81 
 
If these premises are accepted, Partnership at Work can be characterised not as 
“a policy of abstention from legal intervention”,82 but as a more sophisticated 
route to achieving “credible commitments to fairness at work”.83 Further 
regulatory devices pursuant to both symbiotic contract and the two principles 
just mentioned (i.e., proceduralism and voluntarism) would include, for 
instance, allowing opt-out from legislatively-specified schemes upon 
introduction of a company’s “own bespoke system”;84 the approval of 
company rules by independent third parties to transform codes of practice 
into certification standards;85 tiered systems of opt-out or modification of 
rights, according to their categorisation in terms of the likely scope for 
individual (as opposed to collective) employee bargaining to achieve optimal 
outcomes;86 and finally, and claimed as ultimately necessary for the realisation 
                                                 
80 “New Regulatory Method” seeks “[…]to provoke the parties themselves to re-engineer their 
own economic and social relations through partnerships and contractual agreements”; and aims 
at “[…]inducing employers to revise the internal rules of their organization” by describing 
“explicitly the kinds of procedures required, though leaving the detail to employers to 
determine, and to provide incentives to adopt these procedures”, for example, whistle-blower 
laws, European Works Council Directive 94/45/EC [1994] OJ L254, 64464 (Collins, supra n. 
72 at 468). 
81 Collins, supra n. 73 at 463. He continues: “If the employer structures its procedures and rules 
that comprise the organisation around respect for fairness, the bureaucracy is likely to carry out 
these standing orders… [R]eliance upon background legal rights enforceable in an 
employment tribunal is likely to produce little sense of commitment towards the employer 
[…] In order to enhance the credibility of the employer’s commitment, the task of legal 
regulation is not primarily to grant employees legal entitlements that may be enforced by way 
of compensation in tribunals, but rather to re-engineer the internal rules of organisations so 
that they present credible commitments towards fairness.” 
82 Echoing and implicitly rejecting Kahn-Freund’s “collective laissez-faire”. 
83 It is claimed to aim at inducing “voluntary arrangements for consultation and sharing of 
information” (Collins, supra n. 73 at 461). 
84 For example, UK Employment Relations Act 1999 incentivises adoption of partnerships by 
establishing the possibility of imposed union recognition and collective bargaining where 
employers decline to introduce own arrangements for consultation and participation. 
85 Collins, supra n. 73 at 465, suggests taking this approach to equal opportunities “[…] would 
do more than any legal measures to achieve a change in the culture of management practices 
and a reduction in discrimination”. 
86 Some rights would be categorised as alienable by individuals, others only following 
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of true partnerships, profit-sharing measures, such as employee share-
ownership schemes, and profit-related pay, to be encouraged, for example, 
through tax incentives. 
 
Favouring Collins’ reconstruction is the undoubted normative appeal of 
establishing parity of the parties to the employment relationship as a new basis 
for labour law. Likewise, it might seem, the general legal theoretical 
arguments backing procedural approaches and the compromised position of 
trade unions and national autonomy over employment regulation with global 
economic integration. Yet do not these last two factors entail that procedural 
regulation in the workplace will, in practice, amount to devolving near total 
discretion to company management over the form and content of legal 
arrangements governing work, and rights incidental to them – preventing the 
“symbiotic” dynamic in the employment relationship assumed to legitimate 
the move from traditional routes of workers interest definition and 
promotion, and prevent the risks associated with it from eventuating? Various 
studies of EU labour regulation cast empirical light on this question. 
However, staying on the normative plane, a second reconstruction 
superficially appears to indicate that competitive market dynamics and 
inequality of workplace bargaining power need not be definitive. 
 
3.2. Responding to de-unionisation: independently monitored 
self-regulation 
Estlund’s (2005) starting point is the US’ progression, over the twentieth 
century, from the “New Deal model” of industrial relations, reliant on 
workers’ self-organization and voluntary collective bargaining “over most 
terms and conditions of employment […]”,87 through a “regulatory model” 
of statutorily-determined minimum standards enforced by administrative 
                                                                                                                   
conclusion of a collective agreement or after a procedurally fair settlement; and others not at 
all, along lines shown by the UK Working Time Regulations 1998. 
87 The New Deal model’s principal elements are identified as: i) the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act which, in the perspective of industrial democracy, is also described as a “[…] 
‘constitution’ of the private sector workplace – a framework for self-governance supported by 
a set of individual and group rights, and an administrative enforcement scheme”, and based on 
a vision of workers as citizens and the workplace as a site of self-determination; ii) the 1938 
Fair Labor Standards Act, establishing enforcement duties on the Federal Department of 
Labour, as well as universal minimum statutory protections (for example, minimum wage and 
overtime premia). Social security legislation setting minimum provisions on retirement security, 
and subsequent health and safety legislation, by contrast, are described as conferring rights 
without participation, rendering employees “passive beneficiaries of the government’s 
protection”: C. Estlund, “Rebuilding the law of the workplace in an era of self-regulation”, 
(2005) 105 Columbia Law Review, p. 319, at 326. 
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agencies,88 and a “rights model” of judicially enforceable individual workplace 
rights,89 concluding with a contemporary gravitation towards “employer ‘self-
regulation’”90 and, in parallel, the “privatisation of enforcement”.91 Self-
regulation, Estlund defines as “[…] internal systems for enforcement of rights 
and regulatory standards – and of legal inducements to self-regulation in the 
form of reduced public oversight or sanctions”. This evolutionary “mega-
trend” is explained with reference to interest-driven employer resistance,92 
but also on the basis of “[…] challenges to the efficacy of regulation and 
litigation of workplace rights and standards […] from scholars and employee 
advocates […]”. It is accepted, then, that there are valid normative grounds 
for employer self-regulation, in the form of (moderate) regulation theory’s 
critique of “command and control”. 
 
Yet, noting the US’ recent “drastic decline in unionization”, at the same time 
it is acknowledged that self-regulation in the labour domain poses a dilemma: 
despite potential functional gains, the goals it sets may represent a narrowed 
agenda, perhaps even tending to de-regulation. How, then, to proceed? 
                                                 
88 Here the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1970 (“OSHA”), targeted by Bardach and 
Kagan’s epochal critique of “regulatory unreasonableness” is taken as paradigmatic: E. Bardach 
& R. Kagan, Going by the book: The problem of regulatory unreasonableness, (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1982). 
89 Referring principally to the Civil Rights Act 1964, Pub L. No.88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 
255 (codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e-2 (2000).  
90 Estlund, supra n. 87 at 319, supporting this claim with reference to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines which, for example, allow mitigation for firms “[i]f the offense occurred despite an 
effective program to prevent and detect violations of the law, provided firm promptly reported 
violations once occurred (US Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 (f) (2003), at fn.96; and 
also OSHA’s 1982 Voluntary Protection Programme, under which employers showing 
commitment and internal organisational capacity to comply with health and safety standards 
and improve safety records, and employee involvement in safety programmes, could be 
relieved of regular inspections and “put onto a more conciliatory enforcement track” (Estlund 
supra n. 87 at 345). Statutorily incentivised self-regulation of this kind is distinguishable from 
the orientation, for example, of the second Bush administration, to mere voluntary compliance 
with guidelines. 
91 Illustrating this with reference to private civil rights litigation (ibid., at 334); diversity 
programs, internal dispute resolution, and mandatory arbitration clauses (at 338). “Non-union 
grievance procedures”, Estlund further notes, “[…] vary in their complexity from simple 
open-door policies to multi-step grievance procedures involving peer review, mediation and 
arbitration” (at 335). Private labour regulation can be judicially enforced, for example, via 
defences of “reasonable care” and where an employee failed to use “preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer”, (Burlington Industries and Ellerth 524 US 742 (1998) 
and Farragher v City of Boca Raton 524 US 775 (1998). See Hepple’s description of similar 
phenomena in the UK setting (B. Hepple, “Enforcement: the law and politics of cooperation 
and compliance”, in: B. Hepple (ed), Social and labour rights in a global context. International and 
Comparative Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
92 Notably, in Estlund’s analysis, a phenomenon still defined on the national plane. 
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Estlund’s “monitored self-regulation” (“MSR”) proposal draws extensively 
on two earlier approaches: Ayers and Braithwaite’s “responsive regulation”93 
(“RR”), and the Ratcheting Labour Standards model (“RLS”).94 
 
From RR is taken, firstly, the idea of the regulatory pyramid which “situates 
self-regulation in a broader scheme, in which traditional inspections, 
enforcement and punitive sanctions continue to operate for the low road or 
less capable actors at the bottom of the labour market”.95 Self-regulation, in 
other words, in the shadow of law. Estlund secondly appropriates from RR 
the principle of tripartism, précised as based upon the insight that workers’ 
participation in company-level compliance activity “[…] can introduce 
flexibility and responsiveness into the regulatory regime, and can reduce the 
costs and contentiousness associated with litigation, while promoting the 
internalization of public law norms into the workplace itself”.96 
 
However, RR, Estlund suggests, demands levels of union involvement that 
are unlikely to be seen again soon in the US. This leads her to RLS, which 
re-allocates the policing of labour standards within global production systems 
from trade unions and national regulatory authorities to market forces, driven 
by ethical consumer preferences, in turn reflecting information supplied by 
NGOs and multi-stakeholder initiatives on companies’ respective social 
performance, under codes of conduct and the like. 
 
Under the influence of this approach, MSR gives “independent workplace 
monitors” – non-trade union, but nonetheless “worker-oriented” bodies97 - 
the role of enforcing company-level self-regulation. They are to act as 
“watchdogs” and help “leverage limited public enforcement resources” with 
regard to corporate social responsibility norms. Eschewing any role for trade 
unions and state regulation, as RLS does, is, however, seen as expecting too 
                                                 
93 See I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
94 See C. Sabel, D. O’Rourke & A. Fung, “Ratcheting Labour Standards: Regulation for 
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace”, Columbia Law School, The Center for 
Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 185, Public Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Group, Paper No. 21, May 2, 2000.  
95 See Estlund, supra n. 87, at 359. 
96 Ibid., at 323. 
97 Idiosyncratic US statutory prohibitions of “employer unions” are suggested as providing an 
additional reason in favour of this element of MSR: NLRA prohibits most intermediate 
options between individual bargaining and full union representation, and further “[…] limits 
the range of potential experimentation with alternative forms of employee representation 
within a tripartite scheme […]”, ibid., at 365. 
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much of companies and consumers.98 Because they remain in the “[…] best 
position to monitor employer compliance with the labour and employment 
laws”, employees retain a supporting role in MSR, as whistleblowers and 
monitor-informants; likewise, targeted public enforcement action99 and 
private statutory rights litigation. Instances of non-union workplace 
monitoring enhancing employers’ conformity with legal obligations on pay 
and conditions are cited in support.100 
 
The net result, it is claimed, is MSR’s hybrid model, which uses conventional 
“hard” enforcement (i.e., administrative action and private litigation) to 
induce companies to participate in “monitored, quasi-tripartite self-
regulation”. Effective self-regulation, it is claimed, would rest on an “[…] 
explicit code of conduct encompassing at least employers’ substantive legal 
obligations and employees’ rights…to communicate with each other and with 
monitors and regulators regarding code compliance…[which] would be the 
responsibility of specified managerial officials and monitored by independent 
outside monitors accountable in part to workers”.101 
 
Already made clear by this summary, however, is MSR’s assumption of two 
conditions whose problematisation by economic globalisation has been the 
starting point of labour lawyers’ diagnosis of a need for alternative 
frameworks, as described in Section 2 above. First, national legislative 
autonomy in the field of labour regulation. MSR presumes “[…] the threat of 
                                                 
98 With regard to the former, Estlund observes, “simply ignoring the law is an especially 
tempting strategy for marginal producers at the bottom of the production chain, who have 
little fixed capital or stake in their reputation…and who often rely heavily on undocumented 
immigrant workers who are too fearful or desperate to complain,” ibid., at 330 & 370. 
99 The Fair Labour Standards Act’s “joint employer” and hot goods provisions are highlighted 
as the kind of “hard” inducements capable of convincing employers to “take the [regulatory] 
high road”. 
100 Giving as examples: i) the New York State Greengrocers” Code of Conduct, addressing 
issues including: labour and employment laws including relating to minimum wage and 
working hours, payroll records, training, and employee information; appointment of employee 
spokespersons; and regular inspections by monitors, who are appointed by the New York City 
Attorney General. Monitors report on violations under the Code to the Attorney General’s 
office and a tripartite Code of Conduct Committee, which certifies new signatories and 
marshals disputes. Subscribing to the Code can earn partial amnesty for past statutory breaches. 
ii) the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund, a “non-profit watchdog organisation”, 
established by the Service Employees International Union and unionized employers in the 
janitorial services sector, that was established to monitor compliance with statutory obligations 
and promote enforcement via private lawsuits, state and federal regulatory action (Estlund 
(2005), at 353). 
101 Estlund suggests that provisions regarding certification and selection of monitors, approved 
inspection protocols and conflict of interest prohibitions could follow along the lines set by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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potent sanctions against the worst lawbreakers”, and statutorily grounded 
rights of private action.102 Second, labour’s bargaining power and organisation 
qua labour: tripartism cannot function, whatever form it takes, under systemic 
power imbalance.103 Estlund recognises both assumptions.104 But possible 
underlying reasons for the seeming disappearance of the first in the US, and 
further afield, are not investigated. Concerning the second, the hope is 
expressed that external monitoring may be “[…] a step toward the liberation 
of employee voice more generally”.105 But the main examples of MSR 
provided in evidence of the approach’s viability were, in fact, triggered either 
by state authorities or by established trade unions. Moreover, their major 
concern has been to improve employer compliance with existing minimum 
protections set by state or federal law. 
 
In her defence, Estlund does take care to note the shortage, up to the present 
time, of empirical evidence concerning the impacts of MSR-style projects. 
And the modesty of MSR’s underlying vision,106 anathema to the social 
democratic tradition, might be thought to have pragmatism in its favour, for 
workers outside that “golden circle” – migrant, undocumented, and non-
unionised labour whose rising numbers, as noted earlier, are steadily forcing a 
re-definition of typical” employment. MSR, then, is at least important in 
highlighting the heterogeneity that global regulation in the labour domain 
must accommodate. 
 
                                                 
102 See Estlund, supra n. 87, at 379. 
103 “Where there is no power base and no information base for the weaker party, tripartism will 
not work […]” Estlund, supra n. 87, at 358, quoting Ayers and Braithwaite (1992, at 59). 
Further revealing confusion on this point, Estlund later states that as a consequence of the 
problem of “chronic [regulatory] under-enforcement” state regulators must “[…] come up 
with strategies to secure compliance that do not depend on intensive continuing oversight…” 
and so “will need to draw on non-governmental regulatory resources”, the latter which she 
interprets as opening the way for her model’s independent monitoring arrangements. 
However, chronic under-enforcement is endogenous to Ayers and Braithwaite’s RR model 
which, by contrast, demanded that any tripartite agreement address not just substantive issues 
but “[…] adherence to the institutional requisites of effective self-regulation [...]”, including 
granting freedom of association to workers. 
104 “Without a greater coercive threat, it will be difficult to induce most employers to take 
meaningful steps toward effective self-regulation, and perhaps least of all toward employee 
representation,”: Estlund, supra n. 87, at 365. She also states that a move towards self-
regulation must be “[…] part of a regulatory scheme in which serious sanctions also play a 
role” (at 403). 
105 See Estlund, supra n. 87, at 374. 
106 Underlined subsequently with the suggestion that, “Part of what the monitors must monitor 
is the workers’ freedom, individually and collectively, to speak for themselves, both during and 
in between visits that will necessarily be occasional”. 
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But the starting point of this section was the question of whether non-trade 
union supported labour self-regulation can shore up Collins’ “horizontal” 
employment contract, to prevent its collapse into a form of “partnership” 
drained of substantive content in terms of employee rights and protections 
against subordination?107 The claimed effectiveness of MSR has been shown 
to depend on either: a) the initiative and engagement of state authorities and 
trade unions; or b) a radically attenuated vision of labour rights. 
Consequently, the aspiration of horizontal employment relationship remains 
as much at risk as before. Can anything be done, then, to restrain the effects - 
for workers - of the underlying trends leading to de-unionisation and/or the 
weakening autonomy of states with regard to social and labour standards? The 
two remaining reconstructions converge on a suggested solution. 
 
3.3. Reconstructing labour law via corporate law108 
A widening gap between the legal concept of the corporation and the 
economic and social functions that provided its original legitimation is 
highlighted by certain labour lawyers. Historically, the limited liability 
company promoted enterprise by pooling resources and sharing risk for 
relatively small numbers of direct investors, and the rights and duties of 
shareholders reflected their typically “hands-on” engagement in company 
operations, through which, it may be said, they exercised genuine, rather 
than merely formal, co-ownership. 
 
Yet, over the last hundred years, the management role of shareholders has 
diminished and their connections to companies has become steadily more 
distant. In parallel, directors’ and managerial powers have expanded and a 
separate corporate personality individuated. Company law, particularly its 
Anglo-Saxon forms, has become primarily concerned with “financial claims 
on the assets and income streams of the firm”; no longer is it “directly 
interested in the relations of production, and employees feature either as 
marginal subjects […] or in so far as they happen to be creditors or 
shareholders.”109 While the legal concept of the enterprise, where it applies, still 
                                                 
107 Estlund is not insensible to this risk: “Employment law, both its regulatory and its rights 
dimensions, is in many ways a poor substitute for the system of self-governance envisioned by 
the labour laws […] and collective representation key to rights and regulations enforcement.” 
108 For a reconstruction of the corporation, but from the perspective of human rights, rather 
than labour law, see J. Dine, Companies, International Trade and Human Rights, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
109 See S. Deakin, “Enterprise-Risk: The Juridical Nature of the Firm Revisited”, (2003) 32 
Industrial Law Journal, p. 97, at 98. See, also, Ireland (supra n. 21), coming from a more or less 
Marxist position, shares the view that shareholders (“passive rentiers”) are “severed from the 
firm’s productive purpose”, and further asserts that shareholders benefit from “unpaid labour”, 
Reframing RECON: Transnationalisation and Post-national Democracy 123
 
defines a risk management function, this is in tension with company law’s 
explicit content and aims. Individual enterprises are frequently fragmented 
into “multi-corporate” form, whereas there is still no “generally accepted 
legal concept of the corporate group adequately expressing this complex 
social and economic ‘reality’”.110 
 
Labour law, in contrast, remains intrinsically concerned with the relations of 
production inside enterprises; to this end, for instance, conferring as separate 
legal identities employer, undertaking, and establishment. During the 
twentieth century, moreover, labour law in some jurisdictions articulated 
ideals of “worker participation” and industrial democracy, and concern with 
power and control. Its more radical forms put on the agenda, vis à vis 
corporate law, “relaxation of the goal of profit maximisation”, “diminution 
of shareholder rights” and a more general “re-orientation of corporate 
goals”.111 Not just contingent inequality of capital, then, but the “fundamental 
institutional framework of capitalist relations of production” and the 
“institutional design of firms”112 were implicated in labour law’s critique of 
corporate law, its ultimate ambition to replace capitalistic hierarchy with 
“democratic” relations in the economic sphere.113 Derailed by the 1970s’ 
economic crises, to a limited extent such aspirations reappeared in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, with ideas of “stakeholder democracy”, retaining at least 
some of previous decades’ concern with the devolution of control over work 
                                                                                                                   
i.e., in the form of residual profits, so that there can be no moral case for giving them 
ownership rights. This is said to explain the relatively recent emergence of the “efficiency 
case” for shareholder rights. Property and commodity exchange are identified in this 
perspective as the principal means of extracting surplus labour, relocating social subjugation in 
the economic sphere, claimed by market liberals as “private”, inherently democratic, and a 
domain of “freedom and voluntary activity”. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ireland, supra n. 109, suggests the expression “industrial democracy” usually implied the goal 
of the “introduction of worker representatives on corporate boards” as under German law. See 
alternative definitions provided by T.H. Marshall, Phillip Selznick (both supra n. 6) and Harry 
Arthurs, supra n. 6 and H. Arthurs, “The new economy and the demise of industrial 
citizenship. The new economy and the demise of industrial citizenship, Don Wood Lecture, 
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen’s University, Toronto, mimeo. 
112 See H. Collins, “Labour Law as a Vocation”, (1989) 104 LQR, p. 468, and “Market Power, 
Bureaucratic Power and the Contract of Employment”, (1986) 15 ILJ, p. 1. 
113 Ireland, supra n. 109, notes Kahn-Freund’s dissent from this view (O. Kahn-Freund, 
“Industrial Democracy,” 6 ILJ 65), rejecting the possibility of a unity of interest embracing 
capital and labour, and urging the inevitability of interest pluralism and so fundamental conflict 
between the two (see Chantal Mouffe’s critique of deliberative rationalist theory’s similar 
assumptions (C. Mouffe, “Democracy and Pluralism: A Critique of the Rationalist Approach”, 
(1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review, 1533; this point is taken up in Conclusion. 
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to employees and moderation, if not elimination, of institutional hierarchies 
inside the enterprise. 
 
Against this background, the thesis of “flexibilisation as a transformative 
opportunity”114 is seen as significant slippage. Its vision of companies as 
“communities of interest”, and “[…] based upon a micro-corporatist 
coalition of producers”115 wherein neither labour, capital nor management has 
a natural or exclusive claim to control might, momentarily, appear to accord 
with the ideal of workplace democracy – especially when tied to calls for 
“enhanced workers’ rights” and greater worker involvement in management, 
perhaps even where such goals are included only for the sake of their 
instrumental value in contributing to competitive advantage (i.e., via trust). 
But reflexive corporate governance which, as, for instance, under Partnership 
at Work, stops at consideration of workers’ perspectives and interests in 
managers’ and directors’ formulation of corporate goals falls far short of 
participation,116 especially when “socially disembedded liquidity and mobility of 
shares” are intensifying market imperatives and increasing pressure to 
subordinate workers’ rights in pursuit of greater efficiency. 
 
For some contributors, it is only by excavating to a deeper level of analysis 
that we can understand this progression. Economic history, they suggest, can 
demonstrate that the structural necessity of labour’s exploitation within 
systems of capitalist exchange derives not from the relationship between 
capital and wage labour, but directly from the operation of competition. 
“Democratising” companies, whether radically or moderately, cannot, 
therefore, end labour’s instrumentalisation. Nor can the re-introduction of 
regulations on capital movements, work councils, stake-holding companies, 
social clauses, “universal labour standards” or voluntary corporate codes: all 
such measures are merely “ameliorative”.117 Only by recognising the historical 
                                                 
114 With reference to H. Collins, “The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law”, (1997) 26 
ILJ, at 295, and H. Collins, “Flexibility and Empowerment”, in: T. Wilthagen (ed), Advancing 
Theory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a Global Context, (Amsterdam, Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1998), at 117. See, further, the analysis of Collins’ 
account presented above, in Section 3.2. 
115 With reference to G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoeitic System, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), at 6. 
116 See, also, C. Barnard, S. Deakin & R. Hobbs, “Reflexive Law, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Evolution of Labour Standards: The Case of Working Time”, ESCR 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 294, (Cambridge: 
CBR, 2004). 
117 See Ireland, supra n. 109, at 211, citing (at fn.38) E. Meiksins Wood, “The Politics of 
Capitalism”, (1999) 51 Monthly Review, p. 12. Pension fund socialism and “shareholder 
activism” are dismissed for the same reason, i.e., the imperative to maximise returns on shares 
at multiple points is intrinsic to capitalism, for example, shrinking public pension provision, 
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specificity of current property forms (the company and share first and 
foremost) and then re-conceptualising them, will the transformation to non-
exploitative modes of production become possible. Consequently, to de-
commodify labour, and simultaneously restore political autonomy, fading 
under the advance of neo-liberalism,118 requires the reconstruction of 
corporations as social institutions, and a “process of experimentation in which 
they are increasingly placed under a combination of worker, community, 
supplier, and consumer control.”119 The rise of flexibility agenda, on the other 
hand, is said to demonstrate that without such reconstructive measures, social 
democracy cannot restrain capitalism and “that high labour standards, let 
alone true industrial democracy, are simply incompatible with it”.120 
 
3.4. Reconstructing labour law through social rights 
Were this analysis, for sake of argument, to be accepted, to what ends, 
precisely, should the re-defined, reflexive corporation be dedicated? By 
reference to which values or goals could the corporation be born again as a 
“social institution”, instead of one of capitalist exploitation? Scope for 
explicitly investing corporations with exclusively, or predominantly, social 
functions, through their internal legal constitutions, i.e., the course of action 
recommended in the last section, would appear politically restricted. Might 
the same end-point be reached by another route? 
 
In answer to the phenomena described in Sections 2 and 3 above, the Supiot 
Report proposes, in the EU context, a reconfiguration of labour law based 
upon a new understanding, not of the corporation, but of the goal of 
individual employment security.121 Its principal elements are three. First, a 
new concept of occupational status.122 In the light of trends affecting work and 
the employment relationship, the aim here is to “protect continuity of a 
                                                                                                                   
pension funds subject to competitive pressures. 
118 See Ireland, supra n. 109, at 205. 
119 See Ireland, ibid., at 217 (emphasis added). 
120 See Ireland, ibid., at 211. He also suggests this shows that global economic integration is 
eroding “national class compacts” on which the corporatist and welfarist capitalisms 
respectively of Germany and Sweden were based on up to the 1990s. 
121 A. Supiot, supra n. 22, at 31, states: “Labour law, whether national or international, is rooted 
in an industrial model that is currently being undermined by technological and economic 
changes […]”, and later, “Employment practices have always varied widely, and the industrial 
model has never been universal. Yet, it was by reference to this model that the western 
countries’ labour law was developed. To a large extent, the same holds true of international 
labour law as embodied in the institutions of the International Labour Organisation in 
particular” (ibid., at 33). 
122 Alternatively, “labour market” status (in the original, the expression used is statut 
professional). 
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lifelong trajectory rather than the stability of particular jobs”. As a substitute 
for “employee status”, which, as observed, historically combined 
“subordination and security”, by contrast, this would “reconcile the requisites 
of freedom, security and responsibility,” thereby rectifying the imbalances 
increasingly in play in the employer-employee bargain.123 It would aim to 
facilitate “career individualisation and mobility” on the one hand, and new 
production processes, demanding higher job turnover and skills upgrading, 
for instance, on the other. Its practical aspects would include protecting 
workers during transitions between jobs, establishing new linkages between 
training and employment, and addressing transitions in status (for example, 
between self-employment and salaried work).124 
 
Second, an extended concept of work would replace employment as the basis 
for access to social protection. The inclusion of “non-market work”, it is 
suggested, would contribute to meeting the “requirements of equality 
between men and women, continuing training, involvement in public-
interest assignments, family responsibilities and workers’ occupational 
freedom.” Work would, accordingly, be re-defined as activity “[…] linked to 
some obligation undertaken voluntarily or imposed by law, which is 
performed for a valuable consideration or without consideration within some 
statutory framework or under contract”.125 
 
Third, a new concept of social drawing rights, attached to occupational status 
and which would permit individuals to “manage their own flexibility” and 
achieve “active security” under conditions of uncertainty. Supplementary to 
traditional labour and social rights, these would encompass freedom from 
employment, and be discretionarily exercisable by the individual. Four 
clusters of rights within this categorisation are distinguished: i) rights accruing 
specifically from wage employment; ii) rights common to all forms of 
employment; iii) rights deriving from non-occupational work (such as caring 
for dependents, voluntary work or self-training); and iv) universal social 
rights. The content of social drawing rights is to be discerned with reference 
to international human rights and labour standards: the Working Time 
                                                 
123 Referring principally to the rising intensity of work, a similar degree of dependence, albeit 
without security of employment, income or social security in return. 
124 Supiot, supra n. 22, at 36. See ILO/Auer, supra n. 72 for a similar analysis, which concludes 
the need for “a new combination of employment security and social security”, and “new 
framework of protected mobility (or protected LM transitions)” as “one possible form of an 
optimal institutional setting for a globalising world, at least for the developed world”); and 
“[…] allowing workforce adjustment in relative security, without jeopardising productivity and 
labour market performance”. 
125 Supiot, supra n. 22, at 37. 
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Directive’s126 “Fordist definition of free time” and concern only with 
workers’ health and safety falls to be re-appraised, the report suggests, with 
regard to norms of respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR and ILO 
Convention No.156.127 
 
Finally, the report begins to unpack the implications of its proposed 
reconfiguration of labour law for the state and for citizenship. On the basis 
that national autonomy over labour regulation is compromised,128 it identifies 
a need for a “new modus operandi for state intervention”. Flowing from a 
“comprehensive view of social rights based on solidarity”, a new approach is 
outlined, with both procedural and substantive dimensions. Procedural 
guarantees are necessary because the norm of participation can no longer be restricted 
to political representation, on the twin grounds of political legitimacy and regulatory 
efficacy. Substantive content is to be derived from rights already located in the 
EU’s Community Social Charter, and ILO instruments, although these, it is 
added “[…] could usefully be written into constitutional law at the European 
level […]”. These two dimensions are then united in the concept of social 
citizenship. This is to be a vehicle for synthesising reorganised labour and social 
security law, in circumstances where the old concept of social protection is 
no longer viable. It is also proposed as a new constitutional “cornerstone” at 
EU level. Amongst its additional advantages are “inclusiveness”, the linking of 
social and labour rights to social integration (i.e., not only to work), and 
expression of the ideal of participation.129 
 
Thus Supiot proposes, for labour law, a reconstructed regulative ideal – 
individual security based on occupational status - and a new substantive agenda, to 
be defined by reference to EU and international social, labour and human 
rights standards. Both elements give shape, next, to a broadened notion of 
social citizenship, which extends participation from the political and civil 
spheres into the economic sphere, renewing the legitimacy of exchange 
relations between individual, state and (where there is one) employer – and 
                                                 
126 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time, OJ L.307, Vol. 36, 13 Dec 1993, 18-24.  
127 Supiot, supra n. 22, at 39. Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 
156). The indication is that law needs to take a broader view of time, and “Work must be 
adapted to the worker who performs it – not vice versa”. 
128 Supiot, supra n. 22, at 42-43. 
129 That is, because citizenship “[…] implies that the people it covers should participate in the 
framing and realization of their rights” [citation], with these words making clear the 
indebtedness of the Report’s vision to Habermas’ law-making ideal. 
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answering the question from which this section departed.130 How, though, do 
these connect, as indicated above, with the claim that the only hope for 
labour, under global capitalism, lies in a reconstruction of corporate law? 
 
Though beyond the remit of the Supiot Report, possible linkages are 
signalled by other labour lawyers. Barnard and Deakin see social rights and 
citizenship as having consequences for corporate law at two levels. At the 
macro level of “regulatory competition between different legal orders”, social 
rights “[…] set the parameters within which procedural solutions are sought”, 
to legal determinations affecting corporate law, as other legal domains.131 At 
the micro level which, under subsidiarity, increasingly refers to standard-
setting within the firm or enterprise, social rights act as “general principles”, 
and so as “[…] reference points capable of ‘steering’ or ‘channelling’ the 
process of negotiation between the social partners”, so that social dialogue, at 
all levels, becomes “framed” by fundamental social rights. 
 
For Barnard and Deakin’s account, as for Supiot’s,132 this duality, of external 
legal framing and self-regulatory process, including at workplace level, is key. 
Absent explicit constitutional commitments to social citizenship rights, and 
within the context of economic integration within post-national 
constellations, procedural law and reflexive governance approaches are 
unlikely to preserve the “space for local experimentation and adaptation” that 
provide its main functional rationale. More likely is that they will constitute a 
                                                 
130 S. Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment”, in: Conaghan et al., (eds), 
supra n. 19, at 195, echoing this view, at the same time, reveals a Marshallian genealogy. 
Suggesting that a conception of social citizenship provided the underlying “normative force” 
for the employment contract’s original function of spreading market risk through the working 
population while underpinning relations of production at the level of the enterprise, social 
citizenship “[…] extend[ed] the bases for social and economic participation in the same way 
that rights of democratic participation had been extended through political reform”. 
131 See C. Barnard & S. Deakin, “Corporate governance, European governance and social 
rights”, in: B. Hepple (ed), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context. International and 
Comparative Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 149, giving as 
examples the decisions of the ECJ in UK v Council (Working Time) Case C-84/94 [1996] ECR-
1 5755, and Albany International v Stichtung Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-
5751. 
132 See Supiot , supra n. 22, at 44: “The law can do no more than lay down principles whose 
implementation then falls within the scope of the law of collective agreements. It follows that a 
collective agreement should no longer be seen simply as a means of adjusting the particular 
interests of the parties thereto, but as a legal instrument whereby those parties are joined in the 
pursuit of objectives laid down by the law. In this process of determining the public interest, 
independent agencies could also play a useful role provided that democratic debate does not 
become sidetracked under the influence of “experts”.’ 
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“market for legal rules that can lead to a race to the bottom”;133 at minimum, 
the outcome will not be clearly distinguishable from the “levelling down” to 
minimum standards achievable via “negative integration”.134 
 
Hence, even if it is no longer thought appropriate to use law to impose 
specific distributive outcomes135 at national or supranational level, legal 
standards remain necessary. Procedural and heterarchical forms of governance 
(of which deliberative cosmopolitanism is one variant) still need laws (such as 
those supporting individual participation and group representation) to secure 
the input legitimacy in turn needed to induce the desired ‘second order 
effects” shown in Section 2, to be a required element of democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
4. Conclusion: Reframing RECON 
Sparely defined by RECON’s founding fathers, democracy is a “principle 
which specifies what it means to get political results right”. On the other 
hand, under the cosmopolitan hypothesis, as noted at the outset, democratic 
legitimacy “[…] requires public justification of the results to those who are 
affected by them”; and deliberation embodies the democratic principles of 
congruence (“those affected by laws should also be authorised to make 
them”) and accountability (the means by which decision-makers can be held 
responsible to, and ultimately dismissed by, citizens).136 
 
I have argued that as matters stand there is a discrepancy between the first, 
teleological statement and its subsequent operationalisation, deriving not from 
any necessary defect in cosmopolitanism’s aims, but from a tendency, still, to 
lean towards the classical liberal assumption of a division between the public 
and private spheres that confines democracy, constitutions and citizenship to 
one side of it. 
                                                 
133 See Barnard & Deakin, supra n. 131; see, also, F. Scharpf, “The problem-solving capacity of 
multi-level governance”, (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy, p. 520. 
134 Even given a “[…] close link, in practice, between procedural rights and substantive 
outcomes”, Barnard and Deakin caution, “…the merits of the procedural approach must be 
carefully weighed against the costs in terms of uncertainty over the meaning and application of 
legal rights”. 
135 Including via comprehensive justiciability of socio-economic rights, for this point citing 
(supra n. 131, at 148), A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: Reality and Myth of Collective 
Bargaining in the EC Legal Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), at 152. 
136 See Eriksen & Fossum, supra n. 1, at 4, and further (at 8): “The public sphere located in civil 
society holds a unique position, because this is where everyone has the opportunity to 
participate in the discussion about how common affairs should be attended to. It signifies that 
equal citizens assemble into a public, which is constituted by a set of civil and political rights and 
liberties, and set their own agenda through communication” (emphasis added). 
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In doing so, cosmopolitanism partakes of a venerable orthodoxy.137 Over 
decades, jurisprudential analyses have demonstrated that normative 
constitutional argument experiences difficulty in “subjecting private power to 
greater scrutiny and control”.138 This has given rise to scepticism concerning 
law’s autonomy from the influences of politics and market, itself turning into 
an enduring strand of legal scholarship (and one that survived the strongest, 
passing claims of economic determinism or “synchronisation”139). From this 
viewpoint, contemporary “hegemonic globalisation” articulates with rights-
based constitutionalism, and “the most important artefact” of this relationship 
is a “state-civil society divide” that “[…] serves the crucial legitimating 
function of obscuring the broader constellation of law and political power – 
including corporate political power – operating in society”.140 
 
Labour law, this contribution has shown, by contrast, paradigmatically focuses 
on the employment relationship as a site where public and private ordering 
coincide, and where individual autonomy and collective self-rule must be 
guaranteed.141 Again, to use RECON’s terms, it considers the labour market 
as polity (comprising “authoritative institutions equipped with and organised 
capacity to make binding decisions and allocate resources”) and forum (“a 
common communicative space located in civil society, where the citizens can 
jointly form opinions and put the power holders to account”.)142 Historically, 
national constitutions, read in conjunction with the broader social risk and 
resource redistributive arrangements that accompanied them, have usually 
taken the same view, in Polanyi’s double movement,143 even if this may be 
overlooked today, due to the ascendance of representations to the contrary.144 
 
                                                 
137 As noted by Gavin Anderson, “Until recently, the critique that a constitutionalism which 
embodied these [classical liberal] values failed to take seriously the threat from private power 
left mainstream constitutional theory largely undisturbed. This can perhaps be explained by the 
strong belief that the business of constitutional law is the regulation of the state […]”: G 
Anderson, “Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism”, (2004) 17 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, p. 31, at 33 (footnote omitted). 
138 Ibid., at 32 & 33, and generally, for discussion of whether Dworkin’s “law as argument” 
approach can counter this claim. 
139 See Scheuerman, supra n. 78. 
140 See Anderson, supra n. 137, at 58. 
141 See Fossum & Eriksen, supra n. 1, at 7-8, defining autonomy as “[…] constituted, when 
actors have to seek justification in relation to what others can approve of, viz., everyone who is 
subject to collective decision-making must be able to find an acceptable basis for such 
decisions”. 
142 See Fossum & Eriksen, supra n. 1, at 8. 
143 See Block, supra n. 12. 
144 For example, the “good governance” narrative of the rule of law as market liberalisation, as 
discussed, for instance, in Bevir & Rhodes, supra n. 4. 
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Some constitutional theorists, and feminist scholars foremost, share and 
continue to press this position. “If democratic self-governance is a moral 
value,” according to Iris Marion Young, “then it should be present at places 
where persons have the greatest stake and where they are vulnerable to 
domination by others; workplaces are prime among them.”145 RECON for 
the moment seems to overlook this. One might possibly find principled 
reasons for doing so: it might be seen as necessary to restrict the ambit of 
cosmopolitan deliberation on the basis, for instance, of weaker 
communication or identification at supranational level. What cannot be 
acceptable, is for cosmopolitan theorising and, more specifically, RECON’s 
framework, to slip into liberalism and thin proceduralism146 by default,147 
while communicating these selections as a neutral, natural, value-free 
position.148 Even then, space for normative and strategic contestation will 
certainly remain. European integration, the project of political union, requires 
“the legitimation of shared values”, “a particular ethos”, and the attraction of 
a specific way of life”.149 Historically, Europe’s values have been as social 
democratic as they have been liberal. Now is no time to give up the ghost. 
                                                 
145 See Iris Marion Young, quoted in Fung, supra n. 9, at 47. See, also, D. Sciulli, “Foundations 
of Societal Constitutionalism: Principles from the Concepts of Communicative Action and 
Procedural Integrity”, (1988) 39 British Journal of Sociology, p. 377. 
146 Anderson, supra n. 137, at 31 (footnote omitted) denotes a “procedural account of 
democracy, best actualised through the participation of formal equals in popular elections.” 
147 Scheuerman, supra n. 78, at 118, criticises the experimentalist reconstruction of democracy, 
for presupposing “far-reaching social equality” as a condition of its success, with reference to J. 
Cohen & J. Rogers, “Power and Reason”, in: A. Fung & E.O. Wright (eds), Deepening 
Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, (New York: Verso, 
2001). 
148 See Nanz’s definition of law, adopted here, as “a normative discourse in which competing 
claims are contested”: P. Nanz, “Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutionalisation of 
Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory”, in: Ch. Joerges & E-U. 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multi-level Trade Governance and Social Regulation, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2006). 
149 Habermas, supra n. 18, at 8, (footnote 3 omitted), citing J.E. Fossum, “Constitution-making 
in the EU,” in: E.O. Eriksen & J.E. Fossum (eds), Democracy in the EU – Integration through 
Deliberation? (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.111-63). 
 
Chapter  6 
Transnational Governance and Human Rights: 








We live in a world of complex global economic, political, ecological and 
social processes that influence our lives enormously. It is difficult to trace the 
causes of these developments and to determine who is obliged to remedy the 
massive problems that we face today, such as global poverty, slavery and 
exploitation, and the destruction of our environment. Moral philosophy and 
political theory are struggling to discover an adequate conception of our 
obligations in global and regional contexts. The prevailing common sense 
morality says that the primary moral actor is the individual and the obligations 
of collectives are often more or less ignored. From this perspective, the 
individual is overburdened with responsibility for mitigating large-scale 
problems effectively. Things look quite different, however, when we turn to 
political theory and look at the political legitimation of rules in international 
relations. While the individual is seen as the principal and ideal actor in 
processes of democratic will-formation and rule-setting within the nation-
state, governance beyond the nation-state has other demands. 
 
It needs to address the fact that the international world order has changed 
rapidly during the last decades. The state-centred international system of law 
included only one type of “player”, the nation state. The current 
international political order, however, consists of a multi-level system, 
without a world government but with multiple players in functionally 
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differentiated fields of activities. The international community has established 
the United Nations as the single power on a supranational level that has the 
authority to implement enduring peace and prevent massive human rights 
violations. At the level “below”, the transnational level, networks and 
organisations converge and overlap to satisfy the different functional demands 
of co-ordination. The various forms of co-ordination between transnational 
state organisations, state and non-state actors, and simple private self-
regulation address not only “technical” problems such as quality standards, 
telecommunication, and the prevention of catastrophes; they are also 
increasingly involved in regulations of a genuinely political nature such as 
financial and economic issues, energy and the environment, poverty 
reduction and health care. 
 
In keeping with current notions of international governance, the citizen has 
given way to collectives as the primary political actor. Private collectives, in 
particular, have gained increasing prominence in international negotiations, 
public deliberation, and rule-setting. 
 
We, therefore, face the somewhat awkward situation that, in moral 
frameworks, the obligations attributed to the individual have become quite 
extensive, whereas, in political frameworks, the legitimacy of a citizen’s 
participation in global agreements has been curtailed. However, both 
frameworks have their pitfalls. Our understanding of the moral obligations 
required to address large-scale problems is as inadequate as the prevailing 
ideas concerning legitimate governance in international relations. In this 
paper, I will discuss these issues, focusing on the obligations of transnational 
corporations in international relations. 
 
The transnational corporation (TNC) became a main international actor 
during the second half of the twentieth century.1 The revenue of some 
transnational corporations exceeds the gross national product of the smaller 
European states, not to mention the African states, which gives them 
                                                 
1 See M. Koenig-Archibugi, “Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability”, (2004) 
39 Government and Opposition, pp. 234-259, at 234. Their growth has been enormous: in 1976, 
there were 11,000 TNCs with 82,600 foreign affiliates. In 2002, there were 64,592 TNCs 
with 851,167 foreign affiliates. It is not just the growth in TNCs that make them relevant in 
international relations; it is also that their roles have changed. While nation-states have lost 
important decision-making competencies at the international level, TNCs have gained 
tremendous political and economic power; see, also, O. de Schutter, “Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights: An Introduction”, 2005, Hauser Global Law Working 
Paper, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/GLWP_0105.htm. 
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inordinate influence over international market regulations and national 
legislative and political processes.2 More than 54 million people are employed 
by TNCs, and this number is even higher when one includes non-equity 
relationships such as sub-contracting and licensing. 
 
At the centre of these developments is the issue of transnational corporations’ 
obligations to respect basic human rights. They embody the most basic moral 
rules with global scope. It is widely held that human rights treaties are, first 
and foremost, addressed to individuals and to states. States, for various 
reasons, no longer sufficiently control the implementation of human rights 
law. Non-state actors - not by accident defined in contrast to the “state” - are 
not parties to such treaties because – or so it is said - they have not been 
involved in the drafting process, cannot report to the treaty bodies, and 
cannot participate in electing the expert members.3 This position, however, 
no longer seems tenable and has raised pressing theoretical questions. I will 
address two of these questions in this article. 
 
The first question focuses on the normative side of the topic: Do corporations 
have human rights obligations, and, if so, do they differ fundamentally from 
the human rights obligations of states on the one hand, and of individuals on 
the other? I will argue that collective actors do have obligations to avoid 
directly violating human rights, and have an obligation to mitigate in 
situations in which rights are being violated by others, if they have the power 
to intervene. Moreover, having broached upon the subject of an “extended 
notion of corporate obligations”, what should be the content of these 
obligations? 
 
Normative studies are often criticised for being trapped in the powerlessness 
of “ought to” language. My approach combines a normative and empirical 
perspective, connecting the normative grounds for corporate obligations to an 
empirical analysis of the current global and EU policies that work towards the 
implementation of corporate obligations. Against the background of the 
normative proposal offered in Section 1, I will look at some institutional 
arrangements and corporate initiatives that aim at norm compliance and asks 
the following question: Which modes of governance already allow for 
                                                 
2 The value of the exchanges at Merrill Lynch every day exceed the total GDP of the whole of 
Africa. Many thanks to Chris Engert for this remark. 
3 On this claim, see P. Alston, “The “Not-a-Cat-Syndrome”: Can the International Human 
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?” In: P. Alston (ed): Non-State-Actors and 
Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 3-37, at 9; however, this is not 
the position, which he defends. 
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private-public co-operation in the implementation of human rights 
obligations? I will offer three criteria for the critical evaluation of just two 
(because of page constraints) international initiatives that aim at enhancing 
corporate human rights compliance. 
 
Thirdly, I will argue that one has to put these analyses into a broader 
institutional context. A third question is, therefore, what entities, and what 
institutional, contractual arrangements and strategies support, or hinder, the 
implementation of the new modes of governance which aim to establish 
human rights standards within market processes and beyond. I will argue that 
a network of diverse regulations concerning the responsibility of non-state 
actors has brought about a new institutional context of justification and 
control. 
 
However, not all of these new policies meet the standards of democratic 
legitimation. I will conclude with a sceptical note on the political equality of 
private collective actors within global governance processes. 
 
2. The obligations of the collective actor 
States remain the major violators of human rights, but there is now also 
widespread concern at human rights abuses committed by corporations that 
have the power to escape national legal responsibilities. At the same time, 
TNCs have become an important partner to states, intergovernmental 
agencies, and non-governmental organisations in the development of 
mechanisms to enforce human rights-related standards, such as adequate 
wages and leisure time for workers, and environmental protection. The 
corporation appears both as a potential human rights violator and as a political 
bargaining partner in governance processes that establish human rights 
standards. 
 
In moral philosophy and political theory, most approaches bear the hallmarks 
of what Samuel Scheffler has called “common sense morality”. It includes 
assumptions that not only influence theory but are also entrenched in 
everyday practices.4 Four assumptions in particular make it very difficult to 
speak about the obligations of a collective actor.5 These are: that collective 
                                                 
4 S. Scheffler, “Individual Responsibility in a Global Age”, in: Boundaries and Allegiances: 
Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp. 32-48, at 37. 
5 The first assumption is not mentioned in S. Scheffler, “Individual Responsibility in a Global 
Age”, in: Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 32-48. For the other three, see, also, the very 
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actors do not act intentionally; that the individual (and not the collective) is 
the primary moral actor; that action is more morally significant than omission; 
and that consequences that have proximity in time and space are more 
significant than remote consequences. In the sub-section that follows, I will 
first address these four assumptions and argue that we should, in fact, attribute 
obligations to collective actors, including transnational corporations, as there 
are advantages to assigning obligations to collectives, rather than to 
individuals. Secondly, I will focus on the content of these obligations, thereby 
taking into consideration that corporation’s obligations do not transform the 
corporation or any other collective actor into a moral person. 
 
2.1. The “unintended-action-argument” 
When considering the obligations of corporations, we are first confronted 
with the common sense-based objection that the actor we are talking about is 
a collective whose way of “acting” differs fundamentally from that of an 
individual. By a “collective actor”, I mean an entity with an internal 
organisation structure that is able to make decisions and direct its activities 
accordingly. 
 
In an argument that can be traced to Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek, and 
later to Niklas Luhmann, it is commonly held that the activities of 
corporations are not regulated intentionally but arise spontaneously as a result of 
the establishment of a sub-system in an expanding capitalist world economy. 
Market processes, they say, can best be understood in terms of a game, “partly 
of skills and partly of chance”6 whose outcome is not foreseeable but is 
instead unpredictable and has winners and losers. The economic system is 
metaphorically driven by an “invisible hand” (Adam Smith) or “steering 
medium” (Niklas Luhmann).7 As part of the systematic economic order, 
corporations are self-referential entities, subject to the imperatives of 
economic rationality, such as the exchange of economic goods, the 
                                                                                                                   
illuminating article of M. Green, “Institutional Responsibility for Moral Problems”, in: A. 
Kuper (ed): Global Responsibilities. Who must deliver on human rights?, (New York, Oxford: 
Routledge, 2005), pp. 117-135. 
6 See F.A. von Hayek, “Law, Legislation and Liberty”, Vol.2: The Mirage of Social Justice, 
(London, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 71. 
7 See A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (ed). by R.H. 
Campbell, A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1776] 1976) (The Glasgow 
Edition of the Work and Correspondence of Adam Smith.); F.A. von Hayek, “Law, 
Legislation and Liberty”, Vol.2: The Mirage of Social Justice, London, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press,1976; N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 
1997). 
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maximising of profit under conditions of competition, and the accumulation 
of power. The argument for restricted corporate obligations concludes that 
because the actors in the market are driven by the forces of economic 
rationality, and do not have intentionality, one cannot say the corporate actor 
was ever in a position to act otherwise.8 
 
This emphasis on an interest-neutral and completely unintended co-
ordination of activities seems to be overly one-sided.9 This becomes obvious 
when we consider the/0 problems or conflicts that occur within the market 
that require reactions from corporations. Stakeholder demands, moreover, 
have led to new institutional mechanisms such as progress reports, 
benchmarking, and peer review.10 Corporations clearly react to new external 
demands, and can be said to be involved in learning processes. Shell in 
Nigeria is a prominent example of a firm dealing with external demands in a 
way which, at first glance, seems to contradict one major aim of a 
corporation, which is, to increase its profits. The impact of oil extraction on 
the Ogoni people and the Delta environment and, in particular the execution 
of Ken-Saro-Wiwa led to very negative publicity for the company 
worldwide. For a long time, Shell’s standard answer to criticism of its role in 
Nigeria was to strengthen the “division of work” between the state and the 
corporation.11 A change in opinion came after public pressure against the 
company strengthened. Shell admitted that “not to take action could itself be 
a political act”, and declared a commitment to a wider concept of 
responsibility for its future activities. This potential for corporations to change 
their behaviour paves the way for further normative consideration of the 
foundation of the obligations of collective actors. Let us consider the three 
remaining assumptions of common sense morality that restrict the notion of 
corporate obligations. 
                                                 
8 For the relationship between responsibility and the freedom to act otherwise, see J.M. Fischer 
& M. Ravell, “Responsibility for Consequences”, in: J.M. Fischer & M. Ravizza (eds), 
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1993), pp. 322-349. 
9 See J. Gray, “Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice”, in: (1981) 92 Ethics, pp. 73-84. 
10 The European Union, for example, has increasingly used so-called soft modes of governance to 
orchestrate different actors, including TNCs, to solve complex social problems through 
deliberation, based upon voluntary and non-sanctioned forms of policy-making (public or 
non-public). See, for one of the first articles on this, F. Snyder, “Soft Law and Institutional 
Practice in the European Community”, in: M. Stephen (ed), The Construction of Europe. Essays 
in Honour of Emile Noel, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 197-225; later E. Best, “Alternative 
Regulations or Complementary Methods? Evolving Options in European Governance”, in: 
(2003) 3 Eipascope,, pp. 2-18. 
11 D. McBarnet, “Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and the New Accountability”, in: 
T. Campbell & S. Miller, (eds), Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and 
Public Sector Organizations, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), pp. 63-81, at 67. 
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2.2. The priority of the individual over the collective 
The second assumption is the idea that individuals are the primary bearers of 
moral obligations.12 This means that my independent actions are regarded as 
more important for an outcome than my actions as a member of a group. If I 
produce a piece of artwork that becomes very famous, I will receive much 
more attention for my effort if I produce it alone than as a member of a 
group or school. The focus on the relative contribution of the individual to 
the final product has consequences on our daily assessment of our obligations. 
This is one reason why it is difficult to address direct responsibility for climate 
changes. If I drive my car every day and use electricity, this activity on its 
own cannot cause global warming. We see our contribution without focusing 
on the aggregated effects that our actions have in concert with those of 
others. This shapes our ideas about collectives. In so far as collective actors 
play a substantial role in common sense morality at all, their actions and 
obligations are seen as being derived from those of individuals. 
 
This perspective, however, seems shortsighted; it neglects the overall effects 
of unco-ordinated collective harm. This is true also with view to the 
collective actor’s activities. Even though the market system operates 
according to economic demands, examination of the effects of a corporation’s 
activities allows a normative evaluation of the collective activities. Against 
Hayek’s assumption, the systemic mechanisms (power and the exchange of 
goods) are “embedded” in society through the effects of the collective 
actions,13 which means that economic actors are “linked” to processes of co-
operation and interaction in the “life-world”. In a global economy, this 
“link” is more or less reduced to confronting the sometimes desired, but 
often undesired, aggregated effects of radical modernisation. Growing 
political awareness beyond national borders has triggered an evaluation of the 
effects14 of the activities of corporations in different public spheres. Consider, 
for example, the debates on the ecological and human rights abuses caused by 
multinationals. Because they affect people’s lives in massive, not marginal, 
ways, corporations are being said to bear some responsibility for their actions. 
 
                                                 
12 See, for the following aspect, M. Green, Institutional Responsibility for Moral Problems, in: 
A. Kuper (ed): Global Responsibilities. Who must deliver on human rights?, (New York, Oxford: 
Routledge, 2005), pp. 117-135, at 118. 
13 For the notion of “embeddedness”, see K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of our Time, (Boston: Beacon Press, [1944] 2001). 
14 U. Beck, A. Giddens & A.S. Last, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in 
the Modern Social Order, (Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 1997). 
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2.3. The priority of action over omission 
A third common assumption is the idea that actions and their direct effects 
are more morally relevant than omissions and their possible effects. If I cheat 
someone out of their money, this is a greater wrong than watching somebody 
cheat someone else and not taking any steps to intervene. We could be 
tempted to conclude that we have a strong duty not to undertake certain 
actions that harm others, but much less duty to prevent others from 
committing harm.15 Not to help in a situation of need, however, is a failure to 
render assistance, which is usually also declared as a moral, and even a legal, 
wrong. I may have good reasons for inaction, such as fear of being attacked, 
being too shocked to act, or perhaps thinking myself too weak to be 
effective. These considerations may postpone a decision, but they do not 
actually change the duty to offer help. 
 
The situation is less complicated if we slightly change the example. Imagine a 
person who watches a person cheat another, and then receives part of the 
take as a kind of hush money. In this case, we speak of complicity, and we 
would say that the bystander is co-responsible for what has happened as he or 
she profits from the harm inflicted on others. These considerations have 
consequences for the question of corporation’s obligations. It is not just the 
direct action and the influence of corporations that makes them a legitimate 
subject of obligations. If we say that everyone who contributes to the 
furtherance of injustice, including unjust institutions, and those who profit 
from it bear responsibility for the results, then we have another argument for 
corporations’s obligations.16 If collective actors profit from the current 
domestic or international system, they are not only bystanders, but also 
participants, and by this they contribute to the negative effects on peoples’ 
lives. Think of an oil company, for example, that lays a pipeline through a 
country whose government forcibly resettles its indigenous peoples to 
accommodate the pipeline. The company is indirectly implicated, and, by 
this, it is obliged to cease engaging in a process that causes harm.17 Even 
though a corporation cannot be held liable in a juridical sense for a host 
government’s systematic violations of civil, political, economic, social and 
                                                 
15 T. Pogge, “Assisting” the Global Poor”, in: D.K. Chatterjee (ed), The Ethics of Assistance. 
Morality and the Distant Needy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 260-289, 
at 279-280. 
16 T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002). 
17 See R.G. Steinhardt, “The New Lex Mercatoria”, in: P. Alston (ed): Non-State-Actors and 
Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 177-227, at 185. There is no 
domestic legislation defining a comprehensive, enforceable code of human rights conduct for 
multinationals, but there are other models for TNCs, such as ethical investment strategies. 
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cultural rights, it can be held responsible for upholding an unjust domestic 
order. 
 
2.4. The priority of near over remote outcomes 
The fourth assumption of common sense morality is that outcomes that occur 
near to us are of greater moral importance than remote ones. We usually 
decide that an outcome is the result of my own action only if it can be 
directly related in time and space to what I have done. Remote effects that 
may occur in the future or happen somewhere else in the world are not 
clearly linked to my action. This is why we feel much less responsible for 
environmental effects which will, nevertheless, be felt for generations. One 
could add that this makes sense, as it has become very difficult, if not 
impossible, to trace the origins of harms. For example, it requires great effort, 
and is sometimes technically impossible, to single out the source of a 
hazardous substance that pollutes the air. And sometimes the question arises 
of whether one could have known that this substance would become toxic 
when it was released into the air, or whether it would have been possible to 
avoid the dangerous emission. 
 
Some sociological researchers have made the case that modern technologies 
have grown so complex, and risks have become so overwhelmingly 
incalculable, that it is often impossible to attribute responsibilities to single 
agents or for agents to know how to take sufficient precautions. In a “global 
risk society”,18 all human beings are - in a more or less equally manner - 
exposed to uncontrollable risks which, ironically, have their origin in modern 
technologies and industries developed in the effort to improve our way of 
life.19 Irreversible climate changes and interventions in human genetics cause 
incalculable effects across space and time. Long functional chains within these 
complex developments make it difficult to trace both their causes and 
(harmful) effects. These new global threats undermine the logic of individual 
responsibility: the more widespread a technical innovation and its related risks 
(such as toxic emissions or genetic modification), the more difficult it is to 
assign the origin of an effect to a single originator: When there are many 
producers, how can we know who is at fault for hazardous emissions? And 
secondly, it may be impossible for an actor to foresee the negative effects of 
his or her actions; and if the unwanted effects could not have been foreseen, 
it would not be right to attribute obligations to the actor. 
                                                 
18 U. Beck, Weltrisikogesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 2007). 
19 U. Beck, Weltrisikogesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 2007) p. 65; U. Beck, World Risk 
Society, (Cambridge MA; Polity Press, 1999) is a much earlier version of the German edition, 
which is revised in many parts. 
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This position is only partly accurate and needs some differentiation. First of 
all, it, to a certain degree, exaggerates the complexity of circumstances and 
under-estimates the technical and political potential for tracking down the 
causes of global or regional harms. We have to distinguish between limited 
accidents or cases of liability – even though they are not “unintended” 
accidents as long as a catastrophe is part of the overall calculation – and 
unlimited catastrophes. The former are restricted geographically and in terms 
of their possible effects on generations to come. They also include calculable 
risks such as industrial injuries caused by unsafe machines or regional oil spills 
by an oil company. Undoubtedly, even if the damage could be localised 
beforehand, there is a risk that catastrophes are not unlimited in a predictable 
manner and might happen nevertheless. The scale of the catastrophes can 
only be determined ex post but cannot be anticipated ex ante 
comprehensively.20 As not all catastrophes are unlimited, it is important to 
track down those who are responsible for the damage as far as this is possible. 
There are some promising cases. The disposal of the Brent Spar oil storage 
facility is a prominent example of how responsibility has been legally assigned 
to a huge corporation, through the auspices of a watchful public.21 
 
Secondly, a well-known domestic principle has, indeed, come under 
pressure, the principle of compensation: What can serve as compensation for 
something that massively and irreversibly changes the conditions of human 
life? The idea of compensation is being replaced by the principle of 
prevention, which includes anticipating and preventing risks that cannot even 
be proven to exist.22 You may immediately object that the focus on 
prevention does not take us very far if we have to anticipate harmful effects 
under conditions of limited knowledge. If there are cases where a lack of 
knowledge and power makes it difficult to trace the causes of a harm and 
thereby make an institution liable for what has happened, it makes sense to 
reconsider the way we usually judge factual dilemmas. 
 
In criminal cases where there are doubts about both the facts and the role of 
an alleged perpetrator, we are inclined to exonerate the accused from any 
responsibility or obligations. However, “regular” criminal offences and 
institutional cases under complex conditions make for an uneasy comparison. 
It becomes apparent that the obligations of a collective actor are not restricted 
                                                 
20 U. Beck: Weltrisikogesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 2007), p. 243. 
21 D. McBarnet, “Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and the New Accountability”, In: 
T. Campbell & s. Miller, (eds), Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public 
Sector Organizations, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), pp. 63-81. 
22 U. Beck: Weltrisikogesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 2007), p. 104. 
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in the same way as that of an individual actor.23 Our unease with this 
comparison stems from the fact that the smallest actions of collective actors 
can be of an enormous scale, affecting many people, maybe over generations. 
Given this, it makes sense to pursue a new line of argument and examine the 
third reason for collective obligations. In situations where our knowledge is 
limited and conclusive evidence is unlikely, but the harm is enormous, it 
makes sense to reverse the burden of proof. When the evidence of direct 
culpability is in doubt, we can still often speak of a co-responsibility.24 
 
One may still reply here that, if the situation is not transparent, this may be 
an indication that it was impossible for the collective actor to foresee the 
negative effects of his or her actions. However, this is an untenable 
assumption . A major difference between collective actors and individual 
actors concerns knowledge, and the ability to apply it in practice. Collective 
actors, and especially corporations, are able to gather data, conduct their own 
research, work through information, and use this knowledge for their 
purposes through competent agents.25 Corporations have become powerful 
actors because they possess highly specialised and differentiated knowledge 
across many fields, which they can also effectively use in politics: they 
sometimes impose an entire package of labour and tax rights before making 
an investment and settling in a country. They are well-prepared to respond to 
the challenges of an international information society and are very capable of 
contributing towards the upholding of human rights. 
 
By addressing the capacities of collective actors, we cross a theoretical 
watershed. The collective actor’s obligation becomes less dependent on their 
role in causing harm and it becomes sufficient to show that the collective 
actor had the means to prevent harm and respect human rights. This 
discussion of capacities also reveals that the collective actor is not affected by 
the distinction between action and omission in the same way as the individual 
actor. While it may be excessively burdensome for an individual to figure out 
what to do to prevent a third party from harm, large corporations and other 
                                                 
23 M. Green, “Institutional Responsibility for Moral Problems”, in: A. Kuper (ed): Global 
Responsibilities. Who must deliver on human rights?, (New York, Oxford: Routledge, 2005), pp. 
117-135. 
24 See, for this, C. Barry, Applying the Contribution Principle, in: A. Kuper (ed): Global 
Responsibilities. Who must deliver on human rights?, (New York, Oxford: Routledge, 2005), pp. 
135-155. 
25 See P. Zumbansen, “The Conundrum of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on 
the Changing Nature of Forms and States”, in: R. Miller & R. Bratspies, (eds), Transboundary 
Harms: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp. 245-254. 
144                                                                                             Kreide
 
collective actors are, in fact, very capable of addressing these kinds of 
challenges. 
 
To sum up, we have four arguments for why transnational corporations have 
human rights obligations: they react to external demands through various 
moves, so that corporations can be said to act intentionally; they have broad, 
potentially negative influence on people’s life-worlds; they profit from the 
disadvantages of those who are much worse off; and they have the 
competencies and power to influence and address complex problems. The last 
point switches the focus from the cause of harm to the capacity to act 
otherwise on a global scale. As powerful entities, corporations seem to be 
very capable of shaping their social and political surroundings according to 
human rights standards. 
 
What does this mean for the widespread trend in sub-contracting? Sub-
contractors are often small, with less influence and capacities than the primary 
contractors. It is not possible for an individual to dissolve his or her moral 
obligations by simply delegating a morally reprehensible task to another party. 
For this case, of collective entities, it is sufficient to state that if we have 
agreed that a collective actor has human rights obligations, then, those 
obligations must entail ensuring that any sub-contractors meet those same 
obligations.26 
 
2.5. The content of the obligations 
This justification of collective actor obligations/the obligations of collective 
actors sets the stage for specifying the content of the obligations. We can 
begin by identifying “sphere-specific” obligations,27 intrinsically linked to the 
influence and the capacity of a firm. Within their sphere of conduct, 
collectives can bring about social and economic rights, for example, by 
offering adequate wages and leisure-time to their workers, by implementing 
anti-discrimination rules, guaranteeing security at the workplace, using 
environmental protection technology, and so on. Manufacturing firms, for 
example, may specifically violate employee rights which regulate working 
hours and workplace safety, so their sphere of obligation concerns mainly 
these aspects. Companies providing security consulting services to a 
                                                 
26 These demands are part of the Global Compact. See, also, OECD’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2004, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,2340,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
27 T. Campbell, “Moral Dimensions of Human Rights”, in: T. Campbell & S. Miller (eds), 
Human Rights and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector Organisations, 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), pp. 11-31. 
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government may specifically violate the rights of citizens to physical security, 
and thus it makes sense to concretise their obligations, accordingly. 
Obligations may vary in relation to the specific working field, but they also 
vary with view to the size, influence and capacity of a firm. 
 
This does not mean that sphere-specific obligations are determined once and 
for all, which would seem too narrow an approach. We also have not 
answered the question of what this entails, and who decides which 
obligations belong in which sphere. A major principle of organisation for 
national affairs, the “principle of affectedness”, should be applied to international 
relations, too. This says that, in a social relationship, those who are affected 
by the actions of an individual or a collective actor cannot only ask for 
compensation, they can also demand the/0? justification of the conduct of the 
actors.28 This means that the fact that a person or community is substantially 
affected by the activities of a transnational actor ethically implies a relation of 
justification between them. 
 
This is not a new principle in governance theory. It has been interpreted 
narrowly as “internal justification”,29 in which case the individuals affected are 
those who, similar to owners and creditors, have delegated power to an agent 
who manages their affairs. In a globalised economy, this seems insufficient 
and we can call for a supplementary notion. “External justification” embraces 
a wider public and would allow us to focus on stakeholders, that is, all those 
directly exposed to the activities of collectives through environmental disasters, 
unhealthy products, low wages, and so on. The obligations mentioned above 
have to be concretised among all the participants in “value-based networks”30 
- business partners, stakeholders, shareholders, NGOs, science and consumer 
associations - who try to come to an agreement in bargaining processes. 
 
This wider notion leaves room for two interpretations. The first understands 
justification as “accountability” and assumes that what is required from the 
actor is a public and transparent justification of the actor’s conduct in the 
                                                 
28 On this topic, see J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contribution to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, (Oxford, Polity Press 1997) and also R. Forst, “The basic right to 
justification: Towards a constructivist conception of human rights”, (1999) 6 Constellations, pp. 
35-59. 
29 See R. Keohane, “Global Governance and Democratic Accountability”, in: D. Held & M. 
Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization. Frontiers of Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003), pp. 130-160, at 144. 
30 See D. Wheeler, B. Colbert & R.E. Freeman, “Focusing on Value: Reconciling Corporate 
Social Responsibility, Sustainability and a Stakeholder Approach in a Network World”, in: 
(2003) 28 Journal of General Management, pp. 1-28. 
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past.31 This notion of accountability is cut off from any idea of reciprocity or 
participation by stakeholders. It does not, for example, set forth merely rule-
setting procedures, such as rules that allow those who have been affected by 
harmful outcomes to be heard. A second interpretation, therefore, seems 
necessary. According to this second notion of justification, one should 
understand the principle of affectedness as being intrinsically linked to 
reciprocal justification: everyone who has to submit to a norm should also be 
an author in the process of norm setting. Or, as Rainer Forst has put it, 
everyone has a basic right to justification, which allows every individual a 
“veto-right”.32 This includes an anticipatory perspective, addressing future 
events and its negative or positive effects. 
 
In this form of justification, the prevailing notion of accountability fails to be 
legitimate if actors who have been or may be importantly affected are not 
represented in the norm setting process. A collective’s concrete obligations 
should be determined publicly, with input from all the actors directly affected 
by the collective. In the context of regional and global governance, this 
requires transparency in the corporation’s conduct towards the stakeholders 
and access to both the formal and the informal political arenas in which 
decisions - which can have tremendous effect on stakeholders - are made. 
 
This approach should not be seen as an attempt to replace common sense 
ideas of morality; instead, it seeks to supplement common sense notions, and 
by doing so, open new ways of understanding international obligation. An 
attempt to overcome the moral common sense idea completely would not 
only be empirically over-confident, but also problematical from a theoretical 
point of view. We have seen that the capacities and possible influence of 
collective entities on the life-world differ fundamentally from those of 
individuals. The collective is, to a certain extent, much better prepared to 
deal with the challenges of globalisation. Nevertheless, the collective actor 
does not turn into a moral person simply because one recognises its human 
rights obligations. There is one further difference between a collective entity 
and an individual which makes it clear why it is misleading to talk about the 
moral obligations of corporations. A moral person who has moral obligations 
follows his or her moral principles out of the conviction that these are the 
most reasonable rules possible – at least, for the time-being. In contrast, a 
legal person - and a corporation is undoubtedly one - might follow a rule for 
                                                 
31 See A. Benz & I. Papadopoulis (ed), Governance and Democracy, (London: Routledge, 2006). 
32 See R. Forst, “The basic right to justification: Towards a constructivist conception of human 
rights”, (1999) 6 Constellations, pp. 35-59, at 44. 
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a variety of reasons, be it the fear of penalties or loss of prestige, or the 
realisation that a certain activity and its effects might be wrong.33 Human 
rights obligations are not directly deduced from the moral obligations of 
individuals, because they have distinct characteristics. It is more precise to say 
that we have good moral arguments as to why collective entities have or should 
have legal human rights obligations. However, it seems undeniable that 
collectives rely on individuals; without individuals and their participation in 
internal rule-setting and decision-making procedures, there would be no 
collective actor. 
 
3. Evaluation of human rights initiatives 
What has been said so far provides a setting for the evaluation of the current 
initiatives which aim, generally speaking, at norm compliance by 
corporations. These initiatives are, in one way or another, a reaction to the 
new roles of transnational corporations, which make them the object of 
human rights obligations. This leads us to the thesis of the second section of 
this chapter. 
 
Initiatives which aim at the human rights compliance of collective actors are 
legitimised if they meet three conditions relating to internationally accepted 
norms, the congruence of subject and authorship of norms, and the 
sustainable control of power. 
 
Firstly, initiatives should be compatible with human rights standards. To be more 
precise, all non-state agents that affect the essential interests of people have 
enduring duties to respect, protect, and fulfil social and economic human 
rights within their functional domain of influence.34 
 
Secondly, initiatives need to respect the above-mentioned principle of 
affectedness. According to this principle, it should be recalled, those who are, 
                                                 
33 See J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), p. 267. 
34 To be more concrete: Respecting these rights requires that production sites and business 
practices should not destroy local, essential living conditions, nor obstruct access to economic 
and social rights. Protecting economic and social human rights means TNCs must prevent third 
parties – mainly their sub-contractors – from violating these rights. And finally, TNCs should 
contribute toward fulfilling economic and social human rights by, for example, respecting 
international labour laws and/or participating in voluntary agreements on labour standards. 
Those agents who have caused harm and are capable of offering compensation in accordance 
with the realisation of these rights have a strong duty to do so – again, within their functional 
area. If a direct causal involvement cannot be identified, those who are capable of realising 
social and economic human rights have an equally strong duty to comply. 
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or may be, affected by a rule or an initiative based upon rules can be expected 
to participate in the rule-setting process.35 This means that, if a person or 
community is substantially affected by the activities of a transnational actor, a 
relation of justification is created between them. 
 
A third criterion addresses the concept of sustainable norm enforcement. One 
primary concern in this area is that of guaranteeing norm compliance over a 
long period of time. Adequate enforcement also requires a transparent process 
for assigning the responsibility after an accident (both for effects that may 
extend into the future and in response to accidents that occurred in the past). 
Furthermore, a positive evaluation of a TNC’s initiatives should depend on 
the presence of effective mechanisms for preventing future violations. This 
may include institutional incentives that may hinder or support addressing 
accountability. I will come back to this latter point later (Section 3). 
 
Let me briefly sketch out the implications of these criteria through two 
examples. One example is a relatively new ILO initiative, which I am 
including to represent an internationally known public-private initiative. The 
second is a rather new, private, self-regulation initiative that explicitly aims at 
maximum compatibility with market regulation processes. 
 
A Private-public initiative: the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is an example of an institution 
that sets private-public regulations on the activities of states, including binding 
laws and non-binding recommendations. The ILO’s norm-setting is indebted 
to universal norms and explicitly supports some core human rights.36 This was 
part of its founding ideas set out almost one hundred years ago. But with 
regard to the principle of affectedness, the ILO has run into problems of 
representation. One criticism is that the number of organised union members 
world-wide – unions are a main party of the ILO - is decreasing steadily, 
which makes it questionable as to whether the ILO is still able to represent 
employees adequately. At the same time, NGOs are not yet represented in 
the ILO, and the ILO’s first negotiations with them have been difficult 
because the NGOs are afraid of becoming entrapped in old, encrusted 
                                                 
35 On this topic, see J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contribution to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), and R. Forst, “The basic right to justification: 
Towards a constructivist conception of human rights”, (1999) 6 Constellations, pp. 35-59. 
36 R. Blanplain & C. Engels (eds): The ILO and the Social Challenges of the 21st Century, (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 2001). 
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organisational structures. Furthermore, when it comes to mechanisms for 
norm enforcement, the ILO reporting systems have been weak, and, as a 
result, the number of binding conventions has decreased while the number of 
non-binding recommendations has increased. Some core human rights, such 
as the prohibition of child labour, have become binding law, not through 
state consent, but through ILO membership. A new ILO initiative now helps 
with the implementation of human rights standards. The prohibition of child 
labour in developing countries, for example, is supported by offering social 
security payments to very poor families whose income heavily relies on the 
contribution of their children. So we have here a mixed result concerning the 
legitimacy of ILO initiatives. 
 
Private self-regulation: ‘Cotton made in Africa’ 
We are currently witnessing a range of market-based initiatives in which 
firms compete for sales and capital through making a public commitment to 
human rights. The precursors of these measures are the so-called Sullivan 
Principles, first articulated in 1977, which amounted to a voluntary code of 
conduct for companies doing business in South Africa under the apartheid 
regime.37 Despite their uncertain impact in South Africa, the Sullivan 
Principles have served as a model for similar activities such as social 
accountability auditing and verification, unilateral Codes of Conduct, and 
“human rights-sensitive” product lines and brands. Starbucks offers “fair trade 
coffee” and the World Diamonds Council has developed the “Kimberley 
Process”, which is a protocol for assuring that the profits from the sales of 
gems do not support governments or paramilitary groups that violate human 
rights.38 One prominent example of a pact between private actors (TNCs) 
and a public actor, (in this case the United Nations) is the Global Compact, 
brought to life by Kofi Annan in January 1999. Along with the UN High 
Commission for Human Rights, the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), and representatives of the UN Environmental Programme, about 50 
corporations take part, including Nike, Shell, BP, Amoco and Rio Tinto. 
The agreement is that the corporations must go public on the Global 
Compact Internet site by describing their progress in implementing human 
                                                 
37 The principles required an integrated workplace, fair employment practices, and affirmative 
action programmes, J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 254; R. G. Steinhardt, “The New Lex Mercatoria”, in: 
P. Alston (ed.): Non-State-Actors and Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
pp. 177-227, at 180. 
38 See, among others, A. Kuper, “Redistributing Responsibility. The UN Global Compact 
with Corporations”, in: T. Pogge & A. Follesdal (eds), Real World Justice. Grounds, Principles, 
Human Rights and Social Institutions, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2005), pp. 359-381. 
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rights, labour standards and environmental protection. In turn, they are 
allowed to use a UN logo for their advertising. 
 
The project ‘Cotton made in Africa’ that I will discuss in more detail here, 
was initiated by Michael Otto, a German mail-order business, in close co-
operation with three African cotton-producing and cotton-manufacturing 
firms in Zambia, Burkina Faso and Benin.39 It is not a case of pure self-
regulation, as ‘Cotton made in Africa’ obtains support from the German 
Ministry of economic co-operation and development, and from some NGOs, 
such as the World Wide Fund for Nature. Unlike the Fair Trade approach, 
which tries to implement human rights standards primarily through fixed 
prices, ‘Cotton made in Africa ‘aims to build local capacity so as to make 
African cotton capable of competing on the world market. By increasing 
quality, the project tries to stimulate higher demand for African cotton. The 
project is only indirectly obliged to respect human rights in so far as it 
increases the income of the local farmers and thus reduces poverty. Within 
the scope of the project, the participation of those affected seems fairly good; 
the African farmer is very well-integrated into the process of setting quality 
standards. But NGOs have complained that economic aims always trump 
ecological, and sometimes even social, goals. Norm enforcement is based 
upon a genuine economic principle: profit maximisation, without any further 
intervention in the chain of value. The market compatibility is a high 
incentive for integrating the rules of conduct into the on-going process of 
production. Nevertheless, it turns out that it is difficult to convince other 
firms to join the initiatives mainly because most of them are busy setting up 
their own codes of conduct. In the long run, this could mean a competitive 
disadvantage for Michael Otto’s project. In addition, a survey showed that 
Otto’s customers are, more or less, uninterested in this initiative and tend not 
to change their buying behaviour. 
 
Table 1: ILO / ‘Cotton made in Africa’ 




Principle of Affectedness Problem of Representation Difficult position of 
NGOs 
Sustainable human rights 
compliance 
New strategies High incentive through 
market compatibility 
                                                 
39 See www.cottonmadeinafrica.com; This is part of my own empirical research. See, also, the 
master thesis of N. Barth 2007: “Wie fair ist fairer Handel?” Frankfurt am Main. 
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To sum up, we can say that the involvement of both states and international 
government organisations can ensure a focus on human rights standards. But 
this is far from being a guarantee that states will become actively engaged in 
implementing human rights standards. Furthermore, norm-enforcement is a 
major problem for both approaches. Corporations often engage in image-
friendly international initiatives that have no influence on their activities. 
Work conditions have improved in some places in the world, but one cannot 
overlook the fact that self-imposed restrictions are often no more than mere 
“human rights rhetoric”.40 Moreover, it is the enduring distrust that many 
NGOs and customers have of the genuineness of corporate activities that 
sustains public awareness and maintains the pressure on corporations. 
Paradoxically, if this distrust wears out, the initiatives that aim to create norm 
compliance will cease to exist. 
 
One crucial aspect concerning self-regulation is the motivation of 
corporations. A recent study on this topic has identified quite a self-interested 
reason: the codes are an answer to the risks associated with civil action and 
consumer boycotts.41 Economic rationality is not being simply replaced by 
moral norms or a practical discourse, nor are corporations expected to 
become agents which are primarily motivated by morality. Instead, a 
normatively-coloured context creates pressure that becomes a variable in the 
rational calculation. One way to maintain this pressure is to measure 
corporations by their promises and publicly to disclose when they fail to 
comply with norms, for they cannot renege on their promises without losing 
credibility. They agree on moral codes at first only for tactical reasons, but 
                                                 
40 Nike, for example, a prominent member of the “Global Compact”, was sued by an 
American labor law activist, Mark Kasky, for false or misleading statements in its 
advertisements. Nike had assumed that work conditions in their subcontracting firms had 
improved – an assumption Kasky said was untrue. In September 2003, one month after the suit 
was filed, Nike, which claimed it was engaged in fully protected free speech, agreed to an out-
of-court settlement and paid 1.5 million dollars to a fair trade organisation. L. Greenhouse, 
The Supreme Court: Advertising; Nike Free Speech Case is Unexpectedly Returned to 
California, in: New York Times, June 27, 2003. See, also, the contribution on an evaluation of 
the “Global Compact”, by A. Kuper, “Redistributing Responsibility. The UN Global 
Compact with Corporations”, in: T. Pogge & A. Follesdal (eds), Real World Justice. Grounds, 
Principles, Human Rights and Social Institutions, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2005), pp. 259-381. 
41 T. Conzelmann & K.D. Wolf, “Normative Entrepreneurs? Accession to and Compliance 
with Private Codes of Conduct”; in: J-C. Graz & A. Nölke (eds), Transnational Private 
Governance in the Global Political Economy, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 98-114. 
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then “talk themselves into moral obligations” and become entangled in their 
own moral standards.42 
 
4. The institutional context for implementing 
corporate obligations 
The picture that emerges is that, despite the fragmentary and seemingly weak 
regulatory structure, there is potential for the slow crystallisation of new 
comprehensive international human rights norms that specifically bind 
transnational corporations and other business entities. Its realisation has a 
realistic chance only if the moral codes are embedded in a legal surrounding 
that puts some pressure on the participating actors to obtain compliance. 
There are developments bith in transnational and in European governance as 
well as in international law that can be interpreted as an institutional context 
that, by creating pressure for justification and control, promotes the 
implementation of collective actors’ obligations. One can distinguish at least 
three trends in this direction, which could be expanded and further 
developed: 
 
Liability. In international labour law, we find a perspective that focuses on the 
effects of economic exchange processes when it comes to civil liability. A 
corporation, for example, can be held liable for damages that have been 
caused “intentionally” or through the negligence of its employees. Domestic 
courts have a history of ordering corporations to pay for damages that occur 
as a result of their complicity in abuses perpetrated by governments. Since 
World War II, for example, survivors have successfully sued companies that 
relied on slave labour or benefited from the property seized from Jews during 
the Nazi Holocaust. A wide ranges of cases is filed under the so-called Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) in the United States, which was adopted as part of the 
First Judiciary Act in 1789, and provides that district courts have jurisdiction 
over any civil action for a tort committed in violation of US law anywhere in 
the world. The ATS probably aimed to assure that pirates captured in the US 
could be sued by their foreign victims in order to recover damages, and that 
foreign diplomats assaulted in the United States could similarly use the federal 
                                                 
42 Thomas Risse shows that argumentation, deliberation and persuasion plays an important role 
in international negotiations. He speaks of “moral entrapment”: even participants who enter 
the negotiations in strategic intention at some point have to switch to discursive rules and the 
attitude oriented towards a common understanding (“Verständigungsorientiertes Handeln”). T. 
Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, in: (2000) 54 International 
Organization, pp. 1-39; T. Risse, S. Ropp & K. Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights. 
International Norms and Domestic Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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courts. A recent and very prominent case was brought against one of the 
world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer, for injuries suffered by 
Nigerian citizens hurt by an experimental antibiotic administered without 
their informed consent.43 
 
Complicity. ATS actions have also been filed in US federal courts against some 
of the largest multinationals for their alleged complicity in human rights 
violations around the world. In Doe vs. Unocal, a group of Burmese villagers 
sued the US corporation Unocal, and Total S.A., a French company, for 
their complicity in slavery-like practices and other human rights violations in 
a joint-venture pipeline project with the government in Burma.44 It is 
interesting that the Unocal I case did not place liability on the assertion that 
the firm maintained business relationships with a state that violates human 
rights, nor was it claimed that the corporation was liable for the actions of the 
state that was the joint-venture partner. Instead, the court mentioned the 
circumstances under which a private actor can, nonetheless, be held 
responsible: most importantly, the court established when the corporation 
commits one or some of the narrow class of wrongs identified by treaty and 
custom.45 
 
Policy-making. While corporations have historically had to lobby for influence 
in legislative processes, they have now become an integral part of policy-
making, bringing with them much needed expertise and practical 
knowledge.46 This can be observed within the European Union. A main 
channel for firms had been to lobby effectively at national level in order to 
influence the consensus in the Council of Ministers, but the European 
                                                 
43 See, among others, P. Zumbansen, “The Conundrum of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Reflections on the Changing Nature of Forms and States”, in: R. Miller & R. Bratspies (eds): 
Transboundary Harms: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 245-254. 
44 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal.1997) (Unical I), 110 F. Supp.2d 1294 (C.D. Cal.2000) (Unocal 
II), on appeal, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002). It ends with a settlement of the case 2002. 
Another case: Abdullahi vs. Pfizer, F.Supp. 2d, 2002 Dist. Lexis 17436 (17. Sept. 2002). See 
R.G. Steinhardt, “The New Lex Mercatoria”, in: P. Alston (ed): Non-State-Actors and Human 
Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 177-227, at 195. 
45 See R.G. Steinhardt, “The New Lex Mercatoria”, in: P. Alston (ed): Non-State-Actors and 
Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 177-227, at 195. 
46 For rule-making processes in global regulatory networks, see A-M. Slaughter, A New World 
Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private 
Governance. Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005). 
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Commission has introduced a reverse process.47 It now seeks to win over 
firms in order to strengthen the EC’s position vis-à-vis third countries and EU 
Member States. Corporations are now intensively involved in decisions on 
trade and trade policy that affect human rights standards.48 
 
But there are also hindering factors that are mainly the responsibility of the 
state, and these have to do with the international trade system. Regulating 
influences on the international market include the international trade system 
and the WTO, and various US and EU agriculture policies (for example, the 
“Common Agricultural Policies”). The northern countries, for example, 
reduced their tariffs in the Uruguay Round by less than the poor countries 
did. Subsidies for production in the northern countries are still enormous. 
Dairy farmers, for example, receive annual subsidies of $2,700 per cow per 
year in Japan and $900 in Europe. Every textile job saved by tariffs and 
subsidies in an industrialised country costs about 35 jobs in developing 
countries. 
 
5. The problem of legitimate governance 
We have said that the collective actor has enormous capacities to create a 
tight network of binding rules and controls that would help preserve respect 
for human rights. Does a right to political participation follow from 
obligations to respect human rights? 
 
We can currently observe a development that counteracts the previously 
mentioned four assumptions of common sense morality. In governance 
theory, we have the widespread presupposition that the individual is no 
longer the primary political actor internationally, but, if at all, one among 
many collective actors, such as NGOs, transnational governmental 
organisations and transnational corporations. While a common sense morality 
places a great deal of obligations on the individual, a common sense 
governance theory favours the collective actor as the political agent at the 
international level. 
 
                                                 
47 See C. Woll, “Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?” 
MPIfG Working Paper 06/7,2006, http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp06-7/wp06-
7.html. 
48 On the value of advanced modes of administrative co-operative experimentalism that leads to 
creative problem solutions, see the article by Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer, “From 
Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Process: The Constitutionalisation of 
Comitology”, in: (1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 273-299. 
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Various attempts are under way to expand the restricted legal status of 
corporations. One example is that recently, the United Nations Sub-
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved 
“Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, which can be said to be 
the first comprehensive international human rights norms that specifically 
address transnational corporations and other business entities.49 They establish 
the responsibilities of companies to respect, secure, and promote the 
fulfillment of human rights with a special focus on consumers’ and workers’ 
rights, environmental protection, and national sovereignty. One result of the 
Commission’s meetings was to define TNCs as fully-fledged legal persons. 
This is analogous to the status of natural persons in that these entities have 
both rights and obligations.50 This would be a landmark in Economic Law. 
But, from a democratic theory perspective, it has been questioned whether 
the expansion of status for TNCs should go this far.51 What is the problem 
with this? 
 
If international regulations are decided by private (collective) actors who 
make decisions according to economic rationality, and not by democratic 
representatives that voice the interests of their constituents, then, a basic 
democratic principle will be turned upside down: the constitutional and law-
giving power of the people to which all other powers, persons, and 
associations should be subject, will no longer be supreme, and we face the 
danger that private self-regulation will become an instrument for further self-
empowerment of the already powerful.52 This will strengthen private soft law 
and will lead to a pluralisation of labour standards as corporations create their 
                                                 
49 D. Weissbrodt & M. Kruger, “Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses as Non-State 
Actors”, in: P. Alston, (ed), Non-State-Actors and Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp.315-351. The full text of the approved ‘Norms’ is also available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?
Opendocument. 
50 See D. Weissbrodt & M. Kruger, “Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses as Non-
State Actors”, in: P. Alston, (ed), Non-State-Actors and Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 315-351. 
51 See, for this assumption, the, in other respect, different approaches of J. Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms. Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, (Oxford, Polity Press, 
1997); Ch. Joerges & E. Vos, (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, (Oxford: 
Hart, 1999). 
52 H. Brunkhorst: Solidarität, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2002); for a defence of a “deliberative 
democratic constitutionalism”, see, also, P. Nanz, “Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational 
Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory”, in: Ch. Joerges & E-U. Petersmann (eds): 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, (Oxford, Portland OR: Hart 
Publishing, 2006), pp. 59-82. 
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own normative rule systems. ILO norm-setting, one should keep in mind, is 
obliged to respect universal norms whereas corporations are not. 
 
At this point, the role of the state comes into play, and, with it, the question 
of duty allocation between corporations and the state. The state as the 
representative of its citizens should continue to bear the lion’s share of the 
burden of creating an institutional environment that facilitates the 
implementation of human rights duties. It is only through the participation of 
those affected by human rights violations that we can arrive at legitimate 
international rules that bind collective actors. Through this external pressure, 
they have to become much more serious participants in the process of 
accomplishing human rights in their specific fields of competence. 
 
6. Conclusion 
What I have defended here were the following four points: first, I think we 
have good reasons to expand the notion of human rights duties beyond the 
constraints of the common sense morality approach and to speak about the 
obligations of collective actors. Collective actors have become so powerful 
and influential that they, along with states, contribute to human rights 
violations. They have adapted to the demands of today’s information society 
and are much better prepared to deal with complex problems than the 
individual. Their capacities mean that we should recognise them as important 
agents in human rights issues, and doing so has advantages over emphasising 
the obligations of the individual. 
 
Secondly, I have demonstrated that public norm compliance initiatives have 
some advantages over private-public self-regulation, even though both are 
weak when it comes to sustainable norm enforcement. 
 
Therefore, thirdly, the best we can do to fulfil the human rights obligations of 
collective actors might be - one out of a bundle of strategies - to create a 
normative legal institutional context that sustains the “pressure for 
justification” on corporations and promotes the reform of the unjust global 
order. Finally, I have pointed out that we have, nevertheless, to be cautious, 











































Chapter  7 
Legitimacy through Precaution in European 
Regulation of GMOs? From the Standpoint of 
Governance as Analytical Perspective* 
 
Maria Weimer 





Biotechnology is variously perceived as the most frightening or most 
promising scientific development of the twentieth century; agricultural 
biotechnology has proved an extraordinarily fraught topic for 
environmental regulators over recent years.1 
 
The risks and benefits of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and the 
commercialisation of this new technology in different economic areas within 
the EU are subject to ongoing public debate across European societies.2 The 
controversy surrounding this regulatory area refers, above all, to the empirical 
and epistemological3 problems typical of technological innovations in general: 
                                                 
* For useful comments, many thanks to Sofia De Abreu Ferreira and Alun Gibbs as well as to 
all the participants of the RECON Workshop in Bremen in March 2008. All errors are mine. 
1 See J. Holder & M. Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 2nd Edition, p. 61. 
2 On the issues of this debate, see M.I. Kritikos, Institutions and Science in the Authorization 
of GMO Relesases in the European Union (1990-2007): The False Promise of Proceduralism, 
(London School of Economics and Political Science, (PhD Thesis, London School of 
Economics, 2007), p. 181; The debate within civil society also shows a pan-European 
dimension, see for example the website of the European networks of gmo free regions: 
www.gmo-free-regions.org (accessed on 28.04.2008) and www.gmofree-euregions.net 
(accessed on 28.04.2008). 
3 Holder & Lee n. 1 supra. 
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the lack of sufficient scientific knowledge as well as societal experience4 with 
the employment of biotechnology. Given that it is a relatively recent 
invention,5 its long-term consequences for, in particular, our natural 
environment, are at present unforeseeable. The possibility that these 
consequences may be irreversible raises further concerns. Thus, GMO 
regulation in the EU becomes an issue of dealing with complex socio-
economic, cultural, ethical and environmental conflicts at national and 
regional levels across the EU. To put it more dramatically, it becomes a test 
of the EU’s most prominent maxim – unitas in diversitas. 
 
The current Community legal framework for GMOs was born out of a 
regulatory crisis,6 during which the political authorities in the EU both failed 
to resolve such conflicts and to reconcile the expectations and concerns of 
national constituencies with the objective of the free movement of GM 
products within the common market. This regulatory failure can be clearly 
seen in the stalling of EU authorisation for biotech products and the negative 
verdict of the WTO panel7 on the matter of this so-called de facto 
moratorium. The question that I will address in this chapter is, therefore, 
whether the current legal framework for GMO authorisations in the EU and 
its implementation can fulfil the promise of a more legitimate regulation of 
the risks associated with biotechnology. 
 
The challenge for lawyers when dealing with this topic is to develop 
legitimate prescriptive standards that could guide decision-making, and, in the 
end, allow us to assess whether its outcome, for instance, the authorisation of 
a GM maize for human consumption, is a good or a bad decision in a 
particular case. The lack of sufficient scientific knowledge about 
biotechnology makes it difficult to develop substantive standards for GMO 
authorisation. 
 
                                                 
4 On this term, see K-H. Ladeur, Das Umweltrecht der Wissensgesellschaft: von der Gefahrenabwehr 
zum Risikomanagement, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995), p. 22 et seq. 
5 Kritikos n. 2 supra, p. 16. 
6 I refer here to the malfunction and subsequently suspension of the previous Community 
regime because of non-compliance of the Member States; see C. Shaffer & M. Pollack, 
“Agricultural Biotechnology Policy in the EU: Between National Fears and Global 
Disciplines”, in: H. Wallace, W. Wallace & M. Pollack (eds) Policy-Making in the European 
Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5th Edition, p. 339 et seq.; G. Skogstad, 
“Contested Political Authority, Risk Society, and the Transatlantic Divide in the Regulation 
of Genetic Engineering”, in: E. Grande & L.W. Pauly (eds), Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting 
Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century, (Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005), p. 246 et seq. 
7 WT/DS291/R (United States), WT/DS292/R (Canada), WT/DS293/R (Argentina). 
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The fact that the Community legislator lacks information that is 
scientifically established as to the effects of GMOs makes him unable to 
ensure the ‘substantial rationality’ of his decisions concerning these 
organisms and leads him to concentrate on the decision-making 
process in order to ensure the existence of ‘procedural rationality’.8 
 
Following this argument, when analysing the present legal framework on 
GMOs, I will concentrate on its “procedural legitimacy”, that is, on its 
capacity to install a fair and all-inclusive procedure of decision-making.9 The 
yardstick for my evaluation will be whether EU law and its practice 
successfully allow for the mediation10 of the various conflicts surrounding the 
commercial use of “green” biotechnology in the EU. The approach 
envisaged by the European legislator in order to improve this type of 
legitimacy under conditions of “scientific uncertainty” was, as will be shown, 
to base the new framework upon the precautionary principle.11 This principle 
establishes the requirement to justify regulatory decisions taken under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty along two different trajectories – scientific 
rationality, on the one hand, and the adoption of the final decision by a 
democratically accountable political institution which could remain detached 
from the scientific results on the other.12 The decisive question for the 
assessment of the legitimacy of the framework will, therefore, be whether it 
allows for mediation between scientific concerns and “other legitimate 
factors”, such as socio-economic, ethical, cultural and other preferences 
expressed by national and regional constituencies within the EU Member 
States. 
 
My hypothesis is that the current legal regime for GMO authorisation in the 
EU is based upon a particularly narrow notion of precaution, which promotes 
                                                 
8 See Z.K. Forsman, “Community Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: a Difficult 
Relationship Between Law and Science”, (2004) 10 European Law Journal, pp. 580–594, at 583; 
see, also, U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, (London: Sage, 1992), who argues 
that technological risks largely escape the traditional institutions of representative democracy, 
pointing towards more radical and participatory approaches. 
9 On procedural rationality, see G. Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation: Science, 
Decision-Making, Policy Learning and Institutional Reform”, in: G. Majone (ed), Risk 
Regulation in the EU: Between Enlargement and Internationalization, (Florence: EUI, RSCAS, 
2003). 
10 See D. Chalmers, “Risk, Anxiety and the European Mediation of the Politics of Life”, 
(2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 649–674, at 649, who argues in favour of mediation 
between the “politics of hazard” and “politics of anxiety” in European risk regulation of 
GMOs. 
11 See Article 1 Directive 2001/18/EC. 
12 Forsman n. 8 supra, p. 580. 
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the reliance on and belief in “sound science”.13 Although the framework 
contains provisions, which - in theory - allow for the inclusion of other non-
scientific factors into the decision-making, and, therefore, for the possibility 
of departing from scientific results, the authorisation practice itself follows a 
traditionalist conception of objective science. As a consequence, the current 
regime fails to create a balance between the two types of legitimacy pre-
supposed by the precautionary principle – the scientific and the political 
legitimacy. This imbalance, together with the predominance of the “sound 
science” paradigm, poses, as will be shown, a serious threat to the functioning 
of the authorisation regime in the future. The continuing non-compliance14 
with the framework on the part of the Member States, which continue to 
ban biotech products,15 could be seen as the herald of another crisis of EU 
GMO regulation in the future. It shows the strong opposition of the majority 
of the Member States towards the commercialisation of GMOs, which can, 
in turn, be interpreted as mirroring their dissatisfaction with the current 
regulatory practice.16 
 
2. A methodological clarification 
To engage in questions of legitimacy and precaution in the European 
regulation of GMOs is the main, but not the only, purpose that I pursue in 
this paper. As the subtitle indicates, there is an additional, methodological 
added value, which is to analyse the legal regime by employing a particular 
perspective, that of governance, the term being used here in the sense of an 
analytical concept. With this approach to legal analysis, I distance myself from 
the common discussion on “European governance” in general, and on “new 
                                                 
13 The term “sound science” first emerged in public policy discussions in the US as an antonym 
to “junk science”, and was used in order to describe the scientific research used to justify a 
claim or position. It was referred to by both, government agencies and industry representatives; 
the latter exploited it, however, to discredit public health or environmental concerns 
underlying public regulation. For an example of this discussion related to the risks of tobacco, 
see E.K. Ong & S.A. Glantz, “Constructing ‘Sound Science’ and ‘Good Epidemiology’: 
Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms”, (2001) 91 American Journal of Public Health, pp. 
1749–1757,at 1749. 
14 On this issue, see Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 196-197. 
15 See Article in La Repubblica from 31.10.2007, “OGM, l’Italia chiede il bando Ue ‘Basta 
autorizzazioni facili’.” (“GMOs, Italy asks for EU ban. ‘No more easy authorisations’.”). 
16 The discussion on the next reform of the GMO framework already started. See the proposal 
submitted by France to the Environmental Council on: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st07/st07128.en08.pdf (accessed on 
09.07.2008). See also Article on www.euractiv.com from 05.06.2008, “France seeks solution 
to EU GMO deadlock”, on:  http://www.euractiv.com/en/environment/france-seeks-
solution-eu-gmo-deadlock/article-173047 (accessed on 17.07.2008). 
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governance/new modes of governance in the EU” in particular.17 Instead, I 
have chosen to follow a research development that associates the term 
“governance” with a broader theoretical approach to the analysis of collective 
political action at national as well as at supranational and global levels.18 It 
therefore tries to overcome the “old/new” governance rhetoric, which is, at 
the moment, predominant in the discussion among legal and political science 
scholars who deal with European integration. I argue that by trying to 
distinguish between “old” and “new” governance in the EU’s political 
processes and by concentrating on those particular practices identified as 
novel, we are losing the “bird’s-eye view” of the way political co-ordination 
in the EU takes place. Instead, I suggest understanding the term 
“governance” not as a particular innovative practice, commonly contrasted 
with hierarchical regulation, but as an analytical perspective that perceives all 
political action as de-centralised co-ordination of collective action between 
interdependent actors, be they national or supranational, private or public. 
 
Analytically, it is more appropriate to understand governance as a 
generic term for all existent patterns which cope with 
interdependency[19] between states as well as between public and 
private actors, hierarchy as government being only one of these 
patterns.20 
 
                                                 
17 On the ‘new governance’ discussion, see P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4th Edition p. 144 et seq; G. de Búrca 
& J. Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2006); J. Scott & D. Trubek, “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union”, (2002) 8 European Law Journal, pp. 1-18, at 1; P. Dabrowska, Hybrid 
Solutions for Hybrid Products? EU Governance of GMOs, (Florence, PhD Thesis at European 
University Institute, 2006). 
18 On this discussion, see A. Benz, S. Lütz, U. Schimank & G. Simonis (eds), Handbuch 
Governance, Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Anwendungsfelder, (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007); G.F. Schuppert (ed), Governance-Forschung, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2005); W. Hoffmann-Riem, “Governance im Gewährleistungsstaat – Vom Nutzen 
der Governance-Perspektive für die Rechtswissenschaft”, in: G.F. Schuppert, ibid., p. 195; C. 
Franzius, “Governance und Regelungsstrukturen”, (2006) 97 Verwaltungsarchiv, pp. 186–219; 
H-H. Trute, W. Denkhaus & D. Kühlers, “Governance in der 
Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft”, (2004) 37 Die Verwaltung,pp. 451–474. 
19 On this term, see J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 
1990), p. 29; referring to him, U. Schimank, “Elementare Mechanismen”, in: Benz et al., n. 18 
supra, p. 30: “The term ‘coping with interdependency’ refers to the constitutive feature of 
sociality from the standpoint of actors: ‘actors are not fully in control of the activities that can 
satisfy their interests, but find some of those activities partially or wholly under the control of 
others’.” 
20 Benz et al n. 18 supra, p. 13 (translation from German by the author). 
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In my examination of the GMO framework, it is to this understanding of the 
term “governance” that I refer and I apply it as an analytical frame. The 
questions that will guide my consideration of these issues are: How, and 
through what particular modes, do the actors involved in the authorisation 
regime co-ordinate themselves? What kind of legal rules and institutions 
allow for these types of co-ordination? How, if at all, do these processes 
ensure the legitimacy of the regime? The typical modes of co-ordination that 
can - so far - be identified from the standpoint of the governance perspective 
are the market, networks, the hierarchy, and communities.21 It should be 
mentioned, at this point, that the research dealing with governance as an 
analytical concept in this sense is still evolving,22 and and still has to provide 
clear and elaborate analytical categories. As a consequence, this paper is an 
attempt to operationalise this concept in the field of GMO regulation in 
order to contribute to its application in legal regulatory case studies.23 
 
3. The legislative framework as meta-governance – 
The institutionalisation of a ‘sound science’ 
understanding of precaution 
3.1. The relevant legal instruments 
The legal framework for the authorisation of GMOs in the European Union 
is composed of several legislative instruments of EU secondary law. I will 
concentrate on two core measures that are relevant for the questions raised in 
this paper. The first is a “horizontal” measure, Directive 2001/18 on the 
Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(hereinafter the “Deliberate Release Directive”).24 It constituted the first step 
of the regulatory reform in the area, and has, as its objective, the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
                                                 
21 These categories are still very coarse and need to be elaborated when being applied to 
particular analyses in case studies. Their further development will also vary depending on the 
respective discipline. For further specifications, see A. Benz & S. Lütz & U. Schimank & G. 
Simonis, “Einleitung”, in: A. Benz et al., n. 18 supra, p. 9; for legal perspective, see H-H. 
Trute, D. Kühlers & A. Pilniok, “Rechtswissenschaftliche Perspektiven”, ibid., p. 240. 
22 See Benz et al., ibid. 
23 For already existing legal studies employing this concept in other fields, see H-H. Trute, W. 
Denkhaus, B. Bastian & K. Hoffmann, “Governance Modes in University Reform in 
Germany – From the Perspective of Law”, in: D. Jansen (ed) New Forms of Governance in 
Research Organisations, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 155; H-H. Trute, W. Denkhaus & D. 
Kühlers, Regelungsstrukturen der Kreislaufwirtschaft zwischen kooperativem Umweltrecht und 
Wettbewerbsrecht, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004). 
24 Council Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms, OJ 2001 L 106/1. 
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Member States when releasing GMOs into the environment or placing them 
on the market.25 
 
The second measure is the “vertical” Regulation 1829/2003 on Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed (hereinafter the “Food and Feed Regulation”)26 that 
applies only to GMOs used in food or feed products. Both pieces of 
legislation are based, inter alia, upon Article 95 EC, one of the key internal 
market provisions,27 and they partially overlap in their scope of application. 
The Directive applies to releases of GMOs into environment (for instance, 
for experimental purposes, such as field trials) and to placing of them on the 
market as or in products in general.28 The specific case of the use of GMOs 
as, or in, food products is covered by the Regulation,29 which leaves, within 
the scope of the Directive, mainly commercial applications for agricultural 
cultivation. There are, however, cases in which both pieces of legislation 
apply, such as the case of a GMO intended for placing on the market (for 
instance, for agricultural cultivation) and for food or feed use. Because of the 
relevance of the Food and Feed Regulation in these cases of overlapping,30 a 
stronger emphasis will be placed on the analysis of this “vertical” legal 
instrument. 
 
Additionally, a third legal instrument will play a role in the following analysis, 
namely, Regulation 178/2002, which lays down the general principles of 
food law, and establishes the European Food Safety Authority (hereinafter the 
“General Food Law Regulation”).31 The organisation and activities of the 
latter, as we will see, are of crucial importance for co-ordination within the 
GMO regime. 
  
                                                 
25 Article 1 of Directive 2001/18/EC. 
26 Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, OJ 2003, L 268/1. 
27 Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 188. 
28 Article 1 of Directive 2001/18/EC. 
29 Article 3 (1) of Regulation 1829/2003. 
30 In these cases, which are common, a single application can be made under the Food and 
Feed Regulation, but incorporating the environmental risk assessment from the Deliberate 
Release Directive when there is a ‘deliberate release’ (for example, a crop is planted), see 
Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 189. 
31 Regulation (EC) laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of 
food safety, OJ 2002, L 31/1. 
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3.2. The governance perspective 
The legislative framework described above needs to be put into the analytical 
perspective adopted in this paper. Legislative measures that establish the rules 
and the institutions for a given regulatory area are considered here as a form 
of “meta-governance”. 
 
[…] legislation [should] be regarded as a form of meta-governance 
through which, by means of unilateral regulation, a framework for 
other governance modes is established. In this sense, legislators lay 
down an institutional framework or a particular governance dimension 
as well as regulating the interactions between different governance 
modes.32 
 
The idea of “meta-governance” expresses a change in the way that we think 
about how law can effectively regulate societal processes in order to achieve 
change. It conveys a sceptical position towards the assumption that the 
legislator can be perceived as being a kind of “ideal observer” who possesses 
superior knowledge about societal problems and can, therefore, create wise 
rules and anticipate their impact. “Meta-governance” or governance in 
general, as defended in this paper, is, therefore, contrasted with the term 
“steering” (from German: “Steuerung”) understood as the intentional 
“bottom-down” regulation or governing of society through political 
institutions.33 The term “governance” aims at overcoming the analytical 
distinction between legislator as the “steerer” (“Steuerungssubjekt”) and society 
as the “steered object” (“Steuerungsobjekt”), which is inherent in the 
“steering” paradigm. Especially in multi-level systems of governance, such as 
the EU, in which a plurality of actors is legislating, and the responsibility for 
setting norms is dispersed, the question of who regulates, or who “steers” 
whom, becomes unfruitful. The notion of “meta-governance” pre-supposes a 
legislator whose role is to organise the co-ordination of collective action 
between various actors through the provision of structures and procedures 
that would allow for knowledge generation and reflexivity within the very 
processes of norm implementation.34 
                                                 
32 H-H. Trute, W. Denkhaus, B. Bastian & K. Hoffmann, “Governance Modes in University 
Reform in Germany – From the Perspective of Law”, in: D. Jansen (ed) New Forms of 
Governance in Research Organisations, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 158. 
33 See R. Mayntz, “Governance Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie?” in: G.F. 
Schuppert (ed) Governance-Forschung. Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien, (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 12. 
34 For further explanation, see Trute et al., n. 21 supra, p. 247-248; see, also, H-H. Trute, D. 
Kühlers & A. Pilniok, “Der Governance-Ansatz als verwaltungsrechtswissenschaftliches 
Analysekonzept”, in: G.F. Schuppert & M. Zürn (eds), Governance in einer sich ändernden Welt, 
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Stable conventions in the form of experience or the adjustment of 
conflicting interests cannot be pre-supposed in dynamic and complex 
regulatory fields and have instead to be generated in the interaction 
between different actors, while being thought of as ever revisable.35 
 
This perspective seems particularly well-suited to the analysis of the legislative 
framework for GMOs. As mentioned above, regulation of biotechnology is 
strongly marked by the difficulty of formulating substantive prescriptive 
standards to guide the authorisation process due to scientific uncertainty 
about the risks associated with this technology. The requirements that a 
GMO food product has to fulfil in order to be authorised are formulated in 
Article 4 (1) of the Food and Feed Regulation. It states that the product must 
not: 
 
(a) have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the 
environment; 
(b) mislead the consumer; 
(c) differ from the food which it is intended to replace to such an 
extent that its normal consumption would be nutritionally 
disadvantageous for the consumer. 
 
It is apparent from this formulation that these substantial requirements 
provided for by the EU legislator are very indeterminate and need further 
interpretation.36 To decide whether a product fulfils them, and has, therefore, 
to be authorised, pre-supposes a set of prior decisions and activities, such as 
the generation of knowledge about the possible effects of GMOs, of 
conventions about when these effects will be considered as adverse, of finding 
definitions regarding what constitutes “misleading” or so-called “substantial 
equivalence” with conventional food products, etc. 
 
In order to organise these processes, the legislator has provided for a “meta-
governance” that sets out a framework for the co-ordination of those 
involved in GMO authorisation. and it is through this “norm production 
through praxis”37 that the standards for the evaluation of the risks of GM 
products are developed. 
 
                                                                                                                   
(PVS-Sonderheft), (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2008 (forthcoming)). 
35 K-H. Ladeur, “Privatisierung öffentlicher Aufgaben und die Notwendigkeit der Entwicklung 
eines neuen Informationsverwaltungsrechts”, in: W. Hoffmann-Riem & E. Schmidt-Aßmann 
(eds), Verwaltungsrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000), p. 240. 
36 See Forsman n. 8 supra, p. 583. 
37 Trute et al., “Governance-Ansatz” n. 34 supra. 
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Before identifying the particular modes of governance with which action 
between the actors is co-ordinated under the current authorisation regime, 
we should dwell a little on the role of the precautionary principle. The 
legislative provisions show that the principle has been the guiding idea 
throughout the establishment of the new framework.38 The Deliberate 
Release Directive describes its objective in Article 1 as being “in accordance 
with the precautionary principle”.39 In Recital 8, it also states: “The 
precautionary principle has been taken into account in the drafting of this 
directive and must be taken into account when implementing it.” The Food 
and Feed Regulation is based upon the precautionary principle by its 
reference to it as a general principle of European food law.40 It is not only 
these provisions, but also a whole set of principles, procedures and institutions 
established under the new framework, as we will see below, that characterise 
the authorisation regime for GMOs as an institutionalisation of the 
precautionary principle.41  
 
At the level of “meta-governance”, the principle can, therefore, be described 
as a governance structure that organises action co-ordination within the 
regime in a specific way. I should, of course, add that the meaning of 
precaution and its application in risk regulation is a highly disputed subject.42 
What is, however, important in the context of this examination is to show 
that the GMO regime institutionalises a particular notion of the term 
“precaution” – which I call the the notion of “sound science” – which has 
                                                 
38 See Forsman n. 8 supra, p. 581.; see, also,Pollack & Shaffer n. 6 supra, p. 342. 
39 Article 1 Directive 2001/18/EC. 
40 Article 1 Regulation 1829/2003 refers to the general principles laid down in Regulation 
178/2002 amongst which the precautionary principle is defined in Article 7 of the latter. 
41 See H-H. Trute, “Democratizing Science: Expertise and Participation in Administrative 
Decision-Making”, in: H. Nowotny et al., (eds), The Public Nature of Science under Assault, 
(Tübingen: Springer, 2005), p. 93. 
42 See E. Vos & F. Wendler, “Food Safety Regulation at the EU Level”, in: E. Vos & F. 
Wendler (eds), Food Safety Regulation in Europe. A comparative institutional analysis, (Antwerpen-
Oxford: Intersentia, 2006), p.112 & 126-127, who interview EU officials and stakeholders 
about their understanding of the principle; For a discussion on the precautionary principle, see 
E. Fisher, “Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a ‘Common Understanding’ of 
the Precautionary Principle in the European Community”, (2002) 9 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, pp. 7-28, at 7; K-H. Ladeur, “The Introducation of the 
Precautionary Principle into EU Law: A Pyrrhic Victory for Environmental and Public 
Health? Decision-Making under Conditions of Complexity in Multi-Level Political Systems”, 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review, pp. 1455-1479, at 1455; J. Scott, “The Precautionary 
Principle Before the European Courts”, in: R. Macrory (ed), Principles of European 
Environmental Law, (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2004); T. Christoforou, “The origins 
and content of the precautionary principle in European Community Law”, in: C. Leben & J. 
Verhoven (eds) Le Principe de Precaution – Aspects de Droit International et Communautaire, (Paris: 
Editions Panthéon-Assas, 2002), p. 205. 
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been pre-defined mainly by the European Commission in the run-up to the 
legislative reform,43 and has been strengthened by the present interpretation of 
this principle by the European Court of Justice and by the Court of First 
Instance.44 
 
This “sound science” notion of precaution, and its institutionalisation as a 
“meta-governance” structure, allows for the combination of mainly two 
modes of governance as modes of action co-ordination in GMO 
authorisations: hierarchy and networks. We will first look into the elements 
of hierarchy in the current regime in order to examine its network structures 
thereafter. I should make it clear, however, that, in regulatory practice, 
governance modes never appear isolated one from another. Instead, they 
represent a “mixture” of modes,45 interacting with each other and providing a 
somewhat blurred picture at times. 
 
4. Imperative regulation through prior authorisation – 
decision-making outcome 
A hierarchical mode of co-ordinating action among actors becomes apparent 
when we look at the effect that the final authorisation decision produces on 
the actors involved, and thus when we look at the outcome of the decision-
making process. At this point, we should distinguish between two structural 
forms that influence the type of actors involved – the relationship between 
the public authority at EU level and the private applicant company on the 
one hand, and the relationship between the central level and the Member 
States on the other. With regard to the first relationship, Article 4 (2) Food 
and Feed Regulation states that no person should place a GM food product 
on the market unless it is covered by a prior authorisation, which is granted 
by the European Commission and the Council together in the Comitology 
procedure. The same requirement is formulated in relation to the competent 
national authorities responsible for the authorisation procedures under the 
Deliberate Release Directive.46 In this way, the legislative framework 
                                                 
43 See Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle COM (2000) 1. 
44 See Case C-236-1 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri [2003] 
ECR I-8105; Case E-3/00 EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway [2001] 2 CMLR 47; Case 
T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council 2002 ECR II-3305; For an overview of this 
jurisprudence, see E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007) p. 229 et seq. 
45 See H. de Boer, J. Enders & U. Schimank, “On the Way to New Public Management? The 
Governance of University Systems in England, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany”, in: 
Jansen n. 32 supra, p. 138. 
46 See Articles 6 and 13 of Directive 2001/18. 
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establishes a principle of prior authorisation for every GMO marketed and/or 
released in the EU.47 This constitutes a hierarchical,48 “command and control” 
type of regulation, because the decision of the public authority is compulsory 
for the private applicant. The two parties co-ordinate49 their action in relation 
to each other by the mechanism of “order” set up through a system of 
enforceable legal norms; thus, the commercialisation of GMOs is regulated 
not through the mechanisms of the “market” as mode of governance 
(through price),50 but through public authorisation. 
 
Hierarchy is also found in the relationship between the central EU level and 
the Member States. Under the Food and Feed Regulation, the new 
framework has centralised the authorisation procedure, thereby establishing 
the so-called “one door – one key” principle. Unlike under the old regime, 
the role of the national competent authorities in granting GMO 
authorisations has been limited, and it is now the Commission and the 
Council who directly take the decisions regarding the applicant. Once an 
authorisation has been granted, it is valid and enforceable vis-à-vis all the 
Member States, and the GMO product is able to circulate throughout the 
entire common market. Although the Deliberate Release Directive has - in 
principle - preserved the “old” system, whereby national authorities decide 
upon GMO applications, in practice, at least in the area of commercial 
releases into the environment,51 the decision-making is carried out at the 
central level as well. The reason for this is that, in cases where objections to 
an application are raised and upheld by a national authority from other 
Member States or the Commission, the application procedure is elevated to 
the Community level,52 and is, in this case, equivalent to the procedure under 
the Food and Feed Regulation. So far, and since the new framework came 
into force, such objections have been the case in every single application for 
commercial release;53 bearing in mind the contestations regarding GMOs, this 
                                                 
47 See Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 187.; for an example of the opposite model of regulation, see 
the US system in D. Vogel, “The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United 
States”, in: H. Somsen, T. Etty, J. Scott & L. Krämer, Yearbook of European Environmental Law, 
Volume 3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1; see, also, Skogstad n. 6 supra, p. 249 et 
seq. 
48 For ‘hierarchy’ as governance mode, see Schimank n. 19 supra, p. 29; M. Döhler, 
“Hierarchie”, in: Benz et al., n. 18 supra, p. 46. 
49 In the governance perspective employed here, hierarchy is also considered as a mode of co-
ordination. See Benz et al., n. 18 supra. 
50 For “market” as governance mode, see Schimank n. 19 supra, and R. Czada, “Markt”, in: 
Benz et al., n. 18 supra, p. 68. 
51 Covered by Part C of Directive 2001/18. 
52 See Articles 18 and 28 (1) of Directive 2001/18. 
53 See Kritikos, n. 2 supra, p. 166. 
Legitimacy through Precaution in European Regulation of GMO’s 171
 
comes as no surprise. It should also be mentioned that the Deliberate Release 
Directive achieves a degree of harmonisation in the field of GMO releases 
that is almost exhaustive and therefore leaves little scope for variations in 
national implementation.54 Moreover, due to the principle of the pre-
emption of national power because of the occupation of the field,55 national 
unilateral derogations from the harmonised GMO regime are subject to strict 
justificatory requirements.56 
 
All this shows, at first glance, that the legislative framework for GMO 
authorisation establishes a hierarchical relationship between the EU public 
authority and the private applicant on the one hand, and between the central 
level and the Member States on the other. The hierarchy in the public-
private relationship can be seen as a first consequence of the precautionary 
principle, as applied to this framework. The intervention of the EU legislator 
in the realm of the private freedom of enterprise by means of the prior 
authorisation requirement is justified by the uncertainty of the existence and 
scope of the potential risk of the GMOs. Thus, it is an expression of the 
precautionary principle.57 
 
5. Co-ordination through networks – the process of 
decision-making 
If we now turn to the process that leads to the adoption of the final decision – 
the authorisation or the refusal of marketing – a fairly different picture comes 
to light, which modifies the findings of the “command and control” 
regulation described above. The emergence of networks as a governance 
mode within the regime comes from another principle set out in the 
legislative framework – the principle of risk analysis as defined in Articles 3 
and 6 of the General Food Law Regulation.58 Every authorisation decision 
                                                 
54 See T. Christoforou, “The regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European 
Union: The Interplay of Science, Law and Politics”, (2004) 41 CMLRev, pp. 637–709, at 671-
672, who refers to Articles 1 (1) and 22 of the Directive 2001/18. An exception to the 
complete harmonisation is the matter of so-called “co-existence” between GM and 
conventional crops, which remains, at least partially, under the competence of the Member 
States. See Article 26a as inserted into Directive 2001/18 by Regulation 1829/2003; see, also, 
Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 202. 
55 See Christoforou, n. 54 supra, p. 671, with further references. 
56 Either through the so-called “safeguard-clauses” foreseen in the secondary acts, such as 
Article 23 of Directive 2001/18, or by virtue of Article 95 EC. On the latter, see Holder & 
Lee n. 1 supra, p. 206. 
57 See Forsman, n. 8 supra, pp. 582-583. 
58 Although not mentioned explicitly in Directive 2001/18, its provisions follow the logics of 
this principle in the same way as the provisions of Regulation 1829/2003, especially when 
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has to be preceded by a risk analysis of the product in question. This process 
serves the purpose of evaluating whether the substantive requirements for 
authorisation have been fulfilled, and consists of “three interconnected 
components: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication”.59 
The institutional embodiment of this definition is the creation of two main 
arenas of authorisation decision-making.60 The first one is the arena of risk 
assessment, in which actors, such as scientific and administrative experts from 
all over the European Union, the applicant company and civil society co-
ordinate their action under the auspices of the European Food Safety 
Authority (hereinafter the EFSA). The second arena is that of risk management, 
in which the responsibility for taking the final decision is assigned to the 
Commission, a regulatory committee,61 and the Council co-ordinating among 
themselves in the framework of the Comitology procedure. 
 
It is in this division of the risk analysis process into two phases of risk 
assessment and risk management that the “sound science” notion of the 
precautionary principle comes to the fore in this framework. Risk assessment 
is defined in Article 6 (2) of General Food Law Regulation as based upon 
“the available scientific evidence and undertaken in an independent, objective 
and transparent manner”. This extract from the relevant regulation reveals 
that it is the risk assessment that is supposed to provide for the scientific 
legitimacy of the decision-making, and that this legitimacy is based upon 
reliance on an objective and independent source of scientific knowledge. At 
the same time, the political legitimacy has to be ensured in the phase of risk 
management. The risk managers of the European Union should take the 
results of scientific assessment of EFSA into account, but should also consider 
other legitimate factors as well as the precautionary principle when making 
the final decision (Article 6 (3) of General Food Law Regulation). It becomes 
clear, at this point, that the procedural legitimacy, as referred to above,62 of 
the new framework derives from this separation between the two kinds of 
legitimacy. It is now time to consider some of the background assumptions 
and implications of this concept of precaution in more detail in order to see 
that its realisation within the “norm production through praxis”63 of the 
                                                                                                                   
authorisation procedure under the Directive is elevated to Community level. 
59 Article 3 (10) of Regulation 178/2002. 
60 The phase of risk communication will not be considered closer here because it does not 
directly refer to the decision-making process on market authorisations. 
61 In the case of a GM food product, it is the Standing Committee on Animal Health and Food 
Chain, see Article 35 of Regulation 1829/2003; in the case of an application under Directive 
2001/18, see Article 30. 
62 See, above, at 1. “Introduction”. 
63 See, above, at 3.2. “The governance perspective”. 
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authorisation regime creates a bias in favour of the scientific justification of 
the decisions taken. 
 
5.1 The “sound science” notion of the precautionary principle 
and its foundations 
The “sound science” notion of the precautionary principle chosen by the EU 
legislator in the GMO framework mirrors the approach towards precaution 
that has already been taken by the Community institutions in the run-up to 
the legislative reform. The Commission Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle from the year 2000 can be considered as the main 
foundation and the most influential reflection of this approach.64 According to 
this Communication, environmental and public health decision-making in 
the EU is characterised as a three-step process: the scientific process of risk 
assessment; the political process of risk management; and the process of risk 
communication.65 The precautionary principle is considered to be applicable 
only at the stage of risk-management, where “an eminently political decision” 
about the risk level that is “acceptable” to the society that has to bear it,66 is 
taken. Another condition for the application of the principle is that the 
precedent risk assessment has identified a “potential risk”.67 
 
Recourse to the precautionary principle pre-supposes that potentially 
dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process 
have been identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the 
risk to be determined with sufficient certainty. The implementation of 
an approach based on the precautionary principle should start with a 
scientific evaluation, as complete as possible, and where possible, 
identifying at each stage the degree of scientific uncertainty.68 
 
By assuming that a separation between risk assessment as the identification of 
“potential risk”, and risk management as the political decision about the 
“acceptable” level of risk is possible, the Commission creates antagonism69 
                                                 
64 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle COM (2000) 1 final. 
65 Commission Communication at 2. 
66 Commission Communication at 15. 
67 See E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007), p. 226. 
68 Commission Communication n. 64 supra, p. 3. 
69 See, in favour of such an antagonism, Vogel n. 47 supra; critical comments in: P. von 
Zwanenberg & A. Stirling, “Risk and Precaution in the US and Europe: a response to Vogel”, 
in: H. Somsen, T. Etty, J. Scott & L. Krämer, Yearbook of European Environmental Law, Volume 
3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 47; see, also, L. Levidow & C. Marris, “Science 
and Governance in Europe: Lessons from the Case of Agricultural Biotechnology”, (2001) 28 
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between science as an objective source of knowledge and the non-scientific 
elements of decision-making, especially with regard to value judgements. 
Although it states that decision-makers need to be aware of the degree of 
uncertainty attached to scientific results,70 in reality, it reveals a very limited 
understanding of “scientific uncertainty”71 as the pre-condition for the 
application of the precautionary principle.72 The risk assessment accomplished 
by scientists has to provide for some proof of the possibility and probability of 
potential risk or negative effects. Risk assessment is, therefore, defined as 
consisting of hazard identification, hazard characterisation, appraisal of 
exposure, and risk characterisation.73 
 
There are two kinds of problems with this approach to precaution that are 
worth considering in further detail here.74 Firstly, the understanding of 
concepts such as “scientific uncertainty”, “risk” and “science” which underlie 
this approach can be considered as being flawed.75 The reliance upon science 
as an objective source of knowledge disguises the complexity of scientific 
evaluation under conditions of “scientific uncertainty” as well as the “social 
embedment” of scientific reasoning. Secondly, such a conception of science 
exercises a strong attraction for decision-makers to justify their actions 
predominantly by recourse to the authority of apparently objective scientific 
expertise. It, therefore, creates an imbalance between the scientific and the 
other political considerations when it comes to the decision on the 
“acceptable” level of risk in risk management. 
 
With regard to the first set of problems, it is in the social science and 
regulatory literature on risk research that we find inconsistencies with the 
approach to precaution as expressed in the Commission’s Communication 
(and perpetuated in the GMO framework). When risk assessors are required 
to identify the probability of a risk, then, it is pre-supposed that they have 
                                                                                                                   
Science and Public Policy, pp. 345-360, at 349. 
70 Commission Communication n. 64 supra, p. 3. 
71 See Fisher n. 67 supra, p. 227. 
72 See Case C-236-1 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 
[2003] ECR I-8105. 
73 Commission Communication n. 64 supra, p. 13. 
74 For further discussion, see Fisher n. 67 supra; Forsman n. 8 supra; Holder & Lee n. 1 supra; 
see, also, Kritikos n. 2 supra, Chapters 6 and 7, who, however, does not discuss it from the 
perspective of the precautionary principle. 
75 For a discussion of these concepts, see von Zwanenberg & Stirling n. 69 supra; B. Wynne, 
“Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving Science in the Preventive 
Paradigm”, (1992) 2 Global Envirnomental Change, pp. 111-127, at 111; A. Stirling, “Risk, 
Uncertainty and Precaution”, in: F. Berkhout, F. Leach & M. Scoones (eds), Negotiating 
Environmental Change, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003). 
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scientific knowledge about the risks of a form of technology. However, this 
knowledge is usually not available in the situation of “scientific uncertainty”. 
Given that it is an inherent condition of new technological innovations, 
“scientific uncertainty” is “a condition under which there exists an 
insufficient empirical or theoretical basis for the assigning of probabilities to 
reflect likelihoods”.76 In other words, uncertainty precludes precisely the 
activity that is expected from the risk assessors in the GMO framework.77 
 
Apart from adopting a notion of risk assessment in the narrow sense of 
“hazard characterisation”,78 the current framework also departs from a 
traditional positivist conception of the relationship between law and science, 
in which “science is the infallible reflection of the objective world”.79 It, 
therefore, misconceives the fact that scientific reasoning and knowledge is not 
something that is purely objective, but is value-laden and socially embedded, 
instead. 
 
Knowledge inevitably carries with it, […], not just technical elements 
concerned with representing processes in an objective manner. It will 
also carry with it assumptions about how social interaction should take 
place and be understood, and also assumptions about questions of 
personal and collective identity in that these are necessarily informed or 
challenged by new forms of knowledge.80 
 
The traditional “scientific paradigm”81 refers to the possibility of establishing a 
purely rational basis for legal decision-making, which aims at avoiding 
arbitrary decisions. Scientific expertise, under this condition, works with 
principles of the laws of nature, upon which it bases its objective knowledge 
in order, for instance, to predict certain casual effects between different 
processes or events and their probabilities. In addition, a societal experience 
with the product or technology in question is available and can serve as a 
stable orientation for decision-making.82 In fact, it is argued that this 
                                                 
76 See von Zwanenberg & Stirling n. 69 supra, p. 44. 
77 See von Zwanenberg & Stirling, ibid., who state that the requirement of identifying the 
likelihood and magnitude of a risk only considers numerical estimates of risk and, therefore, 
pre-supposes a rather narrow, numerical notion of risk assessment. Other dimensions of risk 
that cannot be estimated numerically are likely to be neglected. 
78 Further explanation on the difference in von Zwanenberg & Stirling n. 69 supra, p. 48. 
79 See Forsman n. 8 supra, p. 580. 
80 See D. Chalmers, “‘Food For Thought’: Reconciling European Risk and Traditional Ways 
of Life”, (2003) 66 Modern Law Review, pp. 532-566, at 544. 
81 See Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 12 et seq. 
82 See K-H. Ladeur n. 4 supra, p. 22 et seq. 
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conception of pre-existent and stable knowledge becomes obsolete, at least in 
areas of technological innovations characterised by “scientific uncertainty”. 
Instead, we are faced with a transformation of knowledge, in which: 
 
[…] knowledge is no longer ‘given’ and made accessible by the 
mechanisms of elected representation or by the concentration of 
specialist expertise, but is, instead, thought to be ‘constructed’ and 
renewed in a process of collective learning that draws support from 
social pluralism.83 
 
In this sense, scientific risk assessment constitutes what is ultimately a subjective 
process that can lead to different outcomes, depending on the particular 
framing assumptions adopted at the beginning of an analysis. These 
assumptions, in turn, are not determined by the scientists, but by those who 
query them, the political risk-managers. To give an example, the European 
Commission, as the risk manager of GMO authorisations, can formulate the 
questions to be addressed by the EFSA in a particular risk assessment opinion, 
and can prioritise certain dimensions of the risk over others. It can, for 
instance, remove from its mandate the consideration by the EFSA of the 
question of the so-called “co-existence” between conventional and GM 
crops; whether this question belongs to risk assessment or to risk management 
is, however, highly disputed, because of the complex interconnection of 
socio-economic problems of “co-existence” (for conventional and organic 
farming) with environmental concerns (the effects on biodiversity).84 The 
framing assumptions of scientific reasoning are, therefore, an expression of 
subjective value judgements and interests,85 which, in the narrow understanding 
of risk assessment as a purely objective scientific matter, remain concealed. 
 
Bearing in mind this kind of “sound science” understanding of the risk 
assessment underlying the GMO authorisation regime, it comes as no surprise 
that risk managers tend to privilege the scientific factors of decision-making 
over those of political or socio-economic nature. In fact, the latter are 
perceived as bringing the danger of arbitrariness and/or protectionism to bear 
on the decision-making. The Commission Communication states that “[…] 
the precautionary principle can under no circumstances be used to justify the 
                                                 
83 See J. Vignon, “Governance and collective adventure”, in: O. de Schutter, N. Lebessis & J. 
Paterson (eds) Governance in the European Union, (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications, 
2001). 
84 See Chalmers n. 10 supra, p. 662; see, also, Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 202 et seq. 
85 See von Zwanenberg & Stirling n. 69 supra. 
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adoption of arbitrary decisions”.86 The best way to avoid any suspicion of 
protectionism would, therefore, seem to be to base oneself on the authority 
of scientific “facts”. 
 
Science has a central role in legitimising environmental law and policy: 
an appeal to the ‘facts’, as established by science, is used to pre-empt 
and undermine criticism. Although, […], there are inherent difficulties 
with relying on science in this area, the apparent objectivity and 
testability of science, seemingly above the fray of divided interest and 
political advantage, can be extremely attractive to politicians and to 
lawyers.87 
 
The consequence of the “sound science” approach is that the political factors 
in the risk management decision-making are neglected88 – a conduct that is 
contrary to the wording of the legislative provisions in the GMO framework, 
which define risk management as political decision-making. The imbalance 
between scientific and other legitimate factors is, however, immanent upon 
the strict distinction between risk assessment and risk management, at least 
when it creates a tension between a supposedly objective science and political 
factors or value judgements. 
 
In order to illustrate and back up these findings further, in the following 
sections, I will explore, in more detail, how the “sound science” notion of 
the precautionary principle is implemented in the different arenas of decision-
making of GMO authorisation and how it influences the interplay of different 
governance modes in the regime. 
 
5.2. Risk assessment – scientific self-governance through 
expert networks 
The main institutional innovation of the EU legislative reform in the area of 
food law in general, and in that of GMO regulation in particular, has been 
the establishment of the EFSA as the main actor responsible for risk 
assessment for GMO authorisations. At first sight, the creation of this 
authority suggests a centralisation of risk assessment practices and, more 
generally, a tendency towards the harmonisation of regulatory practices to the 
detriment of national competences in the GMO area. To a certain degree, 
this is true for GMO releases under the Deliberate Release Directive, where a 
                                                 
86 Commission Communication n. 64 supra, p. 13. 
87 Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 12. 
88 See Kritikos n. 2 supra, p. 159 et seq., who arrives at similar conclusions in his evaluation of 
the Deliberate Release Directive authorisation regime. 
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diversity of national safety assessments is now usually replaced by a single risk 
assessment by the EFSA.89 A closer look at the legislative provisions of the 
General Food Law Regulation reveals, nonetheless, a somewhat different 
picture. We will see that the mission of the EFSA can, in principle, be 
characterised as the “decentralised integration”90 of the national scientific 
authorities and the other organisations which carry out similar tasks in the 
area of food safety and GMOs. Furthermore, it can be described as the 
integration of expert networks through which the different actors of the 
GMO regime from the different societal spheres are linked together and co-
operate in order to generate knowledge and safety standards. By integrating 
these networks, the EFSA itself constitutes a network of experts which 
provides for structures of scientific co-ordination within this area in the EU.91 
It is granted a certain independence92 from the risk managers in the way it 
performs its work and can, therefore, be perceived as a network of scientific 
self-governance. 
 
5.2.1. Decentralised integration of national scientific authorities 
With regard to the integration of national authorities, Article 22 (7) of the 
General Food Law Regulation, after mentioning that the EFSA should be a 
point of reference for risk assessment in the European Union, also states, “It 
shall act in close co-operation with the competent bodies of the Member States carrying 
out similar tasks to these of the Authority.” The EFSA’s tasks, as described in 
Article 23 of the same Regulation, include the establishment of “a system of 
networks of organisations operating in the fields within its mission” and the 
                                                 
89 For regulation of GMO as food products a centralised risk assessment in scientific committees 
of the Commission already took place under the Novel Food Regulation 285/97 that has been 
applicable to them before the reform. 
90 E. Chiti, “Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New 
Perspective on European Agencies”, (2004) 10 European Law Journal, pp. 402-438, at 402; see, 
also, T. Groß, “Kooperation zwischen Europäischen Agenturen und nationalen Behörden”, 
(2005), Europarecht, pp. 54-68, at 54. 
91 The term network is understood as an analytical category in the sense of “an entity in which 
different parts are loosely linked, but not fixed together. The single elements are autonomous 
from, yet not necessarily equal to each other.” See H. Türk & H. Hofmann, “An Introduction 
to EU Administrative Governance”, in: H. Hofmann & H. Türk (eds) EU Administrative 
Governance, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006); see, also, G. Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation in 
der Europäischen Union, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), p. 79: “In network structures, the 
organisational entities which constitute the network are not dissolved. Networks are composed 
of the representatives of these organisational entities and are internally structured. Being 
flexible and yet not only spontaneous, but rather relatively permanent and institutionalised co-
operation structures, networks themselves become administrative structures, the quality of 
which cannot be understood through reasoning in hierarchies.” (Translation from German by 
the author). 
92 See Article 37 of Regulation 178/2002. 
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organisation of their operation as formulated in paragraph (g). Finally, Article 
36 also describes the “Networking of organisations operating in the fields within the 
Authority’s mission” as a basic principle of its operation. Its first paragraph 
describes the aim of such networking: 
 
The Authority shall promote the European networking of 
organisations operating in the fields within the Authority’s mission. 
The aim of such networking is, in particular, to facilitate a scientific co-
operation93 framework by the co-ordination of activities, the exchange 
of information, the development and implementation of joint projects, 
the exchange of expertise and best practices in the fields within the 
Authority’s mission. 
 
The emphasis put on the terms “networking” and “co-operation” suggests a 
heterarchical, rather than hierarchical, relationship between the EFSA and the 
national scientific authorities. The legislative framework provides for a 
conception of the EFSA, not as a centralised body whose authority would 
exceed that of the national risk assessors, but as a co-ordinator and mediator 
“at the heart” of the European scientific food safety network. The activities 
of the EFSA show that it puts a strong emphasis on this co-operation. It has, 
for instance, established so-called “focal points” in several Member States, 
which are “national networks composed of risk mangers, national authorities, 
research institutes, stakeholders and consumers”, and which are responsible 
for ensuring co-operation in risk assessment between the central and national 
levels.94 There is also the direct sharing of tasks with certain appointed 
national bodies and the provision of the EFSA with technical and scientific 
support.95 The strongest expression of the absence of, at least, formal 
hierarchy between the opinion expressed by EFSA and that of another 
scientific authority is the provision in Article 30 of General Food Law 
Regulation. It provides for a mechanism of mediation between diverging 
                                                 
93 Author´s emphasis. 
94 See Strategy for Co-operation and Networking between the EU Member States and the 
EFSA adopted by the Management Board on the 19.12.2006 to find on:  
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/PartnersNetworks/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_National_Focal_Points.htm (accessed on 24.04.2008). 
95 See Article 36 (2) of Regulation 178/2002 together with its implementing Commission 
Regulation 2230/2004, OJ 2004 L379/64. See, also, EFSA webpage on:  
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/1178620777517/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_article_36_cooperation.htm (accessed on 24.04.2008). Another involvement 
of national competent authorities is through the requirement for them to provide EFSA with 
an environmental risk assessment in the case of the authorisation of GMOs to be used in seeds, 
see Article 6 (3) (c) of Regulation 1829/2003; for further reading, see Dabrowska n. 17 supra, 
p. 186 et seq. 
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scientific opinions by stating that the conflicting bodies are obliged to co-
operate and either resolve the divergence or present a joint document which 
clarifies the contentious issues and which will be made public.96 
 
This system of co-operation and networking has led some authors to 
characterise it as establishing multiple accountability and mutual justification 
between the different risk assessors in the European Union, and thus as also 
providing for reflexivity.97 Bearing in mind that, factually, it is the opinion of 
the EFSA that will probably have more weight for the Commission as the 
final decision-maker, which decreases the incentive for the EFSA to justify 
itself in front of other risk assessors, such a characterisation might appear to be 
slightly too optimistic. Nevertheless, a heterarchical form of co-ordination 
and co-operation between the EFSA and the national authorities can be 
regarded as the “ideal” mode of governance as envisaged by the legislator. 
 
5.2.2. Integration of actors from different societal spheres 
Apart from the integration of national risk assessors, the institutional design of 
the EFSA more broadly provides for the creation of networks, which link 
and integrate actors from different societal spheres. The Authority is, 
therefore, described as: 
 
[…] a transnational governance regime which cuts across 
national/supranational and public/private distinctions, and which both 
guides and is accountable to scientific communities, national food 
authorities and civic society. As these networks inform its constitution, 
it cannot be seen as something starkly autonomous from them, but 
something that both contributes to their constitution and is constituted 
by them.98 
 
This can be illustrated by looking at the composition of the organs of the 
EFSA. The General Food Law Regulation establishes four bodies which 
constitute the internal structure of the Authority: the Management Board, the 
Executive Director, the Advisory Forum, a Scientific Committee, and 
Scientific Panels.99 This legislative set up, together with the EFSA’s own 
initiatives in relation to civil society stakeholders, enables a co-ordination of 
actors through networks, at which we will take a closer look in the 
following. 
                                                 
96 For more on the “divergent opinion clause”, see Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 111. 
97 See Chalmers n. 10 supra, p. 6. 
98 See Chalmers n. 80 supra, p. 538. 
99 Article 24 of Regulation 178/2002. 
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The Management Board 
This organ of the EFSA, which is the main operational and control body, can 
be characterised as a network which brings different societal interests 
together.100 In contrast to many other European agencies, it is not composed 
of national representatives, but of 14 independent experts and one member 
from the Commission. Four of the experts must represent consumer 
organisations or other interests in the food chain.101 In fact, the EFSA’s 
current composition of the Management Board includes only technical 
experts of food safety, mainly with a regulatory or academic background, and 
only one person who represents a European consumer body.102 This practice 
narrows down the Boards’s function to the representation of the different 
scientific or technical aspects of food safety.103 
 
The Advisory Forum 
This body is a relatively new organ in the institutional structure of European 
Agencies. It is composed of the national representatives of competent bodies 
that undertake similar tasks to that of the EFSA.104 It is the core of a network 
which links national risk assessors with the EFSA,105 and thus accomplishes the 
above-described function of the “decentralised integration” of national 
authorities in the framework of European risk assessment. One of the tasks of 
the Advisory Forum is to “constitute a mechanism for an exchange of 
information on potential risks and the pooling of knowledge”.106 
 
                                                 
100 See Chalmers n. 80 supra, p. 538; K. Kanska, “Wolves in the clothing of sheep? The case of 
the European Food Safety Authority”, (2004) 29 European Law Review, pp. 711-727, at 715. 
101 See Article 25 (1) Regulation 178/2002; For more about the composition, tasks and 
appointment of the Management Board, see Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 77. 
102 See the list of members on:  
http://efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/AboutEfsa/WhoWeAre/ManagementBoard/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_Members.htm (access on 24.04.2008). 
103 The provision of Art. 25 (1) Regulation 178/2002 seems to be open though to the 
appointment of experts in other than technical domain of food safety, such as for instance, 
social scientists or experts in socio-economic evaluation of risk. The legal formulation is rather 
vague: “The members of the Board shall be appointed in such a way as to secure the highest 
standards of competence, a broad range of relevant expertise …” It does not specify what kind 
of expertise is required. 
104 Article 27 of Regulation 178/2002. 
105 Similarly K. Szawlowska, “Risk Assessment in the European Safety Regulation: Who is to 
Decide Whose Sciene is Better? Commission v. France and Beyond [...]”, (2004) 5 German Law 
Journal, pp. 1259-1279, at 1263. 
106 Article 27 (4) Regulation 178/2002. 
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The GMO Panel 
The scientific panel on GMOs is one of the EFSA’s current nine scientific 
panels and is the main scientific actor which provides opinions on risk 
assessment in the GMO authorisation procedures.107 It can be considered as a 
scientific network that gathers independent experts with different 
qualifications and backgrounds. The Panel is composed of independent 
scientists, who are appointed by the Management Board upon a proposal 
from the Executive Director following the publication of an open 
competition. Their term of office is three years, and is renewable.108 The 
current Panel, established in June 2006, comprises twenty scientists of various 
nationalities as well as ad hoc working groups that can be set up to deal with 
specific matters and involve external scientists in the work of the Panel. It is 
specified that the scientific experts “shall undertake to act independently of 
any external influence”.109 The main mechanisms for securing this are annual 
written declarations of commitments and interests.110  
 
Moreover, all the experts, including the external ones, are obliged to make 
declarations of interests at the start of every meeting in which they 
participate.111 Although the meetings of the Panels are not open to the public, 
they can organise public hearings on matters of risk assessment. There has, for 
example, been a stakeholder consultation in relation to a draft guidance 
document for the risk assessment of GMOs112 as well as a technical meeting 
with different environmental NGOs on the risk assessment of GMOs.113 The 
scope of the issues discussed in these consultations was, however, limited to 
technical issues. 
 
The Stakeholder Consultative Platform 
The main114 embodiment of public participation in the process of risk 
assessment is the establishment by the EFSA of a Stakeholder Consultative 
                                                 
107 For more about the work of the Panel, see Dabrowska n. 17 supra, p. 179 et seq. 
108 Article 28 (5) Regulation 178/2002. 
109 Article 37 (2) Regulation 178/2002. 
110 Article 37 (2). 
111 Article 37 (3). 
112 See, on EFSA website: http://efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_1178620771347.htm  (accessed on 24.04.2008). 
113 See, on EFSA website: http://efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_1178620783103.htm  (accessed on 24.04.2008). 
114 Other forms of public involvement in EFSA’s work are the EFSA Annual Colloque for 
stakeholders, the organisation of ad-hoc technical meetings, conference or colloquia as well as 
ad hoc consultations of the public on different issues of EFSA’a work, see webpage:  
http://efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/PartnersNetworks/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_StakeholderInitiatives.htm (accessed on 28.04.2008). 
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Platform as an institutionalised form of stakeholder involvement.115 Its 
creation is not foreseen in the legislative framework, but follows a general 
requirement stipulated in Article 42 of the General Food Law Regulation 
according to which the EFSA shall “develop effective contacts with consumer 
representatives, producer representatives, processors, and any other interested parties”. It 
should be mentioned that this is a very vague formulation that leaves 
considerable scope of discretion to the EFSA. The platform is composed of 
EU-wide stakeholder organisations operating in the food chain. It is set up to 
advise the Executive Director on the general issues regarding the work of the 
EFSA, and, in particular, the impact of its work on stakeholders. It can, inter 
alia, advise on methodologies and provide information and co-operation at 
technical level.116 The membership of the platform is determined by the EFSA 
and includes such organisations as, for example, Greenpeace or BEUC (the 
European Consumers’ Organisation).117 The permanent institutionalisation of 
the platform presents another example of network co-ordination in the arena 
of risk assessment, this time integrating civil society stakeholders into the 
overall administrative network of experts. 
 
5.2.3. A strictly technical notion of risk assessment – deliberation failed 
The above overview of EFSA’s network and co-operation structures presents 
us with a picture that can be described as that of a transnational expert 
network. Its function is to provide for a permanent and institutionalised 
integration of experts and civil society in order to exchange information and 
generate the knowledge required for the assessment of the risks relating to 
GMO authorisations. A truly multilevel and transnational risk assessment 
regime that pools the knowledge of actors from different levels and spheres of 
society (regulation, science, organised civil society) seems to be installed. 
Thus, the framework provided by the legislator allows - in principle - for an 
inclusive structure of governance. At this point, the question arises as to 
whether the interaction between the actors within this network structure 
actually presents deliberation118 about the possible risks of GMOs. The term 
                                                 
115 See Management Board of EFSA from 12.09.2006, “Stakeholder Consultative Platform – 
Terms of Reference” on:  
http://efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/PartnersNetworks/StakeholderInitiatives/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_EFSAConsultativePlatformAndArchive.htm (accessed on 24.04.2008). 
116 Ibid., at 2. 
117 See List of Member Organisations on: 
 http://efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/1178620924692/efsa_locale-1178620753812_membership.htm 
(accessed on 24.04.2008). 
118 See J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996); see, also, G. 
Skogstad, “Legitimacy and/or Policy Effectiveness?: Network governance and GMO 
Regulation in the European Union”, (2003) 10 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 321-338, at 
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“deliberation” is used here in the “Habermasian” sense of a discursive process 
based upon persuasion and the exchange of arguments, which provides an 
opportunity for open debate in which all the contending positions and 
interests in GMO regulation are included.119 It would, therefore, also need to 
include “other legitimate factors”, such as ethical and socio-economic factors, 
in the risk evaluation co-ordinated by the EFSA. When thinking about this 
question, we need to relate it to the notion of the precautionary principle as 
previously discussed in this paper. The legislative framework institutionalises a 
“sound science” narrative of precaution that is based upon a strict separation 
between risk assessment and risk management, and, on the narrow definition of 
the former as a purely technical scientific matter pursued by objective 
science.120  
 
In consequence of this narrow interpretation, co-ordination between the 
actors involved in risk assessment under the auspices of the EFSA is limited to 
a mutual consultation regarding the technical aspects of risk assessment which 
is performed by the scientific experts. It does not embrace socio-economic 
risks or ethical concerns and thus cannot be characterised as deliberation.121 
Experts on the socio-economic dimensions of risk, for example, social 
scientists or economists, are not included in the composition of the 
Management Board.122 The EFSA’s officials consider their task to be the 
provision of objective and independent science-based advice grounded in the 
most up-to-date and reliable scientific information and data available: 
excellence in science is, to them, the core value of the Authority.123 
 
To conclude, the inclusive governance structure that is - in principle - 
provided for by the legislative framework comes to be undermined by this 
narrow definition of risk assessment and the EFSA’s mandate to consider only 
                                                                                                                   
325; E.O. Eriksen & J.E. Fossum (eds), Democracy in the European Union: Integration through 
Deliberation? (London: Routledge, 2000). 
119 See ibid., and J. Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I”, (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, pp. 597-614, at 597; with a view on comitology Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer, 
“Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European Comitology 
in the foodstuffs Sector”, (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 609-625, at 609. 
120 On the problems of the exclusion of other legitimate factors and the bias of the EFSA’s 
scientific expertise, see Kritikos, n. 2 supra, p. 207 et seq. 
121 See, also, M.P. Ferretti, “Why public participation in Risk Regulation? The Case of 
Authorizing GMO Products in the European Union”, (2007) 16 Science as Culture, pp. 377-
395, at 390. 
122 Despite the openness of the legal provision towards this possibility, see, above, n. 103 supra. 
123 See, on EFSA webpage,  
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/AboutEfsa/HowWeWork/KeyValues/efsa_locale-
1178620753812_Cooperation.htm (accessed on 24.04.2008). 
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the technical aspects of biotechnology risks. Thus, the framing assumptions 
underlying this apparently purely-objective technical process, the value 
judgements involved, and the possible bias remain concealed. As a result, the 
lack of deliberation which is already present at this stage brings the quality of 
the knowledge generated by the risk assessment into question. 
 
5.3. Risk management – transnational administrative 
governance through the comitology network 
5.3.1. The governance structure provided for in the legislative framework 
Risk management as the second arena of decision-making in the GMO 
regime takes place within the structures of Comitology,124 and the role and 
functioning of these institutional structures in EU decision-making has gained 
considerable attention in academic literature.125 Originally perceived merely as 
a mechanism given to the Member States to control the exercise of the 
implementing powers conferred to the Commission on the basis of Article 
202 EC, a more sophisticated idea of comitology has developed over time, 
which can be described as an administrative co-ordination network126 that 
transcends the national/supranational boundaries. 
 
Comitology is indicative of a re-orientation of European regulation 
away from hierarchical policy formulation. The new emphasis is on the 
development of co-ordination capacities between the Commission and 
Member State administrations with the aim of establishing a culture of 
inter-administrative partnership, which relies on persuasion, argument 
and discursive processes, rather than on command, control and strategic 
interaction.127 
 
Whether such a characterisation normatively tends to over-estimate the 
deliberative features of comitology or not has been discussed elsewhere.128 It is 
                                                 
124 See Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 1999, L 184/23. 
125 See Ch. Joerges & E. Vos (eds), EU Committees: social regulation, law and politics, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 1999); Ch. Joerges & J. Falke (eds), Das Ausschusswesen der Europäischen Union: 
Praxis der Risikoregulierung im Binnenmarkt und ihre rechtliche Verfassung, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2000). 
126 Sydow n. 91 supra, p. 80 et seq.; On the term, “EU administrative network”, see, also, Türk 
& Hofmann n. 91 supra, p. 3. 
127 See Ch. Joerges & Neyer, n. 119 supra, p. 620. 
128 See Ch. Joerges, “‘Deliberative Supranationalism’ – A Defence”, (2001) 5 European 
Integration online Papers; “‘Deliberative Supranationalism’ – Two Defences”, (2002) 8 European 
Law Journal, pp.133-151, at 133; for a critical review, see R. Schmalz-Bruns, “Deliberativer 
Supranationalismus”, (1999) 6 Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, pp. 185–244; lastly, see 
Ch. Joerges & M. Everson, “Re-conceptualising Europeanisation as a Public Law of 
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a matter of fact, however, that the comitology procedure has become an 
indispensable part of the decision-making in the EU, and is considered to 
provide for the inclusion of “national sensitivities” into the European 
regulatory process.129 
 
In the GMO authorisation regime, the legislative provisions require the 
Commission to take decisions in accordance with the regulatory committee 
procedure.130 According to this procedure, the Commission prepares a draft 
authorisation decision and submits it to the relevant comitology committee 
for deliberation, which, in the case of GM food and feed, is the Standing 
Committiee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH). The 
Committee can then approve or reject the draft decision by qualified-
majority. In the case of approval, the Commission will adopt the measure and 
will issue a final decision on authorisation. In the event that the Committee 
either rejects the Commission proposal or fails to deliver an opinion, the 
matter will be referred to the Council. The Council then has to decide on 
the draft proposal also by qualified-majority within a period of three months. 
Only when the Council opposes the proposal within the time-limit and by 
qualified-majority will the Commission re-examine it. In the event of a split 
opinion or when no vote is taken, the Commission has the power to adopt 
its draft decision. One of the consequences of this is that authorisations can be 
adopted by the Commission, even when the majority of the Member States is 
opposed to the authorisation.131 
 
The Comitology committees are composed of the government 
representatives of the Member States, and are chaired by a member of the 
Commission, who does not have a voting right. The SCFAHC could, 
therefore, serve as a forum for the Member States to express their concerns 
and to raise arguments about the ethical or socio-economic impact of GMO 
commercialisation on their national economies, agricultures, biodiversity, etc. 
Thus, it could compensate for the loss of national regulatory competences in 
this area.132 
 
                                                                                                                   
Collisions: Comitology, Agencies and an Interactive Public Adjudication”, in: Hofmann & 
Türk n. 91 supra, p. 512. 
129 Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 129. 
130 See Article 58 (1) of Regulation 178/2002, Article 30 of Directive 2001/18, Article 35 of 
Regulation 1829/2003; For an explanation of the regulatory procedure, see Vos & Wendler, 
ibid., on p. 89. 
131 Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 89. 
132 Sydow n. 91 supra, p. 221. 
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In fact, in the phase of risk management, the Commission recognises the 
possibility, and even the necessity, of including “other legitimate factors” than 
scientific considerations in the decision-making. Article 7 of the Food and 
Feed Regulation states that the Commission when issuing its draft decision 
shall take into account “the opinion of the Authority, any relevant provisions 
of Community law and other legitimate factors133 relevant to the matter under 
consideration”. The political character of risk management is also expressed in 
the definition contained in the General Food Law Regulation: 
 
Risk management’ means the process, distinct from risk assessment, of 
weighing policy alternatives in consultation with interested parties, 
considering risk assessment and other legitimate factors […] 
 
The idea that risk management secures the political legitimacy of the GMO 
authorisation procedure is conveyed in several other official documents and 
statements by the Commission.134 For instance, in its White Paper on Food 
Safety, it expressed the view that risk management decisions were of a 
political character and involved “judgements not only based on science, but 
on a wider application of the wishes and needs of society”,135 and referred to 
the need for the consideration of other legitimate factors relevant to the 
protection of the health of consumers, such as environmental considerations, 
animal welfare and sustainable agriculture.136 
 
An important source of information required for this “weighing of policy 
alternatives” and political aspects, is public participation, which should thus 
permit the direct input of civil society in the decision-making. The GMO 
framework provides for mainly two channels of public participation in risk 
management: the public consultation of the Commission’s Advisory Groups 
which represent interested parties, and the possibility for the public to make 
comments regarding the risk assessment opinion of the EFSA. With regard to 
the authorisation of GMOs as food and feed products, the Commission has 
established the Advisory Group on the Food Chain and Animal and Plant 
Health, which is made up of representatives of consumer societies, industry, 
and retailing and farming organisations, and is consulted on food safety issues 
by the Commission.137 Furthermore, in the Food and Feed Regulation, 
                                                 
133 Author´s emphasis. 
134 For an overview, see Kritikos n. 2 supra, p. 178 et seq.; see, also, Forsman n. 8 supra, p. 584. 
135 Highlighted by the author. 
136 White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719 at p. 9. 
137 See Commission Decision 2004/613/EC concerning the creation of an advisory group on 
the food chain and animal and plant health, OJ 2004, L 275/17; The creation of this Group 
follows the requirement laid down in the General Food Law Regulation that “there shall be 
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Article 6 (7), provides for the possibility for the general public to make 
comments to the Commission on the EFSA’s risk assessment within 30 days 
of its publication. Under the scope of the Deliberate Release Directive, 
public comments can also be submitted, albeit at a different stage. They are 
submitted to the Commission not with regard to the opinion expressed by 
the EFSA, but at an earlier stage, with regard to the risk assessment made by 
the competent national authority,138 which is initially in charge of it according 
to the Directive. There is no provision for public comments on the risk 
assessment made by the EFSA at the later Community stage, after the EFSA 
has been asked to re-assess the national opinion and the objections raised 
against it. 
 
5.3.2. The practice of risk management – political deadlock and failure of 
co-operation 
The authorisation practice performed by risk managers reveals quite a 
different picture. The biggest gap between normative ideal and regulatory 
reality can be observed in the work of the Comitology system. The voting 
situation from the beginning of the authorisation procedure under the new 
regime (and therefore after the ending of the de facto moratorium) can be 
described as a political deadlock, and a lack of not only deliberative co-
operation, but also of any kind of strategic bargaining among the actors.139 
Since the restarting of authorisations in 2004, the Commission approved all 
new applications for GMO authorisation, basing itself - in every case - upon 
a positive risk assessment from the EFSA.140 All the draft decisions to date 
have been referred to the Council, which indicates the high politicisation of 
the topic. The Commission’s draft decisions passed through the whole 
procedure without finding approval either in the regulatory committee or in 
the Council, and, in the end, the authorisation decision was adopted by the 
Commission itself. Empirical studies on the work of the committees in this 
field141 reveal that it is usual for no debate to take place among the committee 
members. A vote is always called for, and the national representatives come to 
the meetings already with their instructions or a strict mandate from their 
national ministries.142 When the matter proceeds to the Council, no qualified-
                                                                                                                   
open and transparent public consultation, directly or through representative bodies, during the 
preparation, evaluation and revision of food law…” (Article 9). 
138 See Article 24 (1) of Directive 2001/18; further explanation in Kritikos n. 2 supra, p. 171; 
Ferretti n. 121 supra, p. 383. 
139 On the difference, see Joerges & Neyer n. 119 supra. 
140 See Community register on authorisation on:  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm (accessed on 28.04.2008). 
141 Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 116 et seq.; Chalmers n. 10 supra, p. 56 et seq. 
142 Vos & Wendler ibid., at p. 89. 
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majority can be reached either in favour or against the Commission,143 
although there is always a simple-majority which opposes the authorisation.144 
It has been stated that: 
 
The authorisation of GMOs is precisely the sort of controversial 
decision in which the Council will find it difficult to muster a 
qualified-majority vote in either direction, so that national and political 
involvement in the final decision on GMOs is undermined by 
disagreement. The restarting of authorisations for GMOs in 2004 
depended on the Commission decision in the face of Member State 
inability to reach a qualified-majority in either direction.145 
 
This situation clearly shows that the Commission authorisations lack the 
political acceptance of at least the majority of the Member States.146 
 
At the same time, there is no indication that the Commission has, before 
drafting its decision, taken “other legitimate factors” into account, besides 
those of the risk assessment. The decisions for authorisation taken to date 
have usually referred to the fact that the EFSA has “concluded that it is 
unlikely that the placing on the market of the products […] will have adverse 
effects on human or animal health or the environment”,147 and that, “taking 
into account those considerations, authorisation should be granted for the 
product”.148 
 
Similarly, it is questionable as to whether the channels of public participation 
mentioned above actually provide for any considerable input into the 
Commission decision-making. Besides the possibility of comment on the risk 
assessment by the public, there are no provisions that would oblige the 
                                                 
143 In June 2005, the Council, however, reached a qualified-majority against the Commission 
in a different procedure; It opposed the Commission proposal to lift eight bans invoked by five 
Member States. See Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p. 197. 
144 Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 129. 
145 Holder & Lee n. 1 supra, p.195. 
146 Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 135; See, also, Chalmers n. 10 supra, p. 663, who emphasises 
the ambiguous role Member States play in the comitology voting. Because of the lack of 
reason-giving for national “no” votes, it is mostly not clear “whether the vote was a fob to 
domestic public opinion enabling Member States to say that they had opposed a measure when 
they knew that it would go through anyway by Commission action”. 
147 See, for example, Commission Decision 2008/280/EC of 28 March 2008 authorising 
placing on the market products from maize GA21, Preamble (4); For other GM food and feed 
authorisations, see Community register on 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm (accessed on 26.04.2008). 
148 Ibid., Preamble (6). 
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Commission to take them into account or to provide for reason-giving as to 
the manner in which it had considered them. Thus, the official declarations, 
including the Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle,149 
that all interested parties should participate in the study of the diverse options 
in the area of risk assessment appear, to be little more than “lip service”.150 
Public participation seems to work better when the Commission consults 
stakeholders as organised interest groups, as in the case of the Advisory Group 
on the Food Chain and Animal and Plant Health mentioned above. 
However, it is not clear whether this Advisory Group is directly involved in 
concrete authorisation procedures on GMOs. The formulation of Article 9 of 
the General Food Law Regulation, which is the legal basis for the 
establishment of the Advisory Group, states that “there shall be open and 
transparent public consultation, directly or through representative bodies, 
during the preparation, evaluation and revision of food law…”,151 which indicates 
that consultation is not foreseen for the implementation of food law, which 
would be the case for individual administrative procedures. This is confirmed 
by the fact that the Commission usually convenes two meetings per year in 
which consultation takes place.152 It is thus unlikely that the Advisory Group 
serves as a source of input for “other legitimate factors” in the risk 
management of GMO authorisations. 
 
To conclude, the practice of risk management in the GMO regime 
undermines the fulfilment of the claim to political legitimacy as expressed in 
the precautionary principle and laid down in the legislative framework itself. 
As far as can be observed, risk management by the Commission is based upon 
the scientific opinion of the EFSA. In no case has the Authority’s expertise 
been questioned or departed from. This finding corresponds with the 
comments made above on the “sound science” notion of precaution and its 
consequences on the way that risk is regulated.153 If science is perceived as 
objective and neutral, then all the “extra-scientific” considerations will 
necessarily appear as secondary, because they are interest guided or arbitrary 
or simply not “fact”.154 It should be noted that the Commission strongly 
wishes to be above suspicion with regard to its GMO regulatory practice 
being guided by protectionism or interest politics. The reasons for this lie, 
                                                 
149 Commission Communication n. 64 supra, p. 16. 
150 On the difficulties and failures of public participation in the GMO regime, see Ferretti n. 
121 supra. 
151 Author’s emphasis. 
152 See Article 4 (1) of Commission Decision 2004/613/EC n. 137 supra. 
153 Ibid., at pp. 22-23. 
154 Similarly, Levidow & Marris n. 69 supra, p. 349. 
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inter alia, in the international arena, especially in the Commission’s ambition 
to comply with the EU’s international trade obligations. This context is 
crucial for the understanding of the EU regulation of GMOs, and, as a 
consequence, I will briefly elaborate on it in the next section. We will see 
that scientific legitimacy and “sound science” and their predominance at the 
cost of political legitimacy in GMO authorisations are very attractive to 
Community regulators, especially the Commission. 
 
5.3.3. Global guidance through international trade stakeholders 
Problems of EU governance in the area of biotechnology are deeply 
intertwined with the regulation of such problems in international trade law.155 
The European Community is a member of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and, as such, is obliged to comply with its rules, in particular, with 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).156 
Another important organisation in this regard is the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC), an international standardisation body created under the 
UN system by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). It sets up 
international standards with the aim of balancing trade concerns and the 
protection of consumer health.157 The compliance with the standards for the 
trade products developed by the CAC is crucial in the context of 
international trade law, because they are accepted by the WTO as reference 
points in the dispute settlement procedure. Compliance with Codex standards 
now presumes compliance with the obligations under the SPS Agreement. 
The Community became a member of the CAC in 2003, when it entered 
the FAO.158 
 
The WTO system and the food safety standards of the CAC have a 
preference for scientific proof in evaluating the risks of products, and they 
leave very little space for the consideration of “other legitimate factors”, 
especially if this could affect the scientific basis for evaluation.159 Tensions or 
conflicts between this “external” system and the EU regulatory approach tend 
to have a significant impact on the way in which the EU system functions 
“internally”. This can be seen in the recent WTO dispute between United 
                                                 
155 See J. Scott, “European Regulation of GMOs: Thinking about ‘Judicial Review’ in the 
WTO”, Jean Monnet Working Paper, 2004/04. 
156 This Agreement is the relevant instrument of international trade law dealing with trade in 
food and feedstuffs. See Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra, p. 95. 
157 See ibid. at p. 94. 
158 Council Decision 2003/822 of 17 November 2003 on the Accession of the European 
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States, Canada and Argentina, on the one hand, and the EC, on the other. 
On 21 November 2006, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) adopted a decision (Panel Reports) on European 
Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products,160 in which it condemned the EC and some of its Member States for 
having adopted a general de facto moratorium on biotech products lasting 
from June 1999 until at least August 2003. This decision referred to the 
suspension of all applications for GMO authorisation under the “old” legal 
framework.161 This situation was itself a consequence of a regulatory crisis, in 
which the Member States and the Community failed to agree on the way in 
which the GMO authorisation procedures in the EU should function. The 
opposition against the commercialisation of GMOs within national societies 
and the lack of political acceptance on the part of the Member States in the 
comitology procedure finally resulted in a suspension of the GMO regulatory 
system in the European Union.162 
 
The revision of the “old” system and the establishment of new legislative 
provisions was, therefore, a difficult task, because it had to satisfy the actors of 
both systems, the international trade arena, and the system within the EU. 
The fundamental role assigned to the precautionary principle in the new 
authorisation regime was a tribute to the sceptics towards GMO regulation 
within the Member States. On the other hand, in its Communication on the 
precautionary principle, the Commission tried to stress the compliance of its 
notion of the principle with international law.163 This explains the choice of 
the “sound science” notion in the Communication, where the invocation of 
the principle is possible only if a scientific risk assessment which is as 
complete as possible has identified and characterised both the risk and its 
probability.164 
 
The ambivalence caused by the conditions attached to resorting to the 
precautionary principle cannot be explained other than by the 
Commission’s concern with aligning Community practice with World 
Trade Organisation rules. The communication’s wording is in perfect 
                                                 
160 WT/DS291/R (United States), WT/DS292/R (Canada), WT/DS293/R (Argentina). 
161 Directive 90/220, Regulation 258/97 and Directive 2001/18, the former although part of 
the ‘new’ framework has already been in place at the moment the complainants triggered the 
dispute settlement procedure (May 13, 2003). 
162 Skogstad n. 6, p. 246 et seq. 
163 Commission Communication n. 64, point 2. 
164 See, above, at 5.1. The “sound science” notion of the precautionary principle and its 
foundations. 
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harmony with the approach of the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
on the application of the precautionary principle.165 
 
All this shows that there is another “external” input in the risk management 
decision-making of the Commission when GM products are authorised in 
the EU. It finds itself under pressure from the international community, 
especially from the United States, to implement the WTO ruling in the 
biotech dispute.166 In governance terms, this type of influence on the 
decision-making within the EU can be characterised as guidance through the 
external stakeholders of global trade (not only other governments, but also 
multi-national global corporations that trade in biotechnology products). The 
type of co-ordination between these global actors and EU actors cannot be 
perceived in terms of a direct hierarchy.167 Instead, the interdependency 
between the two arenas is dealt with through instruments of mutual political 
negotiation and persuasion,168 which have, in their background, the logic of 
global trade: the mutual distribution of equal trade advantages. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The question raised at the beginning of this paper was whether the 
Community regime for the market authorisation of GM products could 
ensure the legitimate regulation of risks associated with biotechnology. The 
examination has shown that legitimacy, as envisaged by the European 
legislator in this regime, is understood in procedural terms, and refers to the 
balance between the scientific and the political foundations of the decision-
making. According to the precautionary principle that has guided the 
legislative set up of the new GMO framework, and which also guides its 
implementation, there must be space for the mediation of the various 
conflicts surrounding the commercial use of green biotechnology within the 
authorisation procedure. Legitimacy can, therefore, only be ensured if the 
authorisation regime, in its interplay between the legislative provisions and 
their implementation within the “norm production through practice”, 
                                                 
165 Forsman n. 8 supra, p. 591. 
166 On this topic, see S. Poli, “The EC Implementation of the WTO ruling in the Biotech 
Dispute”, (2007) 32 European Law Review, pp. 705–726,. 
167 On the legal effects of WTO law on Community law, see P. Koutrakos, EU International 
Relations Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 253 et seq.; P .Craig & G. de Bùrca, EU 
Law, 4th edition, p. 206 et seq.; See, also, S.G. Griller, “Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in 
the EU”, (2001) 3 JIEL, pp. 441– 72. 
168 On the subject of current negotiations between the EU and the complainants of the Biotech 
Dispute on the implementation of the Panel Decisions, see S. Poli n. 166 supra, p. 717-718. 
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provides for mediation of scientific concerns and “other legitimate factors” 
such as ethical and socio-economic concerns with GMOs, for example. 
 
Furthermore, the employment of the “governance” perspective as the 
analytical frame of the examination has shown that European regulation does 
not operate out of a hierarchical “centre”, but, instead, includes a variety of 
actors that provide them with the governance structures in which they can 
mutually co-ordinate their action. The knowledge required for the evaluation 
of the risks of GMO is produced within these co-ordination processes. As we 
have seen, the results achieved are influenced, but never fully foreseen or 
determined, by the legislator. 
 
In the “governance” perspective, the EU legislator tries to ensure the 
legitimacy of the authorisation procedure by providing for a combination of 
mainly two types of governance modes: hierarchy and networks. The 
hierarchical co-ordination takes place through the imperative regulation 
expressed in the prior authorisation requirement, the centralised authorisation 
procedure and the high degree of harmonisation in the field, which severely 
limits national regulatory competences. With this type of regulation, public 
control of the risks of GMOs before marketing is ensured. At the same time, 
it also enables the EU level to control the national systems in order to achieve 
the objective of the free circulation of GM products on the entire 
Community market. The second type of co-ordination through networks 
takes the form of scientific self-governance in the risk assessment on the one 
hand, and transnational administrative governance through comitology in risk 
management on the other. These structures play a crucial role in generating 
the knowledge as well as the standards for the risk analysis, at the same time 
ensuring the balance between the scientific and political legitimacy of the 
procedure. 
 
These governance modes, therefore, institutionalise the precautionary 
principle as the governing principle of the regime. The full implementation 
of the precautionary idea is, however, hindered by the narrow “sound 
science” interpretation of this principle. As a consequence, tension can be 
identified in the framework between the provision of all-inclusive and 
integrative procedural structures for balancing the two types of legitimacy 
mentioned above and the “sound science” understanding of precaution. The 
former is laid down in the provisions which define the risk assessment as a 
purely technical process based upon “objective” science. 
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The consequences of this tension on the functioning of the regime are 
twofold. Firstly, in the phase of risk assessment, no open deliberation about 
the value judgements and framing assumptions - which are an inherent part 
of scientific reasoning under conditions of ‘scientific uncertainty’ - takes 
place. Secondly, the understanding of the opinions of the EFSA as objective 
and neutral scientific facts creates a strong attraction for the risk managers to 
prioritise scientific arguments over those of an “extra-scientific”, political 
nature. It makes it an “easy game” for the Commission to disregard “other 
legitimate factors” in the risk management, and to align its regulatory practice 
with the international standards of world trade law. To put it dramatically, 
the result of the “sound science” approach is, therefore, not the 
depoliticisation of European GMO regulation, but, on the contrary, the 
disguised politicisation in favour of only one “extra-scientific” aspect of it: 
namely, the objective of the free trade of GM products. 
 
The narrow interpretation of the precautionary principle leads to the 
predominance of scientific legitimacy in the authorisation regime to the 
detriment of its political legitimacy. It, therefore, fails to provide for the 
successful mediation of all conflicts and interests involved in this area of 
European risk regulation.169 
 
One consequence of this failure is the lack of political acceptability for the 
Community framework on the part of the Member States and a large part of 
their populations.170 Ever since the Commission started approving GMOs 
after the halt of authorisations under the de facto moratorium, new national 
bans on the marketing and cultivation of biotech products have come into 
force in several Member States. About a half of all the Member States seem to 
be opposed to the commercialisation of GMOs in the European Union at the 
moment.171 Many governments have called for another revision of the current 
legislation – the main points of criticism relate to the majority requirements 
with regard to the voting of the Council in the comitology procedure and 
                                                 
169 On the effects of failed mediation on the functioning of the regime at presence, see 
Chalmers n. 10 supra, p. 674. 
170 According to the Eurobarometer Europeans and Biotechnology in 2005: Patterns and Trends 
published in May 2006 only an average of 27 % of the European population encourages the 
technology of GM food. See, also, GMO Compass, “GM Food: Europeans still see more risks 
than benefits” on: http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:URTKd1RW7XwJ:www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/news/stories/227.eurobarometer_europeans_biotechnology.html+eurobaro
meter+gmo&hl=de&ct=clnk&cd=1&client=firefox-a (accessed 29.04.2008). 
171 See La Repubblica from 31.10.2007, “OGM, l’Italia chiede il bando Ue ‘Basta 
autorizzazioni facili’ ” (“GMOs, Italy asks for EU ban. ‘No more easy authorisations.’”). 
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the risk assessment work by the EFSA172 – and some even suggest another 
moratorium until the regulatory system is improved.173 
 
This situation appears as a “déjà-vu”. One should, however, not forget the 
double role of the Member States in this controversy. They are not only the 
addressees of the new GMO legislation, but also, at least partially, their 
authors. A qualified-majority of the Member States was required in order to 
approve the regime.174 One could, therefore, criticise national bans as, at the 
minimum, inconsequent behaviour on the part of the Member States. 
 
At the same time, conflicts between the EU and the national level in the area 
of GMOs can be interpreted as reflecting the dissatisfaction of both the 
Member States and their societies with the current interpretation of the 
precautionary principle at Community level.175 It is, therefore, worth 
contemplating the possibilities of a more deliberative approach to precaution 
within the practice of GMO authorisation in order to increase the political 
acceptability of this procedure across the European Union. Such an approach, 
as indicated in this paper, would not mean allowing for protectionism or 
arbitrary decisions on the part of the Member States. Instead, it would mean 
making space for both the consideration and the mediation of a broad range 
of interests and concerns regarding the commercial use of biotechnology in 
the EU, at least at the stage of risk management.176 A deliberative approach 
would also have to distance itself from the conception of science as being 
objective and neutral, and to recognise the inherent value-laden nature of 
scientific reasoning under conditions of “scientific uncertainty”. What is, 
more generally, needed is the disclosure and discussion in the authorisation 
process of all the value judgements involved in this area of regulation, as well 
                                                 
172 Vos & Wendler n. 42 supra p. 109 and p. 131; See, also, article in La Repubblica, ibid. 
173 See article in La Repubblica, ibid. 
174 Article 251 EC Treaty. 
175 A crucial role in that interpretation play the Community Courts, see, above, n. 44 supra. 
176 A more radical approach would be to broaden also the risk assessment to the evaluation of 
not only scientific, but also socio-economic risks. As an example see the institutional structure 
of the new European Chemicals Agency under the REACH framework. Article 85 of 
Regulation 1907/2006 establishes not only a Committee for Risk Assessment, but also a 
Committee for Socio-Economic Risk Analysis. On the REACH framework from the 
perspective of legitimacy, see P. Kjaer, “Rationality within REACH? On Functional 
Differentiation as the Structural Foundation of Legitimacy in European Chemicals 
Regulation”, EUI Working Papers Law 2007/18; A deliberative approach to precaution would 
more generally mean the inclusion of a broader range of views, such as for example lay 
knowledge, into the risk assessment. On the application of the precautionary principle already 
in the risk assessment, see von Zwanenberg & Stirling n. 69 supra. 
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as mutual reason giving and justification177 among the actors with regard to 
why they want to prioritise some of them over others. 
 
I admit that finishing this paper with a plea for a more deliberative 
interpretation of the precautionary principle at Community level raises 
further questions with regard to the precise institutionalisation and 
practicability of such an approach. It, therefore, opens up a new discussion 
that has to be postponed to future research. The regulation of 
biotechnological products in the EU raises many complex and inter-related 
questions that could not all be addressed in this paper. Future attempts to 
define the meaning and role of the precautionary principle in Community 
law and its applicability in regulatory procedures should consider the 
influence of the European Courts in this area. Another crucial issue would be 
to scrutinise the input of private applicants in the decision-making and their 
power to provide the EFSA with considerable scientific expertise as the basis 
for its risk assessment. The governance analysis accomplished in this paper is 
an attempt to provide the basis for addressing these questions in the future. 
                                                 
177 On justification through arguing and reason-giving as part of deliberative decision-making, 
see C. Lord, “Assessing democracy in a contested polity”, (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, pp. 641-661. 
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1. Beyond the democratic deficit1 
The growing relevance of international organisations2 has given rise to a 
broad debate on the so-called “democratic deficit”. The proponents of the 
democratic deficit thesis hold that the practice of international governance, 
i.e., the intentional formulation and implementation of binding rules by the 
member states of international organisations or their bureaucratic agents, 
suffers from its failure to meet democratic standards. It is pointed out that the 
establishment of global governance organisations such as the WTO or, at 
regional level, the EU, has led to an empowerment of the national executives 
and a corresponding loss of the legislative and oversight powers of national 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented to the conference on “Justice and Global 
Democracy”, Frankfurt am Main, 25-26 May 2007 and the workshop on “Transnational 
Standards of Social Protection: Contrasting European and International Governance”, Bremen, 
23-24 November 2007. I am thankful for critical comments by the participants of both 
meetings and especially Andreas Niederberger and Karl-Heinz Ladeur. I am also thankful to 
Chris Engert for translating my “Germish” into proper English. 
2 In this article, I define international organisations as those organisations which are financed by 
two or more member states. They are called “global” organisations if their membership 
includes nearly all or all nation-states (i.e., the UN or the WTO). Supranational organisations 
such as the EU and WTO are treated as special cases of international organisations. This 
definition of international organisation excludes international non-governmental organisations 
such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International. 
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parliaments.3 International organisations, such as the World Bank, the IMF or 
the WTO, are criticised for being non-transparent, unaccountable and 
dominated by the political agenda of powerful states.4 On the other side of 
the debate, the very existence of a democratic deficit of international 
organisations is disputed. Whilst some argue that advanced international 
organisations such as the EU do not score that badly when compared to an 
average nation-state,5 others point out that the non-democratic character of 
international organisations can be a major normative strength. Democratic 
governments can serve the preferences of the median voter far better if they 
have access to policy-making bodies such as the WTO, which give no, or 
only limited, access to special interest groups.6 A third prominent argument 
holds that the nation-state in inescapably caught in a “democratic dilemma” 
between citizen participation and system effectiveness: one can either have 
effective international organisations or democratic governance.7 To have both 
at the same time is, however, impossible. If we want effective global 
governance, we will have to live with a limited influence of individual 
preferences on policy outcomes. 
 
The debate on the pitfalls and merits of global governance has been raging for 
decades and no conclusion is in sight. A major reason for this 
inconclusiveness, so the argument of this article goes, is that much of the 
debate uses the wrong normative categories.8 International organisations can 
only be assessed as suffering from a democratic deficit or as complying with 
the standards of democracy if they have the theoretical chance to become 
                                                 
3 Pertinent literature on this subject is A. Moravcsik: Why the European Community Strengthens 
the State: Domestic Politics and International Co-operation, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 
1994), Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series 52; J.E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty 
in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research”, 
(1995) 39 International Studies Quarterly, pp. 213-234; K.D. Wolf, Die neue Staatsräson – 
Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft, (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlag, 2000). 
4 See P. Nanz & J. Steffek,: “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere”, (2004) 
39 Government and Opposition, pp. 314-335. 
5 See A. Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union”, (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 603-624. 
6 See F. McGillivray, “Democratizing the World Trade Organization”, (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 2000); M. Kahler, ‘Defining 
Accountability Up: The Global Economic Multilaterals’, (2004) 39 Government and Opposition, 
Special Issue on Global Governance and Public Accountability, pp. 132-158. 
7 See R.A. Dahl, “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation”, 
(1994) 109 Political Science Quarterly, pp. 23–34. 
8 See R.O. Keohane, “Accountability in World Politics”, (2006) 29 Scandinavian Political 
Studies, pp. 75-87. 
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democratic and if that is, indeed, a normatively sound request. Both, 
however, are disputed for good reasons. Even the most developed of all 
international organisations, the EU, lacks those political competences which 
lie at the heart of any state governance, and which have historically been the 
most prominent resources for the provision of public order: the powers to 
tax, to enforce sanctions by means of coercion, and to provide security 
against foreign powers. The EU has none of these competencies. It does not 
levy taxes, it commands no police, and its defence and security policy is 
embryonic, if not less. 
 
The EU – or any other international organisation – also has no demos. 
Democratic theory, however, be it in a Rawlsian,9 a Habermasian10 or in a 
Dahlian11 fashion, emphasises that democracy necessarily entails a demos which 
identifies with a certain authoritative structure (even if it is only understood 
in the Habermasian term of Verfassungspatriotismus). In short, the debate on 
the democratic deficit of international organisations commits the categorical 
mistake of interpreting international data with inadequate domestic analytical 
categories. 
 
An inadequate way of correcting this mistake is to re-interpret international 
organisations as merely technical bodies that should be judged in accordance 
with the standards of good technocratic governance.12 Technocratic 
reconceptualisations overlook the fact that international organisations can 
have a significant impact on domestic policies. In a great number of areas, 
ranging from environmental policy to trade and security policy, international 
organisations provide the normative frame for domestic action. These frames 
are only sometimes producing Pareto-optimal outcomes. International 
environmental and trade policy outcomes are, however, hardly ever without 
costs for some of the parties involved. 
 
This article proposes the substitution of the discourse on the democratic 
deficit of international governance with a discourse on its justice deficit. In 
contrast to democracy, the notion of justice is not tied to the nation-state, but 
can be applied in all contexts and to all political situations. It is an idea which 
is not less important than the idea of democracy, but, explains its normative 
                                                 
9 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 1971). 
10 See J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechtes und des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 1992). 
11 See R.A. Dahl, On Democracy, (New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 1998). 
12 See G. Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards”, (1998) 4 
European Law Journal, pp. 5–28. 
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thrust. In the next section, the article develops a normative justification of 
international organisations that is built on the concept of justice as a right to 
justification. Section Three of the paper elaborates on the difficulties of 
making the right to justification effective under the conditions of the 
international system, and identifies three major obstacles. Section Four 
explains the contribution that supranationalism makes to overcoming these 
obstacles, and interprets supranationalism as a new chance for transnational 
justice. The concluding section summarises the argument and discusses its 
relevance for the debate on the legitimacy of international organisations. 
 
2. Transnational justice as a right to justification 
Justice is one of the most central concepts in both political philosophy and 
politics. It is, in the words of John Rawls, “the prime social virtue, the most 
important virtue of social institutions”.13 No other quality can substitute for a 
lack of justice. Only conditions that are just, and never conditions that are 
unjust, are acceptable. Everything which is unjust has to be rectified through 
practical political measures and improved upon. Notwithstanding the fact that 
most political theorists would subscribe to this statement, it is hard to find any 
consensus on what justice implies in the abstract, or when applied to 
international politics. 
 
2.1. Empirical and philosophical concepts of justice 
Much of the literature on transnational justice can be classified under the two 
categories of empirical and philosophical concepts of justice. From the 
perspective of an empirical concept of justice, justice is often understood as 
those dominant prevailing normative conceptions that exist in a given society 
at a given point in time. No claim is advanced that this conception is, more 
or less, valid than any other conception because, from an empirical point of 
view, no neutral or superior position exists from where such a claim could be 
justified. For empiricists, the search for a universal concept of justice is elusive 
from the very beginning. Meaningful discussions about the proper substance 
of justice can only be conducted in the context of a specific community, and 
only give expression to a certain social system of continuing interaction and 
transaction. According to Franck, “[i]t is only in a community that the 
bedrock of shared values and developed principles necessary to any assessment 
of fairness is found”.14 In very similar terms, Miller claims that nationality has 
an ethical significance which allows the members of a political community to 
                                                 
13 See W. Kersting, John Rawls zur Einführung, (Hamburg: Junius, 1993), p. 31. 
14 See T.M. Franck: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), p. 10. 
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discriminate against those who are outside the community. This significance 
is based upon the reciprocal acceptance of “a loyalty to the community 
expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal gain to advance its interests”.15 
It is only in a nation-state that people develop a sense of community and 
therefore a shared sense of justice.16 The very idea of justice pre-supposes the 
existence of an integrated political community which can only be provided 
by the nation-state and inside the boundaries of a nation-state. By 
implication, transnational justice is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. 
 
The empirical approach is challenged by two arguments. Empirical 
nationalists find it difficult to explain why most societies share an idea of 
justice which is expressed in the reciprocity principle of the famous “Golden 
Rule”. The Golden Rule refers to an intuition which can be found in all 
major world religions. It holds that only those rules which do not impose 
more serious restrictions of freedom upon any other person than one would 
be willing to accept for one’s own self can claim to be just. It is true that 
every culture and society differs with regard to the specific interpretations that 
reciprocity entails when applied to specific circumstances. However, this 
should not redirect our attention from the fact that there is clearly some basic 
common normative intuition which is shared across most cultures and times. 
 
A second objection to the assertion that any meaningful conception of justice 
is necessarily confined by national borders, refers to the problem of 
methodological nationalism.17 If it is true that we live in a world of increasing 
transnational exchange, and if it is also true that normative standards are, to 
some degree, a function of such interaction, then, it is clearly implausible to 
exclude the possibility of a transnationally shared meaning of justice 
categorically. In the 1970s, authors such as Bull and Beitz had already shown 
that the international system can fruitfully be perceived as a social context of 
its own, in which shared normative ideas guide the actions of governments.18 
Although the international system is anarchic, so Bull argued, it can 
                                                 
15 See D. Miller, “The Ethical Significance of Nationality”, (1988) 98 Ethics, pp. 647–662, at 
648; see, also, D. Miller, “In Defence of Nationality”, (1993) 10 Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
pp. 3-16. 
16 See D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
17 See M. Zürn, “Politik in der postnationalen Konstellation. Über das Elend des 
methodologischen Nationalismus”, in: C. Landfried (ed), Politik in einer entgrenzten Welt. 21. 
Wissenschaftlicher Kongress der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft, pp. 181-203 
(Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 2001). 
18 See H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 
1977); C.R. Beitz, “Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics”, (1979) 33 
International Organization, pp. 405–24. 
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nevertheless be understood as a kind of “anarchical society” in which certain 
values, principles and norms are intergovernmentally shared. Similar 
assessments can be found in more recent contributions. Müller,19 for example, 
argues that diplomacy is generally conducted in an “artificial lifeworld, which 
provides a substantial background of shared rituals” (own translation) that 
fosters argumentative interaction even under conditions of massive conflicts. 
Thus, the empirical nationalist’s insight that ethical standards are culturally 
and historically contingent does not imply that meaningful understandings of 
justice can only develop within the confines of a nation-state. 
 
In contrast to empirical approaches to justice, philosophical approaches often 
deal with their subject matter in a manner which is largely independent of 
empirical questions. John Rawls establishes the Theory of Justice20 on the 
counterfactual idea of an “original position” in which people have no 
knowledge about personal attributes such as gender, race or wealth. Such 
purely theoretical reflections are often helpful instruments in identifying real-
world problems, and they evaluate reality in a normative fashion. They 
become problematical, however, if they do not take into account the fact that 
the applicability of analytical categories is dependent on political and/or social 
contexts, or if they apply analytical categories indiscriminately.21 A perfect 
example for this problem is the normative concept of a democratic global 
state. The proponents of this concept argue that a global democratic state is 
“obligatory in terms of law and ethics” because it is understood to be a 
necessary condition for the global rule of law. Such a global state requires “a 
global legislative power which would define rules and put them into force, a 
global executive power which would implement them and where necessary 
enforce with the help of a world police, and a global judicative power which 
would authoritatively settle the disputes”.22 Any such reasoning collides with 
the fact that a global monopoly of coercion is far beyond anything 
imaginable.23 It therefore is a perspective which may be argued to be 
                                                 
19 H. Müller, “Internationale Verhandlungen, Argumente und Verständigungshandeln. 
Verteidigung, Befunde, Warnung”, pp. 199-223, in: P. Niesen & B. Herborth (eds) Anarchie 
der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Politik, (Frankfurt 
aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007), p. 210. 
20 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 1971). 
21 See R.O. Keohane, “Accountability in World Politics”, (2006) 29 Scandinavian Political 
Studies, pp. 75-87. 
22 See O. Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, (Munich: Beck, 2002), p. 279, own 
translation. 
23 See V. Rittberger‚ “Globalisierung und der Wandel der Staatenwelt. Die Welt regieren ohne 
Weltstaat”, pp. 188-218, in: U. Menzel (d) Vom Ewigen Frieden und vom Wohlstand der 
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attractive in purely normative philosophy, but which lacks any real world 
significance. It is a utopian perspective which neglects the fact that normative 
requirements must be practically feasible in order to become politically 
relevant. 
 
One option in order to avoid such a categorical mistake and to formulate 
politically significant ideas of justice is to ensure that the analytical categories 
that we use are both normatively introduced and empirically explained. 
Normative categories should be formulated with a view to the connection 
between “ought” and “can” and reflect an awareness that normative 
requirements will only be convincing to the degree that we provide evidence 
that they are, indeed, “fit for reality”. It remains true that such evidence is 
often hard to collect. Any statement about the possibility of transforming 
normative ideas into real-world conditions must always remain, to some 
degree, speculative, and can be formulated only hypothetically. Nevertheless, 
in order to make the criterion operational, we can consider all these 
normative ideas to be prima facie fit-for-reality, which build upon some 
existing element of the empirical reality and only expand its reach, instead of 
inventing something completely new. This idea reflects Rawl’s insight24 that a 
“necessary pre-condition for a realist justice concept” is “that its major 
principles and instructions are practiced and can be applied to the existing 
political and social institutions”. Hence, a politically relevant concept of 
justice expands “the borders of what we usually consider practically-
politically possible”25 while, at the same time, remaining on solid empirical 
ground. 
 
2.2. The right to justification 
One understanding of transnational justice that is both empirically and 
normatively sound begins with the Kantian idea of reason. According to 
Kant, only those actions which are based upon principles that we may want 
to be of universal character can be deemed to be reasonable. One such 
principle is that we have a right to demand and receive justification on the 
part of all those individuals or organisations which restrict our freedom.26 
                                                                                                                   
Nationen. Festschrift für Dieter Senghaas zum 60. Geburtstag, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp, 2000), p. 
204. 
24 See J. Rawls, Law of Peoples, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 15. 
25 See J. Rawls, Law of Peoples, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 4. 
26 For a more elaborate discussion of the right to justification, see R. Forst‚ “Die 
Rechtfertigung der Gerechtigkeit”, pp. 125-168, in: H. Brunkhorst & P. Niesen (eds), Das 
Recht der Republik, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999); see, also, R. Forst, Das Recht auf 
206                                                                                             Neyer
 
This, of course, does not necessarily imply that no limitations of our freedom 
are legitimate, but only holds that the legitimacy of any such limitations 
depends on the reasons that are given to justify them. 
 
If, therefore, we concede the basic right to others to be considered in our 
choice of actions whenever these others might be affected by the 
consequences of our actions, and if we therefore only regard rules that have 
taken the concerns of the others into proper consideration as being 
potentially just, then it is likewise plausible to assume a right to justification as 
a core element of justice. As a person (or organisation), I therefore have the 
right to have any restriction of my individual freedom justified by whoever 
causes that restriction or has the intention of doing so. This argument takes 
the freedom of the individual from domination as a starting point, and places 
all restriction of this freedom under the reservation of good reasons. In 
crafting the argumentative design of a justification, the justifying person or 
organisation cannot act arbitrarily, but must follow the reservation of good 
reasons. In doing so, only such types of reason are to be understood as good 
reasons which fulfil the two minimum conditions of reciprocity and 
universality. Reciprocity means that nothing more is demanded from 
anybody than we are willing to concede ourselves. Reciprocity refers to the 
condition that reasons apply to everybody to the same degree. 
 
Understanding justice as the right to justification gives the notion of justice an 
intrinsically procedural and discursive character. Any question regarding the 
specific implication of justice in a specific situation is answered with reference 
to a normatively demanding discursive procedure. In this way, the search for 
justice becomes a discursive and always only temporarily concluded project. 
Though those concerned by a regulation may temporarily agree upon a 
specific accord, they will only do so with the reservation of possible later 
changes. The right to justification, with its core idea of an imperative to give 
reasons for actions which restrict the freedom of others, is a political concept 
of justice. It is characterised by holding up the link between “ought” and 
“can” by not only specifying something theoretically desirable, but also by 
combining this specification with the claim that it is achievable in the sense 
that some of its elements already exist. 
 
A thus defined right to justification can easily be applied to international 
relations. It resonates with the idea of self-determination which refers to the 
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basic right of every society to choose, independently of foreign influence, its 
own political status, its own form of state and government, and its own 
economic, social and cultural development. As a matter of principle, 
restrictions of this freedom are acceptable only when a state either voluntarily 
complies with an international legal provision or when ius cogens is applicable. 
 
It is important to note that self-determination today cannot be equated with 
autonomy. The global condition of complex interdependence implies that 
one can neither pursue a successful unilateral money and currency policy nor 
conduct a sensible unilateral security policy. All these policy areas are 
characterised by a significantly reduced ability of single states to realise their 
preferences independently of the actions of other states.  
 
Thus, it is a generally shared insight that complex interdependence among 
national societies has turned a purely national organisation of politics into a 
problem for democratic governance itself: in a great number of issues areas, 
from environmental degradation to security affairs and migration issues, the 
single nation-states is increasingly inappropriate for the formulation and 
implementation of effective policies. The normative deficiency of the nation-
state is not limited to its capacity as an effective problem-solver, however. It 
also applies to the related structural phenomenon that the political measures 
taken by individual interdependent states often have effects for other states. 
The decision to raise or lower the interest rates of a central bank may have 
the effect of making neighbouring countries more or less attractive to capital. 
The easing or restricting of national provisions for immigration will likewise 
re-orient the decisions of individuals seeking refuge from violence or a better 
income, and will equally have an effect on the relative attractiveness of other 
states. The national establishment of certain requirements for legally sold 
products will likewise make it more or less costly for producers in foreign 
states to import their products and may lead to losses or gains or to 
employment opportunities. All these effects are structural phenomena under 
conditions of interdependence. Without being embedded in an international 
structure of policy co-ordination, the individual nation-state has little 
incentive to take the external effects of its actions seriously, i.e., to integrate 
them systematically as an important calculus into its own decision-making 
practices.  
 
The basic normative principle that those who are affected by a decision 
should have a say in its making, is, therefore, systematically violated by almost 
all interdependent nation-states if they are not embedded in an international 
structure that fosters the internalisation of the external effects of domestic 
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decision-making. Thus, international organisations such as the EU, the 
WTO, the ILO or even the United Nations (UN) derive a significant degree 
of their legitimacy from their function as a correcting mechanism for this 
systematical nation-state failure. They make interdependent nation-states 
systematically aware of one another, help pooling resources that are necessary 
for tackling pressing cross-border problems, and provide an organisational 
setting, in which the responsibility to take the concerns of others states 
seriously is transformed into legal obligations.27 Thus, international 
organisations carry, first of all, the potential to remedy the structural 
shortcomings of the nation-state and should be seen as important and 
necessary devices for adapting the nation-state to the condition of complex 
interdependence. 
 
Even those close to political realism are aware that national interests “can 
today, even by the powerful states, only be expressed and exercised in co-
operation with other states and within the framework of codified rules of law, 
taking into consideration universal ethical principles”.28 Chayes and Chayes29 
even argue that the need to complement domestic governance with 
international governance leads to the emergence of a “new sovereignty”, 
which is conditional on being accepted as a reliable member by the 
international community: 
 
[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists 
in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-
interest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes 
that make up the substance of international life. 
 
Today, therefore, insisting on a traditional form of self-determination that 
emphasises the right and the ability to unilateral action (sovereignty and 
autonomy) leads not to more freedom, but runs into the paradox of self-
                                                 
27 Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 273-
299; Ch. Joerges‚ Transnationale “deliberative Demokratie” oder “deliberativer 
Suprantionalismus”? Anmerkungen zur Konzeptualisierung legitimen Regierens jenseits des 
Nationalstaats bei Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, (2000) 7 Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, pp. 
145-161. 
28 See R. Burger, “Nationale Ethik: Illusion und Realität”, (2007) 35 Leviathan, pp. 4-11, at 5-
6, own translation. 
29 See A. Chayes & A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); see, also, R. Dehousse, The 
European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 
p. 27. 
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chosen heteronomy. A modern concept of self-determination entails 
participation in the political discourses and justificatory practices of 
international organisations and of multilateral co-operation. 
 
3. Obstacles to transnational justice 
Despite the centrality of the concept of justice in political philosophy and in 
international relations, it is hardly ever used in the positive analysis of 
international relations. The first reason for the limited awareness that the 
concept had found in the past is probably to be found in the idea that 
international politics is, at the end of the day, about power and interest, and 
not about decent normative ideas. This sceptical reasoning follows a long 
scientific tradition. From Thukydides through Thomas Hobbes to Kenneth 
Waltz30 and John Mearsheimer,31 the mainstream analysis of international 
relations reflects a conviction which can be fittingly called the “two-worlds 
theory” of political science: all political structures are either domestic or 
international; they are characterised either by a state monopoly of legitimate 
coercion or by anarchy. Anarchy, however, has a structural effect on all actors 
since it causes insecurity and forces states to maximise relative rather than 
absolute gains.32 Normatively sound (just) behaviour is only rational if and 
when it is in accordance with national interests which are, again, pre-defined 
by the anarchic structure of the international system. Consequently, because 
of the structural impact of anarchy, justice does not have a viable chance of 
being a guiding principle of international relations. 
 
The prospects of the two-worlds theory for the possibility of a transnational 
justificatory discourse are anything but bright. Realists are quick to argue that 
the idea of a transnational justificatory discourse faces at least three major 
obstacles, i.e., the power asymmetries among states, the preponderance of the 
executive branch in international politics, and the non-coercive character of 
international law. Because of the inexistence of a global ordering power, 
these obstacles remain unchecked by normative principles and thus prevent 
the establishment of effective justificatory discourses. We will discuss these 
three obstacles briefly: 
 
                                                 
30 K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
31 J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York, Norton, 2001). 
32 R. Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory”, (1991) 85 
American Political Science Review, pp. 1303-1320; J.M. Grieco, Co-operation Among Nations: 
Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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1. The fact of asymmetrically distributed international power resources does 
indeed pose a major challenge to the idea of a transnational discourse on 
justification. In spite of the duty to comply with customary international law, 
and that UN law as well as multilateral treaties apply equally to all states, it 
can hardly be disputed that some states are more equal than others. The 
assumption of the equality of states has always been in conflict with the 
empirical reality of massive power differences. From world trade politics to 
environmental politics to international security politics, we can observe that 
the more powerful states dominate the policy-making process, while the 
smaller states have to subordinate themselves to the policies agreed upon. 
Due to the unequal ability of states to transform their interest into 
international norms which are binding for other states, many international 
regimes strongly reflect the particular interests of a limited number of 
powerful states. Many international regimes thus produce heteronomy for the 
weaker states, instead of international justice. Within the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), for instance, the big member states had, until recently, 
negotiated all the important agreements among themselves in a so-called 
“Green Room Procedure”, and announced their findings to the secretary 
general. He, then, presented the outcome as a “consensus” to the rest of the 
member states.33 Clearly, such a procedure leaves little scope for a justice-
oriented discourse of mutual justifications. 
 
2. Power asymmetries exist not only in the horizontal dimension of cross-
border politics, but also in its vertical dimension. In international politics, 
executives have far more leeway to use their discretionary powers than in the 
domestic realm.34 In democratic domestic politics, governments act as the 
legislature’s executive organ and are usually delegated the task of 
implementing its decisions. In contrast, in international politics, executives 
generally act as gatekeepers for political proposals, and decide which issues are 
discussed and which are dealt with at all. The legislative branch can only ask 
its government to put an issue on the international agenda, thereby 
promoting the involvement of other governments. But, unlike national 
politics, the legislative branch has no right to set the political agenda of an 
                                                 
33 A. Kwa, Power Politics in the WTO. Focus on the Global South, (Bangkok: Chulalogkorn 
University, 2003); R.H. Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO”, (2002) 56 International Organization, pp. 339-
374. For an analysis on power politics in the EU, see J. Tallberg, Leadership and Negotiation in 
the European Union, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
34 A. Moravcsik, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Co-operation”, Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series, 52, (Cambridge 
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international organisation or to call on a government, or, in this case, a group 
of governments, actually to implement a certain legal norm. Instead, 
governments are - by and large - free to set the international agenda as they 
wish, and to decide among themselves upon the regulations. It is true that 
international rules concluded among executives become domestic law only 
after a national legislative ratifies the legal act, thereby transforming it into its 
national legislation. Thus, the legislative branches - formally, at least - retain a 
veto. But, at the same time, a parliamentary veto against a legal act concluded 
among executives is, for good reasons, very rare. Vetoing a legal act by 
refusing to ratify it is a massive declaration of mistrust from the parliamentary 
majority towards the government. This is unlikely to happen in parliamentary 
systems in which the government can rely on a parliamentary majority.  
 
The problem of executive empowerment through international negotiations 
is aggravated by the fact that executives do typically possess better 
information about the positions and scopes of other executives and are, 
therefore, able to assess what is politically viable with greater accuracy. 
Through their membership in international organisations, such as the OECD, 
the World Bank or the IMF, they have access to a kind of specialised 
expertise that is not – or only with great effort – available to MPs. Thus, a 
parliament which argues against an internationally-negotiated regulation and 
which denies its ratification implicitly arrogates to itself a better knowledge of 
what is politically viable than the executive – even though it is less informed. 
A denied ratification is also improbable because it is the executives themselves 
who decide upon which information about the positions and scopes of other 
executives to pass on to the media and to the parliament. Thereby, the 
executives not only have the possibility of determining the international 
agenda, they are also in a strong position to influence the perception of the 
respective legislative assembly (and the national public) about what is 
politically viable at all. 
 
3. A third crucial obstacle relates to the non-coercive character of the 
international system. Justice-oriented discourses pre-suppose that successful 
justification is a necessary condition for implementing a certain policy, and 
that any failure to explain and justify incurs costs for a policy entrepreneur. 
Costs, however, will only incur to a policy entrepreneur if the group towards 
whom the justificatory effort is directed has some enforcement capacity 
which it can exert in the event of a failure, i.e., a non-convincing 
justification. However, because the international system is a self-help system, 
the power to impose costs on other states is structurally limited to the 
powerful states. It is for this reason that the limited capacity of the 
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international community to provide incentives to make powerful states 
comply with their legal commitment is often described as the Achilles’ heel of 
effective global governance.35 Some even dispute that legal rules whose 
content or application depends on the will of the legal subject for whom they 
are valid are not proper legal rules at all, but mere apologies for the legal 
subject’s political interests.36 And, indeed, in international relations, it is only 
too often the case that weaker states have a formal right to some justification, 
explanation or even compensation, but simply lack any means to enforce that 
right. Justice-oriented discourses thus pre-suppose that not only strong but 
also weak states have access to effective enforcement capacities in order to 
give a significant incentive to powerful actors to take justificatory discourses 
seriously. 
 
4. Supranationalism as a new context for justice 
The considerations above are hardly likely to create much optimism with 
regard to the probability of a justice-oriented transnational discourse. The 
transnational polity is a space in which horizontal and vertical power 
asymmetries, and the inexistence of a global coercive power, are important 
factors in policy outcomes. The realists’ scepticism about the relevance of 
justice seems, in fact, to be well-founded. International organisations are 
usually dressed in the clothes of inter-executive multilateralism, and can do 
little to give the concerns of justice a meaningful chance to withstand the 
power of self-interested actions. At the same time, however, the realists’ 
scepticism is not fully convincing, since it seems overambitious with regard to 
its scope. Realism is firmly grounded in the two-worlds theory in which any 
political order is either national or international, i.e., well-ordered or 
anarchical. Supranationalism, however, refers to a third type of political order 
which does not fit into the two-worlds theory. Supranational structures 
combine a vertical and hierarchical legal order with a horizontal and non-
hierarchical coercive order.37 Thus, it is different from a state because it is 
established not on a monopoly of power but on an oligopoly of power. All 
member states remain in full command of their legitimate monopoly of 
                                                 
35 See O.R. Young, Governance in World Affairs, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
Chapter 4. 
36 See H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
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coercion, and none of this power is transferred to the supranational level. If 
such a transference occurs, supranationalism transforms into statehood. 
 
Supranationalism is likewise different if compared with traditional 
international diplomacy. Vertical legal integration ties individuals, 
governments and supranational organisations together in a multi-level legal 
structure in which the legal requirement to justify and give reasons is codified 
and can be enforced by both supranational and domestic courts.38 Law in a 
supranational setting is, therefore, similar to national law in that it 
distinguishes between basic norms (primary or constitutional law) and 
secondary law (statutory law), the former being more difficult to change than 
the latter. Individuals are not only subjects and affected parties as they are 
under international law, but have domestically enforceable rights. 
 
4.1. Transforming bargaining into legal reasoning 
A supranational context has important implications for the probability of 
effective justificatory discourses. In order to understand the difference that 
supranationalism makes, it is important to recall that power in international 
relations is most often exerted in the mode of intergovernmental bargaining. 
The preferences of states are treated as intrinsically legitimate reflections of 
domestic political processes. International negotiations are not about justifying 
governmental preferences but about bargaining the differences.39 Under 
conditions of supranationalism, i.e., in a highly legalised setting, bargaining is 
- in general - an inappropriate mode of interaction. Highly legalised settings, 
such as those in the European Community (EC), prescribe both material and 
procedural norms against which the preferences of actors are to be weighted. 
Complying with theses norms necessitates justifying preferences by explaining 
how they relate to these norms. Legal integration, therefore, forces actors to 
abstain from simply issuing threats and promises, and requires them to 
reformulate their preferences in the language of law (by referring to material 
and procedural norms). In this way, legal integration aims to transform 
bargaining into legal reasoning.40 
                                                 
38 I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution-Making Revisited?’, (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review, pp. 703-750. 
39 According to Elster, bargaining refers to a mode of interaction in which an actor tries to 
change the behaviour of other actors by promising or threatening consequences for certain 
actions taken by these actors. See J. Elster, “Introduction”, pp. 1–18, in: J. Elster (ed) 
Deliberative Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
40 On the concept of legal reasoning, see F.V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions. On the 
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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It is true that legal reasoning is not immune to power asymmetries. Good 
arguments are often expensive arguments, because they require good lawyers 
and must often refer to technical expertise and even scientific evidence. It is 
also true, however, that reformulating preferences in the language of law acts 
as a filtering mechanism which limits the range of the preferences that can be 
put on the table exclusively to those which can be justified publicly. In his 
discussion of the analytical differences between arguing and bargaining, and 
their effects on political outcomes, Elster refers to this effect as the “civilising 
force of hypocrisy”.41 In order to argue, speakers must hide their base 
motives. Hiding base motives, however, requires proposals to be subjected to 
a number of constraints which may modify them quite substantially. The first 
constraint is the “imperfection constraint”, which implies that proposals must 
show less than a perfect coincidence between private interests and impartial 
arguments in order to be perceived as good arguments. Arguments must also 
be in accordance with positions that have been formulated at an earlier point 
in time and must be maintained even if they no longer serve the speaker’s 
interests (consistency constraint). Otherwise, a speaker will easily be viewed 
as acting opportunistically and thus lose his or her credibility. And, finally, 
arguments must abstain from making claims which can easily be shown to be 
incorrect (plausibility constraint). Together, all three constraints work as a 
filter against openly selfish claims and thus civilise interaction by forcing the 
disputants to engage in argumentative interaction. Legal reasoning is, 
therefore, a deliberative mode of interaction which forces actors to perform 
in accordance with shared legal norms even if they only have self-minded 
interests. 
 
By fostering argumentation in cross-border policy-making, supranationalism 
implies a de facto change in the mode of representation. In international 
relations, states are - in general - represented by governments. International 
negotiations are, in fact, intergovernmental negotiations in which the weight 
of an argument depends upon the power resources of the state that is 
represented by that government. The importance that is attached to good 
arguments in a supranational context significantly changes this. Under 
conditions of legal reasoning, it is no longer a state’s vulnerability to the 
failure of negotiations which decides who gets what, but the quality of the 
argument which the opposing sides can make. Supranationalism is, therefore, 
about the representation of arguments, and not about power and preferences. 
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Under conditions of anarchy, states bargain. In supranational structures, 
arguments are balanced. 
 
Although it is hardly possible to observe instances of purely legal reasoning in 
any real-world organisational context,42 it is also true that most political 
discussions in close-to-supranational entities such as the EC, or (with even 
less approximation) the WTO, show significant elements of such a 
justificatory balancing of arguments. Articles 28 and 30 of the European 
Community Treaty (ECT) describe the prohibition of discriminatory trade 
practices and list the reasons which can be brought forward in order to justify 
an exemption. The overwhelming majority of political disputes and decisions 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the EC fall under the rubric of 
these legal provisions. Even more importantly, most legal (and even most 
political science) scholars agree that the decisions of the ECJ are hardly ever 
motivated by the difference in size or wealth of the disputing parties.43 It is 
the arguments and the justification, not preferences and power, which carry 
the day. Likewise, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Appellate 
Body (AB) of the WTO often have to decide on disputes that take issue with 
equivalent principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity as well as a 
multitude of exemptions that define and restrict the normative framework 
described. As in the EC, most scholars here agree that the DSB/AB’s 
decisions follow the logic of legal reasoning and are - by and large - immune 
to the concerns of power.44 
 
It is important to reflect upon a final caveat: even if supranational organisations 
have the capacity to transform bargaining into legal reasoning, they are, 
nonetheless, founded on an original bargaining process, and often - to some 
degree - reflect the outcome of an asymmetrical distribution of power. The 
founding of WTO, for example, is described by some as reflecting a 
blackmailing process in which the Northern states threatened to conclude a 
                                                 
42 See N. Deitelhoff & H. Müller, “Theoretical Paradise - Empirically Lost? Arguing with 
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mini-WTO among themselves if the Southern world would not accept the 
inclusion of trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and a General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) into the legal framework of the 
new WTO.45 Thus, one is tempted to assume that even an ideal mode of 
transnational legal reasoning only applies the procedural and material norms 
which have been dictated by the powerful actors. If this were true, then legal 
reasoning would only perform as if it were a neutral and fair language, but 
would, in fact, express nothing but the hidden dominance of the powerful. It 
is also the case, however, that the law is a living thing which adopts its own 
dynamic once it has been established. The practices of the ECJ and the DSB 
give clear evidence that Courts are, only to a limited degree, under the 
control of the member states and have some leeway in interpreting the law in 
a way which is compatible with shared notions of fairness. Burley and Mattli 
have explained the incomplete political control of the Member States over 
“their” Court with reference to the argument that the law acts “as a mask and 
shield” against politics.46 It is also worth mentioning that intergovernmental 
bargaining hardly ever takes place in an environment which is normatively 
void. International customary law provides a distinct normative environment 
that encompasses compelling formal and informal norms such as the ideas of 
reciprocity, sovereignty, pacta sund servanda, and ius cogens. International law is 
thus not only the product of intergovernmental bargaining, but also the 
normative frame in which negotiations are conducted. 
 
4.2. Safeguarding executive responsiveness 
Legal integration in a supranational context is not limited to the horizontal 
level of intergovernmental relations, but also applies to its vertical dimension. 
In abstract terms, vertical legal integration can be understood as connecting 
supranational, national and individual actors by means of legal provisions so 
that justifications can and must be exchanged. Thus, legal integration is not 
limited to relations among supranational organisations but covers the whole 
range of relevant political actors in a multi-level structure. Supranational legal 
integration is highly relevant for establishing the pre-conditions of 
transnational justificatory discourses since it has the potential to safeguard the 
fact that governmental and supranational actors are compelled to comply with 
the requirement to justify their actions and that their policy discretion is not 
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expanded beyond a degree which can be justified towards their respective 
principles. 
 
At Member State level, legal integration can tie executive discretion to a 
mandate formulated by a parliamentary committee. The Danish Folketing, for 
example, exercises its control over the Danish government in European affairs 
by clearly outlining in advance which positions the governmental delegate 
may present and which are beyond his or her mandate.47 The responsible 
minister has to present his or her proposal in person to a specialised European 
Affairs Committee of the Folketing and a supportive majority must be 
obtained. The members of the committee not only vote on the proposal but 
also have the right to propose amendments. The minister has no right to 
enter into any negotiations in Brussels if he or she fails to convince the 
majority of the committee of his proposal. Likewise, if the negotiations in 
Brussels seem to make it necessary to change the Danish position, and if he or 
she wants to go beyond the authorisations given by the mandate, he or she 
must present new suggestions to the committee and wait for new 
instructions. The integration of the Folketing into the daily decision-making 
in Brussels is an important element which explains the high political 
awareness in Denmark toward European affairs. European politics is not 
limited to executive discretion but an essential part of domestic legislative 
politics. Although this awareness may, from time to time, lead to a critical 
stance of the public towards the EU, it is obviously highly attractive from the 
perspective of a justificatory discourse. 
 
The justificatory discipline of supranational legal integration also covers 
relations between the EC’s supranational institutions and its Member States. 
The delegation of competences to the Commission is - in nearly all cases - 
only conditional, and is also subject to control mechanisms. The provision of 
Article 202 ECT is a typical example. It stipulates in its first sentence that the 
Council delegates all competences to the Commission to implement its 
legislative acts. The second sentence, however, immediately adds that the 
Council may establish certain modalities for the execution of these 
competences. In practice, the second sentence has been a major reason for the 
huge growth of the European comitology system, which acts as a safeguard 
                                                 
47 See S.Z. von Dosenrode, “Danish EU-Policy Making”, pp. 281–402, in: H. Branner & M. 
Kelstrup (eds) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe After 1945: History, Theory and Options, (Odense: 
Odense University Press, 2000); N-J. Nehring, “The Illusory Quest for Legitimacy: Danish 
Procedures for Policy Making on the EU and the Impact of a Critical Public”, pp. 60–81, in: 
G. Sörensen & H-H. Holm (eds) And Now What? International Politics after the Cold War, 
(Aarhus: Politica, 1998). 
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against the Commission becoming a “run-away bureaucracy”.48 Even in an 
area such as external trade, where the Commission has had broad 
competences already codified in the Treaty of Rome, it must justify its 
international policies towards the Member States. According to Article 133 
ECT, the Commission can act only after it has presented recommendations to 
the Council of Ministers, and after these recommendations have been 
authorised. In addition, every international legally-binding agreement that has 
been concluded by the Commission on the part of the EC is subject to 
critical scrutiny in the Council. 
 
It is true that all of these mechanisms do not provide any guarantee for the 
complete lifting of vertical power asymmetries. Organisational procedures 
never determine action, they merely provide incentives to act according to 
prescribed rules. It is also true, however, that the list above is far from 
complete and only presents selected parts of a picture which - in reality - is 
much more complex and imposes a much more rigid discipline than the three 
mechanisms imply. In addition, the very existence of these procedures 
provides evidence that supranational legal integration is not only a means of 
expanding governmental discretion, but is also one that simultaneously 
imposes additional needs for justification. Supranationalism, therefore, does 
not just expand or limit governmental discretion, it also provides an 
argumentative discipline according to which it is to be exercised. 
 
4.3. Healing the achilles’ heel 
It is an often cited conclusion that “(a)lmost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and all of their obligations almost all of the 
time”.49 This observation has recently been re-discovered by scholars 
endeavouring to understand why and when international regulations are 
complied with.50 According to Chayes and Chayes, good legal management 
of rules is a most important factor for eliciting compliance51: 
 
                                                 
48 M.A. Pollack, “Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the European Community”, 
(1997) 51 International Organization, pp. 99-134. 
49 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 47. 
50 For an overview, see R.B. Mitchell, “Compliance Theory: An Overview”, pp. 3–28, in: J. 
Cameron, J. Werksman & P. Roderick (eds) Improving Compliance with International 
Environmental Law, (London: Earthscan, 1996). 
51 A. Chayes & A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 205. 
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Enforcement through these interacting measures of assistance and 
persuasion is less costly and intrusive and is certainly less dramatic than 
coercive sanctions, the easy and usual policy elixir for non-compliance. 
 
It is the power of the legitimacy of legal norms, the way legal norms work 
once they are established, and the intelligent management of cases of alleged 
non-compliance, which leads to compliance. 
 
The reasoning of Henkin and the Chayeses is based upon the insight that a 
rule which is part of a broader legal system usually has a far stronger 
compliance-pull than an individuated legal rule, because the former is part of 
a larger normative design and embodies basic principles which are generally 
perceived as being legitimate or just. Even in the light of explicitly opposing 
interests, specific international legal norms have a high probability of being 
observed because they are perceived by the members of the international 
community as being part of an encompassing normative superstructure. The 
blatant, unexcused transgression of rules that are founded on broader ethical 
principles is thus deemed to be synonymous with a general repudiation of the 
normative foundations of international co-operation. 
 
It is also important to underline that a well-functioning international legal 
system is in the interest of both weak and strong states.52 For weak states, an 
international legal order is an important pre-condition for them to have any 
chance of having their concerns heard and taken seriously. Only when weak 
states have enforceable rights will they have the possiblility of succeeding in 
international negotiations against more powerful states. Likewise, powerful 
states are normally those states which have a prime interest in the stability of 
the international order. Any such stability, however, depends on rules which 
are accepted by most, if not all, states. Acceptance for rules pre-supposes that 
they are not the product of purely arbitrary decisions, but that they are based 
upon commonly agreed ethical standards and form part of an overarching 
normative superstructure (see above). In short, stability requires law. In this 
sense, it is, indeed, appropriate to argue that legal rules possess a compliance-
pull of their own.53 
 
                                                 
52 A. Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes. A Reflective Approach”, pp. 
49–72, in: V. Rittberger (ed): Regime Theory and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993). 
53 See T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
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It follows that the more a rule is considered as being part of a legal system, or, 
to put it differently, the more an international organisation is legalised, the 
more likely compliance with the rule becomes. Empirical evidence is highly 
supportive of the legalisation hypotheses:54 The impressive compliance record 
of the EC is hard to explain without referring to its character as a legal 
community.55 The strongest single procedure with regard to compliance 
enforcement is the preliminary ruling procedure according to Article 234 
ECT. It directly connects governments to the control exerted by their 
citizens and instrumentalises national courts as agents of supranational law. 
Article 234 ECT provides that any national legal person may sue his or her 
government if that government has violated a legal provision of the EU and 
inflicted damage on that legal person. Governments are thus not only liable to 
each other by means of an international legal obligation, but have likewise 
adopted responsibilities towards their citizens.56 A supranational legal order is 
thus categorically different from a merely international legal order because 
individuals may use their Member State’s courts against political decisions 
taken by the government or parliament of that state. It is not surprising that 
the direct linkage between the EC’s supranational institutions and its citizens 
is often interpreted as a major constitutional step towards the establishment of 
a European political order sui generis.57 
 
5. Multi-level legitimacy: justice and democracy 
This article started with the diagnosis of a categorical mistake often made 
when reflecting upon the adequate normative foundations of international 
organisations. International organisations have neither the capacity for state-
like governance, nor will they acquire the political competences which cover 
more than narrowly defined policies in the foreseeable future. It is 
inadequate, therefore, to assess their legitimacy in categories taken from the 
analysis of democratic statehood and more appropriate to consider their 
contribution to transnational justice. Although this argument seems to put 
                                                 
54 See the contributions in the special issue on “Legalisation”, in: (2001) 55 International 
Organization, and M. Zürn & Ch. Joerges (eds) Governance and Law in Postnational Constellations. 
Compliance in Europe and Beyond, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
55 See M. Zürn & J. Neyer, “Conclusions. The Conditions of Compliance”, pp. 183–217, in: 
M. Zürn & Ch. Joerges (eds) Governance and Law in Postnational Constellations. Compliance in 
Europe and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
56 See Rs. 26/62, van Gend & Loos (N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming 
van Gend & Loos gegen Niederländische Finanzverwaltung) of 5 February 1963; Slg. 1963, 1, 
24. 
57 See R. Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 
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primary emphasis on justice and to downplay democracy, it is ultimately 
oriented at explaining the relationship between national democracy and 
transnational justice: if the normative promise of national democracy to foster 
self-governance is to survive globalisation, it must be supplemented by an 
organisational layer that fosters transnational justice. And, vice versa, if 
transnational justice is to have a realistic chance, it must be established on 
strengthened domestic procedures of strong democracy, which guarantee that 
the executives remain closely connected to their constituencies and national 
parliaments. Legitimacy in the new international system can only be 
adequately understood if it is explained as a normative multi-level structure in 
which the domestic and the international level are closely interwoven. 
 
Only if interdependent national democracies are supplemented by a 
transnational layer of justificatory discourses can we expect them 
systematically to respect the external effects of their decisions as a relevant 
factor for domestic decision-making. Democracy entails that those who rule 
and who take the decisions are identical with those who are addressed by 
those decisions. If this standard is to be respected in an increasingly 
debordered world, i.e., if we are not ready to accept the effects of other 
nation-states’ decisions without having had the chance to make our concerns 
heard in “their” decision-making processes, and if we are not willing to make 
other citizenries subject to our decisions, then, we have to work for a system 
of collective multi-level governance, in which national democracies open 
themselves to the concerns of foreigners. Otherwise, the external effects of 
the internal practices of our democracy will impose illegitimate costs on 
foreigners, or, if foreign democracies do so, on us. Under conditions of 
interdependence, therefore, it is clear that transnational justice and national 
democracy mutually support and necessitate each other. 
 
The article has shown that an understanding of justice as justification can well 
be used for analytical purposes. It pinpoints major obstacles for the legitimate 
conduct of transnational politics, and helps to explain the normative strengths 
of supranationalism. To be sure, none of the obstacles discussed in this article 
is foreign to the literature on the democratic deficit of international 
organisations. Most of the arguments used in this article are even taken from 
this literature. It is also true, however, that they fit much better into an 
analysis of the justice deficit of international organisations than to an 
assessment of their so-called democratic deficit. International organisations are 
not democratic and – virtually by definition - never will be. Democracy as a 
form of governance is intrinsically connected to a demos and to a monopoly of 
legitimate coercion. 
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The good news of this article is that supranationalism can deliver some of the 
functions that we traditionally attach to democratic procedures. It promotes 
the cause of justice by providing an effective remedy to horizontal and 
vertical power asymmetries, as well as to the problem of non-compliance. 
Legal integration transforms intergovernmental bargaining into transnational 
deliberations by providing incentives to governments to reformulate 
preferences in the language of legal reasoning. In doing so, legal integration 
transforms the mode of representation from preferences and power to 
arguments and reasons. In addition, legal integration has the capacity to 
provide mechanisms which safeguard against the impact of vertical power 
asymmetries on the justificatory discourse. Legal integration, finally, exerts a 
compliance-pull of its own by increasing the costs of non-compliance to both 
powerful and weak states. 
 
It is true that legal integration has no built-in causal connection to justice. At 
the end of the day, even the best procedures only provide incentives. In 
addition, it must be underlined that they will only be effective if the powerful 
actors realise that it is, indeed, in their best interest to accept the discipline 
that is imposed upon them by supranational legal norms. If powerful states 
prefer to go it alone, supranational organisations have nothing but economic 
and political incentives to change their course of action. Real-world 
supranational integration must be understood as a long-term learning process 
which may lead to a constitutionalisation of effective justificatory discourses. 
It is also true, however, that the two real-world close-to-supranational 
entities that we know, the EC and the WTO, are moving slowly but steadily 
toward that goal. Justice, therefore, can no longer be treated as a purely 
normative category in international relations. Both the EC and the WTO 
embody some significant elements of justificatory discourses and can well be 
understood as (imperfect) approximations of this ideal. They are both to be 
cherished for the degree to which they have walked down the road already, 
and to be criticised for the long way that still lies ahead of them. 
Chapter  9 
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When do the rules (and lack thereof) of the world trade order, and the 
consequences of this order for those affected by it, produce good, that is to 
say, reciprocally-generalisable grounds to accept the legal-political frame of 
world trade? What we are concerned with here is a normative question: How 
should the political-legal frames of world trade be fairly instituted? And we 
are not concerned with the normative legitimacy of a single institution (such 
as the World Trade Organisation “WTO”), but with the totality of both the 
institutions and the policies relevant to world trade, instead. The WTO, with 
its treaty and its dispute resolution mechanism, is of great significance, but it 
is not the whole story. The contract generating and modifying rounds of 
negotiations and their national authorisations and ratifications are also part of 
the picture, just like the specific fixed processes of routine politics and, not 
least, their connection to the complementary institutions of global politics. 
  
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Rory Stephen Brown, who translated the article, as well as to Josef Falke, 
Stefan Gosepath, Christian Joerges, Matthias Leonhard Maier, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and 
Jens Steffek for detailed comments on earlier versions, and to the participants in the WTO 
assistant conference and the RECON Workshop Re-framing Transnational Governance for 
their helpful comments. For support with the research and the drafting of this manuscript, we 
also thank Sonja Kaufmann, Annedore Leidl and Yuriy Zhur. 
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Two assumptions motivate this essay. First, there is a wide-ranging, but not 
terribly interactive, literature on the world trade order, which ranges from 
descriptive treatments in legal and political science, to diagnoses of 
contemporary politics, and to philosophical assessments. This, in principle, is 
a good thing, but what hardly exists, are efforts to combine these treatments 
and thus gain some additional or even competing insights. Normative 
theories, which complain about the “hunger in the world” or lament about a 
legitimacy deficit in the world trade order, but which ignore the actual 
functioning of the world trade order, and, on this basis, argue for “abstract” 
(because unencumbered by knowledge of the daily, practically difficult to 
change, functions of the various institutions) reforms, are, at best, little short 
of useless. Second, there is a growing feeling, when contemplating some 
empirical studies, that they would benefit from consideration of suitable 
standards of assessment, or, apropos normative problems, because researchers 
could build their enquiries around them. Here, we will try to weave together 
these perspectives in the titular normative perspective. 
 
In this normative context, the second preliminary assumption is created: in 
political debates, the question of whether the current world trade order is 
legitimate or not is hotly contested. And in the theories, widely-divergent 
thought constructions and normative stances jostle for position. If one simply 
ignores this normative pluralism, one should not expect to arrive at 
convincing normative conclusions. The plausible examination of the existing 
normative pluralism in the light of the various disciplines is the central task 
for the achievement of an acceptable conceptualisation of a legitimate world 
trade order. And it is to this end that this paper should make a contribution.2 
 
First, we shall make a brief, but apt delimitation of our normative enquiry. 
On the one hand, a suggestion will be made as to the (normative) purpose of 
a world trade order. To this will be added two structural (empirical) problems 
which should be heeded by normative conceptions (Section II). Then, the 
variety of normative conceptions will be explained, and, dismissing two 
influential positions, we will try to show why a third, which we call divided, 
procedural constitutionalism, is preferable (Section III). Finally, we will apply the 
                                                 
2 In other words, here, two central aspects of Rawls’ conception of justice are upheld: we are 
concerned with a normative conception of the second order, a political conception of justice, 
which does not exclude different normative conceptions or their conflicts, but tries to 
accommodate or reconcile them. And we are concerned with the approximation towards a 
reflective equilibrium, where the possibility of stable practical implementation (feasibility) is 
ranked as being lexically subsequent to normative principles, but which, nonetheless, forms a 
considerable part of, and affects the suasive power of, such a conception. 
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normative standards discussed to the routine politics of WTO law. In so 
doing, we are searching, above all, for “particles of reason” (Habermas), 
which already exist in WTO law. This paper does not systematically assess the 
extent to which the world trade order fulfils the conditions of normative 
legitimacy. However, the reflections of this conception of legitimacy in the 
existing WTO law nevertheless suggest that the world trade order not only 
has shortcomings of legitimacy but also strengths. Existing WTO law can be 
considered to be a deliberative extension of domestic democracy, which 
hinders populist and parochial protectionism. This concerns not only the 
sanctioning of quasi-constitutional acts, but also important areas of everyday 
political business, such as the setting of national protective measures and 
standards, which might become the subjects of WTO dispute resolutions. 
 
2. “Structural” problems of the world trade order 
The central methodological problem for any attempt to promote a normative 
conception against competitors, is to offer normative yardsticks which are not 
arbitrary, and do not unduly generalise the subjective normative positions of 
the authors. Our suggestion is to approach the problem by using a sort of 
pincer movement, from two flanks. Plausible normative conceptions must 
have more than just certain “internal” or conceptual qualities. To these 
conceptual qualities belong a list of requirements: first, they must have a 
justificatory strategy, which is aimed at convincing us. Strategies, which 
attempt to ground their legitimacy in self-interest, fulfil this criterion just as 
inadequately as those strategies grounded in unrealistic assumptions about our 
behaviour and motives. Furthermore, a convincing normative conception 
should provide plausible principles of application and the core of an 
institutional design, which re-inforces those principles. 
 
A suitable normative conception also has certain, more or less, enduring 
empirical, that is, quasi theoretical “external” framing conditions to consider. 
We are concentrating on two such conditions here: 1. The institutional 
design should be realistic, and so it should be achievable against the backdrop 
of the prevalent international relations, at least in principle. 2. 
Contemporaneously, it should be able to work with the structural problems 
of its subject (here, the world trade order). Structural problems are such 
persistent context-specific problems which influence international 
relationships. In such circumstances, the normative conception which offers 
convincing solutions and results for these problems is preferable. 
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In summary, normative pluralism and enduring empirical conditions must 
suitably be considered and the connected expectations must be brought into a 
“reflective equilibrium” (Rawls). The latter is achieved if the various 
normative and empirical considerations (only partly explicated here) 
reciprocally stabilise as a form of lexical priority of the normative dimension. 
The expression “lexical priority” says something about the standing of certain 
empirical considerations. They cannot positively promote the suasive capacity 
of normative aims, but can delimit it. Precisely which empirical 
considerations are affected by such a fettering is, itself, the subject of debate. 
 
Broadly speaking, three different restrictive usages of the feasibility-problem 
can be distinguished: The least number of feasibility problems is considered if 
the strict impossibility of empirical framing conditions is made a condition for 
their inclusion in a normative conception, so as to affect the normative goals. 
The greatest restrictions occur if normative goals pertain to concrete reforms 
in which all immutable empirical framing conditions and all agency deficits - 
Who actually promotes these desired changes? – lead to a change in the aim. 
Our feasibility expectations are positioned between these two extremes. The 
empirical framing conditions will be considered, which we, with good 
reason, assume will not change in the medium term. Consequently, we will 
regard the concrete institutional instances of the existing world trade order as 
largely flexible and malleable (for this reason, we do not discuss it in detail 
here) and consider ourselves restricted to the question of whether medium 
term, capable actors can promote a fairer world trade order. 
 
Since we cannot go into all the relevant questions thrown up by a 
comprehensive and convincingly just international trade order in the space 
available here, we focus only on the main features of a normative 
international trade order. First, we want to clarify the point of a world trade 
order. What expectations do the participants have of corresponding 
international agreements and institutions (1)? In the introduction, we found 
fault with the fact that most contributions to this debate about international 
justice do not systematically take into account the feasibility problems and 
therefore lack the power to convince. Two such feasibility problems will be 
taken into account here (2 & 3), although their importance must be inferior 
to that of the principles of application (discussed later in Section III) in the 
architecture of this conceptual model. 
  
Towards Normative Legitimacy of the World Trade Order 227
 
2.1. The point of a world trade order 
It is perhaps, one of the central purposes of a world trade order to facilitate 
international trade and thereby create benefits for all parties (states) without 
sacrificing too much of the room in which national political regimes 
manoeuvre.3 
 
Why do we need a political institution for global trade? One answer suggests 
itself if one models situations according to game theory (excluding certain 
important dimensions, like monetary politics). With regard to the distribution 
of the foreseeable economic benefits, the world trade order corresponds to 
the prisoners’ dilemma, in which all participants ideally profit if trade 
restrictions play no role. From the viewpoint of the participant, who is not 
coerced by institutions, it is “rational” to protect the goods of one’s own 
economy from those of another, in order either to maximise one’s own 
advantage (where there is otherwise unrestricted general trade) or, at the very 
least, to minimise the damage (where there is general protectionism). The 
sense of a world trade organisation lies in this economically limited view, 
according to which the exposure and “punishment” of misbehaviour 
incentivises actors to fulfil the common weal of shared trade. 
 
Correspondingly, one of the goals of the WTO Agreements is the hindrance 
of illegitimate protectionism, and thus WTO law controls the members, in 
order to prevent free riding. There is a quasi-natural interest of the state to 
profit from the fruits of international trade, whilst keeping costs down for its 
own economy. If everyone behaved in this manner, there would be no fruits 
of collective trade, because it would be replaced by general protectionism. 
This assumption about the starting point is shared by at least those actors who 
advocate such an international organisation. If a state (when consenting to an 
international trade order) did not at least expect beneficial effects, a rational 
explanation for the efforts to create international trade would be difficult to 
obtain. 
 
We called this view an economically limited one above. How can this be 
understood? Next to the reasonable goal of the promotion and guaranteeing 
of economic prosperity, societies and states have other political goals that are 
not in all cases compatible with the maximisation of economic benefits. Such 
goals include political and cultural self-determination, or various forms of 
individual and collective security. The main “guarantor” of these societal 
goals is the nation state (in the case of the EU, also a regional association). 
                                                 
3 Naturally, a normative conception must rank these various goals. 
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Clearly, they are not all guaranteed on the global plane. Correspondingly, 
from the point of view of all participants, there are good grounds for resisting 
the subordination of national political autonomy to economic prosperity. 
 
It is not just a good part of the coveted performance that is produced in the 
frame of domestic politics. In addition, more demanding conceptions of 
democracy are possible in the domestic context than in the WTO, so that it 
seems important not to restrict national legislatures unduly. The law cannot 
solve such a conflict of interests easily. A strongly-specified law would 
efficiently prevent protectionism. It would, conversely, be potentially 
unsuitable for use in a multitude of individual cases and would fetter national 
autonomy in an exaggerated manner. In contrast, an under-defined and 
procedural law would heighten the danger of protectionism and perpetuate 
the control problem for routine politics. 
 
2.2. Dealing with non-democratic members of a world trade 
order 
Many members of central global organisations have no democratic 
governance structure. According to Freedom House, of the 150 WTO states, 
about a sixth are “not free”.4 They respect neither political nor civil 
freedoms. In addition, a third of these countries rate as “partly free”.5 
Furthermore, there is a lack of an educated civil society in some developing 
countries and in the “not free” states. Normative conceptions, which make 
high demands on the internal democratic quality of states, have the problem 
that many of the WTO states do not come close to fulfilling these criteria. A 
convincing normative conception would either have to show that it remains 
acceptable for non-democratic WTO states, or it would have to draft a basic 
model of cosmopolitan democracy, which is achievable in the afore-
mentioned sense. In the case of a conception of democracy with a universal 
claim to validity, it must be shown (normatively) that, it comprises (a) clearly 
specifiable democratic values, which (b) are not globally imposed particular 
(“Western”) values, and (c) to which there is no acceptable alternative of 
political organisation. Moreover, it would have to be shown that these 
democratic values would be transposed either from within or from outside 
these states. In view of the normative aspect of this question, we are unsure. 
It does not seem to us impossible that there are “well-ordered societies” aside 
                                                 
4 For pragmatic reasons, we concentrate on the WTO, although we are not actually concerned 
with the concrete institutions, but with the relevant institution of a world trade order, and the 
specific, but lasting, empirical framing conditions. We use the WTO only as an example to 
explain certain structural problems. 
5 Freedom House Index 2006, www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=267&year=2006. 
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from the liberal democratic basic structures (see, for example, Rawls 1999). 
But we do exclude the possibility of such a widespread democratisation in the 
next decades. 
 
If one follows this line, two possibilities remain: non-democracies could 
generally be excluded from international trade (in so far as democratic states 
are participants). This would be very difficult to justify. Finally, a considerable 
element of such a cosmopolitan utopia is the demand for equal individual 
rights for world citizens. And one would not want to add to the burdens of 
those citizens who do not enjoy democratic rights, the exclusion from the 
benefits of an independent economy.6 Consequently, one would want to 
exclude only those regimes in which the fruits of international co-operative 
commerce certainly will not benefit the population at large. As a 
consequence, non-democratic states would also be part of the central 
organisation of a world trade order. Finally, different political structures can 
be envisaged which aim to preserve domestic opinion and will-building 
processes, without replicating their typologies at international level. This type 
is called “segmented” political order. 
 
In principle, there are two (not fully developed) types of global order here; 
one world trade order structured through democratic institutions, and a 
strongly segmented, differentiated political order. Is it not purely a normative 
question, which type of order is preferable on the global plane? As noted 
above, we do not share this position. Why not? 
 
Let us consider the model of a replication of democratic structures at global 
level and its use on a plurality of internal democratic and non-democratic 
states. We should expect from such a replication that it prefers precisely those 
societies which also have corresponding structures in their internal affairs. So 
countries with a higher associative activity also have a higher visibility in 
international processes with their goals than those without such a foundation, 
and probably have a higher chance of achieving their demands.7 A simple 
replication of national democratic structures could produce unfair and 
                                                 
6 That such an expulsion puts pressure on these states to create internal democracy is not 
evidenced. The benefit also seems too uncertain and there are also costs to be taken into 
account. 
7 See, for example, the case of the observing organisations of civil society in relation to the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, T. Hüller & M.L. Maier, “Fixing the Codex? Global Food-
Safety Governance Under Review”, in: Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), 
Constitutionalism: Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007), at 267.  
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undesirable effects, not in the ivory tower of their theoretical inception, but 
in their application in the real “non-ideal” world. And, in the case of a world 
trade order, internal democracy portrays such an ideal condition, whose 
inexistence should be reflected upon in normative conceptions.8 
 
2.3. The North-South Divide 
Further problems arise out of the great differences in resources and 
development among the WTO members, which must be dealt with by any 
normative conception. It cannot realistically be assumed that all WTO 
members have the same negotiating or veto power. Whilst the consequences 
of a failure to agree might be tolerable for industrialised states, the same is not 
true for developing countries. They also do not share the same ability to 
influence negotiations or to veto outcomes. It is not only the “Green Room” 
negotiations, but also the great differences in staffing and in the material 
endowment of the national delegations in the WTO that mean that poorer 
countries have a peripheral status in the organisation.9 Let us take, for 
example, the case of an open, equal access to political process and enquire 
how great variations in the resources of national administrations would affect 
fair access. The assumption is the following: the more results of such 
negotiations favour “complex argumentation”, the more strongly differences 
in resources will affect the ability to shape the negotiation according to 
domestic preferences. 
 
In addition, structural differences in interests result from the differences in 
resources and development. Scharpf has already made this claim in relation to 
EU states, with an eye to their relative prosperity. Environment, health and 
work protection standards have spread over the globe, not only subjectively, 
but also objectively, in highly variable extents.10 
 
A normative conception should be able to bridge these differences in 
interests. The further a compromise is from the vital interests of an individual 
state, the harder it will be to describe it as substantially just and suitable. 
  
                                                 
8 And this is clearly a very considerable difference to the EU, in which all the Member States 
are internally democratic. 
9 See M. Krajewski Verfassungsperspektiven und Legitimation des Rechts der Welthandelsordnung, 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001). 
10 See F.W. Scharpf, Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch?, (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 
1999). 
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3. Comparisons of normative conceptions for a just 
international order 
In the literature of both legal and political science, a multiplicity of 
conceptions regarding the normative legitimacy of the world trade order are 
discussed. The legal literature frequently uses the term “constitutionalisation” 
to denote the normative legitimacy of the world trade order and does so, 
both as an empirical description and as a synonym for normative legitimacy.11 
 
In political thought, conversely, normative legitimacy is frequently referred to 
with the word “justice”.12 Various conceptions will be illuminated in the next 
section, and two of these will be discussed in detail. In order to understand 
the various conceptions of justice, it is worth distinguishing them on the basis 
of two central distinctions. First, the conceptions can be distinguished upon 
the basis of which principles of application are taken into account. Second, they 
can be distinguished upon the basis of the level of governance to which they 
attribute supremacy. Through combinations of the various forms, a roster of 
normative conceptions for the international order can be constructed, and the 
different existing concepts can be inserted according to their characteristics. 
(Section III.1). Finally, we will try, by deconstructing the two most 
prominent alternative conceptions, to show why a third, divided, procedural 
constitutionalism is preferable (Section III.2). 
 
3.1. A taxonomy of normative conceptions of international 
order  
There is an absence of clearly worked out, comprehensive normative 
conceptions of the international order.13 Frequently, they are limited in their 
                                                 
11 See D. Cass, “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade”, (2001) 12 
European Journal of International Law p. 39; D. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization – Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational 
Governance and Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Ch. Joerges & E.-U. 
Petersmann, (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006); E.-U. Petersmann „Multilevel Governance Requires 
Multilevel Constitutionalism“, in: Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann, (eds), op. cit. n. 7 supra.  
12 J. Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975); J. Rawls, 
Gerechtigkeit als Fairneß: Ein Neuentwurf, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2003). 
13 There are many approaches. They are mainly restricted to parts of a just international order. 
See C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979/1990); A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations for 
International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); O. Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter 
der Globalisierung. (Munich: Beck, 1999); T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: 
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thematics to single themes. And, often, there is a lack of systematic ordering 
of the normative principles along political planes. In this section, we will 
attempt to put existing approaches into a roster, with the aid of two central 
indices, which every conception of international order must include. In so 
doing, we aim to uncover the normative centres of very different theories. 
All approaches must have principles of application and must determine the 
respective priority of levels of governance. 
 
By the term “principles of application”, we understand the criteria which are 
considered crucial in the respective theories for the normative legitimacy of 
the world trade order.14 These principles of application or criteria can be 
procedural and/or substantive.15 A conception which emphasises procedural 
principles of application would base the normative legitimacy of a world trade 
order upon the rationality or fairness of decision-making procedures. 
Substantial conceptions of justice, on the other hand, see the quality of law as 
being decisive for the normative legitimacy of the world trade order. 
 
A normative conception for an international order throws up the question of 
whether, and, if so, which, governance levels should be included in a ranking 
of normative supremacy. Under some conceptions, cosmopolitan demands for 
justice are realised and also enforced against the nation states. In such a 
conception, the global level would enjoy primacy. Other conceptions 
attribute supremacy to the nation states in the context of the world trade 
                                                                                                                   
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, (London: Polity Press, 2002); J. Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples, (Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1999). Further approaches, which 
are critical of the notion of international justice or democracy, are discussed in Sections III.1 
and III.2. In the following, we will discuss the more partial approaches to international justice, 
as if they were comprehensive. This is justified to a certain extent, because normative 
principles are always in a relationship of tension to other normative precepts, and the 
statements that certain precepts of justice are valid, implies, at the very least, that other 
principles offer no competition. There are two variations: either there are no relations of 
tension, but this seems, in view of the normative principles discussed below, implausible, or 
there is a clear relationship of hierarchy, in which the actually stated conclusions about justice 
enjoy a normative superiority and the inclusion of other principles does not change that 
normative conclusion – and then a full conception of justice is implied. 
14 Justificatory principles have an important function when it comes to the convincing 
derivation from general principles of justice. They are largely excluded here. In contrast, 
principles of application should help clear up which normative rules (in which order) are to be 
used in any given practical context. Only such principles are mentioned in the following 
discussion. 
15 In philosophy, the terminological pair of intrinsic and instrumental values is frequently used; 
in political science, reference is usually made (in relation to Scharpf) to the differentiation 
between input- and output-legitimacy. 
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order. According to this version, the law of the world trade order must be 
measured against the extent to which it achieves notions of justice set by the 
nation state. Four solutions to the problem of levels are pursued: the 
“communitarian” solution advocates the normative supremacy of the national 
organs,16 the “cosmopolitan” claims supremacy for the supranational order.17 
In between, we find two sorts of divided primacy. In terms of its content, the 
realisation of particular principles can be split up, for example, the most 
fundamental human rights could be represented at world level, in questions of 
distributive justice, the domestic plane might enjoy priority.18 Such a shared 
supremacy can also exist without specifying the proportionate mixture at the 
outset (subsidiarity).19 
 
If one combines both of these distinctions between principles of application 
and levels of supremacy, one sees nine (or 12) possible basic positions of 
normative international order. In this roster, the conceptions of various orders 
from different disciplines can be ranked. 
 
Table 1: Normative Supremacy - Conceptions of normative legitimacy ordered 
along the dimensions of democratic participation, substantive justice and normative 
supremacy – an overview 




























The commentators from the legal and political science debates can be placed 
in the above table.20 Amongst the proceduralists, we can find representatives of 
                                                 
16 D. Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
17 B. Barry, Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2001); T. Pogge, “Internationale Gerechtigkeit: Ein universalistischer Ansatz”, in: K.G. 
Ballestrem, (ed), Internationale Gerechtigkeit, (Leverkusen: Leske + Budrich, 2001). 
18 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, n.13 supra. 
19 S. Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus, (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 2004); O. Höffe, Ethik und Politik, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979). 
20 An exception is D. Cass op. cit. n. 11 supra. Cass’ suggestions for the establishment of a 
“Trading Democracy” embrace procedural, deliberative (although vague) but predominantly 
substantial elements (strengthening of the position of developing countries and greater 
recognition of their concerns). She deals with neither the question of primacy nor does she try 
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all three variations of normative supremacy. Authors like Bacchus and Hudec 
represent a nation state proceduralism.21 The legitimacy of the WTO, so they 
argue, derives predominantly from the free national vote on the agreements.22 
Nanz and Held represent variations of cosmopolitan proceduralism. Nanz argues 
that the WTO could enjoy just decision-making procedures in that it 
involves NGOs.23 Shell’s and Charnovitz’ suggestions go in a similar 
direction.24 Held’s model of a cosmopolitan democracy embraces suggestions 
for referenda and a parliamentarisation of international organisations.25 
Joerges’ model of deliberative supranationalism proceeds from a divided 
proceduralism in order to manage the problem of extra-territorial effects of 
national law.26 Where minimum harmonisation in deliberative international 
standardising organisations is not available, WTO law should oversee the 
observance of reasonable national decision-making processes, with the help of 
procedural rules. Von Bogdandy, too, wishes to strengthen the legislative 
abilities of the WTO and argues for a procedural law, which forces the 
members to consider foreign interests in national decision-making.27  
 
                                                                                                                   
to resolve the potential conflict between procedural and substantial elements. 
21 J. Bacchus, “A Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy and the WTO”, in: E.-U. 
Petersmann, (ed), Preparing the Doha Development Round, (Florence: European University 
Institute, 2004), p. 112; R.E. Hudec, “Comment”, in: R.B. Porter, P. Sauvé, A. Subramanian 
& A.B. Zampetti, (eds), Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 295. 
22 Ibid. 
23 P. Nanz, “Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from 
Political Theory”, in: Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann, (eds), op. cit. n. 11 supra, p. 59. 
24 R. Shell, “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory – An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization”, (1995) 44 Duke Law Journal, p. 829, at 915; R. Shell, “The Trade 
Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization”, 
(1996) 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, p. 359; S. Charnovitz, 
“Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization”, (1996) 
17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, p. 331; S. Charnovitz, “WTO 
Cosmopolitics”, (2002) 34 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 299, at 
329-344. 
25 D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 
40 et seq., 219 et seq., & 272 et seq. 
26 Ch. Joerges, “Free Trade with Hazardous Products? The Emergence of Transnational 
Governance with Eroding State Government”, n.50 
27 A. von Bogdandy, “Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient 
Relationship”, in: J. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law, (The Hague, London & New York: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 609, at 632, 
658 & 666; “Legitimacy of International Economic Governance: Interpretative Approaches to 
WTO law and the Prospects of its Proceduralization”, in: S. Griller, (ed), International Economic 
Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the International Legal Order, (Vienna 
& New York: Springer, 2003), p. 103, at 126 et seq. 
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In Krajewski’s discourse theoretical model, the established legitimacy deficit 
of the WTO should be remedied with a stronger inclusion of national 
parliaments, a strengthening of deliberative decision-making between the 
national representatives, the inclusion of NGOs, and an increased 
transparency in the functioning of the WTO.28 Atik advocates a simultaneous 
democratisation and parliamentarisation of the WTO and its members.29 
 
Amongst the substantialists, we find, first and foremost, representatives who 
take the position of cosmopolitan substantialism. Of the WTO commentators, 
Petersmann is often interpreted in this way.30 However, as will be shown 
later, Petersmann’s later writings cannot be interpreted in this manner. His 
earlier work cannot clearly be categorised according to the two elements of 
the principles of application and normative supremacy. Petersmann argues 
that WTO law possesses constitutional functions because it augments national 
constitutional principles of negative freedom and democracy.31 This argument 
can be interpreted as an analysis of the existing state of the law. However, 
various commentators have highlighted that the constitutions examined by 
Petersmann contain no right to foreign trade or parliamentary representation 
in foreign policy, and that WTO rules cannot be understood as basic or 
individual freedoms.32 Petersmann thus raises legal-political demands which 
go beyond vouchsafed national constitutional precepts and rights, although it 
remains unclear upon what basis of normative supremacy these rest. In 
contrast, Thomas Pogge can be classified much more easily as a cosmopolitan 
substantialist.33 
 
We can characterise positions which attempt to reconcile procedural and 
substantive principles of application as procedural constitutionalism. In his 
more recent writings, Petersmann argues that the WTO should protect 
                                                 
28 M. Krajewski, n. 9 supra, p. 261 et seq., & p. 272 et seq. 
29 J. Attik, “Democratizing the WTO”, (2001) 33 George Washington International Law Review, 
p. 451. 
30 With regard to the substantial principles of application in Petersmann’s theory, see, for 
example, R. Howse & K. Nicolaïdis, “Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or 
Global Subsidiarity? “, (2003) 16 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and 
Institutions, p. 73, at 81 et seq.; M. Krajewksi, n. 9, supra, p. 204. With regard to the 
cosmopolitan elements in Petersmann’s theory, see Cass, n. 20 supra, p. 153 & 164. 
31 E.-U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic 
Law, (Fribourg: University Press, 1991); “National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law”, in: M. Hilf & E.-U. Petersmann, (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law, (Boston & Dordrecht: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1993), p. 3. 
32 M. Krajewski, n. 9 supra, pp. 166-185 ; von Bogandy, n. 27 supra, p. 429. 
33 T. Pogge, n. 13 and n. 17 supra. 
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human rights.34 These include, so argues Petersmann, civil liberties, social 
rights but also the right to democracy. He makes corresponding suggestions 
for the democratisation of the WTO. He is not, however, unequivocally 
classifiable. On the one hand, his arguments can be interpreted as statements 
about the existing law, on the other, they go beyond existing law and are 
thus of a legal-political nature. 
 
Where Petersmann directly addresses the legitimacy of the world trade order, 
he refers not only to national supremacy and mixed principles of application,35 
but also to cosmopolitan supremacy and substantial principles.36 Similarly to 
Petersmann, Cottier suggests procedural and substantial human rights as 
                                                 
34 E.-U. Petersmann, “Multilevel Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism”, n. 11 
supra; idem., “Constitutional Primacy and ‘Indivisibility’ of Human Rights in International 
Law? The Unfinished Human Rights Revolution and the Emerging Global Integration Law”, 
in: S. Griller (ed), International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges 
for the International Legal Order, (Vienna, New York: Springer, 2003), p. 212. 
35 E.-U. Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and International Organizations”, (1996/1997) 17 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, p. 398, at 439. [“From the perspective of 
constitutional democracies and their citizens, international organizations […] derive their 
legitimacy from promoting the equal liberties and ‘public interest’ of domestic citizens. It is 
therefore important to ensure that international agreements do not undermine the basic 
constitutional principles of democracies. For instance, the domestic constitutional principles of 
parliamentary and direct democracy […] may require that the rules negotiated among 
governments in the framework of international organizations […] be ratified by national 
parliaments and subjected to popular referenda by domestic citizens.”]; E.-U. Petersmann, 
“Darf die EG das Völkerrecht ignorieren?”, (1997) 11 EuZW , p. 325, at 330. It is, 
nevertheless, not abundantly clear from this citation whether he is referring to a normative or a 
legal dogmatic position. 
36 E.-U. Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and WTO law: From a State-Centered Approach 
Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law” in: D.L.M. Kennedy, & 
J.D. Southwick, (eds), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essqys in Honor of Robert 
E. Hudec, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 32, at 38 
[“Human rights are not only universal moral entitlements deriving from respect of the moral 
autonomy, rationality, and ‘dignity’ of human beings.”]; E.-U. Petersmann, “European and 
International Constitutional law: Time for Promoting ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’ in the 
WTO”, in: G. de Búrca & J. Scott, (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 81, at 81 et seq.: [“Kantian legal theory proceeds from the 
premise that the rational and moral autonomy and dignity of human beings require them to act 
in conformity with self-imposed moral and legal rules that respect and protect maximum equal 
liberty for the personal development of every individual. According to Kant, the legitimacy 
and ‘justice’ of national international constitutional law depend on a ‘constitution’ allowing 
the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of 
each can coexist with the freedom of all others. By protecting human rights, non-
discrimination and free movement…as fundamental individual liberties inside the EC and the 
European Economic Area, EC law offers principles for a just constitutional order to which 
rational citizens can voluntarily agree because the liberties protect their individual freedom, 
legal equality, personal development and economic welfare across frontiers.”]. 
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principles of application, but he also advocates a segmented political order in 
which the principles are realised at different levels of governance.37 To him, 
the appropriate level of governance should be decided upon through a 
subsidiarity principle, defined by criteria of efficiency and participation. We 
will call this position divided, procedural constitutionalism. 
 
3.2. For divided, procedural constitutionalism 
The taxonomy of the various positions makes the plurality of conceptions of 
legitimacy clear. In this section, we are concerned with the question of which 
of these conceptions (or which type of conception) is preferable. In what 
follows, three of these normative types will be analysed for their capacity to 
solve problems in the light of the structural problems set out above (See 
Section II). Unfortunately, the really necessary normative discussion of all the 
positions cannot be carried out in this short contribution.38 We concentrate 
here on two prominent extremes, the nation state proceduralism and cosmopolitan 
substantialism. On the basis of this analysis, we argue for the comparative 
advantages of a divided, procedural constitutionalism. 
 
a. Nation state proceduralism 
For representatives of nation state proceduralism, the legitimacy of 
international organisations springs from the free, authorising vote for their 
founding treaty on the part of the nation states.39 Correspondingly, with 
institutions such as the WTO, they speak not of self-standing supranational 
form, but of “member driven organisations”. Bacchus argues in this way: 
 
The source of ‘legitimacy’ of the WTO is the Members of the WTO. 
The ‘legitimacy’ of the WTO is a ‘legitimacy’ that derives from, and is 
inseparable from, the individual legitimacy of each of the individual 
‘nation-states’ that, together, comprise ‘the WTO’. Far from being an 
effort to subvert the sovereignty of individual states, the WTO is, 
rather, a mutual effort by individual states to assert and to sustain their 
                                                 
37 T. Cottier & M. Hertig, “The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism”, (2003) 7 Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, p. 261. 
38 Finally, we accept that the position of procedural constitutionalism can be demonstrated to 
be normatively superior (see, for a corresponding general position, Rawls 2001, 
Gutmann/Thompson 1996). Here, we concentrate on the anticipated effects pursuant to the 
afore-mentioned enduring conditions of a global economic order, because we see in these 
conditions grounds, which, over and above the principal normative expectations, strengthen 
the position of a divided, procedural constitutionalism. 
39 Bacchus, n. 21 supra; Hudec, n. 21 supra. 
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sovereignty in an effective way in confronting the many challenges that 
face individual states in an increasingly ‘globalised’ economy.40 
 
This can undoubtedly result in legitimacy deficits. But, according to Bacchus, 
these concern not the WTO as an institution, but pertain to the sub-standard 
quality of the national democratic process.41 
 
Such a view of higher law-making can be connected to conceptions of every-
day supranational politics,42 which, for the most part, work through 
depoliticised, deliberative agencies.43 On the whole, such (transparent) day-
to-day politics, such as the setting of individual standards or the settlement of 
disputes, is subordinate to a double (domestic) reservation, namely, the 
prospective domestic authorisation and retrospective accountability. 
 
Unlike cosmopolitan proceduralism, national proceduralism does not even 
have to develop normative principles which are identical across nation states. 
It is suggested that developing universal principles would be difficult as there 
are several plausible candidates, among which we can hardly decide 
unambiguously. Thus, it is also difficult to discuss the related principles 
directly. Nevertheless, the indirect discussion points to sufficient deficiencies 
of such a position. 
 
Fundamentally, one can make the objection that nation state proceduralism is 
ill-suited to deal with problems of international justice. Thomas Pogge puts it 
strongly when he states that the historical and present effects of the global 
economic institutions create obligations of justice towards the world’s poor, 
because they are jointly responsible for their position.44 Other authors 
                                                 
40 Bacchus,n.21. 
41 The argument about the deficiency of nation state vetting of quasi-constitutional 
international acts (Uruguay Round) is almost irrefutable in the case of Germany’s role: see M. 
Hilf, “Negotiating and Implementing the Uruguay Round: The Role of EC Member States - 
the case of Germany”, in: J.H. Jackson & A.O. Sykes, (eds) Implementing the Uruguay Round, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 121; idem “WTO: Organisationsstruktur und Verfahren”, in: 
M. Hilf & S. Oeter (eds), WTO Recht: Rechtsordnung des Welthandels, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2005). 
42 The difference between “higher lawmaking” and “normal politics” was developed by Bruce 
Ackerman with help of the history of the amendments to the American constitution. B. 
Ackerman, We the People. 1. Foundations, (Cambridge MA: Belknap, 1991). For us, two points 
combine with this distinction: When evaluating the world trade order, the processes of normal 
politics and of treaty-making and treaty-alteration must be taken into an integrated account. 
Prescriptively, there might be different normative criteria for both types of process. 
43 Hudec,n. 21 supra. 
44 T. Pogge, n. 17. 
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propound a weaker (natural) duty of international emergency aid.45 As soon as 
one takes one of these two positions, a pure nation state proceduralism 
emerges as insufficient to achieve normative legitimacy. 
 
When attention is paid to the structural problems of the world trade order, 
further points of criticism of nation state proceduralism arise. One objection 
relates to the missing pre-conditions for fair proceduralism, which includes 
problems of the North-South divide (see above, Section II.3). On the 
grounds of unequal economic capacity, there is unequal power in the 
negotiations about international treaties. For instance, the refusal of a WTO-
package is not a realistic option for poor, small states.46 By way of the “Green 
–Room” negotiation tactic, these states are shut out of decisive negotiations 
and have less financial and personnel resources to deploy.47 Similar negotiating 
power would be a pre-condition for agreement on an international treaty to 
count towards normative legitimacy.48 In short: the problems exemplified 
here and the inequalities that are structurally incorporated in the institutions 
of global order inhibit the fairness of procedures. It is neither prudent nor 
possible to hang the legitimacy only on the peg of fairness of procedures, 
when we know of a persistent lack of fairness of all realizable procedures. 
 
A further problem for the position of nation state proceduralism is the lack of 
binding force with regard to subsequent demoi.49 This problem stems from the 
principle of general accord to international treaties, which is fundamental to 
nation state proceduralism. It implies that treaties which create changes must 
be acceded to by all other states. International accords are, therefore, - and 
this is uncontentious - difficult to change. It is a central point of democratic 
proceduralism that the “constitutional” status quo is only temporarily valid – it 
is almost “on call”. The more difficult it is to change such treaties, the less 
one can consider them as being democratically determined, for the reason 
that the elected representatives and citizens have not actually voted for them, 
or that the accords have unforeseen consequences. The fact that the existing 
international structure, such as the WTO Agreements and its dispute 
settlement reports, are difficult to change is cause for complaint by several 
                                                 
45 J. Rawls, n.13. 
46 A similar argument is made by M. Krajewski n. 9, pp. 244-246 & p. 272. 
47 Ibid. 
48 It is not only in an everyday context that threats, coercion and extortion can undermine the 
fairness of contracts of exchange (“your money or your life”). Bruce Ackerman, looking 
precisely at the different symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships, has revealed various 
normative procedural standards. If this is plausible, nation state procedures use insufficient or 
inadequate normative principles. 
49 Similarly, see M. Krajewski, n. 9, p. 272. 
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commentators, and is not, empirically, contentious. Even if there was free 
and equal voting amongst the participants, there would still be the normative 
problem that the Agreements also affect successive generations, without their 
vote. If it turns out that the WTO accords have unintended repercussions, 
the problem remains that it is hard to alter them. 
 
One way out of this problem would be the creation of a materially under-
defined, procedural law which would allow for national exceptions under 
conditions of reasonable behaviour.50 However, such a procedural law would 
shift much of the normative burden onto every-day politics. For many areas 
of routine politics, no international organisation which can deal with these 
tasks is available. Thus, a large part of routine politics would have to take 
place at national level. In such circumstances, the problem would be one of 
being able to distinguish reliably between legitimate measures and illegitimate 
protectionism, and the ability to stop unacceptable distributive effects. 
 
Our central point here is: simply because the already existing structures are 
much harder to change at international level than at nation state level, and 
because we must always foresee changing preferences and positions, there 
must be a practical mechanism for altering these accords. However, such 
normative basic positions as nation state proceduralism do not admit such a 
mechanism, and this will – incrementally – lead to a loss of democracy. 
 
The necessarily central role of the national veto in nation state proceduralism is 
also problematical. Representatives of nation state proceduralism must show 
that even the failure to solve a problem because of a single national veto is an 
acceptable solution. For “either-or- problems”, for example, the question of 
whether to trade with a state which persistently violates human rights, this is 
hardly acceptable. In the light of how the WTO system functions, the veto 
option can lead to non-decision. This is highlighted in the ministerial rounds 
since Seattle, which have failed to achieve consensus on new WTO-
                                                 
50 Ch. Joerges, “Free Trade with Hazardous Products? The Emergence of Transnational 
Governance with Eroding State Government”, (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review, p. 
553; idem. “Constitutionalism in Postnational Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in 
the EU and in the WTO”, in: Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann, (eds), Constitutionalism, 
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); Ch. Joerges, 
“Freier Handel mit riskanten Produkten? Die Erosion nationalstaatlichen und die Emergenz 
transnationalen Regierens“, in: M. Zürn & S. Leibfried, (eds), Transformationen des Staates, 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2006); Ch. Joerges & C. Godt, “Free Trade: The Erosion of 
National and Birth of Transnational Governance”, in: M. Zürn & S. Leibfried, (eds), 
Transformation of the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 93. 
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Agreements. Since WTO members tend to put the brakes on reforms and 
new rules, it is mistaken to speak of the WTO as a member-driven 
organisation.51 The national veto prefers systematic positions which seek to 
prevent rules and impedes those which wish to create new rules. 
 
With a view to certain legitimate nation state politics, the WTO Agreements 
are structurally under-determined, and might well remain that way in the 
light of the central role of the national veto. Nothing is said about some of 
these “non-trade” themes and their handling. We have already mentioned 
that, where there is an under-defined accord, routine politics carries the 
heavy burden of fulfilling the contents of the treaty. The handing over of 
such questions to national autonomy would undermine the central purpose of 
the agreements (liberalisation of trade) and, thus, is simply not an option. 
 
Strong judicial oversight through the dispute resolution organs could 
crystallise the abstract norms in concrete cases, but here, there is the 
possibility that the members of the system do not agree with judicial norm-
adaptation.. The problem of the binding power of the agreements would thus 
be perpetuated in every-day routine politics. 
 
The handing over to an independent supranational agency as a third 
possibility for handling routine politics runs aground on other difficulties. 
Whatever one feels about the normative pull of independent agencies, in 
view of the problems of WTO politics, there is a hurdle which is hard to 
vault. The legitimacy of the delegation of political competencies to 
independent agencies also necessitates that the extent of the delegation is 
clearly delimited. In view of the shared international goal (the liberalisation of 
trade), this is also the case. In the light of the possibility of the nation states 
pursuing different cultural or ethical policies, it is, however, completely 
unclear what role independent agencies can play or how they can be in the 
position to accommodate both sets of aims concurrently. 
 
These criticisms of a pure form of proceduralism, and its nation state type in 
particular, lead us to a discussion of the substantive alternatives. 
                                                 
51 C.-D. Ehlermann, “WTO Decision-Making Procedures, “Member-Driven” Rule-Making 
and WTO Consensus-Practices: are they adequate for making, revising and implementing 
worldwide and “plurilateral” rules?, 
http://www.haledorr.com/de/veroeffentlichungen/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=83, 2005. 
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b. Cosmopolitan substantialism 
Thomas Pogge most clearly fits into the category of cosmopolitan 
substantialism.52 Of the WTO commentators, Petersmann is interpreted in 
this way, too.53 In his earlier writings, he argued that the GATT fulfilled 
constitutional functions, because it protected individual economic freedoms 
from disrespectful state encroachments. For the representatives of a libertarian 
variant of cosmopolitan substantialism, the main problem is the lack of 
parliamentary and judicial control of nation state foreign trade policy.54 Home 
industry is able to burden native consumers and importers with inefficient, 
protectionist foreign trade policies. Thus, freedoms are curtailed and poorly-
represented consumer interests are lumbered by inefficient politics. WTO law 
aims towards the protection of these rights and should enjoy both priority 
over national law and direct effect in the national legal orders. 
 
Next to a libertarian, substantialist position, some derive the legitimacy of the 
WTO from the protection of a wider catalogue of rights, for instance, 
because WTO law relates its legitimacy to the protection of human rights and 
civil liberties. Thomas Pogge represents this position expressly, but the 
“younger” Petersmann also argues that WTO law must measure itself against 
existing international human rights conventions, and that these should, 
conversely, consider the norms of WTO law.55 The traditional human rights 
should have priority over the right to free trade.56 
                                                 
52 T. Pogge, n. 13 supra. 
53 See n. 30. In his more recent writings, Petersmann advocates, to the contrary, a body of 
human rights law, in which procedural principles, such as the right to democracy, would rank 
higher than the right to free trade. See, for example, E.-U. Petersmann “Multilevel 
Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism”, n. 11 supra; “European and International 
Constitutional Law: Time for Promoting ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’ in the WTO”, in: G. de 
Búrca & J. Scott, (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues, (Oxford: Hart, 
2001), p. 81, at 100 & p. 107 et seq.; “Constitutional Primacy and ‘Indivisibility’ of Human 
Rights in International Law? The Unfinished Human Rights Revolution and the Emerging 
Global Integration Law“, op. cit. n. 34, p. 212. 
54 However, M. Krajewski n. 9, p. 198 et seq., points out that many legislative policies are now 
reviewed in the WTO dispute resolution mechanism and that parliamentary laws do not 
guarantee an absence of protectionism. From this, he concludes that Petersmann is concerned 
not with the strengthening of parliamentary control but with the impeding of protectionism. 
In fact, a constitutional self-restriction does not seem to be the most obvious way to strengthen 
parliamentary control over foreign trade policy, given that it comes into being largely without 
much parliamentary oversight. More conceivable and closer would be a domestic 
augmentation of the role of parliaments, for example, through veto powers or hearings in 
international negotiations and trade policy-making. 
55 It is important to bear in mind that Petersmann also advocates the protection of procedural 
rights to participation in his more recent writings and therefore does not adopt a purely 
substantive position. See n. 34 and n. 36 supra. 
56 E.-U. Petersmann, “European and International Constitutional Law: Time for Promoting 
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The main problem of pure cosmopolitan substantialism, in the way it is 
represented by Pogge, is that different laws can come into collision with one 
another.57 A convincing conception must, therefore, provide a laudable 
catalogue and weighting of these rights.58 However, we claim that this is not 
possible. It might well be possible to bring the various rights into an abstract 
hierarchy but. this will be of no avail in countless real cases. On the one 
hand, the gravity of a right in an individual case depends upon the severity of 
the violation. On might, therefore, state that, in the abstract, human dignity is 
the value most worthy of protection. A proportionally small violation of 
dignity might, however, be justified if the violation occurred in order to 
avoid a weightier violation of another right, for example, the right to life. On 
the other hand, new, practical problems might call the hitherto fore 
acceptable hierarchy into question. 
 
It is also impossible to create a ranking of rights which leads to reasonable 
outcomes when applied to all of the individual cases that actually arise. A 
pragmatic solution would be to leave the ranking as open as possible and to 
make it concrete through political decisions in individual cases. Thus, 
procedural rights to participation can play an important role as a necessary 
supplement to a substantialist conception of justice. 
 
At first sight, the problem of conflicts of rights does not seem to trouble the 
libertarian substantialist position. Nevertheless, it is argued that economic 
freedoms are not intrinsically valuable, nor are they more important than 
other rights: they draw their justification from the realisation of other goods, 
such as well-being and both material and physical security; thus, they are a 
means to an end.59 The extent to which the free trade of goods and services 
actually serves this end remains, nonetheless, debatable. 
  
                                                                                                                   
‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’ in the WTO”, n. 36, p. 81, at 100. 
57 See, also, D. Cass n. 20 supra, p. 153 & p. 157 [with further references], M. Krajewski, n. 9, 
p. 204. 
58 Petersmann’s position seems to oscillate between normative-prescription and a doctrinal 
analysis of the law. Petersmann argues that since all WTO members have agreed to 
international human rights obligations, all the WTO should do is uphold these obligations. 
This reasoning can be seen as empirical. That said, Petersmann also makes normative 
suggestions. If his position is to be understood as mainly prescriptive, Petersmann must make 
his catalogue of human rights plausible over and above the positivist justification. Similarly, see 
the criticism of D. Cass n. 20, p. 152. 
59 P. Alston, “Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A reply 
to Petersmann“, (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law, p. 815, at 828. 
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Exclusively cosmopolitan positions such as cosmopolitan substantialism have 
another empirical problem, in that international law may not provide a 
similar, all-embracing balancing of values to that of national law. It has been 
argued that international law is fragmented into a plethora of different legal 
orders, which have diverse and sometimes incompatible logic, and are the 
expression of an inalterable political pluralism; these orders cannot, therefore, 
be coherently constitutionalised.60 In fact, international law has no mechanism 
to solve the direct collision of norms, and the interpretative canons of lex 
posterior and lex specialis only offer unsatisfactory solutions to this collision. 
Furthermore, international treaties do not bind third parties, so it is always 
possible for objecting states not to be bound by international rules for which 
there are good normative grounds. Current international law is, therefore, 
sometimes at odds with the demanding balancing of human and economic 
rights and with norm diffusion between different treaty-regimes. 
 
Moreover, substantial conceptions of justice often explain who should be the 
bearer of rights, and what institutional consequences this dictates, only in an 
unsatisfactory way.61 In the world trade order, the bearers could all be 
individuals, exporters, consumers, or importers. The bearers of rights must 
then have legal tools at their disposal in order to invoke these rights against 
WTO members as well as against the WTO. If we are concerned with 
universally applicable human rights, all individuals should have the right to 
claim against the WTO. Such a world trade order is, however, a long way 
away from today’s regime. On the one hand, the legal interests of individuals 
cannot be invoked before international courts, and, on the other, in the 
framework of the WTO, there is no functioning procedure to take positive 
measures for the protection of rights.62 
  
                                                 
60 M. Koskenniemi & P. Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law: Postmodern Anxieties”, 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law, p. 553; A. Fischer-Lescano & G. Teubner, 
“Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, (2004) 
25 Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 999. 
61 Krajewski argues that Petersmann’s position protects the rights of importers and exporters 
but not all affected individuals Krajewski, Markus, n. 9, p. 204. Nevertheless, this criticism 
only applies in a qualified manner to the embryonic human rights law, because Petersmann 
argues, that the WTO must strengthen its human rights protection. That said, Petersmann 
develops no thought on how to protect affected individuals so that these people can also make 
claims against the WTO. 
62 Curiously, Petersmann argues that the beginnings of positive integration endanger, rather 
than protect, human rights. E.-U. Petersmann “Constitutional Primacy and ‘Indivisibility’ of 
Human Rights in International Law? The Unfinished Human Rights Revolution and the 
Emerging Global Integration Law”, in: S. Griller, op. cit. n. 34, p.212, at 245 & 259 [with 
further references]. 
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The question of the enforceability of rights points to another problem; 
namely, how to deal with the plurality of the “not free” WTO members. If the 
protection of universally applicable rights in the individual states is the 
deciding factor with regard to the legitimacy of the WTO, the world trade 
order would have to do something about those of its members who 
persistently violate human rights. At the very least, it must be left to the 
WTO members to take all suitable measures to move “not free” members to 
protect human rights within their states. Trade sanctions or exclusion from 
WTO membership might be the measures to take. This would produce the 
result that a great number of the current WTO members would be excluded 
from trade and the WTO would lose its status as a world trade organisation. 
 
Given the WTO’s limited financial resources, and its lack of legislative and 
executive competence, the primacy of the global trade level seems unsuitable 
for the handling of problems of distributive justice; the WTO lacks the 
steering abilities of the nation state. 
 
Moreover, there are other arguments against a cosmopolitan position: there 
are reasons, for instance, in the realm of cultural politics, to leave nation state 
competencies intact, because culture and what is worthy of preservation can 
hardly be regulated internationally. Similarly, the question of what amount of 
press or religious freedom over a certain minimum threshold is normatively 
ideal is a matter for the state. This depends on the political and societal 
background conditions, which are highly variable across diverse cultures. In 
addition, with regard to problems that require local knowledge, for example, 
environmental conditions or social needs, nation states are in a better position 
to find solutions. 
 
c. Divided, procedural constitutionalism 
By democratic constitutionalism, we understand a political order (generally of 
nation states) in which the founding principles of application not only testify 
to fair rules of decision-making, and to the alteration of the existing norms, 
but also to particular substantive “goods”, which are not disposed of through 
popular politics. By political order, we intend an order that generates 
collectively-binding rules for its members and presides over disputes about 
these rules, and has procedures for the enforcement of these rules. Such an 
order is democratic if its important decisions are publicly made and a 
mechanism that effectively and fairly binds its members to them exists. If 
substantial norms (which cannot meaningfully be reduced to rights to 
procedural participation), especially basic freedoms and the assurance of 
minimal material demands are considered on a par, we call the order 
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democratic constitutionalism. The significant contents of a constitution (Rawls) 
comprise both procedural or democratic and substantive principles.63 
In plural societies democratic constitutionalism can overcome an absence of 
ideal procedural and substantive order. Pure democracy cannot exist in 
modern societies, and all practical attempts to achieve such a regulatory ideal 
fail to avoid illegitimate results (the tyranny of the majority), so that a weak 
substantive corrective is thoroughly justifiable. A political order which 
comprises largely substantive principles is either almost empty, or is arbitrary 
with regard to many of the different conceptions of the good (Rawls) of its 
members. How can it be legitimately decided which substantive principles 
should be realised and how these principles should be applied in individual 
cases? 
 
We now come to the global level: against the backdrop of the afore-
mentioned structural problems (Section II.2-3), it would be naïve to want to 
extend these normative principles from the nation state to the supranational 
order. In general, both procedural and substantive principles should be 
normatively less demanding in order to be able to claim normative legitimacy 
beyond merely liberal societies. 
 
The people in nation states constitute a general context of obligation. This is 
not the case at global level, where - at the most - only (weak) natural duties 
exist. Duties arise as consequences of particular interactions (for example, the 
conclusion of a contract and the accompanying binding promises for the 
parties). It is precisely here that the increasing international co-operation 
creates a normative problem: on the one hand, by virtue of their generally 
far-reaching social integration, nation state orders should enjoy a certain 
degree of protection and primacy. On the other hand, it is international 
treaties and interactions which expand the obligatory nature of international 
norms.64  
                                                 
63 This is not a revolutionary idea. It tallies both with the practice of the constitutional law in 
liberal democratic societies, and an important branch of political philosophy (see A. Gutmann 
& D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, (Cambridge MA, London: Belknap Press, 1996); 
“Why Deliberative Democracy?, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), J. Rawls, 
Gerechtigkeit als Fairneß: Ein Neuentwurf, n. 12; for a discussion of different conceptions in the 
frame of the nation state order, see, also, T. Hüller, Deliberative Demokratie: Normen, Probleme 
und Institutionalisierungsformen, (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005). 
64 Thomas Pogge has, in various publications, attempted empirically to demonstrate a global 
context of obligation. We do not follow his reasoning. Nevertheless, his texts impressively 
substantiate that normative demands can no longer stop at the boundaries of states. T. Pogge, 
“Internationale Gerechtigkeit: Ein universalistischer Ansatz”, in: K.G. Ballestrem, (ed), 
Internationale Gerechtigkeit, (Leverkusen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), T. Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, (London: Polity Press, 2002). 
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The world trade order is one of the central generators of obligations. 
Through the trade relationships, a series of intended and unintended effects 
are produced, which, in turn, create further reciprocal obligations. They 
produce, first, the necessity for shared (global) social regulation and, 
therewith, generally recognised political and juridical decision-making 
processes.65 
 
With the procedural question in view, normative conceptions face a 
complicated problem: it is hardly gainsaid, that at the very least some relevant 
political questions should no longer be decided within the national 
democratic process. The alternative conception of a global or cosmopolitan 
democracy raises normative questions with respect to the generalizability of 
democratic values in all parts of the world and particularly the empirical 
suitability of such an order. It is not only the case that a continuation of 
national democracy and a vision of cosmopolitan democracy are unusable 
normative conceptions, but also a refusal to accept the spreading of a global 
political order, which might also provide a framework for global decisions, is 
unacceptable. 
 
What could one positively say about a supranational political order, about 
which we can neither accept that its normative principles are consistent with 
the afore-mentioned principles, and which cannot plausibly replace the 
nation state order or lay claim to a normative primacy? The first point, which 
is nothing new, points out that we need an order divided between political 
levels. Terms like subsidiarity, complementarity, accommodation or conflict 
of laws in normative conceptions of international justice aim at some sort of 
stratification of this nature. 
 
In practical terms, we advocate not a global democracy, but fair procedures at 
international level, as well as an expansion of democratic practices to the 
foreign policies of democratic states and, in particular, to the quasi-
constitutional acts (for example, the foundation of the WTO, as well as to 
alterations (or non-alterations in the framework of the various rounds of 
negotiation)).  
                                                 
65 These contexts between market opening and non-discrimination and global/supranational 
social regulation are being examined in the project “Trade liberalisation and social regulation 
in transnational constellations” as part of the collaborative research centre on Transformations 
of the State at the University of Bremen. Information about the research programme and 
publications are available at: http://www.staat.uni-
bremen.de/pages/forProjektBeschreibung.php?SPRACHE=de&ID=1 and the website of the 
CRC http://www.state.uni-bremen.de. 
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Even in its basic construction, we are not talking about an ideal 
proceduralism here, which can be realised in the modern world of states. It is 
precisely because this is the case, and, by dint of the fact that no clear, 
binding standards exist in the international order for the working out of many 
political themes, problems and conflicts, that we cannot avoid the binding 
nature of global, substantive norms, as delimited, domestic proceduralism 
would suggest. In particular, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann has, in the last few 
years, shown us the starting points that already exist in the emerging 
international legal order.66 
 
Like the positions discussed above, we are concerned here with the 
representation of a divided, democratic constitutionalism: a normative 
position. Here, the claim made is only that such an order, were it 
implemented, would be a just order, not only in comparison to the existing 
order, but also in comparison to the other normative orders discussed here. 
 
It should not be disputed that we are concerned with a regulative idea. 
Indeed, our suggestion fulfils the feasibility criterion (should implies could), 
but it lacks, like all competing blueprints, the necessary power in the 
international system. This notwithstanding, the various constructions 
discussed here have, first, a “seat” both in the existing rules of international 
law and in the world trade order. Second, an important function of regulative 
ideas is that they provide a type of “compass” for adequate concrete reform 
efforts. Compared with nation state orders of Western societies, the world 
trade order is subject to a notable transformation. Different political options 
and “small steps” can be evaluated (and created) only on the basis of a 
systematic normative conception. 
  
                                                 
66 E.-U. Petersmann, “Multilevel Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism”, n. 11 
supra. 
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4. On the way to a divided, procedural 
constitutionalism? 
As we have shown elsewhere, many traces of a procedural, divided 
constitutionalism, already exist in WTO law.67 These traces show up in both 
procedural principles of application, civil liberties, material assurances and the 
solution to the problems of normative supremacy.68 In particular, with regard 
to the procedures for deciding about quasi-constitutional acts and the 
mutability of the WTO Treaty as well as the substantiation of minimal, 
material demands, we contend that there is a need for improvement.69 
 
In what follows, we discuss only the control of nation state risk regulation, 
which shows that substantial and procedural principles of application and 
forms of divided supremacy can be found in WTO law. Our impression is 
that of a divided, procedural constitutionalism which, to some extent, has 
already crystallised. Very similar mixtures of supremacy and principles of 
application can be found in other social-regulatory areas, where the Appellate 
Body in US v Shrimp in addition to the substantial, environmental principles 
of Article XX(g) GATT, developed procedural principles for the 
participation of the affected exporters and considered solutions in the form of 
multilateral environmental treaties not as mandatory, but as desirable.70 
 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(the SPS Agreement) grants members the right, to pass rules for the 
protection of human, animal and plant life and health, even if these restrict 
trade. The SPS Agreement recognises the right to life as a substantial principle 
and strikes a balance between the conflicting goals of free trade and the 
protection of health. 
 
Nothwithstanding this, national health measures must be justified, and 
measures that are consistent with international standards are deemed to be 
WTO-consistent (an element of cosmopolitan supremacy).71 These 
international standards are based upon a political decision-making process in 
                                                 
67 A. Herwig & T. Hüller, “Zur normativen Legitimität der Welthandelsordnung“, in: M. Hilf 
& T. Niebsch, Perspektiven des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts, (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 2008), p. 
117, at 142-153. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., p. 153-157. 
70 Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 122 & 164-166, Appellate 
Body Report, US – Shrimp (21.5), WT/DS58/AB/RW, paras. 123-134. 
71 SPS Agreement, Articles 3.1, 3.2 & 3.3. 
250                                                                             Herwig and Hüller
 
which non-scientific criteria can be considered.72 In a departure from 
international standards, the WTO members can determine higher levels of 
protection if they base this upon a risk assessment,73 or if they can establish 
that the available information is not sufficient for a risk assessment.74 With 
regard to the question of what scientific knowledge their measures are based 
upon, the WTO members enjoy a wide area of discretion (domestic 
primacy).75 
 
In the SPS Agreement, science is used in the sense of an obligation to public 
justification, in order to make any health measures comprehensible for the 
affected exporting countries, whilst recognising that there is a plurality of 
scientific studies upon which measures can be based.. The scientific 
justification represents a multilateral basic consensus, which can be generated 
independently of the comprehensive – and unrealistic – participation of the 
affected exporters in national decision-making procedures. Put differently, the 
duty of scientific justification opens up the national political decision-making 
process to the demands of the affected exporters. To this extent, we can speak 
of a simulated multilateralism through scientific inquiry (a procedural 
function of science). A decision will, through the consideration of scientific 
knowledge, also be based upon a sound empirical basis, and is therefore, 
better suited to produce reasonable political decisions than a decision based 
upon false empirical assumptions. 
 
The SPS Agreement also takes the fact that the determination of levels of 
protection touches normative questions and evaluations, which are disputed 
between the relevant states, into account. Decisions about the legitimacy of 
corresponding national rules cannot be determined by scientific expertise, 
and, consequently, member states are free to decide how much risk they wish 
to tolerate (national supremacy). Nevertheless, they must take the goals of 
free trade into account. The effects of the measure on trade may not be 
greater than what is necessary to achieve the appropriate goal and the decision 
on levels of protection may not be arbitrary or unjustifiably depart from those 
                                                 
72 As to the Codex Alimentarius Commission, see T. Hüller and M.L. Maier, “Fixing the 
Codex? Global Food-Safety Governance Under Review”, in: Ch. Joerges & E.-U. 
Petersmann, n. 11, p. 267; A. Herwig, “Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods 
Derived from Biotechnology and their Legitimacy”, in: Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand & G. Teubner, 
n. 11, p. 199. 
73 SPS Agreement, Articles 2.2, 5.1. 
74 SPS Agreement, Articles 2.2, 5.7. 
75 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, paras. 194, 104, 172-173 & 177. 
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in similar situations if discrimination or obstacles to trade result (consistency 
of level of protection mentioned as a goal in Article 5.5).76 
 
Using these two yardsticks, the SPS Agreement can check whether the given 
normative grounds for choices in individual cases are taken in earnest and in 
good faith. Where normatively similar situations are handled in a dissimilar 
manner, this could mean that the justification is merely fictional. Through the 
procedural mandate of consistency in Article 5.5, the SPS Agreement can 
protect national autonomy and diversity, rationalise national decision-making 
processes and establish trade free of discrimination,77 because members must 
justify the different treatment of like cases. Thus, the SPS Agreement 
discourages national governments from taking measures on grounds of ill-
conceived views, populism or individual interests. The existing WTO law 
“repays” a deliberative extension of nation state democracy and hinders 
populist, or particularist protectionism. 
 
A general conclusion can be drawn that the substantial principles of 
application in WTO law can be recognised when good grounds are given. 
Multilateral solutions have a special justificatory gravity when it comes to the 
every-day politics of nation state social regulation. The preference towards 
international treatment of particular social regulatory problems often seems 
sensible both in view of the achievement of effective protection and in view 
of the goal of non-discriminatory trade. In terms of transnational protection 
requirements, individual national measures are not terribly effective, and the 
special position of international standards in the SPS Agreement can thereby 
be understood as a requirement of rationality in finding workable health 
protection. 
 
Nevertheless, the members remain free to take certain measures in their 
regulation of social activity if, in their view, multilateral regulations are not 
effective. This is plausible, since the necessary processes of balancing 
substantive goals are more likely to be achieved on the domestic level than on 
the international one. In the case of national measures, further cosmopolitan 
                                                 
76 SPS Agreement, Article 5.4, 5.5, 5.6,. It remains unclear whether Article 5.5 relates to a duty 
to set up similar levels of protection or a duty of consistent justification. A. Herwig “The 
Precautionary Principle in Support of Practical Reason: An Argument against Formalistic 
Interpretations of the Precautionary Principle”, in: Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann, n. 11 
supra, p. 301, at 219-323. The consistency of levels of protection has been tested by the 
Appellate Body in the framework of the necessity test pursuant to Article XX(d). See Appellate 
Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, paras. 170-172. 
77 Similarly, R. Howse & K. Nicolaïdis, n. 30, p. 87. 
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procedural principles of application are appropriate (the duty to provide 
reasons, of transparency, and legal protection as well as the control of 
consistency), which help generate reasonable results, open up decision-
making processes for the interests of the affected exporting countries, and 
cause members to consider the goals of free trade, without predetermining 
the domestic decision (national supremacy). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The world trade order should be ordered after the fashion of a divided, 
democratic constitutionalism. Only when both the procedural standards of 
law-making, such as publicity and the duty to give reasons, are guaranteed, 
and fundamental substantial requirements (the basic freedoms, the securing of 
basic material needs) are reliably considered, can the international order rely 
on justified acquiescence. This democratic constitutionalism is divided in 
many respects. First, we should expect different, possibly complementary, 
normative orders stretched over the various political levels. And, also in 
“segmented” differentiation, legitimate procedural and substantive standards 
between states can deviate from one another. With regard to the procedural 
standards, this means two things: liberal democracies may not give up their 
domestic standards of legitimation in international negotiations and 
agreements, without there being a need to elevate (as in many philosophical 
treatises) western-style democracy to a universal standard. Instead, the 
international political processes should have sufficient standards of fairness. 
 
Does it make a difference whether we, to stay on this point, suggest a fairness 
or democratic yardstick? It does. Today, the opportunities for civil society to 
participate are celebrated for their democratising effect on the global level, 
independently of whether this praise is deserved or not. In free countries, the 
appropriate organisations can come about more easily and numerously. 
Consequently, we can anticipate that, in the relevant fora, the organisations 
from the democratic countries will have a perceptible advantage and the 
demands from the various national societies will not, therefore, be equally 
represented. In this precise context, a fairness principle would be appropriate. 
 
We have not concentrated on the normative suggestion in the sense of trying 
to secure a consistent, philosophical justification; instead, we have tried to 
base it upon certain practical considerations: a divided, democratic 
constitutionalism would be in a position to resolve some of the structural 
problems of the international order more satisfactorily (see Section II) than 
competing blueprints (see Section III). 
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Finally, we have demonstrated with examples that the conception of a 
divided procedural constitutionalism is already anchored in world trade law 
(Section IV). This is not to say that deep reaching reforms are not needed. 
The processes for the setting of quasi-constitutional rules need an overhaul, 
so that the members of democratic states can associate the international 
agreement on binding-standards with the conception of democratic law-
making. 
 
Chapter  10 
From Utopia to Apology – The Return to Inter-
state Justice in Normative IR Scholarship: 
Comments on Neyer and Herwig & Hüller  
 
Jens Steffek 




In the normative, or normatively inspired, literature on international relations 
and global governance, there seems to be an attempt underway at reframing 
the problématique. For many years, political scientists, philosophers and lawyers 
have all, in a similar way, been in the business of describing, debating, and, at 
times, denying the “democratic deficit” of international institutions. What we 
can observe now is a turn away from the democratic deficit as the key 
problématique of international governance, and towards a deficit in justice. 
Clearly, the reason for this semantic shift can hardly be that the democratic 
deficit has been resolved in the meantime. Instead, there seems to be a sense 
of frustration at the prospect that it never will be. This is particularly true for 
scholars who strive to ground their theoretical reflections in empirical data, or 
who aspire to deliver “realistic” advice for policy-makers. Both the papers 
under consideration here clearly belong to this category of scholarship. As 
Neyer states in his paper, “normative requirements must be practically 
feasible in order to become politically relevant”. In such a perspective, 
democratising world politics is, of course, a very demanding and utopian 
enterprise. 
 
For love of realism and feasibility, the two papers seek to go beyond the 
established debate over the democratic deficit and to advocate a turn to 
justice, instead. While Neyer is quite radical in his conceptual move away 
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from democracy, Herwig and Hüller propose a significant extension of the 
established focus on democracy, in order to embed it into a wider conception 
of transnational justice. Thus, both papers strive to open up new avenues for 
normative research on international governance. This is a very welcome 
addition to the literature, and is also a timely enterprise. At the same time, I 
feel a certain sense of puzzlement regarding the semantic shift to justice, 
which also inspired this critical commentary. To explain this sense of 
puzzlement a little detour into political theory is necessary. 
 
In normative political theory, theories of justice and theories of democracy 
form two distinct bodies of literature. The two issues are clearly related, but it 
is not always apparent exactly how. “Most theories of justice implicitly seem 
to suppose that some kind of democracy is the preferred political form, but 
for reasons that are usually not fully worked out.”1 Theories of justice are 
usually broader in scope than theories of democracy, and justice is usually 
thought to be the supreme value, in the sense that democracy is instrumental 
in realising justice, but not vice versa. Democracy provides procedures for 
collective decision-making in a society, and thus realises the principle of 
equality. It is evident that not all theories of justice need to be concerned 
with questions of collective decision-making. In particular, theories of 
distributive or economic justice might not be required to address them. 
However, to the extent that questions of collective decision-making and law-
making are at issue in any theory of justice, we cannot escape the discourse 
on institutional design that would normally lead scholars to promote a model 
of democratic self-governance. Even strenuous supporters of the primacy of 
justice, such as Philippe Van Parijs, argue that there is no real alternative to 
global democracy: “If barbarism and chaos are to be avoided, this can only be 
through the establishment, no doubt laborious and meandering, of true 
democratic institutions beyond the national level.”2 In other words, the 
empirical difficulties and failures of democracy are not an argument for 
abandoning the democratic ideal. 
 
                                                
1 K. Dowding, R.E. Goodin & C. Pateman: “Introduction: Between Justice and 
Democracy”, in: K. Dowding, R.E. Goodin & C. Pateman (eds): Justice and 
Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 
5. 
2 P. Van Parijs: “Justice and Democracy: Are they Incompatible?” (1996) 4 Journal of 
Political Philosophy, pp. 101-117, at 117. 
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2. Neyer 
For Neyer, the main reason to abolish the idea of global democracy does not 
seem to be a conceptual primacy of justice, but his rejection of the 
cosmopolitan utopia. Let us scrutinise his argument in more detail. First of all, 
Neyer debunks the idea that international politics can ever be democratised. 
To him, the very idea of transnational democracy is a “category mistake”, 
i.e., the transfer of a term or concept into an inappropriate context. In order 
to explain why the international context is inappropriate for considerations of 
democracy, Neyer refers to the well-known “no demos”-thesis: international 
organizations cannot be democratised because there is no transnational demos. 
However, Neyer argues that, notwithstanding this, international organisations 
can, and, indeed, should, be studied from the perspective of normative 
concepts, and his candidate is justice. Interestingly, while the discussion of 
justice in Neyer’s paper places emphasis squarely on questions of collective 
self-governance, decision-making, law-making and law-enforcement, he 
nonetheless avoids immediate reference to democracy. Thus, my suspicion is 
that his turn to justice is not much more than a new rhetoric in which the 
same old issues of democratic theory are couched: fair procedures of 
governance, (in)equality of influence, safeguards against abuses of power, etc. 
 
Beyond such questions of terminology, I also have some critical remarks 
regarding the structure of the normative argument that Neyer presents. His 
starting point is an approach developed by Rainer Forst, according to which 
our conception of justice should be based upon the basic right to justification. 
From position, Forst develops a model of deliberative democracy (sic!) that 
suggests a procedure through which a catalogue of rights is determined and 
political institutions established. To be clear, the right to justification is an 
individual right, upon which a democratic polity is founded. Neyer deviates 
from this conception in two important ways. First, in using the right to 
justification for a normative defence of international adjudication and 
deliberative supranationalism he transposes it into an intergovernmental arena. 
This move needs, at the very least, careful explanation. Why would states, or 
governments, have a right to justification? There might be a sound way of 
arguing this, but such an argument would need to be developed step by step, 
and the problem of non-democratic states would probably need to be 
discussed in the global context. 
 
Secondly, in his defence of supranationalism, Neyer separates deliberation 
from democracy. As democracy remains reserved to the domain of the 
national level where the demos reigns, deliberation has to go transnational on 
its own. However, in the supranational arena, the deliberators, who in 
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deliberative democracy usually are supposed to be citizens, become 
professional diplomats and lawyers. And deliberation, originally conceived as 
an unconstrained exchange of arguments among citizens, which operates 
under the condition that all initial beliefs and preferences are put to the test, 
turns into legal reasoning, which is, instead, a way of pursuing one’s own 
interest within the argumentative constraints posed by the law. Again, a 
consistent defence of deliberative supranationalism in the framework of a 
theory of transnational justice might be possible, but it needs to be both 
careful and explicit. In summary, it seems that Neyer’s paper suffers from 
conceptual overload, with argumentative pillars that are not able to sustain 
the heavy weight of all the expectations raised by the eye-catching appeal to 
justice. What would be lost if this paper just suggested national democracy 
plus the legalisation of international relations? 
 
3. Herwig & Hüller 
Herwig and Hüller also propose justice instead of democracy as a core 
category of normative analysis of international relations. The desire for 
“realism” is an equally strong motivating force here, which may even be 
stronger than in Neyer’s piece. Not only should the envisaged order for the 
world trade regime be normatively coherent and just, it should also be better-
suited to resolve the world trade regime’s existing empirical problems than 
rival approaches. One of the most interesting aspects of this chapter is that it 
takes issue with the world trade order as a whole, and not with a single 
institution of governance, such as the WTO. This is, indeed, an aspect which 
the calls for the democratising of the WTO have, to date, often neglected. 
Before we ask what specific procedures of decision-making should be applied 
in the WTO, we critically need to take issue with the enterprise of trade 
liberalisation and regulation as a whole. Herwig and Hüller do this by 
resorting to a game-theoretical argument. The underlying assumption is that 
the liberalisation of world trade would benefit all participants because of the 
aggregate gains in welfare. Individual parties, however, face an incentive to 
defect from collective agreements to liberalise and will therefore resort to 
opportunistic protectionism. Thus, the structure of the situation resembles a 
prisoners’ dilemma, which can be overcome by the foundation of the WTO 
as an institution that guarantees compliance with free trade agreements. 
Hence, the thrust of this argument for the liberalising of the world trade 
regime is a mixture of Ricardo’s praise of free trade and some sort of 
Hobbesian scepticism about the prospects of co-operation under anarchy. 
 
This particular justification of a global trade order has certain limiting 
implications. First of all, the argument that free trade will benefit all countries 
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needs at least some critical reflection and probably qualification, in which 
credit is given to non-orthodox economists who have analysed its effects on 
underdeveloped countries (such as Dani Rodrik). Second, Herwig and Hüller 
do not consider any alternative to centralised public rule-making and global 
multilateralism. One could, however, think of alternative conceptions of a 
trade order, based upon bilateral treaties or even purely private governance 
arrangements. These private alternatives, in particular, would deserve serious 
consideration, because the state, or public power, is as much a part of the 
problem as it is a part of the solution. In my view, a general philosophical 
defence of a state-based, multilateral, coercive system of trade governance 
needs to take such alternatives seriously. In other words, I am not quite 
happy with the unquestioned Ricardian cum Hobbesian framing of this 
discussion, which inevitably leads the authors to argue for a global minimum 
Leviathan as a way to overcome collective action problems among states. 
 
The core normative problem that the authors discuss in the remainder of the 
chapter closely follows from this framing of what the “point” of having a 
global trade order actually is. They are centrally concerned with the division 
of labour between the global minimum Leviathan (WTO) and the local 
maximum Leviathan (the state), which continues to pursue its own visions of 
the good life. As there might be conflict between the two, we need a 
normatively sound strategy to resolve it. There are, as far as I can see, only 
two pure strategies. We could either resolve all problems of collision globally, 
thus strengthening the global minimum Leviathan at the expense of state 
autonomy, or we could give precedence to the state and shelter its autonomy 
against intrusion from the global level. But this, quite clearly, would bring us 
back to the problem of compliance which the authors set out to resolve in 
the first place. To avoid such pitfalls, the authors advocate a mixed strategy 
for dealing with the collision problem, which they call “divided procedural 
constitutionalism”. 
 
The suggested political order is supposed to generate collectively binding 
rules for its members (which are states), settle disputes over these rules 
(among states), and enforce these rules (against defecting states). Such an 
order qualifies as democratic, “if its important decisions are publicly made and 
a mechanism obtains that effectively and fairly binds its members to them” (p. 
276). Thus, democracy returns, but in a version that has very little to do with 
a textbook understanding of the concept, which, in some way or the other, 
always relates back to Lincoln’s famous phrase that democracy is the 
government of the people, by the people, for the people. What Herwig and 
Hüller are talking about here are global institutional arrangements for 
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something which might, in a sympathetic reading, be called inter-state 
democracy: government of states, by states, for states. 
 
4. Conclusion 
There is a lot of common ground between the two contributions. Both of 
them call for some form of inter-state proceduralism as an alternative to 
democratising world politics in a cosmopolitan direction. By bringing the 
state back in so prominently, they relegate the individual as the bearer of 
rights and the subject of political rule to the second rank. This is somewhat 
ironic, in that the move to citizens in discourses about the legitimacy of 
international governance, which has marked recent decades,3 now seems to 
be reversed by advancing conceptions of inter-state justice and inter-state 
democracy. The feasibility argument seems to be the driving force behind this 
roll-back. In order to remove the utopian element that comes with 
cosmopolitan conceptions of justice and/or democracy, the authors 
emphatically re-affirm the legitimacy of intergovernmental politics, including 
(nolens volens) the foreign policies of authoritarian and illiberal regimes. I 
certainly sympathize with inter- and supranational law as a “gentle civilizer of 
nations” and with the idea of preventing abuses of power in world politics 
through appropriate institutional engineering. As a normative vision, 
however, I find the proposed conceptions of inter-national justice and inter-
state democracy deeply apologetic and, indeed, troubling. 
 
                                                
3 For an overview of this development, see J. Steffek: “Legitimacy in International 
Relations: from State Compliance to Citizen Consensus”, in: A. Hurrelmann, S. 
Schneider & J. Steffek (eds): Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 175-192. 
 
The inter-disciplinary workshop ‘Transnational Standards of Social Protection: 
Contrasting European and International Governance’ was jointly organised 
by RECON Work Package 9 and the Collaborative Research Centre 597 on 
‘Transformations of the State’ at the University of Bremen.
The Report presents the proceedings of the cooperational work, which illuminates 
the intertwinements of European regulatory policies and global governence 
arrangements. By pinning down the exact nature of the interaction between 
these two levels, the EU’s dilemma becomes obvious: On the one hand, stronger 
global governence can be a chance, through which the EU can clarify its own 
raison d’être of increased integration to the wider world. On the other hand, 
the design of the European project is being challenged by more assertive global 
structures. This is especially the case in relation to the WTO regime, which is 
constraining the decisional autonomy of the EU, regarding the appropriateness 
of its content and its external effects. Thus, the regulation of services in the EU 
and the WTO are discussed in the first section of this report. Section two focuses 
on labour standards, which are analysed from different angles in order to clarify 
the functions of the WTO and the ILO, multinational companies as well as other 
private actors within this specific field. The final section deals with the legitimacy 
problematic of transnational governance.
* * * * *
Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON) is an Integrated Project 
supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme for 
Research. The project has 21 partners in 13 European countries and New 
Zealand and is coordinated by ARENA – Centre for European Studies at the 
University of Oslo.  RECON runs for five years (2007-2011) and focuses on the 
conditions for democracy in the multilevel constellation that makes up the EU.
